University of New Hampshire

University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository
Doctoral Dissertations

Student Scholarship

Spring 2010

An initial evaluation of market-based land reform in Brazil: Can it
create sustainable communities?
Arthur Powers
University of New Hampshire, Durham

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation

Recommended Citation
Powers, Arthur, "An initial evaluation of market-based land reform in Brazil: Can it create sustainable
communities?" (2010). Doctoral Dissertations. 604.
https://scholars.unh.edu/dissertation/604

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Scholarship at University of New
Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. For more information, please contact
Scholarly.Communication@unh.edu.

AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM IN BRAZIL:
CAN IT CREATE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES?

BY
ARTHUR POWERS
Bachelor of Arts, Shimer College, 1967
Juris Doctor, Harvard Law School, 1975

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the University of New Hampshire
In Partial Fulfillment of
The Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
In
Natural Resources and Environmental Studies
May, 2010

Copyright 2010 Arthur Powers

UMI Number: 3470113

All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.

UMI'
Dissertation Publishing

UMI 3470113
Copyright 2010 by ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

uest
A

ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346

®

This dissertation has been examined and approved.

Dissertation Director, Mimi L. Becker, Ph.D., Associate
Professor of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy

Robert T. Eckert, Professor of Natural Resources and
Environmental Conservation
Is- /

/

I t\

a.

Theodore E. Howard, Ph.D., Professor of Forestry
Economics

Marc W. Herold, Associate Professor of Economic
Development and Women's Studies

Andrew B. Conroy, Professor of Applied

Date

^J

1 Science

/?•

DEDICATION

In Memory Of
Nequinha, Orlando, and Ze Alegre
companions in
the struggle for land
Tocantins - 1985-92

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the settlers in the seven communities we studied in Bahia, who opened
their homes to us and shared with us their thoughts and feelings. Also the technical
advisors who so ably support those settlements and who provided us with valuable
insights and information: Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu, Sergio Ricardo Matos
Almeida, Edna Moreira de Brito Batista, Jose Eduardo Rocha Reis, and Rafael and the
team at CELANOR.
I also deeply thank the following people:
Berta Veloso de Passos and Antonio Fernando da Silva, who provided us with valuable
guidance and feedback.
Daniel Carvalho, former Director of CARITAS Bahia and the son of a small farmer in the
Bahia semi-arid region, who aided us in our field research, providing much insight and
wisdom.
Brenda King-Powers; my wife and partner in research, whose years of experience
working with Brazilian farmers and women's groups helped me to see many things I
might otherwise have missed, and whose moral support made this project possible.
Dr. Mimi Becker, my advisor, who untiringly encouraged and oriented me, and whose
patience was admirable.

iv

PREFACE
This dissertation is the fruit of forty years experience.
In 1969, following my first year of law school, I joined the Peace Corps and was
sent to the state of Espirito Santo, Brazil. After training as a community organizer, I was
assigned to a rural electrification cooperative, where I worked for nearly two years.
Espirito Santo in the late 1960s was classed as the second poorest state in Brazil.
Yet it did not have the wide-spread miserable poverty1 that one saw in other, supposedly
richer states. The answer to this apparent contradiction, I came to realize, was that
Espirito Santo was a state of small farmers. The people, while having less per capita
money income than in most other Brazilian states, had land, food, work, family, and
dignity, and the wealth of these things was more evenly distributed than was generally
the case in Brazil.2 I learned a lesson and filed it away for future reference.
In 1978 I returned to Brazil as a lawyer for a large international law firm, working
in Rio de Janeiro and representing multinational companies. The experience was, for me,
a radicalizing one. As a Peace Corps Volunteer I had seen poverty but had accepted it

'That which Brazilians refer to as miseria.
2

This kind of wealth formed the basis for further development: the sons and daughters of many of these
farmers went on to become teachers, accountants, and university graduates. Sadly, however, large scale
development funded by outside forces, which has turned Espirito Santo today into one of the wealthier per
capita Brazilian states, also brought the problems of inequality and miseria. By the end of the century,
Vitoria, the formerly quiet capital of the state, had the highest murder rate in Brazil.
v
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more or less as the people themselves did ~ as an unfortunate reality.

As a lawyer in

Rio de Janeiro I realized that poverty did not just happen but was the result of ~ or, at
least, was aggravated by — a legal and economic system that largely worked to the
advantage of the rich.4
This realization was particularly brought home to me by an assignment I had in
1980.

A large Canadian company had taken advantage of the government FISET

program5 to invest in reforestation projects. As was the case with most multinationals,
the company did not run the reforestation projects itself but invested the money through
independent reforestation enterprises established to capture such funds. The Canadian
company had heard reports that one of the enterprises receiving its funds was engaging in
ft

7

grilagem and the Canadians were genuinely concerned.

A Canadian lawyer and I were

sent to Santa Catarina to investigate.

3

Many of the people, indeed, went further, accepting poverty fatalistically as a vontade de Deus - the will
of God. It was in part to change this vision of "the will of God" that the Church became so actively
involved in promoting base community groups which helped the poor analyze the socioeconomic causes of
poverty, engage in self-help projects, and view God as a God of justice rather than accept fatalism. This
was the practical side of the "Theology of Liberation." I have long contended that the translation of this
theological approach - Teologia de Liberagao - as "Liberation Theology" was unfortunate — the term
"liberation" in American English had come to be identified with Communist movements. "A Theology of
Freedom" would have been a more accurate translation.
4

This is not to deny that there were and are validly populist elements within the Brazilian legal system. The
labor courts, for instance, generally favor the rights of workers over employers. The OAB - the official
Brazilian Bar Association - has been a strong advocate of human rights, as are many judges and members
of the Ministerio Publico (the prosecutors in the Justice Department). Brazil is a complex and multifaceted country. However all of these populist forces are aware that they are working within a system that
generally favors the ruling classes. It is still too early to judge the long term impact of the Workers' Party
(PT) and the Lula government.
s

The program, which allowed companies to use funds that would otherwise be paid for taxes to invest in
reforestation, is discussed in more detail in Chapter III.
6

The illegal or unethical seizing of land.

?

Although there is a great deal of valid debate about the role of multinationals, it has been my experience
that multinationals (I have worked principally with American, Canadian, and British ones) are honest in
vi

We found no evidence that grilagem had occurred. In retrospect, I realize that we
were very naive; to this day I do not know whether or not we were hoodwinked by the
local company. However, even though we found no evidence of illegality, the process I
saw in practice forced me to think about the negative effects of government policy. As I
later wrote:
Brazilian ecologists were concerned about deforestation, so the government
instituted a program under which companies received a tax break for investing in
reforestation.

The companies bought rural land from subsistence farmers;

assuming the companies paid market value for the land, or at least the price the
farmer asked (to a subsistence farmer who has never had to pay for food or rent,
$1000 seems like a fortune), the farmer received enough to support his family for
a few months in the city. After that, the former farmer, without trade skills and in
an overburdened job market, ended up unemployed in the slums. Meanwhile, his
land, which formerly produced food for his extended family and a little extra for
the local market, was taken out of food production and food shortages began to
increase...

Finally, the company planted trees, but varieties which it could

harvest most quickly, such as Pinus Eliotis, which ruin the soil. Thus in place of
one problem - deforestation - several were created:

family displacement,

unemployment, urban slum growth, food shortages, soil denutrition (Powers
1987b, 288-289).

their dealings, treat their Brazilian employees fairly, and are scrupulous about obeying Brazilian law.
Indeed, one of the points that radicalized me was that it was the structure of law itself — and not
disobedience of the law — that helped the rich to get richer, the poor to get poorer.
vii

It was also around this time that I became deeply interested in the response of the
Catholic Church to the Brazilian agrarian question.

In 1980, the Brazilian Catholic

Bishops published "The Church and Land Problems."

This document, which was

adopted by a nearly unanimous vote of the bishops at their annual assembly, took a strong
stand in favor of land reform.8 I was impressed by the logic and strength of the bishops'
stand.
In 1985 my wife and I, with our two daughters, went to work for the Franciscan
Friars in the northern part of the state of Goias, a region which in 1989 was formed into
the new state of Tocantins. We worked with the Catholic Church in Tocantins for seven
years. In addition to pastoral duties, we helped to organize base ecclesial community
groups (CEBs)9, rural workers unions10, and groups of small farmers who were struggling
to stay on their land. Our work involved not only legal rights, but helping to organize
small scale production and looking toward rural development in general.
Tocantins is a frontier area in the southeastern corner of legal Amazonia, an area
primarily of savanna land of limited fertility. In the 1980s it was a region of violent land
conflicts (as it continues to be, to some extent, today).

The 1986 murder of Father

Josimo Tavares, a priest actively involved in promoting land reform, was only the most

8

Igreja e Problemas da Terra, Document approved by the 18th Assembly of the CNBB, 2/14/80

9

In CEBs neighbors gather to pray, read scripture, and discuss the issues touching their lives in light of
gospel, seeking to understand the socio-economic and political factors which affect them and to find viable
means of resolving common problems. The movement started in Espirito Santo in the early 1960s and
spread throughout Brazil, having the greatest impact in rural areas and urban slums.
10

The Sindicatos do Trabalhador Rural; their membership includes not only salaried workers and day
laborers (boia-frios), but also small landowners, share croppers, and posseiros.
viii

visible of many acts of repression by landowners and speculators.

In Tocantins we

witnessed grilagem on virtually a daily basis.11
As a member of the Church's statewide land commission (CPT), I was able to
examine not only the conflicts that our team was directly involved in but those
throughout the state and in neighboring states.12 We soon discovered that, in areas where
small farmers won their battle to get or retain land, they needed support in learning how
to make the land more productive.

Through working with small scale production,

appropriate technologies, and organization of family and community based agro-industry,
we became increasingly involved in what would now be called sustainable agriculture
(although the term "sustainable" was not widely used at the time).
My experience with sustainable rural development increased when, in 1992, I
became director of Catholic Relief Service's program in the drought-ridden Brazilian
Northeast.

The key elements of CRS's program were legal rights for small farmers

(principally through the CPT13) and projects to help subsistence farmers in the semi-arid

11

In our region, grilagem followed a fairly standard procedure. Agents of interests trying to seize the land
would arrive with pieces of paper they claimed to be titles, would show these to the posseiros, telling them
that the posseiros were invaders without any right on the land. They would then offer an "indemnification"
if the posseiro would sign a waiver of his rights and leave peacefully, saying that, if this were turned down,
the posseiro would receive nothing. Many would succumb to this. Pressure on those who remained would
then escalate with police threats, court orders, burning of crops and houses, and killing of one or two key
leaders; by that time, most posseiros, even if they knew their rights, abandoned the area.
12

Due to geographical affinities and eclessial politics, our state commission included not only Tocantins
but the Prelacy of Sao Felix do Araguaia in Mato Grosso (whose bishop, Dom Pedro Cassidaglia, was
highly respected throughout Brazil for his strong positions on social justice) and the Diocese of Conceiao
do Araguaia in the state of Para (whose bishop, Dom Patricio Hanrahan, courageously supported land
reform efforts despite frequent death threats). Para was, and continues to be, the single most violent region
of land conflicts in Brazil. It was there that Sister Dorothy Stang was murdered in 2005.
I3

CRS provided support to CPT Regional Northeast I (Pernambuco, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, and
Alagoas) and, to a lesser extent, CPT Regional Northeast III (Bahia and Sergipe). We also worked with
three diocesan CPT groups (Cajazeiras and Campina Grande in Paraiba and Mossouro in Rio Grande do
Norte) and with CETRA, an organization in Ceara formed by Catholic lay people to support agrarian
ix

zones better catch, store, and use water.14 Shortly thereafter my wife became director of
GARD Brasil, an NGO working with rural cooperatives, community-based cashew nut
processing, and rural women's groups. Together, and in conjunction with such groups as
the World Food Program, Oxfam, and a number of the best Brazilian NGOs, we became
actively involved in working toward sustainable rural development in the semi-arid
Northeast (see, e.g., Jordao; Forum Nordeste).
The situation in the Northeast was different from Tocantins. The region is one of
the oldest in Brazil, and the rural population is dense. Repression of rights of small
landowners and farm workers tended to be (with some exceptions, such as the state of
Alagoas) subtler and more sophisticated than the gunmen used in the Amazon region.
The presence of large irrigation and development projects pressured small farmers
economically, pushing them onto marginal lands. The richest lands near the coast have
been held as large sugar plantations since the 16th century.
This is the experience I brought to my doctoral studies. Research during those
studies allowed me to more fully place my experience within the context of a larger
Brazilian legal, cultural, economic, and political structure. The research has not been
easy - the materials, though voluminous, are often hard to come by, and vary widely in
quality. However, preparation of this dissertation is one step in an ongoing process and,
while far from definitive, has enabled me to gain insights and confirm or question
conclusions originally drawn on the basis of my experience.
reform. We made a number of small grants to other groups working for rural legal rights, including a small
seed loan to the Movimento dos Sem Terra (MST), which was then relatively new to the Northeast (having
been founded in the South of Brazil).
l4

We had water projects with MOC in Feira da Santana, Bahia; CAATINGA in Ouricuri, Pernambuco;
PATAC in Campina Grande, Paraiba; the Institute of Human Ecology in Recife, and Caritas Ceara.
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ABSTRACT

AN INITIAL EVALUATION OF MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM IN BRAZIL:
CAN IT CREATE SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES?
by
Arthur Powers
University of New Hampshire, May, 2010

Land reform is a burning issue in Brazil. Redistribution of land through government
expropriation has proven to be difficult and expensive as unwilling landowners can hold
up the process for years, or defeat it, in the courts. In 1997, the World Bank, at the
request of the Brazilian Government, approved Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation
Pilot Project 4147-BR - known in Brazil as the Cedula da Terra. This program instituted
a market based approach to land reform through which eligible agricultural workers could
form associations and obtain subsidized financing to purchase land from willing sellers.
As there was no previous work that comprehensively brought together the historical and
legal roots of land in Brazil from a land reform perspective, this study initially sets out
that history. It then asks the question: Is market-based land reform potentially an
effective instrument to redistribute land to working farmers in a socially,
environmentally, and economically sustainable manner? In order to answer that question,
case study research was carried out in seven Cedula da Terra land reform settlements in
northern Bahia. Sustainability was defined as land reform settlements being socially,
economically, and environmentally viable for a minimum one generation. Data from the
case studies was analyzed and placed in the larger context of Brazilian land reform
history. The primary finding is that viable settlements can be developed through marketbased land reform where sufficient support is provided. Additional recommendations are
provided as to factors that tend to increase the success of such settlements.

xxii

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH

Introduction
Land reform is a burning issue in Brazil.

Hardly a week goes by without a

significant land reform story appearing in newspapers and on television. It is discussed
by political parties during elections, by social and developmental organizations, by the
public at large.
It is an even more pressing issue to the large number of landless farmers, to the
multitude of farmers with too little land (minifundistas), to young adult children of small
farmers who would themselves like to have land, and even to a certain sector of the urban
poor who envision returning to the land. And it is perceived as a threat by some large
and medium-sized landholders, and even by some small landholders who fear it may
touch their own land holdings.
Discussion of land reform in Brazil can be traced back to the 18th Century. The
issue became more vital as population grew and frontier lands diminished, reaching a
peak in the 1950s and 1960s. The Estatuto da Terra, a good land reform law, was
enacted in 1964.
But despite the ongoing discussion, a good law, and repeated favorable
declarations on the part of academics and politicians, actual land reform in Brazil has

1

been disappointing.

Up until the 1990s, political, social, economic, and legal (and

illegal!) factors had combined in such a way as to keep land reform programs at a
minimal - almost token - level. The number of families settled on the land was minute in
comparison with the number of families needing land, or the number leaving the land due
to economic or other pressures - some of which involved fraud and violence {grilagem).
Expropriating land - except where the landowner wished it to be expropriated - became
an expensive, extended process that could be stalled for years.
Then, in the mid 1990s, with the support of the World Bank, a new approach was
tried. What came to be called "market-based" land reform (MBLR)15 was experimented
with in the Northeastern State of Ceara and quickly expanded throughout the country.
The essential principal of this approach was that, rather than the government
expropriating land for distribution to landless farmers, the government financed the
purchase of land (from willing sellers) by groups of landless farmers.
The approach almost immediately became controversial. It was viewed by some
as being too closely tied to the capitalist system, as unduly burdening the farmers with
land payments, and/or as an attempt by the Cardoso administration to undermine the
power of the land reform movement - most notably the Movimento Sem Terra (MST).
Some feared that it whittled away the underlying concept of land reform as seeking
justice, undermining the concept that the landless have a right to land, and unduly
rewarding large landholders who sold their land under the program. Others feared that
the associations of landless workers required to be formed by the program would be nonauthentic, paper groups established by politicians in their continuous effort to corral the
15
Borras Jr. (2003, 1) and Wolford (2007, 244) prefer the term "Market-Led Agrarian Reform" (MLAR),
distinguishing it from "State-Led Agrarian Reform" (SLAR); Domingos (2002, 3) prefers "Market-assisted
agrarian reform" and Pereira (2007,1) calls it "'Market-Assisted' Land Reform" (MARL).
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rural vote. Opposition to the program reached such a pitch that, in 2002, a conference
organized by NGOs in Washington D.C. to discuss market-based land reform was
required (in order for key land movements to participate) to change its title from an
International Seminar on World Bank Market-Based Land Reform to an International
Seminar on Negative Impacts of World Bank Market-Based Land Reform. It became
almost de rigueur in center-left circles to be opposed to the World Bank approach.
The objections set forth by opponents of the program, although often politically or
ideologically driven, were not without basis. They will be discussed in more detail in the
last chapter. At the same time, one would occasionally encounter field workers who had
a highly favorable impression of the market-based approach. An essential question thus
arose: Is market-based land reform potentially an effective instrument to redistribute land
to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable manner?
This is the primary research question posed by this study.

Theoretical Context: Policy
Policy may be very roughly divided into stages of planning, implementation, and
evaluation. In this sense, the current study primarily deals with the implementation stage
of market-based land reform. This is useful, but also somewhat artificial.16 Planning,
implementation, and evaluation are deeply interrelated. Increasingly it is recognized that
the three must take place as part of a whole process and not linearly or even, necessarily,
divided by time (e.g., Layzer 2002, 15-16). A series of feedback loops are created: thus
we plan (often in a participatory manner with the target population), begin to implement,

16

Patton & Sawicki (1993, 366) suggest that separating the planning and implementation processes too
greatly can lead to serious dysfunctions in implementation.
3

do initial monitoring/evaluation, modify the plan, implement, monitor/evaluate - as three
aspects of the policy process.

This, at least, is the ideal.

In practice, the need for

governments and donor agencies to approve detailed written projects prior to funding and
implementation, as well as other internal dynamics of governments and donors (discussed
below), can seriously limit the ideal model.
Policy sciences have been compared to trying to change a tire on a moving
vehicle. Unlike laboratory sciences, or natural sciences dealing with a slower pace of
change, policy sciences seek to examine, propose, plan, evaluate in the midst of rapidly
ongoing and changing human society. Furthermore, the policy process itself is likely to indeed, intended to - have an impact on the very movement of the object (society) that it
is examining. The policy scientist is thus required to help study, plan, and implement in a
moving, open-ended, and highly complex situation with many players.

Almost all

planning and implementation will have unexpected spin-offs, both good and bad; poor
17

planning or implementation is likely to have very negative impacts as well.
All of these factors are considerably increased in the 'third world' for several
reasons. Policy has been defined as "a social process of authoritative decision making by
which the members of a community clarify and secure their common interests." (Clark
2002, 6) In the 'third world,' those who are the target population of the policy process
may be less able to fully participate or make themselves heard for a number of reasons:
lack of organization, inexperience in dealing with policy questions, limited ability to
articulate their needs, vast differences between policy makers and target populations in
17

Clark (2002, 33-34), based on Lasswell (1971, 14-33), sets out a useful process for mapping this
complexity, including seven categories: participants, perspectives, situations, base values, strategies,
outcomes, effects.
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terms of education, wealth, world view, power.18 There may be, as in Brazil, a history of
the more powerful and educated planning on behalf of the poor - with a mixture of
motivations, not all of them benign.19 Tremendous inequalities in the society lead to
distortions in implementation, so that policies often unintentionally end up benefiting
those who are better off due to the underlying socio-economic dynamics (it is like trying
to row a boat in a straight line with all the weight on one side of the boat). Finally,
because target populations often live very close to the edge of survival, policy errors can
have a much more serious negative impact on them than might be the case in more
affluent societies.
None of this is intended to denigrate the intelligence, capacity, or resilience of the
'third world' poor - all of which are, in my experience, tremendous. However, the policy
and development games were invented by the formally educated classes, and the poor are
therefore playing in our court. It is not surprising that they do so at some disadvantage.
This is part of the background within which this study is carried out.

Notes on Implementation
Based on work by Laswell (1971, 27-29), Clark (2002, 59-70) presents seven
decision functions of the policy process: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation,
application, appraisal, termination.

Of these, invocation has most to do with the

implementation stage.

18

Regarding rural development, there may also be urban bias: "...most [development planners] have only a
very shaky understanding of rural life in... developing societies." (Gardner and Lewis 1996, 63)
19

When international experts or donor agencies are involved, there is an additional cultural gap (beyond
that between the target population and the educated elite) between countries and languages.
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Prescription is the stage that sets forth the rules under which a policy will be
carried out. Invocation is the first step toward acting in accordance with that prescription
to carry out the policy: setting up administration, allocating people and resources,
deciding who will be accountable and who will enforce the prescriptions. Arrangements
for invocation should be

...effective, practical, and complete ways of executing the prescription. Do
the arrangements make adequately clear exactly what the invocation
activities will be in different contexts or under different contingencies and
who will be held accountable to follow the rules? ... Are the people who
carry out invocation adequately skilled, and do they receive ongoing
training?

Are the organizations adequately staffed, and do they have

sufficient resources? To whom should they turn... if they run into problems
in carrying out their invocation activities? How can the invocation function
be appraised as a basis for improving it? (Clark, 65-66)

While offering insights into implementation, invocation is really more concerned with the
decision process leading to implementation than with implementation itself.
In the United States, implementation may depend largely on government bodies
and elected officials (Sargent, et al. 1991, 42-43; see Clark, 65-8). Formal procedures
take on a highly significant role.

90

While formal rules, roles, and regulations are certainly

20

For Sargent, et al. (43), implementation includes three essential steps "The first and most important is
identifying and adopting specific implementation procedures.
The second is for the appropriate
jurisdictions to enact bylaws or ordinances.... The third is delegating the responsibility of evaluating
implementation to the planning commission, a citizens advisory group, or a community organization."
6

a factor in Brazil, they are not the mainstay of implementation. Implementation involves
(but is not limited to) whether, to what extent, and how these formal factors are actually
carried out. This may be due to a cultural practice of treating written rules as an ideal
somewhat divorced from practical life (see discussion in Chapter III). In any event, in
Brazil the essence of implementation is, I believe, in the key factors which I have
developed and set forth below (see Table I-A).
Implementation can be many layered. In the market-based land reform program,
for instance, an international donor (the World Bank) developed the basic methodology
that it intended to try out in several countries.

It then approached the Brazilian

Government, first via a pilot program, then a fuller program, which was designed without
significant civil society input; in a sense, this stage was beginning to implement the
World Bank program. The Brazilian Government then began implementation (invocation
and application) by enacting regulations, empowering the Ministry of Agrarian Reform,
making arrangements with financial institutions, etc. Then the program was moved out
to the states that were to help administer it, and state technical units (STUs) were
selected. Finally, at the local level, individual land reform projects were carried out.
There are therefore at least three layers (federal, state, local) of implementation involved,
each with its own issues, opportunities, and problems (World Bank 2000).

Key Factors21
In my experience, the following are key factors in program implementation:
Authenticity of participation. Almost all commentators recognize the role of
participation in successful implementation. A World Bank study showed that "...two
21

These Key Factors are revisited in light of the Cedula da Terra program in Chapter VI.
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thirds of projects that included significant participation of the local population were
successful, in accordance with Bank criteria, and only one tenth of projects without
participation were successful" (Stiglitz 1998, 12). In an increasingly complex society,
participation of the target population and others can help provide a wider range of talents
and knowledge for making implementation more effective. In situations of rapid change
and/or instability, a good participatory and collaborative base can help manage that
uncertainty and reinforce the ongoing capacity to adapt to change (Wondolleck & Yaffee
2000, 15-6, 19, 29). 22
Concepts of participation range from it being the essential first element, as in
Escobar's "unmaking" development (1999), the politics of place (Gibson-Graham 2004)
or the Brazilian Base Community movement (e.g. De Gregori 1971), to being a useful
tool for carrying out donor agency policy (see Stiglitz; Gardner & Lewis 1996, 110-13).
It has been suggested that both top-down and "strictly bottom-up" approaches are prone
to failure and that the best approach is to gear participation to intended results, possibly
through use of backward mapping (Patton & Sawicki 1993, 307).

In order for

participation to be meaningful, it "requires a larger context of trust" between the target
population and those working with them23 (Tendler 1997, 6).

However, pseudo-

participation - i.e., projects in which the implementers go through the motions of
participation without being willing to significantly modify programs in light of
participatory input - can be counter-productive, increasing stakeholder resistance and

22

Mention of change should not obscure what Layzer (348) has referred to as "remarkable persistence of
the status quo." The two are not necessary contradictory: plus 9a change, plus c'est la meme chose. The
tendency of essential power structures and patterns of distribution to endure is indeed remarkable.
23

Wondolleck & Yaffee (6-7), noting the negative impact on project implementation of a growing distrust
of government and institutions, have found that participation can also help to create and/or increase trust.
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dissatisfaction (Wondolleck & Yaffee, 102).
Participation can also be more or less authentic. While lack of authenticity often
arises from "top-down" agency or government approaches, it is not limited to these.
Third parties (politicians, irresponsible NGOs) can create less than authentic community
groups to seek funding or to hasten implementation, and even community or association
leaders can intentionally or unintentionally misrepresent or pass misleading information
to their groups for a number of reasons, such as political or ideological differences with
the government24 (Valadez & Bamberger 1994, 176-7; see Martins 2000a and 2000b).
Some essential questions with respect to participation include:
•

When does participation start?

Generally, the earlier, the better (e.g.,
9S

Wondolleck & Yaffee, 103). Participation at the design stage is often ideal,
bringing target population and other impacted party input to bear early on, and
helping them to feel they have a stake in the project (see below). This is not only
a design question, but an implementation one as well - participation facilitates
subsequent implementation.

The market-based land reform program requires

target population participation at the very beginning of the local implementation
stage - the first step in the actual land reform process is target population
identification of the land to be acquired (World Bank 2000). However, failure to
have civil society participation at the national design stage was one of the factors
that created strong resistance to the program.
24

In the case of market-based land reform, something like this may have happened between MST
leadership and its followers. In my own experience, the CPT worker who followed us at our site in
Tocantins discouraged settlers from participating in a favorable government financing program because she
was ideologically in conflict with and distrusted the government (her advice, possibly erroneous, was in
good faith).
25

"Community development has a tendency to become largely cosmetic unless it involves the active
participation of the community in the planning stages of the project." (Gardner & Lewis, 121)
9

•

Whom does participation include?
population

participation,

but

This study focuses primarily on target

successful

implementation

also

includes

participation of other stakeholders, including those responsible for implementing
the program,26 members of the community surrounding the program,27 and other
28

people who may be impacted by or have an impact on the program.

In the

market-based land reform program, this is recognized at the state and local levels
through expressions of hope that rural workers unions and NGOs will actively
participate (World Bank 2000).
•

How is participation achieved? This will vary with the size of the project and
29

target population, the number and diversity of groups involved,

etc. Whereas in

a local land reform area, all of the target population is able to participate actively,
this would not be true of programs that operate on a larger scale - in which some
type of representation must be called for.30

However, at the back of the

26

"Zeleny suggests a process of formulating alternatives, reassessing goals and objectives, and involving
the people who will implement the final decision in the decision-creating process. This potentially timeconsuming work aims at gaining a consensus on a decision so that fewer people have to be convinced to
implement it. Zeleny believes there is little advantage in making fast, efficient, optimal decisions that
require such enormous effort to implement that they become obsolete or suboptimal before they are put in
place." (Patton & Sawicki: 366)
27

An excellent example of this was provided by Pe. Anibal Gil, a Catholic priest who opened the first
AIDS hospice in Brazil. Knowing that such hospices often encounter resistance from neighbors, he spent
considerable time visiting and talking with neighboring residents and businesses before opening the
hospice. As a result, the community not only tolerated the hospice but actively supported it, providing
donations, visits, and volunteers.
28

However, there may be potentially impacted groups whose participation might be counterproductive. In
land reform projects, for example, certain landowner groups may be hostile to the basic goals and may try
to sabotage them through participation. However, my tendency is, at least initially, to try to be inclusive to
the degree practical. One sometimes finds allies in surprising places.
29

Clark (39-40) distinguishes between issues that impact only one group (singular) and those that impact
more than one (plural).
30

There are excellent materials available on actual techniques of participation. Wondolleck & Yaffee (168171) note the importance of fun, hope, hands-on activities (rather than mere abstractions), and non10

implementer's mind, it is good to remember the doctrine that has emerged out of
politics of place - nobody has a right to 'speak' for other groups. (Gardner &
Lewis, 23-24)
•

Is participation authentic?

This is a multi-faceted question.

Are the

representatives and organizations what they claim to be - do they really speak for
their constituents or are they essentially a fiction or a front (either intentionally or
unintentionally)? Even if they are not such a front, has the group represented
really gone into the matter in enough depth so that the constituents understand the
issues and have expressed their real feelings and thoughts? Key at all stages is
the need to assure that no group is (inadvertently) dominated by those who are
most informed, most powerful, or most articulate (Valadez & Bamberger: 176).
Rural Brazilians tend to defer to people who are more educated, urban, or locally
influential; even among themselves, those who are more timid or less
experienced tend not to participate. Patience, knowledge of the community, and
structured group dynamics can help to remedy this (e.g., De Gregori 1971).
Ownership. Closely related to participation, is the important factor of whether the
target population takes 'ownership' of the program - whether the beneficiaries really feel,
believe, and act as though the program is their own. King-Powers (1975) relates an
incident that illustrates this. In her community, the local priest decided to start a water
filter campaign to counteract the constant problem of intestinal parasites. The people
humored the priest, engaged in the campaign, and then used the clay water filters to store
beans.

Where the target population does not take ownership of the program,

monetary rewards for efforts (awards, etc.) The Community Building Institute, Viva Rio (a Rio de Janeiro
NGO) and others have developed interesting facilitating techniques for complex community negotiations.
See also Susskind 1993-4, 1997, and 1999.
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implementation - even, as if in this case, it appears to be successful - is not likely to
attain stated goals.
Ownership becomes even more important in dealing with holistic local programs
and the increasing trend toward local management of environmental resources31 (Ascher
1995, 10-12; Camarotti & Spink 2000, 8-10). This aspect was well considered in the
market-based land reform program where, in addition to actual land ownership, the
landholder associations were given considerable responsibility for selection of land,
negotiation of purchase, and administration of the settlement areas (World Bank 2000).
Adequate statement and communication of goals. This is a very tricky issue,
aspects of which will be discussed in more detail below in the section on internal
dynamics of the aid industry and governments. There has been a strong move in recent
years to results-oriented or performance-based management (used synonymously). In the
positive sense, this approach seeks to focus government agencies and NGOs on their
objective (the results they wish to obtain) rather than on simply inputs (i.e., the budget)
and the administrative process (Wholey 2003, 44-55). The danger of this approach is that
it can push toward simplistic or checklist objectives, and that these can override the
qualitative and organic aspects of the program32 (Mark 2003, 185-6). The former director
of World Food Program in Brazil, Mark Latham, frequently commented that it is
unfortunate that donor agencies have to work with the project format at all, as it would
probably be preferable to simply accompany the evolving situation, placing resources

31

"The rural community is seen as the conservator of its own resources, habitat and culture. Local citizens
are directly involved in the control of community assets as they plan for the retention, enrichment, and
equitable use of those assets for present and future generations." Sargent, et al.: 5
32

This is particularly the case when management models are imported from the business sector which,
almost by definition, has much more simplistic goals.
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strategically in small increments where they would help influence the organic social
process in positive directions.
But clearly some objective must be kept in mind. Even the Latham approach
presupposes an objective - in his case, food security. The overall objective of the Base
Community Movement, for instance, was very broad - to enable neighbors to form
community groups in which they would discuss issues and take action based on their felt
needs. But even there, when an action was to be taken, a more specific objective needed
to be stated by the group.
Participation, then, again becomes key. If results-based management is to work,
the desired results have to be in tune with the needs and thoughts of the target population,
especially, and of other key stakeholders (See Wholey, 44, 46). Communication among
implementers, target population, and other stakeholders is vital.
Adequate time frame - Also closely related to the question of participation is the
time frame the development agency allows for the project.

Authentic participation,

especially among relatively uneducated rural populations, requires considerable time and
patience to develop. A rule of thumb in Brazil is that it takes three years to develop an
authentic community organization capable of carrying out a major project. Many NGOs
and church agencies respect this time frame, allowing projects to develop at an organic
pace that may go more or less slowly, depending on circumstances. These agencies allow
the project funding and objectives to be led by the community growth pattern, waiting as
the community takes each step in the process. Government and major donor agencies, on
the other hand, tend to be budget and statistic driven, pushing for results within a preset
time frame, and the end product is often unauthentic community groups and statistical
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results that, in practice, leave much to be desired. Note that time frame may not only be
related to participation (although this may be the single most important factor), but also
to other factors: agricultural, education, and health projects, for instance, may take longer
to successfully achieve than originally contemplated, as all are, at least in part, dependent
on organic processes. Even projects that lean toward the technical end of the spectrum
may be delayed due to social, political, or economic issues, on the one hand, or technical
and logistic problems, on the other.
Awareness of local social, cultural, and political complexities. "Local categories
and contextuality are central to problem solving" in the policy sciences (Clark, 118).
Programs can fail because implementers are not fully aware of the complexities of the
local situation. Gardner & Lewis (63) tell of a fish-farming project that, while technically
sound, nearly failed because the first world technicians did not understand the network of
family and commercial ties that surrounded the project. The network of family, friends,
and feuds in a rural community - including a land reform settlement - can take outsiders
unaware. Outsiders often mistake those who enthusiastically support their program for
leaders, whereas they may be innovators, eccentrics, or sycophants.

And program

managers may mistakenly rely excessively on those locals who share their political or
ideological views (Valadez & Bamberger, 177).
The extent of local knowledge needed may depend on project objectives.

In

Tocantins, as church workers involved in agrarian reform and also responsible for
promoting many aspects of community welfare, our knowledge of these local

33

"No administrative system is capable of representing any existing social community except through a
heroic and greatly schematized process of abstraction and simplification.... There abstractions and
simplifications are disciplined by a small number of objectives...." (Scott 1998, 22 -23). Clark (3) notes
the tendency of problem solvers to "simplify, misconstrue, or overlook..."
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complexities had to be extensive. Land reform settlements - being relatively holistic would require nearly the same depth of knowledge, but other types of programs - for
instance, a vaccination campaign - might be carried out with more limited knowledge of
specific local contexts. This being said, there is a growing awareness that all programs
should be approached within a holistic context.34
Unawareness leads to surprising results.

When, as part of an emergency

community-based anti-drought program in the Northeast, we encouraged the formation of
seed banks, we generated an unexpected reaction (unexpected because we were unaware
they existed) from regional seed salesmen, who sought to undermine the seed banks by
offering farmers free seeds.

In this case, in part because of prior participatory

groundwork with farmers discussing economic issues and the value of organization, the
dynamics of the situation worked out relatively well.
Internal workings of aid industry and government. As noted above, the dynamics
of the "aid industry" and government tend to drive project time frames. 35 This can be due
to a number of factors. Bi-lateral agencies such as USAID often have budgets that, if not
used in a certain time frame, are lost. Development contractors of the beltway bandit
variety usually contract to perform a task in a fixed time period and, especially where
they have won the contract on the basis of bidding, have tight budgets.

Government

agencies often wish to implement projects prior to elections or during the term of the

34

Kathy Kohm and Jerry Franklin (quoted in Wondolleck & Yaffee, 15) speak of "Appreciating the
complexity of systems and managing for wholeness rather than for the efficiency of individual
components..." Although they were speaking of forestry, the quote also applies to social and economic
undertakings.
35

Gardner and Lewis (68-75) provide a useful discussion of aid industry dynamics.
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administration.36

Where projects are financed by foreign entities such as the World

Bank, the government may be concerned that delays may affect foreign loans. Where
staff salaries are involved, delays may lead to significant cost overruns. Delays may also
affect equipment obsolescence, quality, maintenance, and warranties (Valadez &
Bamberger, 19-20).
Furthermore, agencies are often accountable to groups (first world donor
countries and taxpayers, congressional committees, corporate and private donors) that
have a limited understanding of development issues and/or require quantitative results.
The pressure to "show results" is often reflected in project implementation. Depending
on how this pressure is handled, it may exert a negative impact on the quality of
implementation (see discussion of monitoring below).
It is not surprising, therefore, that NGOs and Church groups are often much more
able to take a more patient and organic approach to implementation. They usually have
highly committed, relatively low-cost staff, who are not paid on a per-project basis. They
also have a sense of mission, and mission statements, that include mention of the type of
patience and organic approach needed, and to which their donors (often individuals or
similarly minded groups from the first world) fully subscribe. Frequently, church groups
and NGOs such as Oxfam and Save-The-Children enjoy the implicit trust of their donors,
who prefer qualitative results in accordance with the entity's mission to time frames and
statistics. Finally, such groups tend to work on a smaller scale than the larger donor
agencies, and thus can more fully accompany projects at a less demanding pace.

36

Ascher (1999, 18-19) correctly points out that governments do not have motives - government officials
do. These may be a mixture of personal, economic, and political, and the motives of one person or group in
the government may conflict with those of others.
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Resources - Human, Technical, Financial. This point is, perhaps, so obvious that
it should not need mentioning.

Yet programs continuously fail due to inadequate

resources. "Inadequate" may or may not mean "insufficient" in terms of quantity - often
there are sufficient but inappropriate resources. For instance, in Brazil, many agricultural
extension workers have been trained and are oriented toward working with large
commercial farms; assigned to work with land reform settlements, they are almost
•5

n

completely unprepared.
understaffed.

Local program managers may be untrained, uninterested,

For instance, INCRA - the Brazilian Government's Agrarian Reform

Agency, was throughout the 1970s and 80s used as a place to find jobs for people with
political connections who were of no particular use elsewhere; when we were working in
land reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was very difficult to find INCRA staff
seriously interested in land reform, yet the agency was in charge of administering land
reform projects (it improved notably under the Cardoso and Lula governments). In the
Brazilian Northeast, state governors have similarly used government social agencies for
patronage jobs (Tendler, 8).
In terms of financial resources, excess funding can be worse than insufficient
funding for many community-based projects. Funding received too early, too easily, or
in too great amounts can drown the natural growth process of a community organization,
lead to dissention and/or the attempt to carry-out inappropriate projects, and attract
outside opportunists. Part of the negative reaction to market-based land reform on the

37

Tendler (1997, 74-101), in her case study of agricultural extension service in Ceara, points out the value
of customized, user driven technical service over "top down" standardized service. Interestingly, in that
case, it was the state extension workers who provided the customized service, and NGO-Cooperative
workers who took a more standardized, top-down approach.
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part of the MST and CPT was based on a fear of incipient community groups being
overwhelmed by resources.
Ongoing monitoring. Monitoring is a vital element of implementation (Wholey
2003, 43-44; Valadez & Bamberger, 18). Sargent et al. (73) include evaluation as one of
the three essential steps of implementation. Wholey (45-46) notes that, equally important
to monitoring, is using the results of that monitoring to improve program implementation.
When this is done, monitoring allows implementers both to continuously refocus program
efforts to better achieve goals and to better adapt to changing situations.
The criteria by and way in which monitoring is done is extremely important.
Approaches taken reflect, to some extent, the split mentioned above between those who
seek formal or statistical objectives and those who seek organic and qualitative
objectives.38 In my experience, the most effective monitoring is done by those who have
an underlying sympathy with program objectives and experience in the area, but stand
enough outside the program to be able to see it with fresh eyes and ask outsider
questions. The evaluator also needs to be able to review objective criteria in light of the
people and communities participating, appreciate qualitative differences, and recognize
positive and negative spin-offs. It is important that the evaluator be viewed by program
implementers and target population as a resource and not a threat.
In addition to outside monitoring (and where outside monitoring, for budget or
other reasons, is not available), implementing staff, target population representatives, and
other stakeholder representatives, need to engage in self-monitoring of the program. This

38

This is, of course, not a pure either/or question. Almost all programs and evaluators seek both. Although
I favor the more qualitative/organic approach, an evaluation that ignores objective measurements altogether
would, in most cases, be inadequate. Certain types of programs, however, such as human rights initiatives,
are very hard to measure or evaluate quantitatively in any meaningful way.
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can be done through regular reviews of process, and review of interim steps or objectives
to be accomplished, with a discussion of whether and how they have been achieved or not
achieved.
Provisions for maintenance. In Brazil maintenance is a major problem. This is
true of simple maintenance of buildings and machines - throughout Brazil one encounters
hospitals that were never staffed, school buildings inadequately staffed, machines in
storage rooms because nobody knows how to maintain them or find spare parts. It is also
true at a more sophisticated level of providing (or not) continuity and sustainability for
programs beyond the donor stage.

Implementation that does not include plans and

provision for maintenance or continuity is inadequate and is likely to result in projects
that begin to unravel shortly after the implementing team leaves the area. The sense of
ownership, mentioned above, through creation of a genuine participatory process, is
certainly the first step to building a constituency that will insure program maintenance
(both on the more sophisticated level and, consequently, on the simple maintenance
level).

Additional steps can be taken to assure this process, such as through

institutionalizing

or

encouraging

replication

of

these

participatory

processes.

(Wondolleck & Yaffee, 115-7)

Concluding Thoughts On Theoretical Context for Policy
Clark (118) provides a wonderful table of the skills and talents needed by the
policy-oriented professional. Among these are an ability to deal with uncertainty and "an
open learning process," an interdisciplinary

and integrative approach, a holistic view, an

39

In Tocantins, we used to say that it was easy to be a rural pastoral worker. One only had to be an
agronomist, medical doctor, theologian, community organizer, psychologist, educator, mechanic, lawyer....
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ability to solve problems in a manner that is "process-like, yet empirical, systematic." I
would add humility.
Table I-A - Key Factors Listed, with advantages and disadvantages
Advantages if present
Dangers if absent
Key Factor
Irrelevant projects that will
Basis for most of the factors
Authenticity of Participation
meet indifference or
below; opens possibility for
resistance from target
project reaching felt needs of
population & other
target population; secures
stakeholders
stakeholder support
Program effectiveness and
Project not internalized by
Ownership
target population, likely to
continuity vis-a-vis target
end when implementers leave
population
Confusion, conflicts,
Implementers, target
Adequate Statement &
misunderstandings
population & stakeholders
Communication of goals
work together
Program allowed to fully
Truncated programs with
Adequate Time Frame
develop in accordance with
partial, inadequate, or merely
target population needs
formal results
Blindsided
Program integrated into local
Awareness of Local Social,
Cultural, & Political
reality
Complexities
Target population and
Implementers and target
Awareness of Internal
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shortage or excess of funds
Walking in the dark
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Ongoing Monitoring
implementation to ongoing
reality
Program will begin to
Program will carry on after
Provisions for Maintenance
unravel once implementers
initial stages
leave
This discussion emphasized participation. This is in part due to my experience as
a community organizer. But, in an increasingly complex world, where people are dealing
with potential conflict over limited natural resources, I firmly believe that participatory
solutions offer the best road to meaningful design and implementation of programs, as
well as for their adaptation to changing circumstances and endurance over time. Only if
we successfully learn to work in participatory and collaborative manners will we be able
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to create the social structures necessary to deal with complex human and environmental
issues, and avoid the choice between self-seeking individualism or collective repression
posed by the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968).

Theoretical Context: Development and Land Reform
Background
As will be discussed in Chapter III, the 1950s and early 60s witnessed an active
campaign in Brazil for agrarian reform. Large landholdings and "backward" agriculture
were seen by opinion leaders as constituting a barrier to modernity and progress.
However, the land owning classes continued to be powerful, and reaction to the agrarian
reform movement was one factor which led to the military dictatorship of 1964-85. The
military dictatorship promoted the modernization of agriculture.40
Thus it has been said that "...the so-called 'conservative modernization' of
agriculture was born with the defeat of the movement for agrarian reform" (Delgado
1996, 218).

Ramos (1999, 189) quotes Alberto Passos Guimaraes: "... there are only

two options for market economy countries: agrarian reform or the strategy of
'conservative modernization.' Brazil chose the latter." As Griffin (144) phrases it, "The
green revolution represents an attempt to substitute technical change for institutional
change."41
Certainly the military government opted for modernization and, despite enactment
of a model Land Statute in 1964, made no serious move toward agrarian reform.
40

Defined as the growing use of industrially manufactured inputs (Powers 2006, 7)

41

The pattern of attempting to avoid agrarian reform by effecting technical agricultural reforms is long
standing in Brazil, dating back at least to the 1780s. See Chapter III.
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Twenty-one years of military rule changed the climate for agrarian reform in three
important ways: (1) suppression of active agrarian reform movements cut off advocacy
for over two decades; (2) subsidization of urban elite purchase of rural land removed
pressure from that sector for agrarian reform; (3) the modern agriculture model convinced
the great mass of society - including most decisions makers - that the small farm was a
relic of past eras, thus turning agrarian reform into a peripheral issue as opposed to a
basic step necessary to remove barriers to development (Powers 1999).
By the late 1980s, interest in land reform seemed to be limited to the Church, a
few academics, and the Workers' Party; the still incipient Movimento dos Sem Terra
(MST) - created under the wing of the Church - was just beginning to be heard.42 But by
the mid-1990s, interest in agrarian reform revived - including on an international level
(SDDimensions 2000). Fernandes notes (1998, 224) that in each decade different aspects
of the agrarian question emerge; he saw the question in the 1990s being the
democratizaton of land holding, with the government pressured on one hand by the
powerful ruralista bloc,43 on the other by the growing actions of the MST, which
undoubtedly kept (and continue to keep) the issue in the public eye. In economic terms,
the fall of land prices - brought about in part by stabilization of the economy and the
possibility of greater returns from other investments - was a major factor favoring
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de Janvry (3) provides a summary of the dominant approaches to rural development up until 1980: in the
1940s, community development programs to mobilize rural people toward democratic forms of
government; the 1950s, diffusion of technological knowledge through extension workers; the early 60s,
land reform; the late 60s, new technologies of the Green Revolution; the 70s integrated rural development
seeking to democratize the new technologies to smaller farmers while preserving peasant structures. "As
the limits of dealing with poverty via rural development became increasingly evident, the strategy of basici
needs was put forward as an instrument to improve welfare among the masses of dispossessed peasants and
the rapidly rising numbers of rural workers."

43

Landowners and their allies in the Brazilian national congress.
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agrarian reform. 44 Fear of MST land occupation is another "cost" to landowners and,
given low land values, might reduce their resistance to land reform, making expropriation
by the government an attractive alternative. 45 Serious enforcement of the Rural Land Tax
(an unrealized goal of Lula's government) could also make large landholders more
amenable to land reform (Fernandes, 225-227; Alston, et al., 1999, 202).46 Other tax
incentives can be considered that encourage sustainable agriculture and land distribution
(Graziano da Silva, 67-68).
Also favoring a new attitude toward agrarian reform was a growing sense that
highly mechanized, commercial agriculture can result in environmental problems and
can, in the long run, prove to be expensive.

The system demands large amounts of

capital while producing often beyond the capacity of the market to absorb, making the
system very vulnerable (Powers 2006). Mechanization also reduces jobs, displacing or
marginalizing rural workers. (Benjamin, et al., 1998, 82-84)
At the same time, the viability of small farms gained more recognition in Brazil.
For instance, Barros, et al. (2000), in an extensive analysis of 1985 agricultural census
data, show that in the Northeast - with the exception of very small minifundios, profits
44

The government was known as paying well for land, and is required to indemnify the landholder based
on the value of the land and improvements. Clemente (5) quotes Cesar Jose de Oliveira, director of
INCRA in Rio Grande do Norte: "The methodology for appraising real property in this country has to
change. It is absurd. Do you think that, in this country, the legislation was enacted to benefit the worker?...
Who buys land in this country is INCRA because the market for land is inactive. Imagine the bargaining
power of who has R$ 1 million in hand to buy a farm. But when INCRA appraises it, everything enters in.
It is the rigor of the law. The legislation very much benefits the landowners, and this is the problem."
45

There have been numerous reports in the press of landowners arranging with the agrarian reform agency
- INCRA - to purchase their land, and allegations of inflated prices paid. INCRA has been accused of
using outdated appraisal methods, such as paying more for deforested land "as if this were an
improvement;" the Lula administration is seeking ways of changing these policies (Clemente 5). MST
land invasions increased 62% during the first six months of 2003 (Marques 2003a).
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However, per recent negotiations regarding tax reform, the levying of rural land tax may be passed to the
municipio. (Lyra 2003). In many localities where landowners are powerful, this may militate against
serious collection of the tax; it would seem to considerably reduce the utility of the tax as a policy tool.
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per hectare decline as rural properties grow larger. In addition, attention was drawn to
other positive economic aspects of small farms:
Even if the productivity of family-based agricultural work were inferior to largescale mechanized production - which is not the case - there are other
advantages... the concentration of income being less, consumer expenditures tend
to be distributed throughout the population, increasing the market for commonly
used goods, produced internally, often locally

(Tubaldini 1998)

It seemed as though many factors were coming together to make land reform once again
i•
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an attractive policy.
But there were still issues, not least of which was that many land reform projects have
not been successful. This is partly because land reform had been carried out on poor
quality land and/or lands located far from markets, this latter pattern being one which
even the well-intentioned Lula government found itself forced into (see below). Also
contributing to failure has been lack of infrastructure, technical support, financing, and
the broader supports (education, health, etc.) which help families to function.
Alternative Modes of Development
Given the current situation, what paths are open to Brazil for future agricultural
and rural development? Critiques of Brazilian modern agricultural have been discussed in
detail elsewhere (Powers 2006), and are summarized here. These include claims that the
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Claims were made that more land was distributed between 1994 and 1998 than in the entire proceeding
30 year period (Helfand and Rezende, 256-257). These figures have been widely questioned, the main
critique being that they represent in large part recognition of land rights of posseiros (squatters) who were
already on the land. Even if these figures are correct, however, they - as well as the stated goals of the
Lula government (see below) - represent only a small fraction of the 2.5 to 5.3 million families who need
land (World Bank 2000, 2; Stedile c. 1999, 2; NEAD 2001)
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modernization of agriculture and the growth of "agro-industrial complexes" has displaced
many small farmers (including renters and share-croppers), marginalized others or
subjected them to the domination of agro-industrial companies, reduced the bargaining
power and earnings of farmers, distorted community life and work relations, disvalued
traditional rural life and knowledge, maintained (if not increased) land concentration,
pushed small farmers into marginal lands with negative ecological consequences, led to
anti-ecological practices of mechanization and use of chemicals, promoted monocultures,
made agriculture at the same time over-productive and highly vulnerable to market
changes and pests, promoted oligopolies in the input and output sectors, and led to
treating land as a commodity to be used rather than as a resource to be nurtured and
husbanded.
While it is tempting - and sometimes useful - to focus on fertilizers, pesticides,
and machines, it is really the underlying mentality behind them that is of concern.
Placide Rambaud noted that agriculture is evolving toward a "dictatorial regime of
numbers" (Almeida 1999, 32).

Not only are these the numbers of accounting and

management, but the very mentality of GDPs and markets - the mentality that sees
economics as an end in itself, with people serving economics rather than vice versa, or at best - as the most important discipline in ordering human life. Questioning this
mentality is one of the basic tenets of the movement(s) toward alternative development:
First, alternative development is formulated based on a fundamental critique of
the strict economic rationale that inspired the dominant thoughts and policies
regarding development. Against the idea that economy is an independent sphere
of social life, whose functioning requires the sacrifice of non-economic goods and
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values - social (e.g., equality), political (e.g., democratic participation), cultural
(e.g., ethnic diversity) and natural (e.g., the environment) -

alternative

development underlines the necessity of treating economics as an integral and
dependent part of society, subordinating economic objectives to the protection of
these goods and values. (Souza Santos and Rodriguez 2002, 46)
Insofar as different social groups and actors question modernization, both in the
agricultural sphere and in society as a whole, the precariousness and fragility of
the system appear with greater clarity, tending toward a reevaluation of the social
responsibility that touches upon the construction of the future. (Almeida, 32)
But where does this questioning lead us? Asking his key question, "alternative to
what? " Graziano da Silva (1999, 55) states:
There is an almost general agreement that the value of the movements for an
'alternative agriculture' is in creating a new social conscience about production in
its widest sense.... Unfortunately, it is here that the waters begin to part....
A myriad of proposals for rural development have been put forth, ranging from
almost complete negation of and resistance to the modern agricultural system, on the one
hand, to substantial integration of small farmers into that system, on the other. The very
term "development" - even "sustainable development" - has been rejected by some due
to their identification of that term with concepts of economic growth. Noting that infinite
growth is not an ecological possibility, they prefer to speak of alternatives to
development rather than of alternative development (see, e.g., Souza Santos and
Rodriguez 2002, 53-54; Escobar 1995; 215).
Where does one start amongst this myriad of proposals?

One starting point is

suggested by Jalcione Almeida (1999, 151 et seq.).

Modern economy, in Brazil as

elsewhere, is given to periodic crises - and these crises have tended to be magnified in
48

Brazil by the contradictions and vulnerabilities within the national economy.

Almeida

notes "...the capacity that certain marginal regions and small units of agricultural
production have to resist the crises with a [relatively] small social cost...." He attributes
this to the flexibility of small family farms in seeking out alternatives:
...to the extent that one increases the range of possible choices within a productive
structure (it is clear that those choices are intimately linked to the possibilities of
the market, whichever that may be), the degree of autonomy also increases. Thus,
the greater the number of activities in which the farmers engage (up to a certain
limit, obviously)... the more one can admit the hypothesis that a great level of
autonomy is attained, at least in the case of family structured [farms]... as long as
the equilibrium among activities is one of the conditions of the stability of the
microsystem. (152)
This ability to survive - born out in the statistics that show a continued presence of
small farmers - is a real starting point for examining possibilities of rural development.
Focused on this, there are those who advocate a resistance to the modern system to the
point of having been accused, often unfairly, of wanting a virtual return to romanticized
historical patterns of rural life. More often what such groups advocate is a revaluing of
small-scale traditional agricultural experience, preserving and revalidating traditional
knowledge and insights (which are often viewed as being more ecologically sound than
modern ones), but also incorporating new "appropriate" technologies and techniques that
48

"One of the implications of uneven development is the continuous reocurrence of crises...." de Janvry (2)
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can facilitate work, helping farmers and land to be sustainably more productive 49 Much
valuable and creative work has been done in this area, especially by the NGOs loosely
associated in the PTA system.50
But such small farming does not come without a cost. Moreira (1999, 30-31, 120,
189) points out that the modern small farmer often works with a theoretical profit of
zero,51 and that the ability to reproduce this way of life is threatened.

There is an

implication here that, as the present generation of farmers dies off, it will be more
difficult for their children to follow in their footsteps - or event to want to follow in them
(see, e.g., Carneiro, 1999).

Noting that small-scale agriculture entails "...high risk...

with very low profitability and frequent bankruptcies" (188), Moreira is skeptical about
how far the alternative agriculture movement can really change Brazilian agriculture:
We will be challenging the notion, currently diffused, that

ecological

sustainability tends to revalidate "peasant" knowledge and practices, guaranteeing
to the family forms of agriculture better competitive conditions and better
conditions of life. We will be formulating the argument that the owner-worker
(family agriculture) in contemporary intercapitalist competition has a restricted
space for technical progress and for economic and cultural valuing. (181)
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Escobar (219) notes that creative use of hybrids of traditional and modern technologies, techniques,
organizational methods, and skills has helped "many 'traditional cultures' survive through their
transformative engagement with modernity." He also (96-97) provides an excellent description of the
peasant model of human-land relationship that can serve as the basis for such hybrids.
50

Much of the literature generated originates in the South of Brazil, where there is a strong pattern of
relatively successful small family farms. However, in the more difficult, semi-arid climate of the
Northeast, groups related to PTA such as CAATINGA in Ouricuri - Pernambuco, PATAC in Campina
Grande -Paraiba, and MOC in Feira de Santana - Bahia, do outstanding work in helping small farmers
survive and thrive, both through use of appropriate techniques and technologies and, perhaps even more
important, use of appropriate organizational, management, and educational skills.
51

In other words, that there is little or no profit or land rent as such, and the return may not theoretically
compensate the value of the family labor expended; however, the family produces its subsistence.
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He argues (197) that market forces tend to push non-modernized family farms towards
low returns. Even in the case of reduction of mechanical and chemical inputs due to
ecological factors, "...the dynamics of operation of the (imperfect) markets do not
guarantee that the benefits of these new practices will be allocated to the family farms."
In the case of non-modernized family agriculture, its permanence in the market is
attributed to an economic irrationality on the part of the small [farmer], due to a
supposed "peasant" culture, that does not expect profit or return on the land.
Moreira also indicates (190) that, with adequate capitalization for tools and
infrastructure, this very willingness to work without profits or land rents can provide a
competitive advantage to the family farm.

But he see the emphasis on appropriate

technologies and traditional knowledge and folkways as tending to discourage small
farmers from focusing on the larger political and social critiques necessary to bring about
more substantial change (e.g., 194-195).
Similarly Graziano da Silva (1999) argues that focusing on appropriate technologies
is not enough. He agrees that, even where such technologies result in savings, these may
not accrue in the long run to the farm families:
...a certain technique X or Y, appropriate (or not) to a certain social class... does
not absolutely guarantee that the surplus retained by the members of that class be
greater or lesser. It can... cause a greater surplus to be generated.... But as the
distribution of this surplus within the capitalist system necessarily involves
relations of exchange with other economic agents... what generally occurs is an
increase in the degree of exploitation in measure as there in an increase in surplus
generated. (58)
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While acknowledging that technology affects human and economic relationships, he
does not believe that it is the primary cause of those relationships and that there is no way
to "think about technological policies in the abstract."

The use of alternative

technologies as a "strategy of resistance" may have some short term success for
individual farmers, but in the long run it will lead to the impoverishment of rural families.
The road of "technification" necessarily puts small producers into the
intercapitalist competition, as much in the market for [their] products as that of
inputs. Their capacity to survive comes to be determined by the intercapitalist
competition in these markets.

It is a "race" whose rhythm is produced by

accumulation and, no matter how one runs, there are few who manage to at least...
survive as small producers. The majority, in a situation which is unfavorable
from the start, go on falling relatively behind until they find themselves obliged to
abandon

the race,

thus

confirming the

excluding

nature

of

capitalist

modernization in the countryside. (59)
The key, he believes, is "organization of the campones sectors in a manner that permits
them greater bargaining power vis-a-vis large-scale capital and ...appropriation of at least
part of the greater surplus which they come to produce." (169-179)
De Janvry (1981, 263) believes that rural development programs "implemented
within current agrarian structures can have only an extremely narrow clientele of upper
peasants." Even this depends on favorable trade terms, which he thinks are difficult to
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Regarding technology, Graziano da Silva (167-169 ) notes that two general approaches are usually
thought of: (a) developing adequate technologies for small farmers or (b) "adequating" the condition of
small farmers so that they are able to absorb available technologies. On an official level, Brazil has
generally opted for the latter, by trying to provide subsidized rural credit to small farmers.
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achieve "because unfavorable terms of trade are directly linked to the structure of
disarticulated accumulation through cheap-food policies and the lack of effective
demand: the one a prerequisite for cheap labor, and the other its immediate
consequence."

Writing in 1981, he believed that the focus of development had shifted

from rural to urban areas and that it is necessary for small farmers and rural workers to
forge alliances with urban workers in order to work for changes in agriculture and
elsewhere. (267-268)
Souza Santos and Rodriguez (47-51) emphasize that alternative development should
have its collective beneficiaries as primary actors, being essentially a bottom-up, rather
than top-down, movement.53 They outline six factors which they feel to represent basic
currents of alternative development:
•

associative forms of production

•

ecological awareness and focus on sustainability

•

inclusion of women

® financial resources for peripheral populations, e.g., micro-lending
•

access of these populations to resources such as land and housing

•

a focus on local action

On this last aspect, while respecting the need for local action, they believe that it is
not sufficient and that meaningful action should be "ambitious in terms of scale" - able to
act locally, regionally, nationally and globally. Solidarity generated in one community
should reach out to other communities.

They cite the Mondragon network of

cooperatives in Spain as an example of such interconnection. (37-41, 53) Among their
53

The Brazilian sociologist, Jose de Souza Martins (2000), criticizes MST leaders, most of whom are not
small farmers, for claiming to speak for small farmers.
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conclusions (64-67), two are particularly worth noting:
Alternatives of production are not only economic: their potential for emancipation
and their prospective for success depend, in good part, on the integration they
achieve among processes of economic transformation and cultural, social, and
political processes.... The success of alternatives of production depends on their
insertion in networks of collaboration and mutual support.
They also note that alternative forms of development must be judged according to
gradualist and inclusive measures. "If the only criterion for evaluation of success of noncapitalist alternatives is the short term radical transformation of society... then none of the
alternatives we have examined is worth the effort" (72).
Paul Singer (2002, 83-87) further elaborates the concept of solidarity economics.
A solidarity undertaking "negates the separation between work and instruments of
production" - i.e., is worker owned. He is strict in his interpretation, stating e.g. that a
cooperative that employs non-members cannot be considered a solidarity undertaking.
However he notes that, in practice, many entities (e.g., cooperatives) born in solidarity
may evolve out of it, or may vacillate in the degree of real self-governance by workers, or
may - by implication - be more or less authentically self-governing. He attributes these
difficulties in part to the fact that such undertakings are inserted into the capitalist system,
capitalism being not only the largest current mode of production, but its principles
"molding the legal and institutional superstructure in accordance with its values and
interests." Nevertheless (86-87),
Even being hegemonic, capitalism does not prevent the development of other
modes of production because it is incapable of inserting within itself all of the
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economically active population.54 Solidarity economy grows in function of the
social crises that the blind competition of private capital causes periodically in
each country. But it only becomes viable and a real alternative to capitalism
when the majority of society, who are not owners of capital, become conscience
that it is in their interest to organize and produce in a manner in which the means
of production belong to all those who use them to generate a social product.
With respect to Brazil, Singer discusses the efforts of the landless movement (MST)
to implant collective land holding through agricultural production cooperatives (CPAs).55
He concludes that the CPAs "show themselves, as a form of organizing the economy of
land reform settlements, superior to small property holdings," with greater income, an
average of 10% greater capitalization, and a better standard of living. Nonetheless, most
CPAs failed "possibly because the majority of land reform settlers prefer small scale
production... even when it results in a lesser standard of living and greater risk...." As of
1997, only 1.21% of land reform settlements were in the form of CPAs. (103-105, 115)
Interestingly, Singer seems to consider this decision on the part of the land reform
settlers to be essentially irrational, the final implication of his chapter being that a
younger, less culturally bound generation will find collective production more acceptable
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This seems to contradict the theory that capitalism's internal dynamic, causing it to seek to continuously
expand, ultimately destroys all noncapitalistic modes of production (de Janvrey, 9-12). However, I believe
that Singer is not so much questioning the overall expansionist dynamic of capitalism as stating that, in
practice, the capitalist system leaves gaps (due, in part, to internal contradictions and to disarticulations
with social and environmental reality) which can be filled by alternative modes. Moreira (193) makes
much the same point.
55

These experiences on land reform settlements are illustrative but not representative. Moreira (157)
correctly notes that "...family agriculture and rural land reform settlements presuppose distinct social
processes. Whereas the first refers to social forms already constituted and, as such, already integrated and
subject to the competitive logic of this integration, the notion of rural land reform settlements is associated
with the social and political process of access to land and the constitution of new social forms of productive
organization and social integration."
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(115). It is ironic that we have here an echo of the skeptical Moreira's statement that
small farming is economically irrational, especially as alternative development - or
alternatives to development - are supposed to consider non-economic values to be at least
equal to economic ones in structuring society.

In fact, family ownership as a non-

economic value may be very rational indeed. One is reminded of G. K. Chesteron's quip
that "Anything worth doing is worth doing poorly" - i.e., that there are certain things one
wants to do for oneself or one's family, even if someone else could do them more
efficiently - and of Samuel Popkin's (1979, 267) insistence that small farmers do indeed
make rational decisions:
Why do good fences make good neighbors? One answer is that building a good
fence requires collective effort, and sharing the effort with neighbors helps to
develop workable patterns of interaction which lead to sustained interaction and
collective benefits. Good fences also make good neighbors because they establish
precise boundaries, and thus ease the difficulties of accounting between peasants
and help settle the conflicts which need to be resolved for cooperative patterns to
develop between peasant households.

It is my experience in working with the landless that owning their own parcel of land
is a fundamental value and goal for the vast majority of them. The studies Singer cites,
and others (e.g., de Janvry 267), verify this. In practical terms, therefore, any economic
plan for small farmers in Brazil needs to respect the basic underlying premise of familyowned and operated farms.
Based on this premise, three elements seem to me to be essential:
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1) Psychological reinforcement of small farmers as a class. "I don't know anything" is a
comment one frequently hears from subsistence farmers when one starts working
with them. Such farmers as a class have tended to be looked down upon by Brazilian
society, which sees them as archaic, marginal, uneducated. Only those who can't do
anything else would be subsistence farmers.

Carneiro notes that it is not the

modernization of agricultural, per se, that is largely responsible for young people
leaving farming, but the confrontation with modern values generally, in which small
farming is not seen as an option that can help them reach their goals. In order to
survive as a class, small farmers need a sense of their importance, their role in society
- of being essential (as they in fact are) rather than marginal, of possibilities of
success.

2) Appropriate education. The best strategy for small farmers in Brazil is the growing
recognition that small farms are, at least in some areas, more efficient than large ones
- even in a strictly economic and agricultural sense (e.g., Barros, et al., 2000;
Tubaldini 1998; Netting 1993). When environmental and social costs are taken into
account (and Brazilians in general are increasingly aware of both), the degree of this
efficiency increases even further - e.g., small family farms tend to better nurture the
land and provide more jobs. 56

While I am a great advocate of appropriate

technologies, they really make sense only in terms of what Brazilians might call
appropriate "capacitation" - a term that implies something more holistic and integral
S6

"My contention is that smallholder intensive systems achieve high production, combine subsistence and
market benefits, transform energy efficiently, and encourage practices of stewardship and conservation of
resources." (Netting 1993, 320)
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than mere training, an education - whether for youth or adults - that helps the learner
to more fully realize his or her potential in his or her undertakings. If small farms are
in fact to be more productive and sustainable than large ones, small farmers have to
have access to information, skills, techniques, technologies, etc. (i.e. know-how).

3) Organization. Almost all commentators mention the need for organization, both on a
production-marketing level (e.g., associations, cooperatives) and on a socio-political
level. The former is very difficult; anyone who has seriously worked in community
organization in Brazil knows that it takes at least three years of solid effort for a
community to reach a level at which serious association work is possible, and that
such work is fraught with problems. Political organizing - at least on the level of
marches and protests - is easier, the problem arising of creating and maintaining
viable long-lasting political groups that can work within and, when the opportunity
presents itself, administer government positions.

57

Important here is the building of a consensus that questions the ultimate efficacy of
the currently dominant schools of economics and recognizes the importance of social,
cultural, and environmental values that are being distorted by policies arising out of the
current economic mindset. Brazilians are already far closer to questioning these values
than are, on the average, Americans - so the building of such a justification, based in part
on a realistic analysis of the strengths of family agriculture - is not a mere pipe dream.
There is, among other things, a growing recognition that legal structures need to, and in
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When working with land issues in Tocantins (1985-92), we found that leaders - once they showed their
potential - were often co-opted by the landowning class through offers of political jobs, favors, etc.
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fact do, allow for the protection of values (e.g., the social value of property) not
necessarily advocated by the modern economic schools, and that they can and should be
used to protect those values (Sodre de Carvalho 2003).
It is also important to avoid certain fetishes. While it is positive to recognize the right
of people to express their needs and desires, and while landless workers and small
farmers are intelligent and rational beings, pure bottom-up development very rarely
occurs. It is almost never the "poorest of the poor" who organize for change, but those
poor who have something to gain or lose. And they almost always require a catalyst often in the form of a church or movement organizer - who has had an opportunity for
training and study. Furthermore, one of the reasons the poor are poor is that they lack
certain forms of know-how needed to effectively operate in the world. Manipulation of
the poor by movement leaders interested in their own ends must be avoided.

But

development needs to be seen as a synergy among the poor, middle-class workers and
trainers, intellectuals, development agencies, and others acting in good faith.
The type of rigidity reflected in Singer's definition of solidarity should also be
avoided. In every community I have ever known, there are some people more interested
in issues, more willing to assume responsibility, than others. Not everyone wants to be a
small farmer, some would rather sign on as hired hands. Not everyone wants to be an
active participatory member of the cooperative, some would just as soon be hired to do
their job and go home at closing time. At least in Brazilian culture, these options need to
be recognized and taken into account when considering forms of alternative development.
Any realistic scheme for small scale farming must also deal with markets. "The
essence of the difference between small and large farmers is in the market opportunities
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they confront." (Griffin 142)
"Small farmers often find it more difficult to market their output. Because the
marketable surplus is low, they are more likely to have to use middlemen to
transport, process and sell their produce. Their costs of marketing therefore tend
to be higher and the prices they receive at the farm gate lower. Of course where
they are able to sell their produce directly to the final consumer, small farmers
may receive a higher price than the larger farmers." (ibid.)
Direct marketing - e.g., through farmers' markets - is thus a very viable option where
possible.

Cooperative transport, processing, marketing, and even exporting can be

undertaken.58 Organization of producers to negotiate and/or compete with processing and
marketing oligopolies is also vital.
Finally, it must also be noted that rural development is not limited to agricultural
activities. The growth of non-agricultural rural employment is a factor of tremendous
importance, to the extent that it has been stated that "... increase in opportunities for
income generation in rural areas [is] the central challenge of any poverty reduction
project" (Vieira 2000, 106). Demand for such non-agricultural rural labor - and for
government incentives to increase such opportunities - has increased. While it is evident
that non-agrarian activities will not, in and of themselves, resolve the problems of rural
development, they are a factor that needs to be contemplated in rural development
programs as both a potential supplement to agricultural family incomes and as a way of
decreasing migration, especially among the young. (Forum do Nordeste 1993; Bacelar de
Araujo 2000, 303; Graziano da Silva 1999; Carneiro 1999, 113-114; Jank 2000, 124)
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MOC in Bahia has done this successfully for small-scale sisal producers.
promoted family and community based cashew nut processing.

GARD in Recife actively

Applying Development Theory
A statement quoted earlier in this chapter warrants repeating: "... there are only
two options for market economy countries: agrarian reform or the strategy of
'conservative modernization.'

Brazil chose the latter."

(Alberto Passos Guimaraes,

quoted in Ramos 1999, 189; see Escobar, 114)
Failure to have carried out an agrarian reform is undoubtedly one of the root causes of
the economic disparity and poverty in Brazil today.
... where the evidence exists, the persistence of poverty does indeed correlate with
the unsatisfied land-hunger of the rural population. In Brazil... rural poverty is
seen as the end-product of the inability to ensure sufficient access to land in order
to make possible an adequate livelihood. (Sobhan 1993, 104)
Indeed, as mentioned above, due to the close interaction of rural and urban economies
and the anticipated displacement of workers from the countryside into the cities, the
failure to carry out agrarian reform not only is a cause of rural poverty but of urban
poverty as well, creating barriers to development in both sectors (Sobhan 1993). Tania
Bacelar de Araujo (286 et seq.) places land concentration as the first of five major factors
causing poverty in Brazil.59
Griffin (1999, 16) notes that income inequalities are increasing in developing
countries, and that they especially do so in situations of significant economic growth. He
believes that highly concentrated land holdings are an important factor.
The balance of recent evidence suggests that the degree of inequality is not
closely related to the level of income per head, as we once thought, but to factors
59

The others are the strong oligopolies in the urban economy, the government's economic orientation and
policies, the precarious level of education, and the tax system.
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dependent on the strategy of development that is followed. These factors include
the distribution of productive assets (particularly land)....

[I]t is possible to

prevent large income disparities emerging... by adopting a development strategy
that places high priority on an equal distribution of agricultural land, universal
access to primary and secondary education, labour-intensive methods of
production and a pattern of international trade that reflects the relative availability
of resources.
De Janvrey (1981, 7) believed that the agrarian question "is but a symptom of the
nature of the class structure in the periphery and of the particular process of capital
accumulation it undergoes."60

Rural development programs, if involving adequate

technology and remunerative market practices, can help the upper elite of small
("peasant") farmers. However, "For the majority of semiproletarianized peasants, rural
development could be effective only after implementation of massive redistributive land
reforms." (263) In 1981 he wrote a statement that could be a summary of the MST's
position today: "...redistributive land reforms and rural development programs conducted
by (and not for) peasants can be useful departing points in a struggle for democracy and
articulation." (268)
However, a large scale agrarian reform in Brazil is hardly conceivable without
government action. Jose de Souza Martins (2000, 22) has stated - I believe correctly in
the current context - that those who would negate state administration of agrarian reform
are essentially negating the possibility of that reform occurring.
Such a large scale land reform is not likely to happen in Brazil in the near future.
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Escobar (130) explicitly goes beyond what he feels to be de Janvry's overly functionalist view.
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While the Lula administration has taken significant steps to help small farmers and is
strongly committed to land reform, it is caught in the network of political, legal and
economic forces which have inhibited land reform by prior governments.61

The

announced goal of the government for 2004, for instance, was to locate 60,000 families
on the land - little more than 1% of those who need land,
would permit the settling of only about 27,000 families.

and the budget for 2004
Like prior administrations,

Lula's administration is finding itself pushed toward colonization of the Amazon as an
answer: the government has made available federal and state company lands for land
reform settlements, but most of the lands are located in the North (i.e., the Amazon),
whereas the landless are seeking land in the South, Southeast and Northeast (Taves 2003)
At the rate land reform is currently being carried out, social and economic pressures
pushing toward reconcentration of land holdings may well cause there to be little or no
net change in the overall structure of landholding (Martins, 23).
De Janvry (3) noted that, when the complexity and limits of rural development
strategies become apparent, governments and development agencies tend to turn toward
basic needs approaches to development, assuring basic food, clothing, and shelter. It
could be argued that the Lula government's Zero Fome program - a commitment to end
hunger in Brazil - is just that: something of a retreat from the complexities of issue such
as land reform to an issue which is less controversial. On the other hand, Zero Fome can
be seen as a potentially brilliant strategy which unites and motivates Brazilians behind an
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"No planner begins with a tabula rosa.... Policymakers are surrounded by constraints." (Griffin, 25)

The goal for the 2004-2007 pluriannual plan was settlement of 148,000 families on the land; these are the
families already in landless "camps" (acampamentos). It is contemplated that 0.6% of available funds will
be spent on "agrarian reorganization" - those funds come from the projected government budget (73.6%),
the official banks (10.5%), state companies (8.5%), development funds (4.2%), contributions from private
enterprise (2.1%), and other sources. (Breve 2003)

issue on which virtually all agree (that hunger should be eliminated), leveraging past
work that was done through the Citizen's Anti-Hunger movement founded by the late,
almost legendary, Betinho.63

The basic needs can be extended to health care and

education, and beyond to work and production.
Implicit within [the basic needs approach] is greater economic and political power
in the hands of the poor. This, it is thought, often requires a redistribution of the
ownership of productive assets, and in particular land reform. (Griffin 1999, 30)
The basic needs approach allows the achievement of "a widely agreed upon, high-priority
objective in a shorter period, and with fewer resources..." (Paul Streeten, quoted in de
Janvry, 256) and, as such, may be exactly what Lula needed to establish credibility in the
social field as a basis for further action.64
In any case, large scale land reform in Brazil will depend on the development of a
national consensus in favor of such a change.65

Thus the importance of the "new

consciousness" which, as noted above, so many of the students of this area of discussed
(e.g., Graziano da Silva; Souza Santos; Vieira).
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Betinho - Herberto de Souza, a sociologist, with impeccable leftist credentials, who was dying of AIDs
contracted in a blood transfusion (he was a hemophiliac), was a widely-loved, charismatic leader who did
much to heal wounds between conservatives and leftists. Together with the Catholic Bishop, Dom Mauro
Morelli, he was a leader of the movement to impeach President Collar (1993); following the impeachment,
rather than disband the movement, they decided to focus the movement on ending hunger, encouraging the
formation of thousands of local end-hunger groups and, with the support of Lula and of Itamar Franco's
government, the founding of a national food security council. One of Betinho's great contributions to
Brazil was his insistence that there is no conflict between helping the poor (formerly viewed as a
conservative response) and helping the poor fight for their rights (formerly viewed as a leftist response); he
noted that hungry people are seldom able to successfully fight for their rights.
64

The importance of this approach in practice is noted in our case studies with reference to the bolsa
escola/bolsa familia. Martins (91-92) criticizes those who point out that distributing basic essentials to the
poor would be less expensive than carrying out land reform. He notes that this ignores both the dignity of
the poor (who would be turned into a beggar class by such a program) and the need for true social
transformation.
65

At the 45th Assembly of the CNBB in 2007, Bishop Mauro Montognoli of Ilheus, in an official statement,
noted that "The political will is lacking to carry out [agrarian] reform
" (Cangao Nova Noticias 2007)
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Escobar (1995, 56) deals with this aspect of development most folly. He notes (5)
that discourse about development essentially builds the world in which development
takes place: "... a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being and
thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible." 66
Development relies on setting up the world as a picture, so that the whole can be
grasped in some orderly fashion as forming a structure or system.... The need to
compose the world as a picture is central to all theories of economic development.
Thus it is essential to build new terms of discourse - "...changing the order of
discourse is a political question that entails the collective practice of social actors and the
restructuring of existing political economies of truth." This can be a slow process, or it
can happen rapidly. Changing the underlying structures is, of course, more difficult.
"The process of unmaking development... is slow and painful, and there are no easy
solutions or prescriptions." (Escobar, 216-217)
According to Escobar (216), the first step in effecting this transformation "is the
breakdown of the basic organization of the discourse...." The title of Jose de Souza
Martins' book (2000) might, therefore, be taken as a sign of hope: "Agrarian Reform:
The Impossible Dialogue."
Martins' thesis is that communications between the various social movements, the
government, and other players with respect to agrarian reform has broken down largely

66

"...discourse results in concrete practices of thinking and acting through which the Third World is
produced." (11) "Social power of this kind has an insidious way of encroaching upon the most recondite
corners of social life, even in inconspicuous ways. This is no less true in those arenas in which life itself is
at stake, such as in the arena of food and hunger.... I will examine... how today's practices in nutrition,
rural development, and health care came into existence not as a result of improved consciousness, scientific
progress, or technological refinements, but rather as effects of power brought about by the probelmization
of hunger in the context of the pervasive economization of subsistence." (101)
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because these groups have (to borrow Escobar's terminology) different 'pictures' of what
agrarian reform is or should be. He sympathetically critiques the Catholic Church's view
of agrarian reform (noting that the Church's primary interest is a pastoral one) because
the Church has not fully realized that its picture of agrarian reform is based on what he
calls a "simple mercantile" economic system (others, he notes, call this 'subsistence'
agriculture, but this he thinks a misnomer):
This is a terminal economy that survives in some societies, and also in ours, in a
residual manner only because it has become irrelevant to modern and global
economy.... Although it is fundamental for the survival of hundreds of thousands
of persons who at this time have no alternatives for survival....

It is a

contradictory survival whose drama and whose relevance a parish or grass-roots
pastoral religious worker can understand, but a government economist generally
cannot, at least without great effort and fatigue.

fil

(32)

Noting that the Church rightly sees a link between this type of agriculture and
community/family structures which

are supportive of human

dignity,

Martins

acknowledges that these structures - and the concern with reaching out to those excluded
by the modern process - are significant values. However he critiques the Church - and
even more so the MST - for at times developing this moral question into a degree of
Manichaeism through which modern agriculture is viewed as evil, leading toward an
/-O

attitude of negation to all that is modern.

He believes that the appropriate response is
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Although Martins was writing during the Cardoso administration, relations regarding agrarian reform
between the Lula administration and the MST and certain wings of the Church are not necessarily better
(e.g., Pereira 2003; Marques 2003)
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During the nine years I spent working for the Church in land reform and rural rights, I myself at times
experienced this negative reaction to modernity; although it needs to be transcended, it arises out of a
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an attitude that seeks transformation "...that would insert the poor into the new economic
order and, at the same time, preserve for them the dignity and way of life, gradually
adding to and fortifying it, getting them out of poverty and cultural deprivation." (32-35)
Martins is a brilliant writer and an insightful, balanced thinker. His comments - as
they were intended to - have provoked controversy. In places he overstates his case. Yet
most observers would agree with the essence of what he says: that a new consciousness
must be a process of transformation and not simply a retreat into old patterns.
The greatest importance of the movement for a sustainable agriculture is not in its
'production for production' but in its 'production for a new conception' of
economic development. The principle contribution of this movement is... in the
creation of a new social conscience with respect to relations between humans and
nature, in the production of new philosophical, moral, and even religious values,
and in the nurturing of new legal concepts, in short, in the production of new
political and ideological forms.... (Graziano da Silva, 65)
Souza Santos and Rodriguez note that the movement toward alternatives to development
has already made significant contributions in working toward a new discourse, having
managed to impact World Bank and even IMF policy.
A new consensus cannot be woven out of thin air.

Thus the importance,

mentioned above, of developing and diffusing serious data which shows that small farms
are viable and - in certain respects - superior. The possibilities for making society aware
of the advantages of small agriculture are very real. Thus Tania Bacelar de Araujo, a
highly respected economist from the Northeast, states:
history of experience of that which Griffin noted: that modernization and technological advances in a
highly unequal society tend to further marginalize the poor. The Church is therefore suspicious of
modernity with some reason.
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Some day Brazilian society will understand that, even the questionable (financial)
allocative efficiency of business agriculture cannot compensate for its absurd
distributive inefficiency. Brazilians will perceive that, in all developed countries,
rural economy and family agriculture had and continue to have a socio-economic
and political importance that is greater than business agriculture that is based on
salaried workers. (303)
Similarly, Netting (1993, 323) thinks the evidence indicates a probable increase in
small-scale farming because:
(1) Historically... the denser the population becomes, the smaller and more
numerous the farms become. (2) Financially, the economics of scale... do not
really apply to any sustainable kind of food production - when you count all the
costs, it is cheaper to raise a zucchini in your garden than on your megafarm. (3)
Socially, people are beginning to understand that they really are what they eat,
and we are demanding quality foods that megafarms can't supply.
Netting's comments on farms and population have an empirical basis. Large farms
tend to have a higher output per worker and are, thus, labor saving.

Small farms,

however, as noted above, tend to have a higher output and a higher profit per acre.
The agronomic reasons for this are by now pretty clear. First, small farmers use
more labour-intensive methods of cultivation for any given crop. They devote
more time and are more careful in land preparation, weeding and harvesting....
[S]mall farmers cultivate a higher proportion of their land....

[T]he cropping

ration tends to be higher on small farms. That is, because of greater use of
multiple cropping techniques, small farmers obtain more harvests per year than

large farmers. (Griffin, 141)
At an earlier period in Brazilian history, these factors were seen by some as militating
against small farms - Brazil, it was argued, has an abundance of land and therefore
cannot be expected (as is the case with, e.g., Holland) to be concerned with production
per acre.

But such an argument is no longer convincing, especially in light of the

growing realization of the social and environmental elements of the issue.

Development and Land Reform - Conclusion
When I first came to Brazil in 1969 as a Peace Corps Volunteer, an older ex-pat
told me that, if I were thinking of ever writing a book on Brazil, I should do so during the
first six months I was here. After the first six months, he said, I would realize that Brazil
is far too complex to ever put adequately into words.
Fortunately or unfortunately, the six-month book was never written. Forty years
later, I find myself struggling with trying to capture at least a small portion of the
dynamic of the country. Part of the 'picture' (Escobar's picture) for me, however, is
undoubtedly based on my first experiences as a community organizer among small-scale
farmers in Espirito Santo (no doubt building upon Jeffersonian values I brought with me)
- I was deeply impressed by their dignity, self-sufficiency, and sense of community. Yet
I have known Brazilians of good faith who have another picture of rural Brazil - of
sweeping fields of soy or rice and large harvesters saving the back-breaking work of
hand-harvesting (I have harvested rice with a scythe, and it is very hard labor).
Within the complexity of Brazil, it is important - as Escobar (98) puts it - "to
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make explicit the existence of a plurality of models of the economy." But, he notes, this
in itself is not enough.
What needs to be studied... is the mechanisms by which local cultural knowledge
and economic resources are appropriated by larger forces (mechanisms such as
unequal exchange and surplus extraction between center and periphery, country
and city, classes, genders, and ethnic groups) and, conversely, the ways in which
local innovations and gains can be preserved as part of local economic and
cultural powers.
This is a process that is currently ongoing in Brazil - seeking to make possible the
"impossible dialogue" - in a manner that will give voice and opportunity to the rural
population, especially the rural poor. There is urgency here - yet there is also a rhythm
to rural life in Brazil, an "historic" patience that has outlasted predictions of the demise of
the small farm and, I suspect, will continue to do so for a long time. The dialogue on
development is an important one but, while it is ongoing, millions of small farmers and
thousands of union leaders, pastoral workers, extension workers, and community
organizers keep making the decisions which result in the hybrids and transformations
needed for small farms to survive and thrive.

Note On The Economic Paradigm

Redistributive Paradigm - Background
Griffin (1999) describes six basic economic paradigms: monetarism, open
economy, industrialization, green revolution, redistributive strategies, and socialist
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strategies.69 In this section we examine the pros and cons of land reform within the most
applicable of these, the redistributive paradigm. We will then critique that analysis from
the point of view of discourse analysis, especially as developed by Escobar (1999).
In the 1950s, development was largely associated with growth. It was assumed
that economic growth would benefit the population at large. However, in the wake of the
dramatic growth made possible through the green revolution, it was discovered that such
growth tended to widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor. Furthermore, there
was evidence that, at least with respect to large sectors of the poor, growth negatively
affected their welfare in real terms. (Griffin 164-6)
Typically, during the 1960s, the poorest 20-40 percent of the rural population was
found to be worse off than previously. And the decline in real income was found
to be concentrated on particular classes or occupational groups, namely landless
farm workers, small peasant cultivators who supplemented farm income by offfarm employment and plantation workers. (Griffin 166)
The development community therefore began to focus on the effects of growth and
on the distribution of benefits. One of the positive results of this focus was recognition of
the "heterogeneity of poverty" - i.e., that not all the poor are alike. It was noted that
much poverty is rural,70 that there can be an "urban bias" in development,71 and that
certain groups, regions, family profiles, etc., tend to be negatively impacted by growth.
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Brazil has experimented with four of these - monetarist, open economy, industrialization, and green
revolution. It has not seriously attempted either redistributive or socialist strategies.

70

"Poverty in Brazil has a strong regional and rural dimension. About 48 percent of the Brazilian poor
(16.5 million people) live in rural areas, and the incidence of rural poverty is more than double that for
large cities and other urban areas." (World Bank 2000, 3)
71

Urban bias has been a definite factor in Brazil (e.g., Graziano da Silva 1999, 123).

The challenge thus became to design poverty alleviation policies in which the proposed
action would rationally connect with the target populations. (Griffin 166-7)
Within the rural sector attention tended to focus on land tenure arrangements, the
role of co-operative institutions and the organisation of large scale, labourintensive public works projects. Once these topics began to be probed, however,
it became impossible to stop because the analysis inexorably raised questions
about the equity of existing arrangements, the degree of inequality in the
distribution of income and the extent of concentration in ownership of productive
assets. (Griffin 168)
In the 1970s, the World Bank Development Research Centre analyzed several
models of development, including two redistribution strategies: redistributing 2% p.a. of
total income for 25 years (a) directly to the poor (consumption redistribution) or (b) into
investment projects to benefit the poor (income redistribution). The models concluded
that consumption redistribution would, in the long run, actually significantly decrease the
per capita consumption of the poor, whereas income redistribution had "considerable
potential for raising income in low-income groups... [and] can achieve substantial
improvements in patterns of asset concentration over time."72 (Griffin, 168-9)
Griffin points out, however, the high political cost of the income redistribution
model, which required long-term action during which the per capita consumption of
middle and upper income groups would decrease significantly. Furthermore, he notes
that, as much of the planned investment would be in terms of public investment (roads,
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Significantly, a third redistribution strategy, asset redistribution, which the Bank planned to analyze in
the 1970s, "was quietly forgotten." (Griffin, 168)
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irrigation, drainage), the redistributive effect might not be as planned:
In practice... the non-poor often gain disproportionately from public investments
because the distribution of benefits reflects not the distribution of population but
the distribution of ownership and control over economic resources. (Griffin, 170).
Furthermore, market forces work so that "Following intervention... distribution of
income tends to return to the pre-intervention distribution." (Griffin, 171, quoting Irma
Adelman).
These evident fragilities in the income distribution approach led the development
community to seek more effective strategies. In the mid-1970s, the ILO, based on earlier
work by the Indian Planning Commission, pioneered a redistribution strategy known as
the "basic needs" approach.73
Basic needs is not really about things at all....

It is about giving priority in

development to the needs and desires of poor people. This is reflected in three
features of the approach which effectively convert it into a strategy: a
preoccupation with ensuring that essential public services are available to the
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de Janvry (1981, 258): "The basic-needs approach... has absolutely no theoretical foundation; nor does it
really need one, being, as it is, nothing more than institutionalized charity...." Yet, later (262) he admits
that it can be seen according to one of two "diametrically contrasted interpretations," either "...constraints
on growth imposed fundamentally for purposes of political legitimization - itself legitimized as
humanitarian concern - and hence to reproduce class positions, or they can be seen as [having] the
objectives of social and structural changes aimed at reconciling growth and distribution." In other words,
the basic needs approach can be essentially charity aimed at easing and legitimizing the existing structure,
or structural change aimed at changing it. This distinction is important now in Brazil, as Lula's "Zero
Hunger" program follows a basic-needs approach; there seem to be elements of both the charitable
(humanitarian) and structural (including proposed land reform and basic education), although the latter is
less stressed publically (perhaps for political reasons). Under the important unifying work undertaken by
Herberto de Souza (Betinho) and the anti-hunger campaign in the early 1990s, Brazil (including the left)
rejected the dichotomy between charity (assistentialism) and structural change, recognizing that hunger and
other basic needs must be dealt with through a combination of immediate relief and medium-term structural
change. Betinho's argument is, inter alia, that hungry, destitute people are not able to fight for their rights
as citizens.
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poor, an emphasis on the participation of the poor in the development process and
recognition of the centrality of a major redistribution of income and wealth in
favour of low-income groups." (Griffin, 172)
There is, however, a chicken-and-egg problem here. The necessary elements of the
basic needs approach are most difficult to achieve in countries where there is great
disparity of power and wealth. Participation of the poor in public policy making, for
instance, is difficult in rural communities dominated by wealthy landowners.
Redistribution of assets thus becomes important. And, particularly because so much
poverty in third world countries is generated by rural poverty, land is key.
The unequal distribution of productive assets is a major cause of widespread
poverty and it is for this reason that strategies that give priority to the satisfaction
of basic needs tend to emphasize land reform and other measures to improve the
distribution of income and wealth. It is possible to imagine alternative ways of
reducing mass poverty and satisfying basic needs within a reasonable period of
time, but historical record indicates that the countries which have been successful
in this respect have in common an equitable distribution of productive assets,
especially land. (Griffin, 177)
Griffin believes that an incremental approach to redistribution (such as the World
Bank's income redistribution approach), based on redistribution of the increments of
growth, will not produce substantial development.

Redistribution of assets, and

especially of land, is required. It is best that this happen at the beginning of the economic
growth cycle, as growth without redistribution tends to increase disparity and worsen the
position of the poor.

Adelman summarized the ideal here as "redistribution before
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growth." (Griffin, 171, 179; seede Janvry 1981, 257)
Taiwan and South Korea are cited as countries in which redistribution occurred prior
to growth. In both, land was largely owned by the Japanese prior to World War II. Upon
removal of the Japanese, land was redistributed in a relatively egalitarian, small peasant
system. Subsequent growth promoted equality, so that the Taiwan household income
Gini coefficient fell from 0.558 in 1953 to 0.289 in 1976. (Griffin 179-81).
Griffin's analysis is supported Rehman Sobhan's (1993) study of the impact of
agrarian reform in 27 countries. Sobhan distinguishes among (a) radical land reform,
usually resulting from revolution (e.g., China, Cuba, Vietnam) or war (e.g., Taiwan,
South Korea), (b) non-egalitarian land reform effecting social transition (e.g., Mexico,
Bolivia, Peru), and (c) non-egalitarian land reform without social transition (e.g.,
Honduras, Panama, India, the Philippines).74 Brazil, quite correctly, is not on his list.
Non-egalitarian land reform effecting social transition may have a significant impact
on the country yet not really provide balanced rural development.
The insufficiency of this redistribution has permitted differentiations within
agriculture to persist....

In the case of Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, despite the

degree of social upheaval, the end-product of their agrarian reforms appears to be
a class of impoverished minifundist farmers and another of landless agricultural
workers providing cheap labour on capitalist holdings which have become
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De Janvry (1981, 207-8, 263) refers to all land reforms that expropriate some land as redistributive, and
radical land reforms as "massive." His conclusions with respect to the capacity of land reform effecting
broad-based change are similar to Sobhan's - only massive land reform would achieve this.
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dominant throughout Latin America outside Cuba. (Sobhan, 41)
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The only countries where the rural economies have diffused technology,
maximized use of the rural labour force, provided virtually universal access to the
usufruct of the land, achieved sustained and equitable growth and provided an
expanding market for rural and modern industry are those which have effected
radical agrarian reforms. (Sobhan, 115)
But such radical agrarian reform can generally occur only where imposed by the
government (de Janvry, 257; SDdimensions 2000, 4). It "can succeed only where the
power

of the existing rural-based

elite is

either transferred or

eliminated."

(SDdimensions, 4)

Pros and Cons of Brazilian Land Reform within the Redistributive Paradigm
By the redistributive criteria set forth by Griffin and Sobhan, it would hardly seem
worthwhile to undertake agrarian reform in Brazil. A radical agrarian reform or general
displacement of the landowning class is not going to occur. With the possible exception
of the most radical wing of the landless movement,77 almost all proposals for Brazilian
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It is important to make at least a passing mention here to de Janvry's insightful analysis of the problems
of "social disarticulation" (final goods go to exports and luxury goods for the elites, and market expansion
is therefore divorced from real wage increases) and "functional dualism" (the goal of cheap food requires
cheap agricultural labor, made possible through an abundance of minifiindistas and landless agricultural
laborers who can be hired on an as need basis; such labor is cheaper than slave or serf labor, but requires
state action to keep labor from organizing. However, such a labor system keeps the rural poor from
entering the consumer class and therefore decreases potential markets).
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De Javry (263) agrees: "For the majority of semiproletarianized peasants, rural development could be
effective only after implementation of massive redistributive land reforms."
77

Jose de Souza Martins (2000 [1], 25) notes that some of "Those who fight for the rural workers want an
agrarian reform that is confiscatory and punitive for the latifundio," a position he thinks is pointless and
ahistorical. He notes the danger of thinking of the land struggle as "a holy war," the "manicheism" of
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agrarian reform are based on the redistribution of unproductive or saleable land, and few
propose widespread expropriation of productive large landholdings, much less complete
elimination of the rural elites. "The era of radical agrarian reforms... is over." (Kay
1998, 28; see de Janvry, 222)
Are there, then, reasons within the redistributive paradigm for carrying out nonradical land reform in Brazil?
Sobhan would probably, reluctantly, say that there are not.

He recognizes the

enormous need for land reform in Brazil (127). He also notes that, as in Latin America
generally, large landownership has become intertwined with urban commercial and
political power interests, and that "Agrarian reform would thus demand a social
revolution hitting not just at the balance of power in the countryside but also at the
prevailing configurations of state power." The only attenuating factor is that, due to the
presence of huge landholdings and relative abundance of land, even a radical reform
could allow for farms of up to 500 hectares, permitting capitalist agriculture to
continue.78 "Latin America ... thus emerges as perhaps the only region where agrarian
reform is still feasible within the prevailing relations of production." (128)
However, he notes that the "political mobilization to realize radical reforms...
seeing it as a straggle between good and bad ([1], 25), and the mistake of not seeing the inevitability of
government management of agrarian reform (2000 [2], 22).
78

Kay (1998, 27-8) believes that non-radical land reforms in Latin America, by "hastening the demise of
the landed oligarchy and clearing away the institutional debris which prevented the development of markets
and the full commercialization of agriculture," have most benefited commercial farmers. Escobar (1995,
126) notes that Columbian land reform in the 1960s "had the primary objective of compelling landowners
with large plots to adopt more efficient forms of cultivation." Similarly de Janvy (202): "All twentiethcentury land reforms in Latin America except the Cuban and possibly the Nicaraguan ones have had the
ultimate purpose of fomenting the development of capitalism in agriculture." There is also a long-standing
argument that agrarian reform, by weakening the power of the large landholders, benefits the urban
financial sectors in the "intercapitalist" struggle with urban financial and industrial elites (e.g., Moreira
1999, 162-3)
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remains elusive." Rural workers are now a minority in Brazil. The social dynamics for
mobilizing to carry out radical reforms are probably not present. (133-34)
Development programmes may continue, with perhaps more effectiveness to
reach out to the poor than hitherto demonstrated. Where surplus land exists, as in
parts of Latin America... these may be incorporated in land distribution as distinct
from agrarian reform, though limits to this will obviously be set....
This study remains at its conclusion firmly committed to its central premise,
that if the goal is to eliminate rural poverty and accelerate all-around economic
developments, there is no alternative to a radical agrarian reform which
redistributes land widely enough to incorporate the bulk of the landless and landpoor. .. and which thereby totally eliminates the current as well as any potential
new dominant class in the countryside." (138)

Griffin believes that "Redistributive strategies... represent a genuine alternative to
growth-oriented strategies in countries which attach priority to reducing quickly the most
acute forms of poverty and to creating an egalitarian society."

Redistribution of

productive assets, "particularly land," is only part of a five point approach that includes
(ii) creating institutions that allow local people and active role in planning and managing
social and economic programs, (iii) investment in education, nutrition, health, social
services, and infrastructure, (iv) opting for employment intensive development, and (v)
"sustained rapid growth of aggregate income per head."79 (188-89)
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See also Kay (20): "While agrarian reform may be a precondition for sustainable development, it is not a
sufficient condition."
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But, even with rapid growth, Griffin believes that redistribution has to take
something from the more affluent classes: "a strategy which places the entire burden of
redistribution on the margin is likely to fail." (179)

He notes that the political pre-

conditions necessary for taking such measures cannot be ignored (188); in Brazil they
would be enormous.
Thus, as Sobhan stated, absent radical agrarian reform, there may be other reasons
for land reform, but these do not fall within the strict redistributive paradigm. However,
a possible exception to this statement will be discussed in the conclusion below.

Escobar's Discourse Analysis
In Encountering Development (1995), Arturo Escobar critiques development theory,
a dream, as he puts it, that "progressively turned into a nightmare" (4). Essentially, his
position is that the 'first world' (and, to some extent, 'second world') invented the very
concepts of the 'third world' and 'development.' Speaking of the period of the 1950s 70s, he notes:
Even those who opposed the prevailing capitalist strategies were obliged to couch
their critique in terms of the need for development.... In short, one could criticize
a given approach and propose modifications or improvements accordingly, but the
fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be doubted.
Development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary. (5)
Building on concepts developed by Michel Forcault, Escobar focuses "on the dynamics
of discourse and power in the representation of social reality... [and] unveiling the
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mechanisms by which a certain order of discourse produces permissible modes of being
and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible."
Thinking of development in terms of discourse makes it possible to maintain the
focus on domination... and at the same time to explore more fruitfully the
conditions of possibility and the most pervasive effects of development.
Discourse analysis... gives us the possibility of singling out 'development' as an
encompassing cultural space and at the same time of separating ourselves from it
by perceiving it in a totally new form....
To see development as a historically produced discourse entails an
examination

of why so many countries

started to see themselves

as

underdeveloped in the early post World War II period, how 'to develop' became a
fundamental problem for them, and how, finally, they embarked on the task of
'un-underdeveloping' themselves by subjecting their societies to increasingly
systematic, detailed, and comprehensive interventions. As Western experts and
politicians started to see certain conditions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as a
problem - mostly what was perceived as poverty and backwardness - a new
domain of thought and experience, namely, development, came into being,
resulting in a new strategy for dealing with the alleged problems.(5-6)
Discourse - the way we envision and talk about things - not only builds a model of
reality but, in turn, helps to create that reality (130).

Like its predecessor, colonial

discourse, development discourse "created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing
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knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World."0" "The fact that
most people's conditions not only did not improve but deteriorated over time did not
seem to bother most experts." (5, 9)
Citing a number of statements and actions by the World Bank and others, Escobar
(162) shows how First World standards and values are presupposed in development
theory and programs. He notes that talk of'"Extending the benefits of development' to
rural areas overlooked the fact that a majority of the people in the modern sector - the
poor urban classes - did not enjoy the fruits of development."

Development experts

"would not entertain the idea that too much interaction with the modern sector was the
source of peasants' problems."
The rural development discourse repeats the same relations that has [sic] defined
development discourse since its emergence: the fact that development is about
growth, about capital, about technology, about becoming modern. Nothing else.
More recently, Escobar (2004, 15-16) briefly sketched how the development
'dream' became a nightmare:
The development project was an invention of modernity.

What was called

modernization was precisely the process to bring about modernity - the ensemble
of values, institutions, economic systems and social relations that originated in
Europe in the seventeenth century... to... the 'Third World.' Development was
the name given to the strategy of modernization.
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This... was commonly

Of course, colonial and first world powers are not the only ones who may be guilty of intentional or
unintentional manipulation of discourse. Jose de Souza Martins (2000 [1]), a highly respected Brazilian
sociologist, believes that middle class leaders and pastoral agents in the MST and other movements tend to
ideologize the land struggle in a manner that is alien to the way the workers themselves think. He criticizes
the MST and CPT for failing to dialogue with the government and recognize the plurality of postdictatorship Brazil. [Martins [2] 13-15, 22]

presented as a benign process. While it was believed that it entailed a certain
level of dislocation and destruction of traditions, in the long run development was
seen as inevitable and beneficial.... My argument is that modernity is essentially
about displacement... and that displacement, to put it bluntly, has grown out of
hand.
In the 1980s, the response to development theory appeared as recognition of the
multifaceted voices and realities of'third world' people themselves.
[A] relatively coherent body of work has emerged which highlights the role of
grassroots movements, local knowledge, and popular power in transforming
development. The authors representing this trend state that they are interested not
in development alternatives but in alternatives to development, that is, the
rejection of the entire paradigm altogether. In spite of significant differences, the
members of this group share certain preoccupations and interests: an interest in
local culture and knowledge; a critical stance with respect to established scientific
discourses; and the defense and promotion of localized, pluralistic grassroots
movements. (Escobar 1995, 215)
However, Escobar takes this a step forward, citing the need for a breakdown and
restructuring of the discourse itself.
[C]hanging the order of discourse is a political question that entails the collective
practice of social actors and the restructuring of existing political economies of
truth.... This transformation demands not only a change in ideas and statements
but the formation of nuclei around which new forms of power and knowledge
might converge....

Social movements and antidevelopment struggles may
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contribute to the formation of nuclei of problematized social relations around
which novel cultural productions might emerge. The central requirement for a
more lasting transformation in the order of discourse is the breakdown of the
discourse... that is, the appearance of new rules of formation of statements and
visibilities. (216-17)
He views local communities, operating in light of worldwide phenomenon, as vitally
important. But he notes that "unmaking development... is slow and painful, and there are
no easy solutions or prescriptions." (217)
Thought along these lines by Escobar, Wendy Harcourt, and others, has led to
interesting concepts of the "politics of place" which "gives priority to the local level
without abandoning other scales of activism and organization. What one might say about
the global scale of their activities is that it exists to facilitate success at the local level.
They speak of "...extending the idea of a politics of ubiquity by emphasizing its
ontological substrate: a vast set of disarticulated 'places' - households, social
communities, ecosystems, workplaces, organizations, bodies, public arenas, urban spaces,
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diasporas, regions, occupations... connected through webs of signification."

(Gibson-

Graham 2004, 31)

Discourse Analysis, the Redistributive Paradigm, and Land Reform in Brazil
One of the reasons I chose to discuss the redistributive paradigm is that it is, in some
81

Interestingly, one of the places this happened earliest in Brazil was in the Catholic Church, through a
myriad of local groups, communities, etc., notably including the Base Community Movement. Starting in
the late 1960s, the movement developed into an estimated 100,000 autonomous base community groups by
the mid-1980s.
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senses, one of the standard development paradigms that least suffers from the discourse
related domination critiqued by Escobar. The paradigm calls for radical change which
can, at least in theory (the land reforms in Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua might be cited),
emerge from grassroots movements for change. It seeks to empower the poor by handing
over to their control productive assets - especially land.

As presented by Griffin,

especially in his discussion of the basic needs approach, the input and participation of the
poor is essential to the process.82
Yet there is a marked difference between the redistributive paradigm and "unmaking
development" as conceived by Escobar. Partly it is scale: the redistributive paradigm
contemplates changing national economies on a macro-economic level, either through
foreign intervention (Japan, Taiwan, Korea) or state action, whereas the unmaking of
development focuses on local communities working out their own destinies within the
global context. Partly it may be displacement: Escobar criticizes development for its
dislocation and destruction of tradition, and indeed, as noted above, he and other
commentators have found that, in Latin America, land reform has often served to
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destructure traditional patterns the countryside and open it to commercial farming.

But

mostly the difference between the two concepts is the underlying assumption: the
redistribution paradigm essentially relies on economic growth; the alternatives mentioned
by Escobar cast significant doubt on this assumption.
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"Basic needs is not really about things at all.... It is about giving priority in development to the needs
and desires of poor people." (Griffin, 172)
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It can, of course, be argued that - by placing and/or preserving small farmers on the land - redistribution
also avoids dislocation.
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On this point, I have considerable sympathy with Escobar. When I first moved to Brazil in 1969,1 was
assigned as a rural cooperative worker in the state of Espirito Santo, then considered (per GDP) the second
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The difference in practice is even greater. The concept of 'participation' used by
entities like the World Bank is, in practice, deeply different from that envisioned by
Escobar.
In the World Bank we drew up meticulous and systematic studies of evidence of
the importance of participation. The results were surprising. In one study, of 121
rural water storage projects, financed by the Bank, two thirds of projects that
included significant participation of the local population were successful, in
accordance with Bank criteria, and only one tenth of projects without participation
were successful. (Stiglitz 1998, 12)85
It is my experience that, while large development agencies recognize the value of
participation and that "changes cannot be imposed by external agents" (Stiglitz, 13),
participation is basically seen as making more effective programs which the agency itself
judges to be valid. This can be accomplished on a more or less authentic level - i.e., the
agency can (or not) be genuinely open to community input and the organic pace of
development.

Even in the best case, however, this is not the grassroots, local

development Escobar is talking about. And generally the 'best case' does not prevail:
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projects tend to be driven by agency (or government) goals, budgets, and time frames.
Certainly an initial review indicates that this was the situation with the Bank financed
poorest state in Brazil. It was a region of small, independent farmers who had little money but abundance
of food, dignity, and family comfort. It is now a relatively developed state, has far more "miserably" poor
(to use the Portuguese term) people than before, and has the highest murder rate in Brazil.
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1 have retranslated this passage from Portuguese, but I believe it captures the essence of his statement.
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In 2007, I was contacted by a development company (beltway bandit) bidding on a USAID project
intending to establish thirty fully representative community (town level) councils in the interior of Angola
in a period of 15 months (including program start-up and wind-down). I told them I thought this time
frame highly unfeasible.
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Brazilian market-based land reform project that is the topic of this study. It is widely
recognized that the program was almost entirely developed by the World Bank and the
government, and presented as a fait accompli. This is not only true in Brazil - Kay (28)
notes that market-based land reform has generally "...been much driven from above by
the State and international agencies."

Furthermore, while the program sought to

incorporate, through the settlement associations, the type of participation Stiglitz wrote
about, the time frames and processes tended to create associations of highly questionable
authenticity.

Economic Paradigm - Conclusions
Where does this discussion leave us with respect to the value of agrarian reform in
Brazil? The reality is, of necessity, more complex than any single development model
can portray.
It is the very movements that Escobar speaks of that succeeded in putting land
reform back on the government and World Bank agendas.

"First and foremost land

reform is back on the agenda because rural populations have put it there." This expressly
includes the MST. "The world's rural populations will continue to force land reform on
the development agenda because it is necessary if they are to meet their food and
development needs." (SDdimensions, 1-2, 10)
While, as Martins notes, it is unrealistic to believe that land reform can take place
without the government, and the revolutionary land reform still envisioned by some
activists is not likely to occur, land reform can help produce spaces of the sort that
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Escobar and Gibson-Graham write of. Cristobal Kay (22-3), in his evaluation of Latin
American land reforms, notes, with respect to non-radical reforms, that their "greatest
contribution... may lie in the stimulus given to institution building in the countryside....
[Ajgrarian reforms encouraged a greater organizational and participatory presence for the
peasantry in local and national affairs. "
Thus grassroots movements can make use of government and World Bank programs
to help create the spaces they need and the power to include themselves in local and
national dialogues. The reality of the situation, however, is likely to emerge as a surprise
to the movements as much as to the government: while the ideologies and values of the
movements are undoubtedly formative for the people involved in the land struggle, it is
highly doubtful, and indeed not desirable, that the small farmers emerging after the
struggle will simply reflect those ideologies and values. Rather, spaces will have been
created in which those farm families will be able dialogue in new ways regarding their
R7

future. The results may be, in some respects, more "conservative"

than some current

leaders of movements may expect.
The criteria for judging the results of these spaces created by agrarian reform should
be gradualist and inclusive, especially insofar as they truly represent alternatives to
development.

In other words, success will not be immediate, and the standards of

success should be varied and broad. Sustainability is an ongoing process that requires not
only change on the farm but synergy with other sustainable efforts and structures.
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This is an ambiguous term, and may include positions that are or are not politically conservative, e.g.,
regarding family structure, property rights, approaches to change, conservation of land. Small landowners
are capable of organizing radically to defend their rights (e.g., the U.S. Grange movements), often engage
in cooperative action and sustainable land practices, but also have an ownership stake in society and often
resist radical change. But the key is that they enter into the socio-political dialogue, are more able to look
after their interests, and are less open to political manipulation (by right or left) than the landless poor.
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(Santos & Rodriguez 2002, 72-73).
Finally, as indicated above, there is an aspect in which even the redistributive
paradigm may be applicable to land reform in Brazil. This is not at the national level, but
at the local level, where whole communities and regions may be impacted by agrarian
reform.
One of the findings of the study was that, despite the logic of isolated
expropriations that characterized Government intervention during the post-1985
democratic period, there turned out to be a concentration of land reform
settlements that, even though not necessarily in contiguous areas, caused the
regions studied to come to hold one third or more of the settlements and of the
settlement population in their respective states. The study showed that in 89% of
the settlements studied, the initiative for the expropriation request came from the
workers and their movements in the context of "crisis," such as that of the cocoa
crop in southern Bahia; of the sugar crop in the Northeast Zona da Mata (closing
the sugar refineries); of the cotton crop in the interior of Ceara (intensified by the
occurrence of major droughts); the bankruptcy of the large state subsidized
undertakings in the south of Para; the great increase in land value and strong
migratory flux around the Federal District; the crisis in the reproduction of family
agriculture in the South of the country. In these contexts, which provoked the
outbreak of conflicts over the possession of land, the first expropriations carried
out stimulated the pressure for new expropriations, culminating in the creation of
various settlements in the same municipality or in neighboring municipalities,
causing the formation of 'reformed areas' that serve as a counterpoint to the logic

of isolated expropriations and end up creating a new dynamic in the regions in
which they are found. This, in itself, is one of the impacts that the settlements
have provoked. (Leite c. 2001, p. 2)
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We have here an interesting blending of state expropriation resulting from crisis and
conflict and affecting a locality in the manner of a redistributive reform, driven by the
actions of the landless and their movements themselves, and creating both a new type of
space and the articulation and institutions mentioned by Escobar and Kay.

This, I

believe, is a partial picture of what successful land reform in Brazil can accomplish.

Structure of this Study
Any approach to understanding the agrarian reform issue in Brazil must take into
account a wide variety of factors, some perhaps unique to Brazil, and many of which may
seem to defy logic. I initially adopted an historical approach to the question in order to
build toward a more complete understanding of factors presently at work; this is reflected
in Chapter III. Chapter IV examines more closely economic factors between 1970 and
2005, focusing particularly on the development of the complex of activities that impact
agriculture, and viewing these in light of development theory.

Chapter V examines

closely the "market-based" approach to sustainable rural development, particularly as it
was carried out in the Cedula da Terra program in the State of Bahia.

Chapter VI

presents seven case studies, carried out in 2006, of settlements created under the Bahian
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This impact occurred where we worked for the Church in Caseara, Tocantins. We worked with 35
families who, after much struggle, were able to win title to the land they had occupied. Their success had
such a dramatic affect locally, that - after we left the town in 1990 - the conservative mayor (PFL)
provided municipal trucks to help other families occupy land. Last we heard, there are now at least six land
reform settlements in the area.
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Cedula da Terra program. Chapter VII presents an analysis of the case studies, along
with certain conclusions and recommendations.
The two poorest regions of Brazil are the Northeast and the North (the latter is
basically the Amazon region). Land ownership and settlement patterns are much older
and more important in the more populated Northeast than in the Amazon region, where
the economy has been based on extraction of natural resources from the forest and where,
until recently, land ownership patterns were of less importance (Prado Junior, Formagao,
123). In the eastern portion of the Amazon (Mato Grosso, Tocantins, Para, Amapa, and
Maranhao89), many of the settlers are migrants from the Northeast and elsewhere in
Brazil and land patterns tend to follow those of the region from which the migrants come.
For these reasons, this dissertation focuses especially on land patterns in the Northeast,
and it is that region that the case studies were carried out.

89

Maranhao is the only Brazilian state that is legally classed as being both in the Northeast and in legal
Amazonia.
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CHAPTER II

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

The research framework provides for an initial evaluation of the market-based
land reform program in Brazil, as carried out under the Cedula da Terra Program in the
State of Bahia. It has been correctly pointed out that full evaluation of the impact of an
agrarian reform program probably requires a thirty-year period, and even then may not be
conclusive (Kay 1998). But public policy is not an exact science - decisions have to be
made on the best evidence available.

Such decisions always entail a degree of

uncertainty; "Our task is to reduce that uncertainty" (Meadows 1998, 7).
Much of my own experience has been in what has come to be called
"empowerment evaluation" (Fetterman 2003), working with community groups and
NGOs, in an intentionally affirmative manner, to help them clarify their mission, take
stock of their current position in light of that mission, and adapt plans to bring future
actions into closer accordance with desired goals. This experience was useful in carrying
out the case studies, especially in the context of providing and obtaining feedback from
stakeholders.90

However, the primary purpose of the study itself is an initial, and

inevitably partial, evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures of the
GoBAVorld Bank program, and it is intended to share results with those structuring the
program and those who critique it.
90

Lockwood (1993, 164) strongly argues "that fieldworker-respondent relationships matter." We agree:
being able to establish a personal relationship in the interview process is essential to the free flow of
communication. The experience of the interviewers in empowerment evaluation and their deep familiarity
with the region and with small farmers helped to establish the necessary rapport.
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Values are imperative to undertaking evaluation, both in terms of the evaluator
recognizing his or her own values (Crano, 155) and in the sense of setting up "criteria of
merit" (Scriven 2003, 32-34; see Valadez & Bamberger 1994; Margoluis & Salasfsky
1998, 107 et seq.), which set forth characteristics that a good project of the type being
studied should have. I have set forth below a statement of these two sets of values in
Tables II-C and II-A respectively (Patton & Sawacki 1993, 188-91). It seems clear that
there needs to be some degree of sympathy between the values of the evaluator and the
goals of the program. It is also necessary that the evaluator be competent to evaluate the
program in the context of the culture in which it is being carried out (Guzman 2003;
Devereaux 1993).
One of the salutary results of the natural resources movement is to reject the
notion, prevalent in some postmodern circles, that reality is merely a social construct that "there is no reality except that created by people as they attempt to 'make sense' of
their surrounds" (Guba & Lincoln 1989, 12-13) or that "what is commonly called
scientific truth only represents ideological claims" (Donaldson & Scriven 2003, 8).
Environment forces us to come to terms with real limits and possibilities - no amount of
social construct is going to bring back depleted natural resources. As Thomas D. Cook
has stated, the planet on which we live is itself an evaluator (Ibid., 11). Both existence
and values are rooted in reality (e.g., Crano 2003, 155).
That being said, it is also true that reality is very complex and not readily
comprehensible to the evaluator. A certain skepticism is therefore justified as to the
ability of any single evaluation method to capture the whole picture (Worthen, Sanders,
and Fitzpatrick 1997; Patton 1997; Guba & Lincoln). This calls for humility on the part
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of the evaluator, an openness to consensual models, a willingness to use a wide range of
instruments and input, and an ability to deal with ambiguity and uncertainty, (e.g., Guba
& Lincoln; Haas & Springer, 43; Meadows)
[P]rojects operate in highly complex economic, social, administrative, and
political environments that make it difficult to assess the extent to which
successful (or unsuccessful) outcomes were the result of project design and
management. It is often hard to tell whether the higher incomes of small farmers
were a consequence of the rural development project being assessed or whether
they were caused by national agricultural pricing policies, varying credit rates, or
rapid urban growth... or some other factor. (Valadez & Bamberger, 76)
For this reason, in the present study, as broad an understanding as possible is needed
of the Brazilian conjuntura - the socio-economic-political background of events (H. J.
Souza 1999; Marsden & Oakley 1990).

In researching, I found that there is no

comprehensive historical study in Brazil dealing with land from a land reform
perspective, and considerable research was required to develop a historical model that
places current efforts in perspective; this study is set forth in Chapter III. Similarly, a
review of more recent historical economic developments relating to Brazilian agriculture
was required, and this is set forth in Chapter IV.
Valadez & Bamberger (8-10) discuss three models of evaluation used in developing
countries: (1) those where inputs can be measured on the assumption that inputs will lead
to outcome (e.g., vaccination campaigns), (2) those which "focus on the costeffectiveness of the delivery systems and accessibility to the intended target groups," and
(3) those "based on the notion that the principal objective of social development should
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be to help indigenous communities or underprivileged groups (such as... landless
laborers...) develop the organizational capacity and knowledge needed to identify and
satisfy their own needs."

While the current study involves some aspects of the second

model (e.g., relative cost of land under the program, facility of delivery), it is primarily
concerned with the third model. Again, this type of evaluation involves complexity,
requiring flexibility and a variety of instruments (Ibid.)

Sustainability and Indicators
When we speak of sustainability of a land reform program, we need to consider
both environmental and socio-economic sustainability. The standard for the former is
really perpetual: are the land and other natural resources being used in such a way that
they, and the surrounding environment, will not deteriorate over time?

I am not an

environmental scientist and the measures/indicators used in this area are basic ones
arising from my experience in rural development: are legally required reserves being
maintained?

do agricultural practices maintain the soil and avoid harm to the

surrounding environment? what is the situation regarding water resources?
With respect to socio-economic sustainability, time horizons are less distant. No
one expects a land reform settlement to last forever. A settlement that meets the needs of
its residents for twenty or thirty years may well be considered successful. Bittencourt, et
al. (1999) identified eleven factors that affect the success of land reform settlements:
the natural quality of the land and environment
the origins and prior occupations of land settlement dwellers
the socio-economic context surrounding the land settlement
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basic infrastructure and social services
farming/livestock systems and the productive infrastructure
the organization of the productive infrastructure
availability of rural credit
technical assistance
political organization and institutional relationships
agricultural and monetary income
internal differences among the settlement dwellers
In the Northeast, they found that the first of these (poor land and lack of water) tended to
be the primary cause of weak results in land reform, accompanied by lack of credit and
technical assistance, and poor organization.

In strong land reform settlements, the

organization of production was the most important factor (Ibid., 50-51).
Ieno and Bamat (1998), measuring quality of life in land reform settlements in
Paraiba, looked at many of the same factors - rural production, education, health, internal
organization. In addition, they developed questions geared to discovering land settlement
dwellers' subjective view of their own quality of life. Many of these questions were used
in our study.

Sustainability Measures
Introductory note on indicators. A few basic comments on indicators are included
here as a reminder.

The choice of indicators is highly important and requires a

knowledge of and feel for the subject of study. All indicators work toward producing a
comprehensible model of a more complex reality, and inevitably truncate that reality in
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some manner. Poorly chosen indicators produce distorted results. New information can
lead to changes in indicators - a researcher of a complex reality such as land reform
settlements must walk the line between allowing indicators to evolve while keeping the
research reasonably disciplined.

Settlement dweller input in developing indicators is

helpful where it can be achieved (Meadows 1998).
Sustainability measures. Table II.B sets forth indicators for socio-economic and
environmental sustainability.

I seek here to develop appropriate measures of

sustainability applicable for each indicator; in other words, these measures are more
specific indicators that aggregate into the indicators set forth in the table (see, e.g.,
Meadows, 22-23). This is done with respect to each indicator below. In developing these
measures, I have drawn on my own experience as well as the work of others, including
factors that specifically affected the success of land reform settlements, either
independently researched (Ieno and Bamat 1998; Bavaresco 1999; Bittencourt 1999;
Carvalho 1999; Xavier 1999), or drawn from data from the First Census of Agrarian
Reform91 (Schmidt, Marinho & Rosa 1998; David, Waniez & Brustlein 1998;
Bergamasco & Ferrante 1998; Barreira & Paula 1998; Riedl & Navarro 1998; Abelem &
Hebette 1998; Carneiro, Andrade & Mesquita 1998), and ecological indicators such as
the nineteen indicators developed by the Ministry of the Environment for measuring the
likelihood of environmental degradation in the Northeast (MMA 2004).
These sustainability measures are discussed in detail below. A chart summarizing
them is set forth in the conclusion.

91

INCRA/CRUB/UnB (1996-7)
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Table II-A - Criteria of Merit - Agrarian Reform Programs
Indicators
Criteria
Socio-economic
sustainability

•

•

Environmental
sustainability

•
•
•
•
•

Quality of life assessment
o
Dweller opinions
o Neighbor/family links
o
Access to schools, health care, churches, etc.
o
Community identity, celebrations, etc.
Community Association (existence, functions, settler participation,
view of settlers, etc.)
Micro-economic viability
Agricultural methods
Forest or other reserves
Water
Environment surrounding settlement area

Socio-Economic Sustainability
Quality of life assessment
o

Dweller opinions

o

Neighbor/family links

o

Access to schools, health care, churches, etc.

o

Community identity, celebrations, etc.

Many of the questions in the interviews are geared to assessing dweller opinions as to
their own quality of life.92 The underlying premise here is that dweller satisfaction with
their life in the settlement is a strong indicator of whether they will stay on the land and
actively work to better the community. Some of these questions relate to a feeling of
ownership with respect to the settlement - did they participate in the organization of the
group and/or the purchase of the land, do they contribute to the functioning of the
community, do they hold leadership positions? Also important is a sense of belonging:
do they participate in various groups? Open ended questions about hopes for their future
and the future of their families can bring to light to what extent the settlement plays, in
92

In addition to its value as a tool for determining settlement sustainability, settler views of quality of life
touch on their sense of well-being, which, as Meadows (66) points out, is the ultimate end of development.
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their eyes, a role in that future. Questions as to whether, all things being equal, they
would sell their land or move to another settlement, help identify their feelings.
Qualitatively, the answers to these questions have to be viewed in light of tone of
voice and non-verbals, and must be drawn out slowly. Rural people in Brazil tend to be
initially positive (although a positive answer can come in many grades of enthusiasm or
lack thereof), but are more likely to share real feelings after the first half hour or so. It
was also important to have a sampling where both husbands and wives are interviewed; it
is our experience that, where both members of the couple are not positive, the family is
far less likely to remain on the land.93
Neighbor and family relations were also drawn out through questions.

The

underlying premise here is that close ties with neighbors and the presence of extended
family are key elements in creating a sense of belonging and satisfaction with life.
Family ties are highly important in Brazilian society generally and in rural Brazil
especially.94
Access to schools, health care, churches and other services were drawn out through
questioning and observation. Leite et al. (2001, 6) found that, in the settlements they
studied, 90% of children 7-14 were in school - this would seem to be a reasonable
benchmark. The availability of secondary school education (much rarer in rural areas)
can also be an important factor. Availability of healthcare - usually precarious in rural
Brazil - can be significant; settler feelings with respect to health care may be as
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INCRA/CRUB/UnB (1996-7) noted that approximately 12% of the families in the 1996 Agrarian Reform
Census were headed by women.
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We observed in Tocantins, where many settlers did not have family, the resilience of the community in
creating "family" through a series of godfather/godmother - co-godfather/co-godmother relationships.
These may be created through the Church (at baptism, Is' communion, confirmation, or weddings) or
through folk traditions (e.g., dancing around the fire on the Feast of St. John); in either case, the
relationships are meaningful and are taken seriously.
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important as objective information.

Churches (Catholic and Protestant) are almost

always formed by the people themselves; however, the availability of priests and pastors
is worth noting, as are possible religious divisions in the community.

Other services

(bank services, registries, etc.) are of less urgent importance; many of these may be
accessed through the community association.
Finally, community identity can be an important aspect of settler loyalty, ownership,
and sense of belonging. Does the community celebrate certain days (e.g., the anniversary
of founding) or identify itself in other ways (a soccer team, special symbols, a strong
feeling about the community name, etc.)?
Community Association. The market-based land reform program places considerable
emphasis on the role of settler associations in the purchase of land and successful
operation of the settlement (World Bank 2000). I believe that the authenticity, credibility
and effectiveness of these associations are important to settlement sustainability.95 These
were judged both through objective analysis (what is the association doing, what
programs does it have, what is the degree of participation, what types of facilities and/or
equipment does it have?) and questions geared to finding out dweller's opinion of and
participation in the association. One key question was aimed at discovering whether the
dwellers see the association as principally a means for getting credit (or other outside
services) rather than as an essential element of the community itself. In addition, having
worked in Brazil with community groups since 1969, and working with two fellow
interviewers with similar depth of experience, we used our own experience to gain a
sense of the authenticity of each association.
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Early evaluations of the market-based land reform program raised significant doubts as to the quality of
the community associations (Schwartzman 1999, 2, and 2000, 7; Xavier 1999, 22)

Micro-economic viability. Ultimately, the micro-economic viability of a land reform
settlement is decisive with respect to its socio-economic sustainability. Such viability is
not unrelated to other factors; for instance, strong loyalty to and participation in the
settlement, and a strong association, can be factors that make an otherwise non-viable
settlement function.96 However, in the end, if settlers cannot at least meet their basic
needs while living on the land, the settlement will fail.
Some of the factors here are objective: how much and what is produced, how and
where is it marketed, what prices are obtained, are there plans for alternative marketing,
is there any actual or contemplated processing of produce, how much of local settlement
consumption is raised on the land? The basic land quality and parcel size, and the type
and quality of technical assistance (both at the beginning and ongoing) are important.
How do farmers view their labor,97 and what types of labor patterns are used?
Certain indicators look toward possible hidden vulnerabilities and long-term trends
that could affect micro-economic sustainability. What are the cost, source, and type of
inputs used?

What type of mechanical equipment is used?

With respect to this

equipment, what is the age and condition, the cost/source of servicing and spare parts,
and is a reserve fund maintained for repair/replacement? What are the sources/costs of
energy? (see Tschirley 1996; Schmidt, Marinho and Rosa 1998, 41)
Less objective factors include a sense of creativity in the community, leadership able
to look for and seek alternatives, a collective willingness to overcome difficulties.
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Antonio Fernando da Silva, for instance, mentioned a land reform settlement which "by any objective
standard... should have failed." It had poor land and few resources, but "the people are so determined, they
are making it work." Interview, January 31, 2006.
97

In Tocantins (1985-92) we found that small farmers generally did not allocate any value to their own and
family labor when calculating the costs of production.
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An important factor may be how many settlement dwellers have employment
(permanent, temporary, seasonal) off the land, and whether this is of a type that draws
QO

their energy away from farming their land or otherwise.

Other economic activities such

as handicraft production, food processing, and small-scale commerce are also noted.

Environmental Sustainability
Agricultural methods.

The line between socio-economic and environmental

sustainability is an artificial one.

It is for convenience rather than a hard and fast

division. Clearly there can be no long-run socio-economic viability if the settlement is
not sustainable ecologically.

I am not an environmental scientist and environmental

analysis, per se, is not the object of this study. However, a 'reasonable probability that
the land will remain productive for at least one generation would be the minimum
necessary for declaring a land reform settlement sustainable by any criteria.
Agricultural methods are closely tied to both micro-economic viability and
environment. Many questions related to crops and production serve as a basis for both.
Measures of agricultural methods include the following: What type of plowing and
planting is used? Are steps taken to avoid erosion? Is a system of crop rotation and/or
fallow fields followed? Are various crops raised synergistically or is there a tendency
toward monoculture? What types of fertilizers are used? Are pesticides used, and - if so
- which ones? Are organic farming methods used? What is the source and type of
seeds? What animals are raised and under what system (e.g., grazed and/or ration-fed)?
Are fields burned or plowed under?
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Leite (2001, 3-4) found that 79% of settlers 14+ yrs/age worked only on their land, 11 % partly on their
land, 1% entirely off the land, and 9% - presumably retirees - did not work; 69% of family income came
from land produce, 17% from government pensions, and 14% from outside jobs.
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Questions relating to these issues were included in the study. We found the most
relevant areas to involve the synergy and variety of crops/livestock and the question of
organic/non-organic agriculture.
Forest or other reserves.

Natural reserves in the Northeast can include forests,

grasslands, and/or caatinga - the desert-like growth in the semi-arid region.

Key

measures include: What are the legal requirements for maintaining reserves on the land,
and are they being followed? Are other reserve measures being taken? What is the
attitude of settlers to natural areas: i.e., are they seen to have positive value, to be a
resource (in what way?), to be a hindrance to expansion or development?

Are there

ecological education programs in the community and/or schools? What is their content?
Water. Earlier studies have found that nearly two-thirds of land reform settlers have
problems with water (Schmidt, Marinho & Rosa, 39; Leite, 6). This is a significant issue
in the Brazilian Northeast. Key measures include: What is the source of the families'
water for drinking, washing, and stock raising? Is any form of crop watering or irrigation
used? Are water sources (wells, streams, springs) abundant all year around, or are there
dry periods? What are water sources during dry periods? Is there salinization detected?
Has the settlement worked with water cachements (see, e.g., Jordao 1995) or other
appropriate technologies for catching and/or preserving water?
Environment surrounding settlement area. The environment of the settlement is part
of the environment of the surrounding area.

Thus it is important to have some

understanding of this wider environment. Key questions here include land use in nearby
areas, the types of agriculture engaged in (e.g., wide use of pesticides or of irrigation),
whether there is significant burning of fields, whether there are other factors
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(desertification, mining, urban development, pollution) that may significantly affect the
settlement during the next twenty-five years. What is sought is a broad picture, with an
awareness of possible warning signals of environmental circumstances with potentially
significant impact for the community being studied.
In the current study, our examination of the surrounding areas was rapid, based on
personal observation, discussions with technical advisors and settlement dwellers, and
our own prior knowledge of the region. We did not identify any factors that raised
serious issues affecting the viability of the communities studied, but a more in depth
study could be made of river water quality, water tables, and long term climate trends, the
last especially in the most marginal semi-arid region (e.g., Veneza).

Sustainability - Conclusion
The ideas set forth above are charted below. Our study did not seek answers to all
the measures, especially in those categories most closely related to environmental
analysis. But these measures are mentioned here as a guide to possible future analysis.
Table II-B Land Reform Settlement Sustainability Measures
Indicators
Measures99
Quality
•
•
•
•

99

of life assessment
Dweller opinions
Neighbor/family links
Access to schools, health care,
churches, etc.
Community identity,
celebrations, etc.

"Ownership"
•
Participated in organization of group?
•
Participated in land purchase?
•
Perceived role in community
•
Leadership or other roles*
Belonging
•
Participation in groups/activities
•
Family/friend network
Future
•
Perceptions 2 yrs./lO yrs./20 yrs.
Willingness to leave/sell
Husband/wife dynamic & attitudes
Community sports teams, symbols, name
Unity/divergence

Where possible, measures marked with an asterisk should be graphed over time (Meadows: 38)
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Community Association (existence,
functions, settler participation, view of
settlers, etc.)

Micro-economic viability

Agricultural methods

Activities & programs*
% and quality of participation*
Facilities & equipment*
•
Source of these important (excellent facilities &
equipment may come from political patronage rather
than association authenticity)
Dweller opinions
•
Do dwellers view association as simply a mechanism
for obtaining credit or other benefits?
Land quality
Parcel sizes
Type, quantity & quality of crops & livestock*
Type/costs of inputs*
•
Fertilizers & pesticides
•
Seeds (do they have a seedbank?)
•
Equipment (repairs, parts, reserves)
•
Energy
Labor input*
•
Individual/family
•
Cooperative100
•
Collective
Marketing practices and alternatives*
Local processing (present and/or planned)*
Local consumption v. purchased consumption*
Other sources of income*
•
Labor (daily, temporary, seasonal)
•
Small scale manufacturing or commerce
•
Pensions
•
Government or NGO work projects101
Base information:
•
Arable land per capita
•
Soil quality and tvpes
® Field/pasture size and placement
Soil treatment
•
Co-planting & alternating crops
•
Rotating crops - fallow areas
•
Crops appropriate for soil
•
Organic residue
•
Fertilizer (see also below)
•
Erosion
•
Soil degradation
Crops & livestock*

100
In our experience, almost all smallholding communities have some form of cooperative labor.
Generally this takes the form of trading days of work (e.g., gathering in small groups to plant and harvest)
and of mutirdes - "barn raising" style activities, where neighbors gather together to work on a specific
large project, usually including a meal and some form of social/festive activities as well.
101

Work projects are common in the Northeast, especially during drought periods. In the ones we
organized through WFO/Catholic Relief Services during the drought of 1993, communities chose projects
(usually construction of rainwater cachements or cisterns) and farmers received food for working on these
projects. This allowed most of the farmers to remain with and support their families, rather than
temporarily migrating in search of work (see Jordao).
83

•

•

•

•

Biodiversity
•
Variety
•
Crop/livestock mix
•
Harmony w/natural biodiversity
Orientation
•
Conscious use of sustainable methods
•
If not, what?
Intensity/carrying capacity
•
Crops/ha.
•
Livestock/ha.
Methods per se
•
Clearing (burning?)
•
Plowing
•
Planting
•
Harvesting
•
Others

Inputs*
•
•
•
•

Forest or other reserves

Fertilizers
Pesticides (which pests? appropriate?)
Seeds (do they have a seedbank?)
Tools & Equipment
•
Ownership
•
Source
•
Cost & reserves
•
Maintenance
•
Appropriate-ness
•
Power
•
Energy
•
Sources
•
Cost
•
Quality/dependability
•
Volume
•
Usage
Technical Assistance & Education
•
Who provides technical assistance?
•
Agricultural extension services
•
Are farmers actively involved?
•
Education/capacitation available
Labor input*
•
Individual/family
•
Cooperative
•
Collective
Hired (permanent, temporary, occasional, seasonal)
Base information:
•
Natural environment
•
Flagship species*
•
Mapping of reserves and linkages
Reserves
•
Legal reserves
•
Other reserves
Settler attitudes/behavior
•
Perceived value of reserves
•
Vegetable products
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Water

Environment surrounding settlement area

•
Firewood
•
Medicinal plants
•
Materials for construction, artisan work, etc.
•
Other
•
Animal products
•
Hunting
•
Fishing
•
Honey
•
Other
Environmental education
•
Materials and presentation
Locale and audience
Base Information:
•
Annual rainfall and rainfall patterns
•
Water table level
•
Hydrographic mapping
Household water:
•
Potable
•
Sources
•
Volume of use
•
Treatment
•
Washing & other household uses
•
Sources
•
Volume of use
•
Runoff & recycling
Agricultural water:
•
Crop watering
•
Sources
•
Volume
•
Where used
•
Periodicity
•
Irrigation
•
% of arable land irrigated
•
Mechanism used
•
Cost
•
Energy consumption
•
Salinization or waterlogging
•
Stock watering
•
Sources
•
Volume
•
Periodicity
Drought contingencies
•
Current land use in surrounding area
•
Socio-economic or environmental patterns
•
New highways or railroads
•
Urban growth
•
Major irrigation projects
•
Tourist development
•
Mining activity
Trends in climate change
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It is important to focus on the issue for which indicators are being developed; if this
is not done, one risks an "overload of information" (Tschirley 1996, 4). Indicators should
be "robust" (i.e., able to portray the reality the describe) without attempting to be
exhaustive (Vieira 2000, 56). In the present case, the goal is to determine whether the
agrarian reform settlements are sustainable for agricultural purposes for at least a
generation (± 25 years). This question is distinguishable from, although not unrelated to,
other important environmental questions such as preservation of native caatinga growth
and natural (as opposed to agricultural) biodiversity.
To the extent possible, it is important to look at indicators over time. In agriculture,
trends over time can reveal important patterns. Similarly, it is important to recognize
stock and flow indicators; often, stock indicators will be the most easily identifiable, but
may be most meaningful with respect to the flow they illustrate (Meadows 1998, 12, 28).
Drawing up sustainable development indicators is "an enormous challenge."
(Tschirley: 2)

The challenge is augmented for farm environment

indicators;

environmental information is often gathered for other purposes and/or relates to broad
geographic areas, making it difficult to relate it to individual smallholdings or even
groups of smallholdings (Hamblin 1996, 2). In the present case we start with the farm
and look outward, rather than vice versa.

For example, see what pesticides farmers

actually use, rather than working back from general data on pesticides found in local
rivers. While not pretending to divorce land reform settlements from the surrounding
environment, this seems the best method for focusing on those elements that will most
directly affect the land in question.
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However, it is important to have an understanding of the general environment in
which the settlements operate. This environment affects the local farms and can provide
indications as to agricultural

practices that might present potential

long-term

environmental risks.
Table II-C - Evaluator Values
Evaluator Background

Values

North American, Catholic, male, 30+ years
experience in Brazil, trained community organizer,
13 years experience working with Brazilian
subsistence farmers (mostly with CPT/Church),
political sympathies with Catholic wing of PT
(Workers' Party)
• Catholic Social Doctrine, especially
concerning the right of the worker to own
the instruments of his trade and his land
(CNBB 1980; Pontifical Justice & Peace
Council 1998)
• Jeffersonian concept of positive value of
small farmers in society
• Distrust of capitalism, especially in terms of
large accumulations of capital
• Preference for organic farming
• Distrust of motivation of large fertilizer,
seed, and pesticide producers
• Belief in the value of solidarity, community,
neighbor and extended family ties
• Belief in a link between moral integrity and
community solidarity
• Belief in the importance of environmental
sustainability

Research Site
Research was carried out at seven Cedula da Terra settlements in the State of
Bahia. Selection of the land reform settlements was made by the research team based on
information provided by professionals working in land reform.

As set forth in the

Overview of Case Studies, we selected settlements in the northern portion of the State,
primarily in the semi-arid region, because (1) this region is among the most challenging
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in Brazil to carry out land reform and agriculture generally, (2) the semi-arid Northeast
encompasses the largest and poorest rural population in Brazil, and (3) our research team
had experience with and an affinity for the semi-arid Northeast.

We also selected

settlements that were considered to be relatively successful because we believe that there
is a need to study successful projects in developing countries in order to add to the
knowledge of locally appropriate best practices (Tendler 1-8, 1997)
Five of the research sites are located in what is officially the Semi-Arid microregion of Bahia, and two (Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III) close to that region on the
western edge of the neighboring North Coastal micro-region. Beyond a narrow coastal
strip that was originally Atlantic rain forest, the interior of northern Bahia is dry. Climate
ranges from fairly dry in the easternmost settlements we studied (Nova Lusitania and Boa
Vista III) to drier - 600-700mm/annual rainfall - in the westernmost (Fazenda Veneza).
The natural vegetation of the Semi-Arid region is caatinga - sparse, low-lying
bush made up of cacti and thorny scrub. There is a six-month dry season during which
no rainfall occurs, and every several years this is extended into longer drought periods.
One such period was ending at the time of our visit, and the importance of rain was
emphasized by many interviewees.
Stock raising (cattle, goats, sheep) has historically predominated in the caatinga
area, along with subsistence farming. The soil is relatively good, and manioc, black
beans, and small amounts of corn (maize) grow well. The region is one of small and
middle sized farms and larger ranches.
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Methodologies
The most significant aspect of this research was the field work carried out in
seven land reform settlements, especially those aspects involving evaluation of quality of
life, socio-economic sustainability, and the authenticity and effectiveness of community
associations. Questionnaires were used based on those successfully employed in earlier
studies (Ieno & Bamat), but they were used with caution. It is my experience that rural
people in Brazil reveal their thoughts and feelings through a patient process of
conversation.

Simple answers to questionnaires tend to "elicit atypical roles and

responses" (Webb 2000, 1; see Lockwood 1993), especially as rural Brazilians may
answer in manners they think they ought to answer or in manners that they believe will
please the questioner. It is essential to observe the way language is used in responses and
accompanying non-verbals (Webb 128, et seq.). Thus questionnaires need to be seen
more in terms as a guideline to the interviewers (what are we seeking to find out?) than a
tool to be used rigidly with rural settlement dwellers. Use of open-ended questions and
allowing interviewees to tell their story are important (Seidman 1998, 12-13).
Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick (163) quote Elspeth Huxley, who lived in rural
Africa:
The best way to find things out... is not to ask questions at all. If you fire off a
question, it is like firing off a gun - bang it goes, and everything takes flight and
runs for shelter. But if you sit quite still and pretend not to be looking, all the
little facts will come and peck round your feet, situations will venture forth from
thickets, and intentions will creep out and sun themselves on stone; and if you are
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very patient, you will see and understand a great deal more than a man with a gun
does. (The Flame Tree of Thika, 272)
For these reasons, a number of open-ended questions were provided in the
questionnaires and the three interviewers, all of whom have years of experience in the
rural Northeast, listened to settlers' stories rather than pushing for answers to individual
questions. The result of this method is that conversations tended to veer toward matters
of concern to the settlers, and not all questions on the questionnaire were necessarily
answered by every interviewee.
In fact, when one is willing to listen, rural Brazilians tend to be very forthcoming
about their situation, expressing their thoughts and feelings more readily than most North
Americans do. We found the settlers of the seven settlement areas to be open in this
manner.
Our method followed a pattern. Equipped with introductions from CDA program
officials who were trusted by the communities, we initially (except in the case of Nova
Lusitania) made contact with the technical advisors. In one case (Moita Redonda) the
technical advisor accompanied us in our initial visit to the settlement; in other cases, they
introduced us to settlers or sent word that we would be coming.

Arriving at the

settlement, we would meet with a group of settlers - the meetings were usually called by
association leaders (in Nova Lusitania, by a church leader), but were generally open to all
who wanted to attend. Sitting in a circle, we would introduce ourselves, present our
credentials, and explain that we were visiting the settlement as part of an evaluation for a
doctoral thesis. We would then ask those present to introduce themselves, and would let
the conversation evolve. These meetings lasted for one to two hours, and were generally
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followed by an invitation to visit the fields and/or association facilities (schools, casas de
farinha, the bolacha factory at Boa Vista III, etc.), which we did.
During the group meeting we would state our interest in interviewing individuals, and
we were usually approached by several people who were interested in being interviewed.
Following our visit to fields and association buildings, we three interviewers then divided
up, generally starting with the people who had expressed an interest, and began
interviewing. We found no shortage of people who were willing to talk to us - in fact,
we did not encounter anyone in any of the communities who refused to be interviewed.
Generally the interviews took place in the interviewees' home, although a few were
interviewed in their fields, at neighbor's homes, or elsewhere.

Rural Brazilians are

highly social people, and interviews were seldom isolated one-on-one undertakings.
There were often others present, and where those others (especially husbands or wives,
but also older children, relatives, and neighbors) actively participated in the interview,
their responses were also recorded. Interviewees were generally eager to show us their
homes, house lots (vegetable gardens, fruit trees, poultry, pigs), and other undertakings in one case, for instance, the small candy shop they operated in their home.
Selection of interviewees was generally random - each interviewer would go from
house to house, usually in different sections of the settlement.

We attempted (and

succeeded) to get a range of interviewees, with a good mixture of men and women of
varying age groups. Where possible, we sought out for interviewing certain individuals
who were recognized as formal or informal leaders, but we also always included a
number of interviewees who did not have leadership roles.
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Especially regarding the authenticity and effectiveness of community organizations,
there is a degree of "connoisseurship" (Eisner 1991; Worthen, Sanders, and Fitzpatrick,
128-9; see Meadows, 7) - the ability of one with years of experience to have an educated
sense of what is going on. In this case the three interviewers, all of whom have training
and 15+ years experience in community organization in rural Brazil, had a sense as to the
level of authenticity of a given community group. The presence of a female interviewer
was important as women observers, conversing with women in rural communities, tend to
learn more about certain dynamics of community life than do male observers talking with
either male or female settlement dwellers.
Micro-economic information, important to judging the sustainability of land
settlements, was approached sensitively (see Christensen 1993). On the whole, settlers
were very open with information, but the interviewers never pushed for answers where
interviewees seemed reluctant to provide them.
Especially with respect to issues involving quality of life, associations, microeconomic viability, agricultural practices, environmental reserves, and surrounding social
environment, rapid rural appraisal techniques were used as appropriate (Margoluis and
Salafsky 134; Valadez and Bamberger 151-152, 210-213; National Environmental
Secretariat of Kenya 1991).
To the extent possible, information learned in these ways was triangulated with other
information, such as statistics as to the numbers of people leaving the land settlements,
information on loan repayments, observations of neutral local observers, etc.
our time frame did not allow as much triangulation as we would have liked.
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However,

Analysis of Data
Our team began to analyze data on-site. Following introductory meetings with
settlers and the subsequent tour of settlement facilities, the team would meet briefly to
discuss issues that had arisen and to detail our interview strategy.

We would then

separate and begin interviewing. In most cases, we worked separately in the interview
process, although occasionally two of us would be present at an interview (at times this
happened when two of us chanced to arrive at the same home, or when two of us were
visiting a facility or field together and an opportunity to interview arose; however, it also
occurred in some cases where we felt that an interviewee had particularly important
information to provide and/or a dual perspective (often male/female) might be helpful).
At least once or twice during the day, I would seek out my team members to
briefly exchange information - who we had interviewed, who needed to be interviewed,
any unusual or interesting facts we had gleaned, anything we thought needed to be further
examined. In all of the settlements, the interviewing extended over at least two days
(three days in Boa Vista III, Moita Redonda, and Biritinga); although interviewing often
went on until relatively late (8 p.m.), we would always convene in our quarters to discuss
what we had learned that day and plan for the next.
This on-site analysis allowed us to go back to interviewees and verify questions or
inconsistencies. It also allowed us to identify people we should interview - for instance,
individuals frequently mentioned by other settlers, or those mentioned as being in
opposition to the current association leadership.
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Both during and toward the end of our visits we would return and discuss our
findings with community leaders, clarifying factors we had not fully understood. Among
those who were very helpful in this respect were Adilson, past President of Vila Canaa,
and his wife Veralucia; Erico, President of Fazenda Veneza; Petrus, a leader in Nova
Lusitania; Railda, a leader in Passos da Esperan9a; Antonio Sales, President, and Josi,
Treasurer of Biritinga; and Walmir, President, and Israel, Treasurer of Moita Redonda.
The first community we visited was Vila Canaa on March 16, 2006. We then had
further contact with the technical advisor, interviewed the local CAR manager, and did
one day of interviewing at Fazenda Veneza before returning to Vila Canaa on March 19
(we finished up at Fazenda Veneza on March 20). This allowed us to approach these two
communities with more perspective than if we had completed our interviewing at Vila
Canaa before visiting another community.
After these first two visits, we returned to our base for four days before going out
to the next two: Passos da Esperan^a (March 27-28) and Moita Redonda (March 29-31).
We took similar break periods before visiting Nova Lusitania (April 5-6) and, for
personal reasons related to my job, Biritinga (April 18-20).

We then went back to

Salvador and re-interviewed key CDA personnel (see below) before visiting the final site
of Boa Vista III (April 28-30).
During these breaks we were able to initially analyze and discuss the materials we
had received and to research additional information (e.g., with respect to details of
programs such as PRONAF that had been mentioned repeatedly in interviews). After the
first two visits, we also decided to add a question about kinship links within each
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settlement - whether the interviewee had relatives living in the same settlement (the
answers we received confirmed that the great majority of settlers did have relatives).
In four cases (Nova Lusitania, Vila Canaa, Moita Redonda, Fazenda Veneza), we
were able to discuss our findings with the technical advisor after our visits. We were also
able to discuss findings in most cases with other local sources of information, although I
would have liked to have done more of this had we the time. As noted above, on April
26, having completed all site visits except to Boa Vista III (our visit to that community
was prompted by these interviews), we returned to Salvador and discussed our findings
with Berta Veloso dos Passos and Antonio Fernando Silva, CDA agronomists who had
oriented us in locating possible study sites. On their suggestion, we also interviewed a
senior CDA agronomist, Dr. Penedo, who was particularly informative as to the sub-soil
issues in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, but who also responded to a whole series of
questions we had developed based on our site visits (Berta and Fernando had also
responded to these questions).
Following each set of site visits, we reviewed our interview sheets, refreshing our
memories.

Daniel Carvalho prepared a brief (two-three page) summary for each

community. We organized folders for each community, including a formatted fact sheet,
all interview responses, signed releases from interviewees, Daniel's

summary,

supplementary documents such as maps and copies of association documents, and cross
references to interviews made outside of the settlement.
Returning to the United States, I began the process of analyzing, tabulating, and
translating key portions of the interviews (both those carried out with settlers and others).
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I experimented with a tabulation form, but found it not to be very useful. I found the
most workable method of analysis was to create a complete interview list for each
settlement, based on the numbered interview forms, and then create a Word document for
each category of responses in each community.
Questions had been structured to fairly easily classify the results on a cross-case
study basis.

However, given the free-flowing nature of interviews, material often

appeared in places other than the response to the relevant question. This was particularly
true with respect to settler attitudes, matters dealing with the association and collective
areas, historical information, and economic information. Therefore, each interview form
had to be combed thoroughly to assure that relavant information for each category was
recorded in the appropriate Word document.
Interviewers had been requested to write down direct quotes when they found
these to be particularly applicable or pertinent. I translated these quotes. These were
particularly useful in writing up sections relating to settler satisfaction, sufficiency of
income, views of the future, attitudes toward the MST, and - to a lesser extent comments on history and the association. The quotes often communicate settler feelings
more clearly than a mere summary of the statement or a statistic would do.
Interviewers also noted non-verbals and made other observations. These were
noted in the appropriate Word documents.
Once information had been placed in the appropriate Word document categories,
it was fairly easy to write up each case divided into those appropriate categories. I then
did a cross-analysis of case studies. In some cases (attrition rates, number of settlers

willing to trade or sell, settler response to whether life was better or worse in comparison
to previous experience) the cross-case analysis could be quantified and charted in a
meaningful manner. More qualitative analysis was required for other areas, notably data
related to associations and collective areas, agricultural production, and settler attitudes.
Where possible, findings were checked against data from other studies. This was
particularly the case with respect to attrition rates, price per hectare, and price per family.
However, much of the data available applies to very early (c. 1998) studies of Cedula da
Terra programs, and other data is questionable.
Written case studies and analysis were reviewed by Brenda King-Powers, who
made suggestions and provided additional input based on her experience as an
interviewer.

Daniel Carvalho, our other interviewer, does not speak English, but he

provided input on several points via telephone and e.mail.
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Research Goal: To provide an initial evaluation of the viability of market-based
land reform as a possible instrument for effecting land redistribution in Brazil, seeking to
identify program strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures.
Primary Research Question: Is market-based land reform potentially an effective
instrument to redistribute land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and
economically sustainable manner?
Secondary Research Questions102 (the essential focus of research is reflected in the
questions printed in bold; other questions serve to provide background information useful
to the analysis of the essential questions):
1) Does the nature of the program, per se, create issues that cause a significant
philosophical barrier to its acceptance on the part of a significant portion of
Brazilian society?
(a) Does the program promote a concept of land as a commodity, rather
than as a non-renewal environmental resource with which humans live
in a stewardship relationship?
(b) Is the program's emphasis on land purchase contradictory to the idea
that landless farmers have a right to land, which right must be asserted,
and, if so, does this constitute a significant problem?
Methods:
(a) Ongoing review of current literature
(i)
World Bank literature
(ii)
Government publications
(iii)
MST publications
(iv)
Other observers
(b) Interviews with key leaders
2) Political issues:
(a) Does the program significantly impair other forms of land reform
through transfer of political focus and/or funds?
(b) Does the program tend to reinforce the power of local elites that have
been historically opposed to land reform?
(c) To what extent has the program been used to undercut the action of
landless movements such as MST?
Methods:
(a) Ongoing review of current literature
(b) Analysis of government budgets and policies
(c) Questionnaires and interviews with land settlement dwellers
102

These Secondary Questions are directly linked to questions asked and observations made in the case
studies.
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(d) Field observation.
3) Administrative issues:
(a) What is the facility of the process from the point of view of the
purchasing farmers?
(b) What is the relative quality and value of land purchased, in
comparison with other land reform procedures in Brazil?
(c) What is the quality of technical assistance provided?
Methods: All three issues were examined most closely with respect to the
settlement areas studied, through interviews with land settlement leaders and
other local observers and through analysis of publicly available documents on
land transactions and prices.
4) Sustainability issues:
(a) What is the level of overall satisfaction of land settlement dwellers?
(b) To what degree are land settlement associations authentic and
effective?
(c) What is the micro-economic viability of holdings (i.e., extent to
which potential income exceeds costs, including payments for the
land)?
(d) To what extent are agricultural practices environmentally and
economically sustainable?
(e) To what extent have environmental reserves been provided for on the
land?
Methods: These issues were examined with respect to the settlement areas
studied. Methods included questionnaires, interviews with land settlement
dwellers and other local observers, field observation. With respect to issues (c)
and (d), a sample of individual holdings were be examined in depth.
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Chapter III

Historical Background

Introduction

The attempts at Brazilian agrarian reform generally, and the Cedula da Terra
program specifically, are best understood in their historical context. As there was no
comprehensive history of Brazilian land from an agrarian reform perspective, in
preparation for this dissertation I wrote such a history (Powers 1999). I also specifically
reviewed economic development of agriculture in Brazil during the thirty-five years prior
to our case studies (Powers 2006). This chapter focuses on the findings of those studies
most relevant to the subject at hand.
Brazilian history (since European discovery) may be roughly divided eight
periods:
Early Colonial Period, 1500- 1690: the discovery of Brazil by the Portuguese and
the development of sugar plantations, principally in the Northeast.
Late Colonial Period, 1690 - 1808: the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, and the
shift of economic and political power toward the Southeast.
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The Monarchy, 1808-1889: the transfer of the Portuguese court (fleeing
Napoleon) to Rio de Janeiro, and (beginning 1822) the establishment of Brazil as
an independent monarchy under the descendents of the Portuguese kings; one of
the last acts of the monarchy was to abolish slavery in 1889.
The Old Republic, 1891-1930: following a brief rule by a military transition
government, the republic was established; it was a period of strong state
governments and a relatively weak federal government; coffee was the single
most important economic factor.
The Vargas Government, 1930-1946: a dictatorship headed by Getulio Vargas, a
civilian; Vargas saw himself as a modernizing force and focused on urban
industrial matters; the government enacted corporativist labor laws (including
with respect to rural unions) that are still the basis of Brazilian labor relations.
The democratic interlude, 1946-1964: a period that witnessed political instability
(the military serving as a moderating force), construction of the new capital in
Brasilia, and the rise (especially in the Northeast) of rural worker movements; the
period ended with very high inflation and a weak, leftist president - Joao Goulart.
The Military Dictatorship, 1964-1985: begun by moderate military leaders in
what was expected to be a short transition to stabilize the country, the government
was taken over by hard-line military; nationalist in outlook, the government
created high tariff barriers; the initial years saw unusually high GDP growth but,
with the first oil crisis in 1974, this growth began to unravel and the economy
slipped steadily over the next decade.
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The post-dictatorship period, 1985-present, including the presidencies of Jose
Sarney, a civilian who had been a pro-military government senator during the
dictatorship and who was (and is) closely tied to large landholdings; Fernando
Collar, who was impeached, and his idiosyncratic successor, Itamar Franco; and
two serious presidents (both had been strong members of the opposition to the
dictatorship): Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) of the center-left PSDB,
who stabilized the currency and introduced both the bolsa familia and Cedula da
Terra programs, and Lula (2003-present) of the Workers' Party (PT), who
continued and built upon those programs.
Our discussion here focuses primarily on the period beginning with the military
dictatorship.
In my historical study, which covered the period since 1500, I identified (Powers
1999, 1-2) nine factors that dominate the debate on land use and rural issues:
•

an agricultural system geared primarily toward exportation

•

the triptych of large landholdings, monoculture, and cheap labor

•

under-use of land, poor agricultural techniques, and ecologically harmful practices

•

land as a source and symbol of power and status

•

a complex relationship among land, commerce, and finance

•

a complex relationship between landowners and government

•

confused land titles and possessory rights

•

violence, corruption, and injustice

•

frustration of efforts to carry out reform
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Parallel to these factors, and alternative to them (in a certain sense) has been the
continuous presence of subsistence fanning, sometimes carried out (especially in the
North and Northeast of Brazil) by farmers without formal title to their land (posseiros)
and by renters and share-croppers.

Background of Land Reform
By the late colonial period, writers in the colony were calling for land reform.
Among the first of these was Joao Daniel (1722-76), a Jesuit priest working in the north
of Brazil.

He and others argued that a redistribution of land was indispensible to

resolving the problems of unproductive latifundios and hunger in the country side. They
saw the land question as constituting a social problem and a situation of profound
injustice, and as adding to the problems of corruption and violence (Jobim 1983, 39,
80).103
Leopoldo Jobim notes that two types of reform were advocated: (1) reforms
affecting land ownership, involving redistribution of land for social purposes, and (2)
reforms advocating technical advances to encourage productivity.

He refers to these

respectively as reforma agraria (agrarian reform) and reforma agricola (agricultural
reform). The Crown was actively interested in reform "as long as it did not touch on the
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Luis dos Santos Vilhena, writing in the end of the 18th Century, criticized the morgados, which only
served "...to rob humanity of many means of subsistence," and "the unending and extremely extensive
landholdings that have been granted as sesmarias in Brazil" (M. Silva, 65). Dom Marcos Antonio de
Souza, Bishop of Salvador at the beginning of the 19th Century, saw large landholdings as blocking orderly
settlement in the interior: "This shows that they are a great obstacle to the propagation of the human
race...." (F.C.Teixeira Silva, 10-11).
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problem of distribution of land." It feared alienating landowners and losing its base of
support in Brazil (Jobim, 28).104
Jobim (26) notes that the belief during the Enlightenment in the power of reform
through legislative and administrative measures was "immense," and Ligia Osorio Silva
mentions (1996, 64), during this period, the Portuguese government's "excessive valuing
of the role of administrative measures as conductors of social reform." But governmental
measures advocating reforms were frequently withdrawn under pressure from the
colonial elite, or were ignored. When actually put into practice, they were often counterproductive, creating problems rather than resolving them (See, e.g., L. Silva, 65-66).105
This pattern can be seen in the fate of the royal Alvara of October 5, 1795. The
Crown was concerned with preventing land grants that would dispossess or cause conflict
with colonists who were already farming the land as posseiros:
...on one hand, harm and very grave damage to the Rights of My Royal Crown; on
the other hand, consequences no less damaging and offensive to the Public Good,
and the equality with which should be, and should have been, distributed such
land to their Dwellers, such irregular distribution having reached such a state that
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However, M. Silva (1998, 65, 72) notes that some of the large cattle ranches in Piaui were broken up
during the reforms instituted by the Marquis do Pombal (Portuguese prime minister from 1750 to 1777)
based on the concept that their sesmarias had been illegally granted. Motta (1998, 123-125) also notes
largely ineffective attempts by the Portuguese Crown at some sort of land redistribution. In 1753, royal
Resolutions of April 11 and August 2 provided that "land granted in sesmaria on which there are colonists
cultivating the soil and paying rent to the sesmarios should be granted to the real cultivators." See also
below the discussion of the Alvara of October 5, 1795.
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Skidmore (1998, 51) notes that Pombal did effect two reforms that impacted Brazil: revising the
economic administrative structure in a way that required Brazilian legal and customary practices to be
reinterpreted by judges sympathetic to Portugal's mercantalist ideas, and forming three commercial
monopoly companies to exploit exports of the Amazon, Pernambuco, and coastal whaling.
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many of these Dwellers have not been able to obtain ...Sesmarias106... because of
objections of those without any Right...[trying] to possess themselves without
Merit, and without legitimate license, to that which should have been validated in
Titles to their possessions.
The Alvara not only recognized the right to land of those who actively cultivate it, but
required, with respect to existing idle sesmarias (or the idle portions of same), that
ownership be sold or given within two years to someone who would cultivate them, on
pain of the land being returned (<devoluta) to the Crown. Within a year, the Alvara was
withdrawn (Motta 1998, 123-125).
Here we have patterns which continue to be active through the present time: a
distinction between agrarian and agricultural reform, government reluctance to interfering
with large landowners, and a tendency to try to resolve issues through the issuance of
legal and administrative measures elaborated in an intellectual context far from the reality
on which they are to be imposed, with negligible or negative results.
The period from independence to the military dictatorship (1822-1964) continued
to witness frustrated reforms. These included attempts to regulate land in the Law of
1850,107 the 1890s proposals of Rui Barbosa to distribute land to former slaves, limited
attempts toward the end of the Vargas government to effect agrarian reform, and active
but unproductive discussion of land reform in the 1950s. Throughout this time there was
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Semarias are a form of land grand peculiar to Portugal - grants were made on the condition that the land
be developed, and if it was not developed the land would revert to the crown.
107

Law 601 of September 18, 1850.
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a growing recognition that land patterns were a barrier to development, accompanied by a
seeming inability to do anything about them.
The distinction between agrarian and agricultural reform persisted. A series of
technocratic solutions to the agrarian problem emerged during the Old Republic, with no
attempt at meaningful structural change.108 The Vargas government, which showed some
inclination toward change, would not effect a land redistribution:
Vargas strongly went against the agrarian interests, brought the latifundios under
control, incentivized internal colonization, limited the expansion of large
landowners, promoted small scale family production on the frontier... but
abstained from promoting... modernization of the agrarian structure or... agrarian
reform, leaving the traditional latifundio untouched (Linhares and Silva, 129).
The growth of the peasant leagues in the 1950s,109 together with the new influence
of rural unions, the increasing concern of the Church, and a widespread opinion that the
Brazilian land structure was archaic, gave hope for the first time that a solid reform might
be undertaken. Indeed, some progress seemed to be made and significant legislation was
pending when the military takeover of 1964 cut the process short.
Confused Land Titles and Violence
The background necessary to understand Brazilian land reform would not be
complete without mentioning conflicting land titles and land rights. From the colonial
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Mendonga (1997) presents a thorough analysis of these efforts
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The Peasant Leagues began to be formally recognized in 1955. Initially growing out of groups to help
pay funeral expenses, they were organized by lawyer Francisco Juliao and began to demand a greater voice
for the rural poor. ( See, e.g., Andrade 1989; Martins, 1995)
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period onward, Brazil has had a pattern of contradictory and confusing land titles,
squatters often living on land to which they have no formal title (although they may have
rights of adverse possession), while there are often more than one title to the property.
Repeatedly the government recognized possessory rights without reference to the legality
(or illegality) of the manner in which those rights were obtained. Taxation of land
transfers often results in land being transferred in fact but not in the registry.

This

situation persists not only on the frontiers of Amazonia and Mato Grosso, but even in
cities such as Rio de Janeiro and surrounding areas.
Marcia Motta cites James Holston, who states that "land law in Brazil promotes
conflict, and not solutions, because it establishes the terms by which grilagem is
consistently legalized" (Motta 1998, 20-21). Holston's is, she notes, an original thought
on the subject; it is also a highly insightful one. The continuous process of recognizing
and subsequently legitimizing posses, no matter from whom or how obtained, rewards
those who are able and willing to seize land unscrupulously through fraud or violence.
It has been noted, for instance, that the Law of 1850 ignored customary rural land
patterns, including the use of communal lands. Teixeira da Silva (1999, 11, 14) has
produced evidence that, as the majority of people did not understand the law, the elite
learned to use it as a tool for seizing land by having unregistered land declared devoluta
(returned to the state) and then registering their own titles to it.
The great landlords, principally cattlemen, coming from the coastal region,
managed to register... ample areas of land, as the traditional possessory rights and
forms of communal occupation were not recognized, managing subsequently,
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through incredible violence, to seize [the lands of] rural workers and Indians
(Linhares and Silva 1999, 62).
Marcia Motta's study of legal cases (1998, 225) leads her to note:
...the manner in which the fazendeiros

— lords and possessors of land ~

consecrated their power and prestige, permitting them to forge titles to land,
falsifying in local registries — with the connivance of registrars and witnesses —
the origin and extension of their domains. It demonstrates how the Land Law of
1850 did not succeed in imposing a property title immune to the dubious
strategies of the great fazendeiros in their efforts to occupy legally public land.
While violence was a factor throughout the colonial and imperial periods, there is
some indication that it increased during the Old Republic.
Violence always was and continues to be a constant presence in the countryside.
In the first republican decades, however, the episodes of violence... took on
specific aspects that give the period some of its fundamental characteristics (L.
Silva, 257).
Ligia Silva (258-261) also notes that, during this period, family feuds over land or
political influence were common, as was banditry.

Messianic movements, which

attracted large numbers of people from the backlands, often led to violence. Silva sees
such movements as a sign of the great numbers of people who could not obtain land.
"...(N)either the abundance of land nor the existence of favorable legislation were
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sufficient to counteract the concrete social situation reigning in the backlands, marked by
violence and

coronelismo."no

Under the law establishing the Guarda Nacional, the Coronel and other "officers
of the Guarda Nacional could not, when arrested or subject to criminal proceedings or
when condemned, be placed in common jails," remaining instead under the custody of
the "sala livre" of the local jail. Leal, writing in the 1940s, stated:
The role of hired thugs and bandits in local political battles has been very notable,
although it is diminishing with the development of the Police, who not rarely take
their place... In political reprisals and crimes and in fights between families, the
activity of thugs is of the greatest importance (Leal 290, 293).' 11
Thus, with respect to the extremely violent bandits who plagued the backlands during this
period, it has been noted that "...the struggle of the public powers against the bandits
constitutes part of the struggle against the impunity of the coroneis who gave them
coverage" (L. Silva, 261).112
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By "favorable legislation" she means the tendency to recognize posse rights. Coronelismo is the system
through which rural landowners controlled votes in their region - e.g., of their renters, share-croppers, and
smaller neighbors; the term originated with the coroneis of the Guarda Nacional, which quickly became an
honorary title for any wealthy person. See Leal.
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While many thugs were agregados of landholders, bandits also emerged from among the classes of
smallholders who had been dispossessed of their land, often acting to avenge the murder of family. The
greatest of these, Antonio Silvino, whose band was active in the Northeast during the first years of the 20th
Century, was a Robin Hood figure who robbed only the rich and distributed some of his takings to the poor.
Arrested in 1914, he was pardoned by Vargas in 1937.
112

"In 1912, at the Convention of the states of the Northeast, the chiefs of police of the states most affected
by banditry decided to jointly undertake hunting the bandits, even if, in order to do so, they had to invade
the property of the coronel." (L. Silva, 261).
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During the Old Republic, the Vargas era, and after, landless workers and small
farmers who had lost their land gravitated toward the frontiers and backlands, where they
entered the forests and wild areas in search of free land.

When land became more

valuable — often in connection with the construction of roads — large landowners would
move in and take over:
They would expropriate the land by force, taking advantage of the work done in
clearing the forest... This is the history of the conquest of land which Jorge
Amado relates in his stories about the cacau region of Bahia: gunmen, ambushes,
falsification of titles. This is the history of expropriation and grilagem of small
farmer's lands in Maranhao... and in the semi-humid part of the Tocantins
valley... (Mine, 24-25).113
The violence of thegrileiros was sometimes resisted with limited success.114
Indians also suffered great violence as the white population moved onto their
lands. Massacres were carried out by professional Indian hunters and by bands acting
under the authority of coroneis. Conflicts developed between small farmers and Indians,
often resulting from state governments selling settlers land within recognized Indian
areas (L. Silva, 262).
Subsistence farming
Subsistence farming has been carried out in Brazil since colonial time by independent
113

We witnessed the identical procedures in Tocantins during 1985-1992.
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For instance, Jose Porfirio led a group in Goias that resisted grilagem throughout the 1950s when their
land was made more valuable by the construction of the Belem-Brasilia highway. Porfirio was murdered
during the military dictatorship (Mine, 25).
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small farmers, renters, share-croppers, and posseiros. As manual labor was looked down
upon by the Portuguese colonists, most of the early colonial subsistence farms were run
by those with Indian blood, although later many such farms were run by poor whites, free
blacks, and slaves. Throughout Brazilian history, rural workers and subsistence farming
have been looked on as being backward and inferior.
Current historians recognize, however, that both poor whites and slaves had a much
more pro-active role during the colonial period and the monarchy than had previously
been thought, carving out spaces for themselves, generally in subsistence farming with
the marketing of small surpluses. They have also recognized that subsistence agriculture
played a far more important economic role than has generally been recognized (Motta 45;
Gomes 2001, 269 et seq.; Siqueira 1997, 41-43).
During the Old Republic, there was a great deal of discussion about promoting
food production so as to provide the basic needs of urban consumers. Some of
this discussion centered around small farmers.

The Ministry of Agriculture,

Industry and Commerce established a small number of agricultural settlements.
Technically oriented ruralists promoted a four-pronged approach — colonization,
modernization of production methods, education, and credit/cooperativism.
These ruralists tended to view the rural worker as the object of social action,
rather than as one who could participate in it himself with something valuable to
offer (Mendon9a 1997, 139-140, 178-181,213).

This attitude toward rural workers continued to prevail during the Vargas era. It
was during the 1950s, with formation of the peasant leagues in the Northeast and the
pioneering adult literacy work of Paulo Freire, that the concept of the rural worker as

111

subject of his own development began to be widely spread among intellectuals. This
concept was to be a key element in the base community work carried out by the Church,
beginning in the 1960s (of which more below).
The Estatuto da Terra: 1964 - present
Historical background
On April 1, 1964, a military coup ousted the Goulart government, virtually
without resistance.

While large landowners, concerned about agrarian reform, were

among those who supported the coup, they were by no means the only source of support.
The coup was widely approved among businessmen and the middle classes: inflation was
increasing, the government was deeply in debt, Goulart showed little ability to control the
situation, often engaging in irresponsible rhetoric.115 Since 1889, when they removed the
monarchy, the military had stepped in and assumed control of the government
periodically during crises. It was widely expected that they would do this now, returning
power to a civilian government after a provisional period.
Eight months after taking power, the military government, under its first
president, Marshall Humberto Castelo Branco, pushed through the Estatuto da Terra."6
While the large landowners complained that they had been betrayed, they were stripped
of their primary argument — that such a statute was communist: Castelo Branco, who had
fought with the allies in Italy in World War II, had an impeccable reputation and had
entered office with the support of the United States. The landowners' representatives in
115

In this respect, one of the last straws for the military was when Goulart suggested that enlisted men
should unionize.
116

Law 4.504 of November 30, 1964
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Congress resorted to delaying tactics ~ seeking to question everything they could in the
proposed legislation. But modernizing agriculture was one of the three stated priorities of
the government (the others were controlling inflation and reorienting international
relations), and it pushed the law through (R. Bueno 1997, 3-6).
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It is not my intention here to analyze in detail the Estatuto da Terra. That law is
still the basis of Brazilian agrarian reform legislation.118 What we will look at are the
major developments affecting agrarian reform which have occurred over the forty-five
years since the Estatuto was passed, giving particular emphasis to the underlying patterns
mentioned above.
Suffice it to say here that, while there is debate about many aspects of the
Estatuto, most observers agree that it is a fairly good law which, if acted upon, could
serve as a basis for serious agrarian reform. In enacting the law, the government, both
responding to United States policy and from its own viewpoint, 119 saw agrarian reform as
essential to the modernization of agriculture and the creation of a rural middle class.
Although the validity of those goals was questioned by the left, the law had an overall
applicability that made it acceptable to progressive forces.
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On the role of the agrarian question in justifying the coups, see Jones; for a leftist perspective on the
matter, see Mine. The military also provided subsidized financing to the rural sector in general, and started
the National Fund for Rural Refinancing with USAID funds (Linhares and Silva, 185). Oliveira (1988, 83)
states that Castelo Branco's Minister of Planning, Roberto Campos, assured landowners that the Estatuto
would not be acted upon.
118

There are nearly eighty active laws and decrees that touch upon issues related to agrarian reform; most
of these were issued after the Estatuto, but a few predate it, going back as far as 1937.
119

U.S. influence is seen generally in the Alliance for Progress rhetoric and more specifically in the Carta
de Punta del Este. The Brazilian War College, which provided courses and training for military officers,
also advocated agrarian reform for modernization.
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In taking over the process of enacting agrarian reform, the government had
"seized the flag" from the workers, in a certain sense cutting short their
participation in the making of the law by delivering it from above. At the same
time it provided them with a new rallying point, the workers now taking on the
task of defending the Estatuto (R. Bueno, 6-8, 21).
While the Estatato da Terra provided the basis for an agrarian reform, the reform
never took place. After Castelo Branco, who identified with the moderate wing of the
military, left office in 1967, the government came under the control of the hard liners and
the emphasis turned to national security issues.
It is true that the military government did not carry out an agrarian reform: in two
decades there were only one hundred and seventy expropriations of land, the
concentration of land ownership increased enormously, as did the proletarization
of the countryside (more than one million, six hundred thousand small farmers
were converted into landless workers between 1970 and 1980). The landowners
during these years oscillated a great deal in their positions. On the one hand, they
had the government that, in order to maintain their support, threatened them with
agrarian reform, even if a decrepit one.

On the other hand, they had the

opposition, the workers, the left, the popular movements, talking of a more radical
agrarian reform and of invading land (Martins 1986, 25).

In 1985, the military government claimed that, during its twenty-one year
administration, it had distributed a million titles to land, although the President of INCRA
later admitted the number was only 560,000. Outside observers acknowledge 470,000,
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but of these over 300,000 were simply titles issued to long-standing

posseiros,

recognizing the legality of their holdings. Of the remainder, 94,000 were settlements in
the Amazon, on government lands or on bankrupt rubber plantations that had been
expropriated in order to build highways (principally the Transamazonica), lands of little
value, far from markets. Only 76,000 titles (about 3,620 per year) were genuine agrarian
reform, involving expropriation of latifundios and distribution of land to rural workers
(Mine, 8-10).120
The military planned to pass the presidency to a civilian government through an
election held in a carefully crafted electoral college, meant to assure selection of a picked
successor. However, when Aureliano Chaves, the civilian vice president of Brazil, who
identified with the moderate military, objected to the candidates chosen by the hard liners
and made an alliance with the opposition, many civilian politicians who had supported
the government followed him.
opposition party.

They supported Tancredo Neves, a member of the

Tancredo, a highly respected conservative with close ties to the

Church, made a commitment to agrarian reform.
Tancredo died before taking office, and his vice president, Jose Sarney was sworn
in as president. Sarney, who had been part of the Chaves faction and the former Senate
leader under the dictatorship, is from a family of large landholders in Maranhao. When
the Minister of Agrarian Reform, Nelson Ribeiro (nominated by Tancredo and committed
to agrarian reform) submitted to Sarney a National Plan for Agrarian Reform (PNRA),
Sarney returned it to him nine times — each version weaker than the last — before
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In contrast Mine notes that the rural exodus in 1985 was 1.1 million people per year.
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approving it.121

The Sarney government made it a practice to delay and lose

expropriation requests sent to it by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Martins, 1994, 8990).122
Meanwhile, during the twenty-one years that had passed since 1964, the climate
with respect to agrarian reform had changed dramatically, in three ways:
•

During the hard line years, organization in the countryside had been severely
suppressed. Labor leaders were arrested, killed, or forced into hiding; the incipient
rural labor unions was co-opted and turned essentially into administrative units that
processed government health benefits for workers. Though the Church committed
t ^^

itself to rural worker rights to a greater depth than previously,

and although a

relative loosening (abertura) of government control after 1979 allowed the rural
labor movement to begin to revive, a decade and a half had virtually been lost.
•

The military government successfully involved the urban business sectors in land
ownership. This was done through a series of laws granting incentives to companies
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Decree 91.766
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Veiga (1990, 73-146) narrates the effort to achieve agrarian reform under the Sarney government.
Reform was also sabotaged by INCRA functionaries; in 1988, I was at a meeting with the Governor of
Goias, Henrique Santillo, who was nearly in tears with frustration: he was trying to have a latifundio in
Goias expropriated, but the process repeatedly reached the President's office with errors of procedure and
documentation that would make expropriation impossible.
123
The Church was virtually the only institution in Brazil capable of standing up to the military
government, and even then at considerable risk. The ecclesial base community (CEB) movement, starting
in Espirito Santo in the 1960s and spreading throughout the country, organized groups, especially in rural
areas, to provide mutual self help, understand the current political and economic events, judge them in light
of Christian standards, and act to change them (ver, julgar, agir); this movement had a strong role in
changing the fatalism one often encountered in the countryside in the late 1960s. The CEBs were closely
watched by government police, often harrassed, and organizers were at times arrested or killed. In 1975,
the Church formed the Land Pastoral Commission (CPT) to provide support to dioceses, CEBs and other
groups working with land issues. The CPT also helped the rural labor movement as it began to revive in
the late seventies and early eighties. In 1980, the Bishops came out with a strong document advocating
land reform.
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for the purchase of land or for engaging in rural activities. The FISET program
subsidized corporations that invested in reforestation, the FINOR and FINAM
programs, subsidized companies that invested in agricultural/stock-raising activities
in the Northeast and Amazon regions, respectively. Often companies would invest
through specially formed forestation or cattle-raising enterprises. As criteria for such
programs were vague, the investments tended to be aimed at low-cost/low
maintenance efforts: fast growing trees (eucaplyptus, pinus eliotus) for cellulose,
cattle ranching. The negative impact of these programs on the countryside has been
widely noted. However, they served to provide the urban elite with a vested interest
in a concentrated land structure. With growing inflation, the non-agricultural upper
classes also began buying land for investment and speculation (See, e.g., Aguiar
1985, 53-58; Moura 1988, 3-4; Powers 1987a, 288-289).124
•

The banner of "modernization" — the government's basis for enacting the Estatuto —
had fallen. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the model of modern agriculture had
increasingly changed — in the United States and elsewhere — to large commercial
farming, mechanized and dependent on commercial fertilizers and pesticides. Those
who supported "modernization" now viewed the small family farm as a relic. The
economic argument seemed to be on the side of large landholdings, leaving land
reform as a peripheral social issue. In essence, the landholders had found a new
argument against agrarian reform.
Thus, when the Constitution of 1988 was promulgated by Congress (acting as a

constitutional convention), the Church, the populists, and the left found themselves
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Martins (1994,49) points out that the alliance between large capitalists and landowners dates back to the
beginning of the Old Republic, but was made stronger by the incentive measures here discussed.
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advocating a social justice issue with little support from those most interested in
economic development.
[T]hey did not manage a solid clause on agrarian reform, this defeat due
decisively to the conservative congressmen, who were not worried by Vargas
styled corporativist measures for the urban sector, but did not want to negotiate...
the rights of property in the countryside. A new organization of rural landowners,
the Uniao Democratica Ruralista, outflanked the defenders of agrarian reform
through intensive and effective lobbying. The conservative message was clear:
guarantees of human rights were inoffensive but threats to land rights were
another matter (Skidmore, 269-270).125
The Constitution's vague distinction between productive and unproductive land was
particularly harmful, "practically annulling the relatively more advanced concepts of the
Estatuto da Terra." This distinction gave state and local judges grounds (which they
amply used) for supporting the claims of large landholders, generating "a systematic
wave of evictions of the occupants [small posseiros] from the land" . (Martins 1994, 9091; see also Moura on judicial actions).
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The UDR's lobbying was made easier by the fact that a very large percentage of congressmen (the
"ruralistas") were either landowners or tied to the landowning class. See Martins 1994, 91; Powers 1987b,
326. Veiga 1990, 7-9, notes that, in the mid-80s, not only the right, but the center and left, largely bought
into the argument that modernization had made obsolete the economic arguments in favor of agrarian
reform, a position he finds strange given contrary empirical evidence from other countries.
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Modernization of Agriculture
The modernization in agriculture126 that occurred during and after the military
regime has been analyzed elsewhere (Powers 2006). I outline here a few key points.
The process began as one focused on technology, seeking to augment the
productivity of both land and workers.

This included purchase, maintenance, and

operating expenses for equipment (tractors, irrigations systems, etc.) and inputs such as
hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides — all of which required increased capital. It has
been estimated that the value of such costs and inputs rose from less than 15% of the
brute value of agricultural and livestock (agropecuaria) production in 1949 to 40% in
1980.

At the same time, processing of agropecuaria production became both more

widespread and more of it took place in Brazil than previously. Even items that were not
processed — such as truck garden produce — tended to be marketed increasingly through
modern commercial systems (transportation systems, wholesale centers, supermarkets)
(Lavinas and Ribeiro 1995, 73-75).127 By 1985, approximately 75% of food was sold in
supermarkets (Belik 1999, 193-194).
Agriculture that evolved in this direction became a link in the chain of what has
been called the "agro-industrial complex" (AIC). The chain does not start with the land,
but with the inputs to the land, passes through the growing stage, then moves on to
processing and commercialization.

Capital is essential to this chain, so financing
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Defined as the growing use of industrially manufactured inputs (Powers 2006, 7). Some authors use the
term "conservative modernization" (Delgado et al., 1996, 218; Szmrecsanyi and Ramos 1996, 238; Ramos
1999, 188)
127
Lavinas and Ribeiro note that, in the 1960s, Brazil opted for a "green revolution" productionist model
over an agrarian reform model.
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becomes key ~ sometimes in a subsidized form from the government, sometimes through
other measures such as pre-planting contracts with processors for sale of the crops.
Agriculture is subordinated to financial and industrial capital (Lavinas and Ribeiro, 75;
Mesquita and Brandao 1995, 12.)
The new system increasingly viewed land as a commodity. Ironically, however,
this worked against the modern concept of agricultural efficiency in two ways: (1) during
the inflationary economy that reigned in Brazil from the late 1970s to the mid 90s, land
compared favorably with other investments and was purchased by speculators with no
1

interest in developing its agricultural potential;

(2) corporate investors who purchased

land through tax incentives and subsidies — an attempt to link financial and industrial
capital more closely to agriculture — had little vocation for agriculture and put only about
20% of their land into production (Benjamin, et al., 187-188).129
Modernization of this type was most effective in the newly opening areas of the
Central-West and in the relatively developed Southeast and South. In this last region,
where there is a strong European tradition of family farms, such farms were to a certain
extent included. Nevertheless, most small farmers ~ especially in the less developed
North and Northeast — were excluded from the process of modernization:
Those rural producers, the great majority, who were not associated/integrated into
this process of modernization, but who suffer its consequences, are transformed
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"...in addition to a means of capitalist production, land becomes a highly liquid financial asset in a fairly
unstable market for property titles, gaining value at an accelerated rate, at levels highly competative with
other financial assets" (Lavinas and Ribeiro, 75).
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Although this rate is better than that of other latifundiarios, it is below the rate for small (65%) and
medium (28%) farms.
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into the rural poor, into the excluded ones who are no longer producers, except as
a labor force that lives in want, waiting for the creation of possible modes of more
stable and promising insertion into economic development, and for whom access
to land no longer guarantees anything except a level of survival which is less than
minimal and forces them into various forms of salaried work (Lavinas and
Ribeiro, 74).130
As carried out in Brazil, agricultural modernization proved harmful in at least
three ways. First, it created new, more efficient monocultures (soy, grains, oranges) with
vast productive capacities but for markets which are highly volatile, dependent on the
world economic situation, on the exchange rate, and on subsidies.131
This makes it so that modern Brazilian agriculture is, at the same time, very
productive and very vulnerable. Pressured by the costs of inputs that are acquired
on the market, dependent on capitalist calculations and integrated into agroindustrial complexes, it falls into disorganization easily, in contrast to what
occurred with the traditional [subsistance] agricultural sector, which was much
more self-sufficient.

The vulnerability of our modern agriculture will only
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The last phrase is an overstatement; where subsistence farmers have orientation and mutual support,
they can achieve a level of well-being perhaps superior to that of most urban slum dwellers, although their
money income is minimal.
131131

Jank (2000, 125-6) notes that, while exports stagnated during 1981-92 due to worldwide recession,
1993-2000 was a "surprisingly" dynamic period for exports, especially key products such as soy, coffee,
sugar, chicken, and cellulose. The 1990s also witnessed a "profound structural change" in Brazilian agrobusiness via opening of the economy and deregulation of markets, requiring both manufacturers of inputs
and processors to consolidate in order to compete, causing further concentration in the non-agricultural
components of the AIC. Real prices for crops fell consistently and were 50-60% lower in 1995/98 than
they had been in 1982/86. By the turn of the century, "The big players in Brazilian agro-industrial
exports... could be brought together in a large room" (Jank, 123-4, 126-9; Helfand and Rezende 2001, 2489, 266-8).
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disappear when its ties to a powerful internal market are increased (Benjamin, et
al., 81-83).
Second, as Brazil opted to modernize via large, mechanized commercial farms
rather than through smaller productive units, the marginalization of small farmers
mentioned above forced many rural workers to leave the land.
Enormous contingents of small landowners were ruined and rural workers were
displaced — in a process that continues today — moving on to contend for a place
outside of agriculture, at virtually any [minimal] salary.

Those that insist in

remaining as farmers are systematically pushed out to the most distant areas, with
the worst lands and the least infrastructure.
A new dynamic was added to the land conflict, one in which the more powerful forces
are divided from the poor not only in terms of land ownership and financial power, but
increasingly in terms of technology (Benjamin, et al., 84).
Finally, modernization as it has been practiced in Brazil, leads to increasing
ecological problems. These are due in part to the pushing of subsistence farmers into
areas unsuitable for sustainable farming: arid lands, river margins, rain forests ~ leading
to problems of desertification, erosion, deforestation.

It is also due in part to the

problems that plague modern agriculture everywhere — agro-toxins, destruction of
biodiversity, increasing dependence on chemical fertilizers. But chiefly it is due to the
continued predatory and expansive nature of Brazilian agriculture — worsened by the
current view of land as a mere commodity.

One is reminded of Sergio Buarque de

Holanda's observation, with respect to colonial times, that technology simply made bad
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•

I I1!

agricultural methods more devastating (Buarque de Holanda, 49).

The comment is

even more applicable to the high technological capabilities of our own time.
*

It was common up until very recently to speak of an archaic Brazil and a new one,
existing side by side, the rural areas usually (although not exclusively) being part of the
former, in contrast to the efficient industries of the cities.133 Rural poverty was especially
identified as being part of the archaic Brasil.

While there was some truth to this

observation, it tended to obscure the reality of the modern situation: with the
intermingling of the rural and urban elites and the option for agricultural modernization,
land concentration and rural poverty are not so much a product of archaic practices as
they are of archaic patterns transformed into modernity. New technologies, the opening
of transportation, the increased sophistication of financial and commercial networks,
made it increasingly easier for small groups of the wealthy to dominate larger areas of
land. While their motives may have been no worse than those of their colonial and
imperial fore bearers, the capacity of these groups to extend their influence, to eliminate
the spaces and practices which they see as wasteful or risky (such as adverse possession
by small posseiros, informal land use, or share cropping), advanced considerably. A
strong argument can be made that many subsistence farmers in the past, living in relative
isolation, were better off than the marginalized rural poor today. In any case, those who
think that the struggle of the rural workers and their allies today is against an archaic
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Buarque de Holanda, also noted (51) that frequent change in land ownership served as a disincentive to
invest in the land's fertility, another factor applicable to modernization. See also, L. Silva, 47-48
133

Lambert, Os Dois Brasis, is the classic statement of this approach. See also Moraes. For a view that
refuses this distinction, see Miranda Neto, 45-47
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system are dangerously mistaken:

their struggle today is not against the archaic, but

against the modern, the new.134
The Underlying Patterns
The underlying patterns mentioned above have continued in the period since
1964.
•

Although the domestic market for agricultural goods grew, the export sector
continued to be favored. Pressures and incentives to export increased with the large
negative balance of payments that emerged during the last ten years of the military
regime (Benjamin, et al., 83-84. See also Skidmore, 251).

The great anomaly in

place since colonial times continued: Brazil became one of the world's foremost
exporters of food while a large percentage of its own people suffered from hunger
and malnutrition.
•

Large landholdings continued to be the rule, and land concentration increased (see,
1 'Xft

e.g., Hall, 108-120).

While diversification occurred so that Brazil was not entirely

dependent on a single export crop (as in the case of coffee), the plantations/farms
134

Jose de Souza Martins has developed this thesis; see Linhares and Silva, 142. In traditional, relatively
isolated farm communities, for instance, farmers would store surplus harvest from good years, thus
providing for occassional bad years. With the development of transport, however, the pressure to sell
surpluses increased. Given the vast disparity of wealth, virtually every "modernizing" project - roads,
irrigation, tourism - results in further marginalizing the poor. See, e.g., Porto, 179
135

President Cardoso stated with reference to agriculture: "Or Brazil multiplies its export efforts or it will
not have conditions to overcome its difficulties." He expressed the intention, however, to involve small
landowners in this process (Lana). Martins (Atraso, 77) notes that the military regime's option to focus on
the export market rather than the internal market, largely determined by factors outside Brazil, led toward
promoting large landholdings.
136

In 1985, at the end of the dictatorship, 0.8% of rural properties of 1000 ha. or more occupied 44% of the
arable land; this figure probably underestimates true concentration as it is common for the same owner or
group to own more than one such property.
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themselves tended to be monocultural.

New monocultural export crops emerged

(oranges,137 soy) as well as the older monocultural crops for export or domestic
markets (cattle, rice). With adoption by the military government of the Pro-Alcool
Program (incentivating alcohol-fueled automobiles and subsidizing sugar growers),
land planted in sugar-cane actually increased (Martins 2000b, 27). Cheap labor also
continues to be an important factor, despite a limited amount of mechanization.
Rural wages continue to be low, many rural workers do not have signed work cards
or receive employment benefits, and cases of de facto enslavement of rural workers
1

(often brutally enforced) are regularly reported.
•

Despite the push for more efficient commercialized agriculture, the great mass of
Brazilian land still tended to be wastefully used, with poor agricultural techniques
and ecologically harmful practices. Figures from 1989 revealed that only 14% of
Brazil's arable land was under cultivation; that figure fell to 6.73% on landholding of
between 1000 and 10,000 ha. and 2.31% on landholdings of over 10,000 ha.
(Benjamin et al. 1998, 187). Wide scale burning of fields is common throughout the
frontier areas; during the pre-planting months the smoke over states such as
Rondonia, Tocantins, and Para is thick enough to interfere with air flights. The
continued pushing of poor farmers deeper and deeper into the Amazon has had
negative environmental impact. Widespread land speculation, fueled by economic
instability, increased the tendency of non-agricultural elements to invest in land,
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Oranges were usually processed to concentrate prior to export. One Brazilian orange grower had more
orange trees than the entire state of Florida. Skidmore, 250
138

On slave labor see, e.g., Sutton; J.S Martins (Reforma Agraria, 41-44). Brazil's income disparity
between urban areas and rural (3/1) is the highest in Latin America (BID, Desigualdad, 16). At the end of
the military regime (1983), only 4% of rural workers had signed work cards (Mesquita, 12).
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deforesting large tracts in order to claim the land was "productive," but in fact
increasing the percentage of unproductive land (Almeida and Campari 1995, 1-7;
Powers, 1987b, 324-325).
•

There has been a change in the perception of the value of land. Nevertheless, while
the value of land today may now be more an economic symbol than one of social
status, there still exists in certain parts of the country (the Northeast and CentralWest, for instance) a tremendous prestige in being a large landowner. Certainly the
large landholder still has power in rural areas where he holds land, and in remote
areas this power may be considerable. In addition, during times of instability and
inflation, land offers one of a few safe investments, and is held by the nonagricultural elite for savings and speculation. Landowners also have had privileged
access to public resources through credit, subsidies, and co-opting of government
projects (Costa Filho 1998, 172; Tavares 1999, 230-231; Benjamin, et al., 79,
Almeida and Campari, 7).139

•

The relationship among land, commerce, and finance grew more complex with the
landowner status of great corporations, the myriad of (often abused) subsidized
financing and tax incentive mechanisms, and the greater intricacies of financial and
commercial markets.

With the growth of food processing plants in Brazil, the
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In the early 1990s a scandal broke out when it was discovered that many deep water wells drilled by the
National Department of Drought Prevention Works (DNOCS) were on the property of wealthy landowners,
including congressmen; the procedure was completely legal. Around the same time, the Catholic Church in
Ceara undertook a project of locating over 4000 reservoirs built with public funds over the last forty years;
it was found that many of these were on private lands. The Church advocated for public access to these
reservoirs. Martins, Atraso, 80, says that, with the reinforced link between urban capital and large land,
there appeared after 1984 "...a new oligarchic elite, with very modern outward trappings."
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agricultural-commercial complex of the Empire and the Old Republic has evolved into
the agro-industrial complex of today (Mesquita and Brandao, 12).140
•

The relationship between government and landowners continues to be complex.
From 1950 to 1980 Brazil's rural population fell from 70% to 30%. This clearly
affected the old rural structure, as did opening of the countryside to transportation
and communications (the military regime recognized this and gave control of
powerful media to groups — especially TV Globo ~ that could be counted on to
support positions that maintain the essential economic structure).

Furthermore,

landowners almost ceased to be a class per se: not only had corporate interests (and
many wealthy urbanites individually) become landowners, but the old landowning
families — following practices that had begun in colonial times — were increasingly
important in commercial and financial activities. This is especially true in the North
and Northeast, where there has been no urban industrial class to speak of and the old
(e.g., sugar mill) money plays a significant role. The Northern and Northeastern elite
has become expert in the use of government subsidies, not only in agriculture (e.g.,
Pro-Alcool) but in industry, tourism (e.g., hotel construction), etc. (A member of a
leading Recife law firm representing the elite told me that only three of their clients
were real entrepreneurs; the rest dealt almost entirely with government funds.) But
the old patterns still prevail in the North and Northeast, with elites able to control
significant rural and poor urban votes, and the representational distribution in
Congress, which heavily favors the North and Northeast, gives these elites a

140

Linhares and Silva, 145, note that the role of the agro-industrial complex in knitting together the
interests of the rural and urban elites.
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tremendous voice in national affairs (see, e.g., Sodre 2003)141
•

As noted above, confusion of land titles and of possessory rights continues to be a
problem.

In February, 1999, INCRA announced that it had discovered over 18

million hectares of land in the state of Amazonas that had been illicitly claimed by
latifundiarios, and that there was strong evidence that at least another 11.3 million
hectares in the rest of the country was in the same situation. While such problems
are perhaps most severe in frontier areas, title issues are common close to (and
within) large urban areas (Lacerda, 2/25/99).142
•

Violence continues to be common in land conflicts.

The military government,

fearing a rural uprising, took brutal repressive action against rural union leaders and
organizers and encouraged private groups to do the same:
The military repression... opened the doors for violent action by the large land
owners through their overseers and gunmen, in hundreds of places throughout
the country, in the certainty that they would not be punished and, beyond this,
were allied with the repression that was maintaining order....

Never in the

history of Brazil was the latifundio so poweful in the use of private violence and
never were the armed forces so fragile in relation to it as during the military
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Although many factors lead to rural emigration, one strong factor has been the eviction of sharecroppers and small posseiros (Moura, 1-3; Powers, Land and Violence).
142

Identifying such land requires a painstaking search through local registries; judicial action must then be
taken to reclaim it. As mentioned above, when buying farm land an hour outside of Rio de Janeiro, we
discovered that almost all local lands were held in posse, often with unregistered changes of ownership and
confusion with respect to titles. Major litigation is ongoing as to the legal ownership of Barra da Tijuca, a
huge coastal area at the southern edge of the city of Rio, which has developed during the last twenty years
into one of the richest neighborhoods in the city; conflicting titles and claims dating back to the 19th
Century have litigated for years. Oliveira (85) notes that INCRA figures show that, in the mid 1980s, most
large landowners (96% of latfundios por dimesoes) were not paying land taxes.
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regime. In a certain manner, it was as if the Guarda Nacional had been reborn
.... (Martins, Atraso,82-83; see also, Brasil: Nunca Mais, 125-128)143
Figures for rural workers killed during the military regime are difficult to ascertain.
In the period immediately following, the figures indicate an increasingly violent land
conflict; although murders of workers and organizers peaked in the late 1980s, they
continue to this day, accompanied by almost complete impunity of both the killers and
those who hire them.144 As noted above, fraud and corruption with respect to land
• i

titles are rampant.
•

145

Efforts at reform continue to be frustrated. The Church, principally through the CPT,
has devoted substantial effort and resources to defending the rights of small farmers
and landless workers; it sponsored (in 1987) a major campaign in favor of agrarian
reform and continues to be a vocal advocate. Following the military abertura, rural
union groups and other civil groups, including NGOs, began organizing and
representing rural workers seeking land reform. The Movimento Sem-Terra (MST Landless Workers Movement), organized in 1984 and gaining national visibility in
the 1990s, has engaged in a policy of more dramatic action, including helping groups
of landless workers to physically occupy land. The net result of all this, in terms of
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Oliveira (31-54) presents a summary of land related violence during 1964-86; for more recent period,
see CPT publications.
144

Where there is significant international pressure, as respecting the murder of Sister Dorothy Stang,
convictions of murderers are more likely (e.g., BBC News 2010)
145

"The conflict in Pontal de Paranapanema... is, in this sense, just one example. According to information
collected by the Folha de S. Paulo [a major newspaper], nearly 50% of the region can be considered
devolutas. All of which indicates that the geneological tree of the land titles, from 1852 until today, is
incomplete or falsified. The newspaper [states]... 'two fazendeiros of Pontal manage to quickly falsify the
titles, that have been passed hand to hand with each resale'" (Motta, 224).
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effective land reform policy and actual land redistribution, has been miniscule.146

Impact of Development on Small Farms
It has been noted that the model of rural development adopted in Brazil,
particularly beginning with the military government, favored large corporate and/or
absentee owned farms to family farms. The model "caused great inequalities in the
countryside, as it accelerated the rural exodus, the industrialization of agriculture and its
"technification" without, however, providing equitable distribution of knowledge and
opportunity" (Blum 82). This led to the "premature expulsion" of workers from the
countryside (Veiga 2000, 87; Wood and Carvalho 1994, 226).147 The "expulsion" of
small farmers from the countryside, though generally an economic phenomenon, was also
achieved in part through fraudulent and violent practices on the part of those seizing land
(Powers 1987a, 1987b, 1987c).148
Although the number of small rural properties did not decrease during the military
dictatorship, they tended to become smaller - thus less able to support families - and
offered limited opportunities for the younger generation. Furthermore, the significant
decrease in renters and share croppers meant that many families were forced to leave
agriculture or add to the growing number of day laborers.149 These changes placed rural
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On MST see Oliveira, 79;
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Sobhan (1993,112) notes that disproportionately capital intensive rural development in Brazil results in
both rural and urban poverty which, in themselves, become a barrier to economic development.
148

Porto (1997, 177-207) has an interesting discussion of possible connections between technology and
violence in rural Brazil.
149

There has been some discussion of rental and share-cropping as alternatives to expropriation for
affecting agrarian reform. Although such a movement is probably not politically viable, the founding in
March, 2002, of a rental and share-cropping exchange (bolsa) in Santo Anastacio, Sao Paulo, is an

workers in a position in which they had almost no bargaining power. Of those who
stayed in agriculture, many were forced to migrate to other regions (mostly the frontier).
(Moreira 1999, 28, 39).
Small farmers who stayed on their land often became suppliers of raw material for
agro-industry.

The strengthening of the oligopolies of the industrial sector of agro-

business (both inputs and outputs) gave agriculture per se less bargaining power and a
lower percentage of returns.

This loss was made up to large landholders through

government subsidies (especially rural credit), but small farmers tended to lose out.
(Moreira 1999, 29-34, 39). Writing in 1981, Moreira (1999, 33-34) noted:
In general, the industries... act as an oligopoly, where competition for agricultural
raw material rarely was carried out through competition in prices paid to
producers but through other conditions in the purchase contracts - which tend to
be generalized in relations between small family producers and the processing
industry. Among the most usual forms of domination are (a) the furnishing (for
free or not), of technical assistance, that assumes the double role of binding the
producer to a certain company, on the one hand, and of demanding and
encouraging the use of modern inputs, on the other; (b) the furnishing of credit to
the producer, the company guaranteeing, on the one hand, the sales commitment
in order to repay the debt and, on the other, the reposition of conditions of
reproduction of capital from the small producer, and, consequently, his
technology, (c) fixing the price of the product, established generally without the

interesting development (Sant'anna 2003; X. Graziano 2003). On the level of modern agriculture, Laurenti
(2000, 176) notes that the increasing use of rental land by large producers begins to divorce the question of
land concentration from wealth accumulation. (See also Alston, et al., 1999, 202-203)
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intervention of the rural labor union, the interests of the company prevailing.... (d)
after fixing the price of the product, what effectively deetermines the price
received dpends, fundamentally, on the conditions linked to "classification" of the
product (which results in different prices) and the measure of payment (weight,
volume, etc.). This process has been increasingly carried out by the companies.
Generally, this situation led to a reduction in the surplus value retained by farm families
(Moreira, 122).
Another extremely important impact of the modernization of agriculture - or of
the mentality that promoted that modernization - was to create an attitude that
mechanized, commercial agriculture is advanced and progressive, and that traditional
family agriculture is archaic and backward. Small farmers - and especially subsistence
farmers - were increasingly marginalized culturally,
... especially dealing with that which, more or less in a confused manner, he
associates with his identity... and the practices of life and work with which it is
linked.

In these conditions, individuals and groups will remain always at the

margin of the overall system.... (Almeida 1999, 153)
Together with an overriding attitude that urban is more advanced, "better" than rural,
these values undoubtedly had - and to some extent continue to have - a large role in
causing the young to migrate to the cities.150 (It is interesting, however, that Carneiro
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When we lived (1985-92) in Tocantins, a rural state with a population of 600,000, only one public
middle school in the entire state stressed agriculture as a vocation. Generally the values taught were urban
ones. The movement of Cooperative Family Agricultural Schools does wonderful work against this trend,
but they are few and far between (see UNEFAB undated a, b, and c; see also Carneiro Baptista 2003). It
was only in 2003 that the Federal Ministry of Education, under the new Lula administration and at the
request of the MST, established a special secretariat for rural education.
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(1999, 113) found that children of small property owners were less likely to want to move
to the city than were children of those who did not own land.)
Who are the small farmers of Brazil? Jank (2000, 124) cites Guilherme Dias as
classifying three distinct types of Brazilian rural producers:
•

approximately 350,000 who have accumulated almost unrepayable debt and have not
found a solution, especially in light of the extremely high interest rates in Brazil;

•

about 780,000 who have the possibility of taking a new leap forward based on new
productive technologies depending on a number of factors: the growth of the
domestic market, the opening of new export markets, and the bettering of
macroeconomic conditions and infrastructure;

•

about "four million producers in the process of marginalization;" most of these are
engaged in "pure food subsistence activity (principally in the North and Northeast
regions)" but there are also a good number of "small family producers who encounter
the risk of growing exclusion from the agro-industrial system."

Although there are family-owned farms in all three of these categories, virtually all
farmers in the third group are family farms.
Blum (1999, 69-72) presents another useful classification. He divides agricultural
establishments into those owned and run by businesses (patronais)151 and those owned
and run by families {familiares). The latter he divides into three types:

151

Using terminology from the Estatuto da Terra - the Land Law (4.504 of 1964), he divides these into
Latifundios and Empresas Rurais.
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•

"Consolidated" - properties semi-specialized and diversified (3-5 income producing
activities) whose owner lives on the property; they are generally about 50 ha.,
although they may range as high as 200; they use high technology and generally rural
credit; their gross margin (total receipts minus variable costs) is in the range of
R$ 15,600 p.a. Their owners are usually enlightened, leaders in the community, able
to seek technical and financial advice, have good analytical and management skills.

•

"In Transition" - more diversified properties (3-6 income producing activities) whose
owner lives on the property; generally about 20 ha., although they may range as high
as 100; use medium level technology; and their total receipts are lower. They are less
likely to use rural credit, use less technical assistance, and have weaker analytical and
management skills.

•

"Peripheral" - even more diversified, with 4-7 subsistence activities, the excess of
which is sold. The owner lives on the property, which is usually less than 20 ha.,
with a range up to 50. Low level of technology is used, and little or no rural credit.
152

Income is below one minimum salary per month.
Although the details of Blum's classification reflect the South of Brazil more than the
North/Northeast, his three levels make sense.

Most family farms in the North and

Northeast would be peripheral
ones, belonging also to Jank's "four million producers in
1^
process of marginalization."
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Blum's figures on income are clearly wrong - he claims that a monthly minimum salary represents
RS7800 p.a., when in fact it has never represented more than about R$2600 p.a.
153

Blum (62-70) provides a good summary of attempts to classify and describe family agriculture,
including those used by PRONAF and INCRA. He notes that the difficulty in exactly categorizing family
agriculture should not diminish its importance, but should encourage further study. Note also Porto and
Siqueira (1997, 33-35), who distinguish between "integrated" and "excluded" small farms but note the
overall complexity of rural Brazil.
134

Most of these four million, Jank (124) notes, are subsistence farmers, for whom "the
apparent solution involves mechanisms that guarantee the producer the minimum level of
income to survive (such as work programs, distribution of food baskets, rural pensions,
minimum income programs). For the other family producers, the solution involves the
creation and sustaining of jobs that permit the competitive insertion of large numbers of
people in agricultural and, above all, non-agricultural activities (rural or urban154)." The
increasing need for non-agricultural sources of income for rural inhabitants, which
partially results from the modernization of agriculture (Graziano da Silva, et al. 1999), is
discussed below.
Montoya and Guilhoto (2000, 22) state that "the technological development and
specialization of labor signify for the Brazilian rural producer a process that is necessary
and beneficent as it permits him, with the same effort of labor, associated with the
intensification of use of capital, to produce greater income and, therefore, increase in
social well-being."

They note that, from 1959 to 1990, while the rural population

remained essentially the same (33.16 million/1959, 35.83 million/1990), the per capita
value of actual agricultural and live-stock produce rose from US$ 89.71 to US$ 925.29.
These figures are impressive. However, while it cannot be doubted that "for some,
this process [modernization] brought about a bettering of work conditions, cultural
awakening, and an important increase in income and salaries, it meant, on the contrary,
for many, marginalization or social exclusion.... Brazil finds itself increasingly marked
by inequality and the maintenance of regions and social classes in misery or in conditions

154

The term "urban" in Brazil applies to small towns - the seats of rural municipalities - as well as to
cities.
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close to misery." (Almeida 1999, 30) The results of the policy of modernization have
been described as:
... the exclusion and the exodus [from the countryside] of large contingents of
rural workers and inhabitants, the strong social differentiation, the elevated
concentration of land and of certain modes of production, pollution and the
wearing out of renewable natural resources, the decrease in biological quality of
agricultural products, the increasingly concentrated markets. (Almeida, 31)
The increase in salaried rural workers has led to discussion of the "proletarianization"
of rural workers (e.g., de Janvry).
...the concept of the industrialization of agriculture should not be reduced only to
alterations in the form of production....

The industrialization of agriculture

represents not only changes in the relations of Man with Nature but also in the
social relations of production and with his work tools.... The industrialization of
agriculture implies the passage from a system of artisan production to a system
based on manufacturing (with machines and a division between labor and capital)
and even to large scale industry in some subsectors...

And this passage is

charactarized essentially by the inversion of the role played by the worker who
passes from the active and integrated artisan role to that of a partial worker
(specialized in his tools) in manufacturing, until he reaches the passivity of the
industrial worker who only watches his machine. (Graziano da Silva 1998, 4)

However, this description may be overstated when applied to Brazil. Veiga (2000,
104) estimates that, as of 1997, only 26% of agricultural workers were "employees" -
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and this would include many outside of the industrialized model discussed by Graziano
da Silva.

Especially in the less developed Northeast and North of the country, large

holdings with employees tend to follow older patterns - such as on the sugar plantations,
th

where employment methods are often similar to what they were in the 19 Century.
It is important to note that "the rural poor are not a homogeneous class" and that
changes such as new technology effect different rural groups - and individuals differently. Rural wage earners, however, tend to be a particularly vulnerable class, and
the proportionate rise in their numbers speaks to the greater vulnerability of the rural poor
in Brazil. (Griffin 1999, 136-138).
Subsistence Farming
Subsistence farming continues to be important.

While still considered by most

Brazilians as being backward and a block to development, recent scholarship notes that
subsistence agriculture is not really an impediment to modernization, but provides inputs
that modern agriculture finds convenient ~ available sources of cheap day labor, raw
materials and food stuffs that are not profitable for larger commercial farms to produce.
Analysis has shown that there are many forms of family farm: the "modern family
farmer" and the "technically qualified small producer" ~ both of which tend to be more
common in the South - part-time farmers (who hold some type of non-agricultural job to
supplement income), "lumpesinato" (who have a small piece of land where they live and
produce a few things, but depend for their livelihood on working as day laborers for
bigger farms), as well as the more traditional, self-sustaining subsistence farmers (see,
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e.g., Siqueira, 42-43; Miranda Neto, 45-47).155
As noted above, small farmers increasingly get pushed onto the least desirable
lands. Large numbers have been pushed into the Amazon:
Successive governments have deliberately used the region as a 'safety valve' to
disarm pressures in other areas.... At the beginning of the 1970s, the Medici
government, instead of undertaking structural reforms, fed the hope of diverting
the so-called 'excess' population from the rural Northeast in order to colonize the
Transamazonic Highway....

More recently, official resettlement projects in

Rondonia and Acre, as well as private settlement plans in various parts of the
eastern Amazon, have attempted to attract migrants... (T)he vast majority of the
settlers have received no help from the government. They abandon their former
homes, travel thousands of kilometers for land, measure out the lot that they
claim, construct their houses, chop down the forest by hand, plant and sell their
harvests...

fighting

incessantly

against

a

hostile

physical

and

human

environment....

This human effort led to a repeated cycle of occupation and usurpation, as the
Amazon frontier was pushed ever further inward.

No sooner had the small

farmers completed the exhausting task of clearing the land, the stronger
commercial interests appeared and evicted them, by legal or violent means, in
order to set up cattle farms or other businesses (Hall, 108-109).

155

Benjamin, et al. (87) estimated there were four million traditional subsistence farmers in Brazil, only a
fourth of whom had any access to credit.
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The "Power of Backwardness"
Noted Brazilian sociologist Jose de Souza Martins has eloquently referred to "the
power of backwardness" that seems to dominate Brazil. By this, Martins does not mean
the notion that part of Brazil is "archaic" in the sense that Lambert (1973) and other
earlier writers described it. Rather, Martins is talking about a deeply embedded cultural
pattern which makes Brazil unique in many ways, one which — at least on a public policy
level ~ avoids confrontation and seeks to work out compromises, especially among
powerful groups.
Part of this pattern is a blurred distinction between public and private property.
While dating back to colonial times, this is not an "archaic" characteristic, but one which
is very much alive. It touches upon what is sometimes referred to as corruption, but does
not end there — many practices (such as a government agency - DNOCS - constructing
deep water wells on private properties of major politicians) are legal.

Although

Brazilians often think of poor people "selling" their votes to politicians as a key factor
here (actually, such "sale" is a complex process involving exchanges of favors and
patronage156), Martins points out that the really important exchanges of favors are not
between the politicians and the poor, but between the government and the rich.
Furthermore, he notes that, aside from a small portion of the "Weberian" middle class,
few Brazilians see such exchange of favors as being essentially wrong. Indeed, both the

156
In 1999 a law was passed, with Church support, that prohibits the giving, offering, or promising of
anything of value - including patronage or jobs - in return for votes. Law 9.840 of September 29, 1999. It
is not clear how effective that law has been in practice, particularly at the local level.
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labor movement, which was born in the state-protected Vargas system, and academics
(federal universities — the keystone of Brazilian academia — are government-supported
institutions with free tuition, the majority of their students coming from upper and middle
class families) are involved in the system of government favors (Martins 1994).
While systems of exchange of favors are an essential part of any political system,
they reach a high level of expectation and commitment ("compromisso") in Brazil. One
of the privileges — one might almost say duties — of public office is to provide for one's
family and friends, and very few Brazilians see this as being essentially wrong. The
external trappings of coronelismo may have changed, but the essential structure — often
carried over to urban settings — is still very real. 157
A related phenomenon is the flexibility of the elite. Rarely does the political elite
say "no" — protesting rural workers march to Brasilia, meet with officials, have their
demands verbally met, go home, and nothing ever happens.

It is truly amazing how

quickly Church and leftist rhetoric is adopted ~ my wife once remarked that, if a stranger
came to Brazil during elections and saw the television presentations of the various
parties, he would think that every candidate was a leftist.

i co

It would be difficult, for instance, to find anyone in Brazil who would ~ at least
publicly — admit to being against agrarian reform. Even the UDR — the ultra-right
157

The electoral system in Brazil is not based on districts; thus federal and state legislators can draw votes
from anywhere in their states, which increases the power of informal networks. Nepotism and helping
related groups is common; Brazilians may well complain when a politician "exagerates" in naming too
many family members to office, but they are basically sympathetic to the practice. On "compromisso" see
Bezerra, 118
158

This phenomenon sometimes takes concrete form; at the height of the base community movement, for
instance, the government encouraged local prefeitos (mayors) to organize "community" associations, which
were then given government grants.
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landowners association — always declares itself in favor of agrarian reform. Such people
will simply say (with some reason) that agrarian reform is more than just distributing land
— one needs infrastructure, schools, health posts, credit facilities, and so on ~ all of
which are highly unlikely and place a real reform well out of reach.159 Or they do as the
Sarney government did — outwardly support the idea and sabotage it through inaccuracy,
delay, and inefficiency, which are so expected from government in Brazil as to hardly
raise a stir.
When it is clear that a change is going to happen, the elite is often able to seize
leadership of the change to prevent it from running too deeply — what Sonia Mendon^a
has called "changing in order to remain the same." This is true in the political sphere —
the prince of Portugal declaring Brazilian independence, the military government
enacting the Estatuto da Terra, the military regime's vice president making possible the
election of the opposition presidential candidate. It is also true in the economic sphere —
for instance, in the uniting of rural and urban elites to modernize agriculture.
The political system is also expert in co-opting people. One of the difficulties of
Church and union organization in Tocantins was that, as soon as leaders emerged among
the people, they would be offered jobs or political opportunities by the local power elites.
While some resisted the temptation, and a few managed to occupy such posts without
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There is a genuine debate as to the importance of land distribution as the basis of agrarian reform. Jose
de Souza Martins, whose opinion is highly respected, claims that the Church particularly has made a large
mistake in thinking that land distribution is the essence of agrarian reform - that in itself it is not that
meaningful. Other writers (e.g. Delgado, 233-234) argue that the agrarian problem is primarily an issue of
land distribution. It has been my position, and that of most of the Church, that land distribution is an
essential first step - that having land provides farmers with a base and vested interest to work for necessary
changes. There is evidence, for instance, that land ownership per se causes rural workers to be more active
politically. As we discovered in Tocantins, however, once farmers win their land, a whole new stage of
action is needed, helping them to organize and develop productive capacity. The difference, therefore,
among people of good faith, is one of emphasis and strategy.
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losing their focus, for most struggling farmers or landless workers, it was very difficult to
resist the allure of a paying job (for himself or his wife or grown child) and the political
compromise that implicitly went with it.
A final factor is widespread impunity for crimes. Impunity is partly the result of a
cultural reluctance to call anyone to account for his actions. While scandals rock Brazil
on almost a weekly basis, a few token actions against a few scapegoats usually ends the
matter. This attitude extends to perpetrators of rural violence.160
This set of political characteristics continues to affect rural Brazil. Linhares and
Silva argue that it is the chief unifying characteristic of Brazilian agrarian history:
The only common link uniting the diverse historical patterns of the agrarian
question among us is the continuous presence of the political question, in other
words, of the domination that excludes the rural population from citizenship,
generates poverty and extreme violence.

Being a long-standing feature of

Brazilian society, it brings with it the seeds of disorder, as though we had always
been faced with the same agrarian question, facing the same five hundred years of
latifundio.
In fact, agriculture and its responses to the development of the country are not
archaic; what is archaic is the political system of domination that impedes the
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Due to international pressure, the gunman who in 1986 killed Father Josimo Tavares, a CPT priest
active in land reform, was later convicted of the murder, although the people who hired him never were.
The gunman escaped from prison after a few months. He was later arrested in Gurupi, Tocantins, for a
minor crime; when police recognized him, he insisted that he would only deal with CPT lawyers as they
were the only ones he could trust! The lawyers met with him once, but within three days he had broken a
hole through the Gurupi jail wall and escaped.
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workers from participating in the riches of the cornucopia that agriculture creates
or could create (Linhares and Silva, 145-146).

Conclusion
Tania Barcelar de Araujo, a highly respected economist from the Northeast, notes
that Brazil has been able to internally develop highly sophisticated technology for
building airplanes and for oil drilling:
This is the same country in which millions of people go hungry. Not because of
technical incapacity. Always when the Brazilian elite has made a decision, the
country has had the capacity to respond, including in agriculture. Up until the
1960s, for example, the Brazilian savannah lands were considered unsuitable for
agriculture.

Now the are dynamic areas that produce grains competatively,

including for exportation. The same region that, twenty years ago, was held to be
hostile to agriculture.

Embrapa, a public resarch company, used it technical

knowledge to correct the soil of the savannahs. There was no lack of technology,
no lack of organizational skills, no lack of government to supply infrastructure,
roads, warehouses, telephones... (Benjamin and Araujo, 17).
In studying the history of land in Brazil, the theme of chaos emerges. Chaos in
undefined and overlapping land titles, confusion in a plethora of laws that are not
regulated, decrees that may or may not supersede other decrees, regulations that may or
may not be valid. Uncertainty when it comes to protecting small landholder's rights,
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uneven enforcement of laws that do exist. Impunity when it comes to punishing gunmen
who shoot rural leaders.
Chaotic situations tend to benefit the strong and unscrupulous, tend to hurt the
smaller and weaker.

Which raises the question that lingers behind every Brazilian

analysis of the agrarian question: Is the chaos really chaos, or is it planned chaos?
One notes the frustration, the outrage, on the part of many serious scholars who
have studied the land issue. One can hear despair in Ligia Silva's comment, "...with
respect to land matters, nothing appears to have been decided among us in a definitive,
clear, and uncontestable manner...," in E.C. de Mello's mention of patterns of
"modernization without change" or Sonia Mendon?a's, "changing in order to remain the
same." One remembers James Holston's statement that "...land law in Brazil promotes
conflict, and not solutions, because it establishes the terms by which grilagem is
consistently legalized" (L. Silva, 243; E.C. Mello 1999b, 161; Mendonfa, 80; Motta 120121.) 161

During the 1980s, most writers tended toward the position that the apparent chaos
was consciously created or aggravated by classes that wanted to maintain the status quo
of their own power with respect to land and to use land policy to benefit their own
interests. There is significant truth to this position. It is clear that certain policy makers
advocated systems that would force small farmers off land and into cities in the interests
of keeping labor costs down, although others seem to have done so under the idea that it

161

In 2009 Lula was severely criticized for signing into law Medida Provisoria 458 (which became Law
11.952), nicknamed the Medida Provisoria de Grilagem, which legalized 67 million hectares of informally
obtained land in the Amazon region. Critics noted that 72% of this land is large tracts held by less than 7%
of the landholders benefitte.(J. P. Martins 2009).
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is easier to provide services to urban populations than to rural ones (many of these
viewed rural life as essentially backward and saw urbanization as enlightenment). There
can be little doubt, also, that landowners interested in seizing public or small posseiro's
land have seen the advantages of confused land titles and unclear laws, interest groups
opposed to land reform have seen the possibilities for delay through complicating
procedures and proposals, gunmen (and those who hire them) have benefited from
inefficient, overloaded, and sometimes corrupt courts.
More recently scholars have tended to stress the multi-faceted nature of land, the
many types of small and large landholders and rural workers, the variety of relationships
among them.

Some of these scholars see the dualism (small producer v. latifundio,

dominant class v. oppressed class) of earlier writers as naive. They make valid points,
although the essential difference may be that, whereas the military regime, with its clear
demand that one choose sides, gave legitimate rise to dualistic interpretations (power v.
people, government v. Church, etc.), the more complex interworkings of Brazil's current
democracy make multi-faceted approaches more viable.

Some of the newer writers,

moreover, especially those who deal with the intricacies of the agro-industrial complex,
risk a naivate of their own, seemingly underestimating the impact of domination in a
system in which disparities of wealth are as great as they are in Brazil.
E.C. Mello suggests that (especially with respect to Northeastern landowners) we
are not dealing with a hegemony as such, but with a "corporativist class," i.e., "a class
that seeks to preserve its objectives not through control of the social milieu but through
insertion into a milieu whose control has escaped them" (E.C. Mello, Norte Agraria,
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I

26).

This seems to me, on a national level, to be valid. Certainly landowners, by

merging their interests with those of urban based capitalist classes, have been able to
expand their influence. There are, in addition, other factors which have tended to give
the interest group power over the ordinary Brazilian mind:
•

Faulty agricultural models: as noted above, Brazilians have been generally convinced
that large scale, chemically and mechanically oriented agriculture is the only modern
approach. The environmental movement is beginning to challenge this view, but it
has a long way to go before effectively changing public opinion.

•

A model of planning divorced from reality: this is a phenomenon which has been
repeatedly noted in Brazil. There is a deep cultural tendency for experts (in Brasilia,
in universities, etc.) to develop elaborate and theoretically pleasing plans that have
little relation to, much less input from, the people effected. Furthermore, there is a
tendency to mistake a paper accomplishment — a law passed, a plan written and
published ~ for a concrete one.163

•

Paternalistic modes of behavior, favor-based politics, and corruption ~ the "power of
backwardness" discussed above ~ which make real change so difficult.164

•

Inefficiency and inertia. Mello (1999b, 9) quotes Henry Adams: "My conclusion is
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Mello was writing of the late imperial period, but the observation is even more valid today. Belik (181188) further discusses the role of "corporativist" or "corporatist" groups in modern Brazil.

163

This tendency is shared by some well-meaning Brazilian civil groups. There is a tendency to produce
beautifully designed posters (against AIDS or child prostitution, for instance) or, as recently happened
outside my office building, elaborate displays (this one ran up the hillside and said - children should not be
in the garbage - referring to children who work in garbage dumps) and feel one has accomplished
something, without taking any action that essentially changes the situation.
164

Thus Veiga, 7, writing in 1989, noted, along with the potential economic advantages of agrarian reform,
the growing political inviability of carrying it out. J.B. Silva, however, discussing political evolution in
Ceara since 1985, correctly views more optimistic possibilities.
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that history is simply social development along the lines of least resistance, and that
frequently the line of least resistance is as much unconsciously discovered by society
as it is by water."
With respect to the last two points above, the MST (Movimento Sem Terra) took
one of the few viable approaches. They became expert at keeping the agrarian issue in
the public eye — through court actions, demonstrations, public declarations sometimes
bordering on the outrageous (see, e.g., Secco).165
One of MST's key strategies has been occupying unproductive land — or,
depending on one's point of view, invading it.

Marcia Motta notes that the term

"invader" is used by the landed classes to describe small posseiros today in very much
the same way that it was used in the 1850s.
The truth is that the sem-terra of our time are, in one way or another, heirs to the
struggles of the sem-terra of the past, but today they have at least the possibility
to record, in the media, their version of the facts. For their representatives, the
invasions are in reality occupations of land undertaken by the movement, whose
objective is to question Brazilian agrarian policy through occupation of
uncultivated lands, many of them legally public (devoluta), but griladas by large
landowners.
.... As much in the past as today, the invaders claim that the occupied lands
are, in reality, public lands, and not part of the landowner's domain....

165
The current head of MST, Joao Pedro Stedile, lacks the charm of his predecessor, Jose Rainha, and the
MST seriously alienated public opinion through seemingly gratuitous acts of vandalism, most notably the
invasion and looting of President Cardoso's private farm in 2002 and the invasion, forced detention of
guards, and destruction of plants and specimens at an Aracruz research farm in 2005.

147

More than a century has passed... Nonetheless, as much yesterday as today,
small landless posseiros seek to legitimate the occupation through the principal of
the act of possession, denying in judicial actions or in direct confrontations,
through their occupation, the territorial limits set by the large fazendeiros (Motta,
225).
In this respect, MST's efforts had real impact; by 1999 an estimated 90% of rural land
expropriations in Brazil resulted from occupations, most of them with MST support
(Fernandes, 225).
In order to be effective, the MST's political approach needed to be backed by
serious, long-term pressure, such as the Church and a few civic organizations continue to
provide (see, e.g., "O Clamor Que Vem Do Campo" and Biernaski). Equally important is
the continued realistic presentation of a new model of "modern" agriculture, one that
presents a caring relationship between humans and land not only as the only option which
is sustainable over the long-term, but as one which is at least equal (in the long-run
superior) to the productivity of current commercial practices.166
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were indications that Brazil was
approaching another moment in its history when agrarian reform might be viable:
Never have conditions been so favorable for the decision, which must be of a
political nature, to eliminate the latifundio. It does not have the strength it once
had. There are great numbers of the population who desire to work the land; new
agricultural technology is available, opening up wide regions for development and
166

For work in this area, see, inter alia, Pessoa, Coelho & Miranda, Tubaldini
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profoundly altering the conditions in which production in the countryside can be
carried out; rural isolation was broken by roads and communication networks, the
population has urbanized, diminishing the political weight of rural bosses. It is
anti-historical that Brazil continues to submit itself to groups who base their
power and authority on the monopolistic control of territory....
Modern Brazil is now witnessing... a notable phenomenon: the desire to
return to the land of populations mistreated in the cities, which have exhausted
their capacity to absorb [the population]. At a moment in which unemployment
places on the agenda the need to alter the paradigm of employing labor, and in a
society in which the demand for food remains high, the existence of empty land,
of people disposed to cultivate it, and of available technology makes for a rare
potential that our country cannot refuse to use (Benjamin, et al., 85-86.)167
A number of additional factors added to the favorable circumstances outlined in
the above quote. With a relatively stable currency implanted in 1994, land prices fell
considerably and other options for investment (the stock market, lending, commercial and
industrial activities) became more attractive. Investment in land was also been affected
by other factors: concern with the rising number of land invasions by MST, a serious
effort on the part of government to collect land taxes from large landholders, a 1993 law
providing a more streamlined process for expropriation, and actions by the government to

167

New mechanisms for promoting agrarian reform, recently introduced by the government, may be a step
in this direction. See, e.g., Sekles; Jungman "A Nova Reforma Agraria"
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revise the indicators for land use and production efficiency. It appeared that holding a
latifundio would become increasingly less viable (Fernandes, 224-227).168
By early 2006, when the case studies reported in this dissertation were
undertaken, it seemed there was a window of opportunity to promote the vocation of
Brazilian farmers (as well as of Brazil) for agriculture. It was against this background
that this study was carried out.

168

Fernandes traces land price declines of 30-50% in Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul; in the North this
may not be so much a factor. However, he notes that INCRA has now become probably the major
purchaser of land (it has been accused of paying inflated prices [see, e.g., Galluci]), to the point that at least
one fazandeiro has been accused of paying to have his land invaded. (Galhardo). Delgado, 235, notes that
the fall in land prices is due in part to the lowering of prices for agricultural goods through opening of
borders to imports, but also affected by the high price of Brazilian currency, which changed with this years
devaluation. The summary process law mentioned is Complimentary Law 76 of July 6, 1993.
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CHAPTER IV
MARKET-BASED LAND REFORM IN BRAZIL
(1996-2005)
Background
Brazil is a unique political/cultural/economic system and, as with all such
systems, change is easier to discuss or plan than it is to effect. In Chapter III, I traced
how certain patterns in Brazilian land occupation have been endemic since the colonial
period. As with any complex system, what appear to be the obvious leverage points for
change may not in fact be the best leverage points, and policies made to correct problems
may have spin-offs that are damaging, or unexpected reactions which produce results
different from, even contrary to, those originally intended.169
In a country with the vast income disparity of Brazil, public policies and
development programs tend to suffer significant distortions. One reason is that those who
make laws and policies often represent or identify with the ruling classes, and the policies
and/or their application therefore, consciously or unconsciously, benefit those classes.
Even when a policy or its administration does not actively benefit the ruling
classes, however, distortions result. Access to information, skills, education, and capital
are so unequally distributed that almost any change tends to favor the small portion of the
population that possesses these resources.

Thus the poor tend to be displaced by

development projects (irrigation, road building, tourist development) and pushed into
more marginal areas while (in a process similar to "gentrification" in U.S. cities) the
better-off occupy those lands benefited by the projects.

169
Examples date back to the 1690s, when the Portuguese instituted land taxes to raise income and control
speculation, but which resulted in a loss of control of land registration; the 1790s reforms by Pombal,
which proved counterproductive; attempts to diminish rural exodus in the 1950s-1970s by passing land
reform legislation, which (due to landowner fears) resulted in expulsion of tenant farmers from the land;
FISET incentives for reforestation in the 1970's, which resulted in increased land speculation, rural exodus,
environmental degradation, and food shortages.
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Particularly applicable to the present case, this inequality extends to bargaining
power. The wealthiest classes in Brazil can afford to sit on assets (rural land, urban
offices and apartments) even where the assets produce no income or involve ongoing
expenses.

This phenomenon appears in the holding of vast tracks of rural land, for

purposes of speculation, access to rural credit, hedging against inflation, and/or the
prestige and political power that land ownership entails. On the other hand, the poorest
classes - including most rural workers and many small farmers - are often desperate to
secure immediate necessities and have very little possibility of bargaining.

The Players
With respect to the implementation of agrarian reform in Brazil during the period
leading up to our case studies (1996-2005), a number of players must be considered.
Foremost should be mentioned those who need land - landless workers and those
whose parcels of land are too small to sustain their families. The FAO estimates that 2.5
million Brazilian families are in need of land (World Bank 2002, 2), while the MST
(Movimento dos Sem-Terra) estimates that number at 4.5 million (Stedile c. 1999, 2) and
a government/university study as high as 5.3 million (NEAD 2000b). In addition, there
are many small and medium-sized family farmers who, while they may not need land
personally, are interested in the availability of land for their children.

Other small

farmers may believe that their political-social-economic position may be improved
through the growth in numbers and influence of the small landowner class. Small towns
- especially their commercial classes - benefit substantially when agrarian reform
populates the surrounding countryside with small farmers in place of thinly populated
latifundios with absentee owners. Urban workers and unemployed may benefit from land
reform through a reduction in the numbers of workers in the labor market. In some areas
of the country, an increase in small properties may also lead to a more secure and
accessible food source, benefiting the urban poor and residents of smaller towns.
At the policy bargaining table, the interests of the landless, of rural workers, and
other popular groups tend to be represented by the following:
1) CONTAG (Confedera^ao Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura
[National Confederation of Agricultural Workers]) - the federation of rural
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workers' unions. Formed in 1963, it is based on union structures developed in
the 1940s as part of the corporativist state plan of dictator Getulio Vargas.
Operating out of a political philosophy similar to that of Mussolini in Italy,
Vargas promulgated labor laws which protected workers' rights but viewed
unions (sindicatos) of both employers and workers as auxiliaries of the state;
the purpose of these unions was to help keep the economic system working in
an orderly fashion.

Local rural workers unions were more involved in

administering workers' health benefits than in fighting for their rights.
CONTAG supported agrarian reform, especially after the end of the 1964-85
military dictatorship, but did so from an administrative approach - proposing
laws and trying to work within the government system,

(e.g., Magalhaes

1996, 2) It met with little success. CONTAG is opposed in some places by
unions linked with the more leftist CUT (Centro Unico dos Trabalhadores),
although since 1995 CONTAG has itself been officially a member of CUT.
CONTAG is in some senses both an ally of MST and its rival in representing
rural workers. (Navarro 1998, 5)
2) Catholic Church/CPT (Comissao do Pastoral da Terra [Land Pastoral
Commission]). During the late 1960s and early 70s, partially in response to
the modernization of agriculture promoted by the military government, the
Church, especially through its Base Community groups, began to support the
cause of displaced and threatened farmers and rural workers. The CPT was
founded in 1975 to organize this work, and was soon active throughout the
country. The unique role of the Church during the military regime - as the
only body large and popular enough to attempt to counterbalance the power of
the military - brought under its protection a large number of social justice
activities that would normally have been carried out by lay or secular
organizations. The interest of the Church and the CPT was and is (as the
name of the latter implies) a pastoral one, primarily concerned with the
injustices experienced by small farmers and rural workers at the hands of
grileiros (land-grabbers) and the negative effect that being thrown off the land
has on families.

While capable of confrontation, the Church is more
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comfortable with negotiation.170 These positions at times put it at odds with
leftists and radical groups, but has also at times placed it in the role of
mediator (e.g., Fernandes 2000b, 50-51). The CPT is allied to, but sometimes
critical of, the MST.
3) MST (Movimento dos Sem-Terra [Movement of the Landless]) - The MST
was organized, with strong Church/CPT assistance in 1984 in southern Brazil
- a region of numerous small farms. It has developed a confrontational policy
with the government, actively occupying land and engaging in civil
disobedience. It is fair to state that the increase in land reform expropriations
following 1994, facilitated by economic factors that reduced the value of land
as a speculative hedge against inflation and a source of easy credit,171 was also
due to active pressure from MST in occupying land and keeping the land
reform issue alive in the public consciousness.

(e.g, Kay 1998, 28;

SDdimensions 2000, 3)
4) NGOs

- Prior to the 1992 Earth Summit, there was division between

environmentally oriented NGOs (mostly international), some of which seemed
to view people as primarily a problem, and socially oriented NGOs, some of
which viewed environmental issues as frivolous.172 The Agenda 21 process
helped to do away with this false dichotomy, so that almost all serious NGOs
working in Brazil recognize the mutuality of social justice and environmental
issues. NGOs have been wary of collaborating with the government for three
reasons: fear of political manipulation, lack of government continuity,

173

and

170

Jose de Souza Martins (2000b, 27) believes that, with the greater laicization of the CPT after the military
dictatorship, the CPT (as opposed to the Church itself) lost some of this pastoral approach and became
more confrontational and ideological. It is true that most mediating has been carried out by the CNBB
(Council of Bishops) rather than the CPT, but CNBB depends on CPT orientation on land reform issues.
171
During the 1980s, e.g., GoB spent $2.5 billion subsidizing cattle ranchers in the Amazon. (Myers 1992,
443)
172

See, e.g., Hurell 1992, 411-13, 410, on the environmental movement prior to the Earth Summit. There
are, however, groups like the Institute of Human Ecology in Pernambuco/Paraxba (with roots dating to the
1960s), that always took seriously the dynamic between human poverty and environment.
173

It is common at all levels of Brazilian government for one administration to completely cancel and
change policies and programs developed by its predecessor.
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government pressure (responding to political demands) to diminish quality
and increase quantity of program coverage. However, most NGOs consider
working with government in appropriate circumstances if it is understood that
their primary obligation is to beneficiaries.
The other key groups at the market-based agrarian reform policy bargaining table
(although only the first two of these were ever officially at the bargaining table) are:
5) The World Bank - The World Bank comes to the table with a history of its
own, including the following factors that need to be considered: 1) significant
criticism inside and outside Brazil for engaging in large-scale development
programs that have often proven socially and environmentally harmful (e.g.,
Piddington 1992)174, 2) significant criticism in Brazil for having ignored civil
society and NGO input; 3) limited success with land reform programs.175

At

the time the Cedula da Terra program was started, the Bank had limited
experience with market-based agrarian reform, and this program was viewed
as an experiment. It should be noted that the World Bank is viewed in Brazil,
to a large extent, as the representative of the development policies of the
industrialized nations, and thus a certain north-south tension exists.176
6) The Government of Brazil ("GoB") - which, itself, is a complex alliance of
interests.

The President from 1995-2003, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a

sociologist of the PSDB party, was viewed at the time of his election as being
center-left. However, in order to win the election against the Workers Party
(PT) and to govern the country in a multi-party congress, Cardoso allied
himself with two other large parties: the PFL - a right-wing party, based in
Northeastern and Northern Brazil, with a heavy representation of large
landowners, and the PMBD - the party with the largest national political
174
"Despite... efforts to improve its environmental image, questions persist about whether the World Bank
has... enacted sufficient reforms. It is not apparent that the environmental units and policies are having any
meaningful impact on the culture of the organization...." (Soroos 1999,46)
175

Interest in land reform among donor agencies had lagged for the fifteen or so years prior to 1997, then
experienced a sudden resurgence. (SDdimensions 2000, 1)
176

"Development programs devised by the North have often emphasized large-scale, politically visible
projects that impose Western technologies and ways of thinking on cultures and societies that are organized
and structured much differently." (Bryner 1999, 178)
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machine but which is largely made up, at a congressional level, of political
opportunists without strong ideology but with a significant interest in
maintaining the status quo. Cardoso became identified with neo-liberalism the policy of opening the country to free markets (which many feel happened
precipitously) and privatizing government enterprises (often in favor of
foreign capital). Although he introduced significant programs - including
market-based land reform and the bolsa escola, Cardoso was unpopular and
widely viewed as sacrificing Brazil's interests to the demands of the
industrialized nations.

In 2002, Lula - the PT candidate - was elected

President, assuming office in January 2003. Lula maintained many of the
prior government's policies (notably with respect to economics), and built
upon and improved such existing programs as the bolsa escola, Cedula da
Terra, and PRONAF. His origins in the poverty of Northeastern Brazil gave
him a strong personal commitment to land reform, but he faced many of the
same political and institutional issues that Cardoso had faced; he same found
himself facing a confrontation with the MST that was almost as tense as that
faced by Cardoso.
7) Agro-Industry - there is intense competition in Brazil in the areas of seeds,
fertilizers and pesticides (mostly multinational

companies) and food

processing and marketing (both multinational and national companies). These
groups have a vested interest in including as many farmers and as much land
and production as possible in the agro-industrial chain - producing specialized
crops with high levels of chemical fertilization and regular uses of pesticides,
usually on a mono-cultural basis (considered more efficient), often with preplanting sales contracts to large processors.177 Agro-industry has no objection
to land reform and/or small farms per se, seeing them as appropriate for, e.g.,
fruit and truck farming.

177

The representative of a Japanese pesticide firm told me (8/24/01) that his company, in order to compete,
attempts to put together a complete package for farmers - bringing together a seed/fertilizer manufacturer,
their own pesticide company, and a food processor who will finance/buy the crop - with orientation
provided to the farmers. He considered this to be a win/win situation for everyone.
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8) The Ruralistas - the "ruralists" are the larger landowners.

They are

represented by a powerful inter-party block in congress. Their extreme wing
- represented to some extent by the somewhat discredited UDR (Uniao
Democratica Ruralista) - promotes violent reaction to the threat of land
reform and land occupations.

Generally, however, the Ruralistas use their

considerable political power to secure legislation and policies favorable to
their interests. 178
179

Summary of Brazilian Land Reform Efforts
While discussions in Brazil of land reform date from the 18th Century, the issue
rose to a serious national level following World War II. The 1950s witnessed increasing
demands for land reform from both developmentalists and leftists, culminating with the
enactment of the 1964 Land Statute (Estatuto da Terra - Law 4.504) - promulgated by
the new military regime with support of the United States government, both of whom
viewed land reform as a method of combating Communism. Although the Land Statute
is in many respects a good law, the strong influence of landowning elites within the
military regime prevented serious land reform from occurring over the next twenty years.
The first civilian government, which came to power in 1985, headed by a conservative
president closely identified with large landholdings, produced little significant land
reform, and progress under subsequent administrations has proved disappointing.
Poor progress during the post-military period is attributable in part to the political
resistance of landholders, whose position was reinforced during the military regime by
government programs that encouraged industry and the urban upper/middle class to
invest in large landholdings.

In addition, the modernization of Brazilian agriculture,

during the 1964-85 period, caused opinion leaders to increasingly view the small family
farm as a relic with little economic significance, removing much of the force of the
developmentalist argument in favor of land reform. Land reform thus began to be viewed
by many as a social project to provide subsistence to rural families so that they would not
178

"One of the main difficulties the executive faces... is the passage of pro-land reform legislation in the
national legislature. The bancada ruralista... has repeatedly voted down legislation...." (Magalhaes 1996,

3)
179

This section is a brief summary. See Chapter III for more detail.
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move into urban slums - i.e., the lesser of two undesirables - a dirt farmer's life (viewed
by urban Brazilians as quaint but not something they would want) v. a life in violent
urban favelas.

Serious interest in land reform seemed to be limited to a small group of

academics, the opposition Workers' Party, the Church, and the growing MST.

Legal Background
Articles 184-191 of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 deal with agricultural and
land policy and agrarian reform. Article 184 allows the Federal Government:
to expropriate on account of social interest, for purposes of agrarian reform, rural
property which is not performing its social function, against prior and fair
compensation in agrarian debt bonds... redeemable within a period of up to twenty
years
Expropriation is prohibited of small and medium-sized properties and of
productive properties. A property is deemed to be fulfilling its social function if it is
being rationally and adequately used, is in compliance with environmental and labor
laws, and the exploitation "favors the well-being of the owners and laborers." Agrarian
reform title deeds cannot be sold for ten years after they are conceded. (Arts. 185-6, 189)
The Constitution was further defined by the Agrarian Law (8.629). Enacted in
1993, it was seen as a significant victory for the ruralista anti-land reform block. The
law provided liberal definitions of what constitutes "productive property" exempt from
expropriation, extended that exemption to unproductive property that has a technical
project being implanted, and generally used language which is intentionally unclear and
makes the legal process of expropriation easier to defeat. (Alves 1995, 251-253)

The Beginnings of "Market-Based Land Reform"

The Birth of a Policy
"Market-Based Land Reform" (MBLR) is a term that has come to be used for
programs in which a government, rather than expropriating land for redistribution,
finances the purchase of land by groups of landless farmers.
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Though arguably a

misnomer, the term is used in this paper for convenience. The two forms of MBLR that
had been fully implemented at the time of our case studies were the Cedula da Terra
(under which the settlements we studied were formed) and the Banco da Terra (Land
Bank). A third form, Credito Fundiario, was beginning to be implemented at the time of
our case studies.
1) The World Bank Pilot Project - Cedula da Terra
A 1996 World Bank financed project, Ceara Rural Poverty Alleviation Project,
included a small market-based land reform element which allowed 700 families to obtain
land at a cost of approximately US$ 6000 per family, less than half the then current per
family cost of land reforms using expropriation. The initial results of this project led the
GoB to make "its first-ever request to the Bank for a free-standing Land Reform Project."
(World Bank 2000, 4)
In 1997, the World Bank granted this request, approving Land Reform and
Poverty Alleviation Pilot Project 4147-BR - known in Brazil as the Cedula da Terra
[Land Note] Project, which further instituted a market based approach to land reform.
The project seeks to reduce rural poverty in Northeast Brazil by: (i) increasing
the incomes of about 15,000 poor rural families through improved access to
land

and

participation

in

complementary,

demand-driven

community

subprojects; (ii) raising the agricultural output of lands included in the project;
and (iii) pilot testing a market-based approach to land reform in which
beneficiaries obtain financing for the purchase of suitable properties negotiated
directly between rural communities and willing sellers and which, if successful,
will enable the Government to greatly accelerate the pace and lower the cost of
its programs to improve land access by the rural poor throughout the Northeast
and elsewhere in Brazil. (World Bank 1997, 2)
Community associations of rural workers would select the land and negotiate the
purchase, allocate land to members, present supplementary proposals, receive financing,
and engage in mutual self-help projects.

The program was to be operated in a

decentralized manner through state and municipal governments, and an active role was
foreseen for "intermediary" NGOs. (Ibid, 2, 9)
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The pilot would be implemented over four years. The budgeted cost was US$
150 million (i.e., $10,000 per family), allocated 30% for land purchases, 56.2% for
infrastructure, goods and materials, 2.6% for community development and technical
support, 6.7% for state government level administration, and 4.5% for Federal
Government evaluation and dissemination. (Ibid.,2-3)
The World Bank justification for the market-based approach as an alternative to
expropriation noted that resistance to expropriation leads to higher fiscal costs, legal
disputes, long administrative delays, and political contention, and that the expropriation
1 80

and redistribution process results in "Frequent selection of unsuitable beneficiaries."
(Ibid., 5). It was noted that government policies (subsidized agricultural t ocredit,
blanket
t
debt relief, and tax breaks) and economic structural problems (inflation),

that had led

to land being over-valued as an object for speculation, had to some extent been curtailed
by the current GoB, improving the viability of a market-based approach. (Ibid., 4,6).
With respect to environmental matters, the World Bank noted:
In contrast to conventional land reform projects, which because of lower costs are
often located at or near the agricultural frontier, land purchases under the
proposed project will likely occur well within traditional agricultural areas where
services are available and markets are near. Therefore, the project is consistent
with an overall approach to reduce the pressure on protected areas and primary
forests by intensifying land use within the agricultural frontier. (Ibid., 9).
182

2) Implementation of the Land Bank {"Banco da Terra ")
Complementary Law No. 93 of February 4, 1998, instituted "the Fund for Land
and Agrarian Reform - Land Bank." Following the World Bank proposal (developed in
180

The World Bank Proposal did not specifically mention corruption, which in the past led to gross
overpayments for land and purchases of phantom land (e.g., Ministerio de Desenvolviment Agrario 1999;
Gondim 2001b). The World Bank model clearly envisions a negotiated model in which the interest of the
buyers will make such overpayments less feasible.
181
"...without price stability at the macro-economic level, the problem of getting prices and incentives right
at the regional and local levels (which forms the central thrust of... World Bank policy) is unlikely to be
effectively addressed." (Hurrell 1996,424)
182

This paper focuses on the Cedula da Terra, and is not directly concerned with the Land Bank.
Differences between the two programs are briefly discussed in Chapter VI.
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conjunction with the Ministry of Agrarian Reform), the Law created the Land Bank "for
183

the purpose of financing programs of landholding reordering and rural settlement."
Beneficiaries are to be landless rural workers with at least five years experience or tillers
with land parcels whose properties do not reach the size necessary to sustain a family, as
defined in Article 40(11) of the Land Statute. It allowed for both collective and individual
loans, payable over twenty years, a grace period of up to thirty-six months, interest no
greater than 12% per year (a subsidized rate in Brazil), with a discount of 50% of
184
principal and interest allowed pursuant to regulations.
IOC

The Decree regulating the Law

entered into more detail, clarifying that

collective loans could be made through cooperatives or associations of beneficiaries, that
loans were to be secured by mortgages on the farm properties and, in the case of
collective loans, by the fiduciary pledge of all cooperative or association members.
Loans could be made for land purchasei o/:and basic infrastructure. A Caretaking Council
(Conselho Curador) for the Land Bank

was created at the federal level to oversee the

state and municipal governments, which had direct administrative responsibility for the
program.
The process of land purchase started with a Carta Consulta (Consulting Letter)
from the proposed beneficiaries - usually a group organized in a cooperative or
association. The Carta included basic information on the group, number of members of
the group who intend to participate in the program, identification of all association
members and their spouses, preliminary data on the land they wished to acquire (more
than one property can be listed, in order of preference), and the estimated value of the
183

Assentamento - here translated as "settlement" — is the term for communities of small farmers who have
won their land through land reform.
184

The actual rate in use is even more highly subsidized. Central Bank Resolution 2.728/2000 establishes
interest at 6% p/a for loans up to R$ 15.000 per beneficiary, 8% on loans of R$ 15.000-30.000, and 10%
above that. A rebate on financial charges is allowed of up to 50% in regions denominated "poorest" and
30% on all others.
185

Previously Decrees 3.027 of April 13, 1999 and 3.115 of July 9, 1999, both revoked by the current
Decree 3.475 of May 19, 2000.
186

The Council consists of seven Ministers (Agrarian Development - who presides, Agriculture, Planning,
Development-Industry-External Commerce, Finance, Environment, and Sports & Tourism), the president
of the National Development Bank (BNDES), the president of INCRA, and two representatives of potential
beneficiaries, selected by the Minister of Agrarian Development.
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property and of additional basic infrastructure needed. A declaration by the landowners
declaring willingness to sell to the beneficiaries, and proof of their ownership, had to
accompany the Carta. The Carta was submitted to the local Municipal Council for Rural
Development, which must forward it, within thirty days, to Technical Units, established
I £7

by state governments or associations of municipalities.

The Technical Unit then

examined the eligibility of the proposed beneficiaries (cross-checking with lists of
beneficiaries of other agrarian reform programs), the legal status and eligibility of the
property, the adequacy of the property for the proposed purpose, its fair value, the
priority of the project pursuant to national norms, and the availability of resources. If the
project presented no difficulties, approval was to be communicated to the beneficiaries
and the Municipal Council; if resources for the year in question were lacking, the project
would placed on a waiting list for the next year. (Regulamento, Arts. 3, 27-30)
The legal operation was carried out in a single document which included the
public registry of sale, financing contract, and mortgage. (Ibid., Art. 38) Provisions were
made for accompanying and auditing the process. (Regulamento, Arts. 40-45) In the
event of non-payment of principal or interest by beneficiaries, extra-judicial collection is
to be attempted, failing which the beneficiary is listed as non-compliant in CADIN (the
informative registry of unpaid credits of the federal public sector) and S ERAS A (the
central credit service for banks). (Ibid., Art.25)

No mention is made of judicially

enforcing mortgages.
The Philosophical Issues
At first glance, the question of MBLR would seem to be simple in concept, if
somewhat more difficult at the level of proof. Is the MBLR an effective instrument to
redistribute land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically
sustainable manner?
No instrument, however, is value free. The manner in which goals are achieved
affects both the nature of those achievements and the lives of participants and
beneficiaries.

187

Municipalities may group together in associations to participate in the program.
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Underlying the conflicts that surrounded MBLR are deep philosophical
differences as to the way things ought to be. This is true even among those who, in good
faith, firmly believe that a meaningful land reform should take place: the World Bank,
sectors of the government, the Church, the unions, MST, the NGOs. I concern myself
here with looking at the philosophical issues that divide these "good faith" players,
setting aside for the moment, those players who - while they may verbally support
agrarian reform - have little interest in its outcome or, in some cases, consider it as a
superfluous or negative undertaking.
For convenience, I divide this discussion into a look at (1) methods and (2) results
of agrarian reform, although I believe that the two sets of issues have many common
philosophical roots.

1) Methods
1

"Land is not received as a gift, it is conquered"

is an MST slogan. It is a reaction

to centuries during which access to land in general, and agrarian reform in particular,
were viewed as primarily something which occurs from the top down. In Chapter III, I
traced how, from the 14th Century in Portuguese history, land was a grant from royal
authority, and how this pattern remained throughout Brazilian history, both formally
(through legal structures) and informally (through large landholders, who would allow
less important tillers use of land). While there were always exceptions of small tillers
who staked their own claims, this happened most frequently in frontier and other
marginal areas189 (continued expansion into the Amazonian frontier and other marginal

188

"A terra nao e ganhada, e conquistada " An MST document translates this as "Land is not gained, it is
conquered," but this translation loses some of the meaning of the word "ganhada" in Portuguese.
189
This is a recurring pattern in Brazilian history. "Certain societies, such as Brazilian, permit an
expansion at the margins of the formal and institutional system. This reveals at the same time a negative
aspect, that is, concentration of power, and others, positive, the possibility for many people who live in
marginality to find conditions more or less comfortable in which to live and work. But this does not occur
without a strong dependency in relation to the "center." It appears that one deals with, here, a form of selforganization of the "periphery" that seeks to constitute a more autonomous way within the economic
system, giving itself levels of liberty and independence in relation to the dominant scheme and the modern
classical pattern of organization of work. Those who propose this type of autonomy pertain to social
groups that have generally few rights to participate, are poorly organized, and live in a precarious situation
on the economic and material plane." (J. Almeida 1999, 149)
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areas being one of the causes of environmental problems190).

If land in those areas

became more valuable, the top-down structure would reassert itself.
For the MST and its allies, therefore, the struggle for land is not only an end in
itself, but a process of conscientization (concientizagao).

Through the struggle, the

worker learns not only to value the land itself but the need for solidarity, critical thought,
and continuous assertion of rights.
It could be responded to this position that the MBLR mechanism, in establishing a
system through which small farmers pay for their land, is providing them with a sense of
importance of that land, a true sense of owning it and having "conquered" it. It is not (at
least, entirely) a give-away. Furthermore, insofar as the program promotes associations
of owners, cooperatives, training, etc., it could be argued that the system is promoting
other values which the MST advocates - such as solidarity.
The answer to this is partly practical as well as philosophical. Or, better, it has
practical results which arise out of the philosophical positions. The position of the MST
and its allies might be summarized as follows (this list was originally developed during
the Cardoso administration, but the MST relationship with the Lula administration is not
as different as one might have expected)191:
•

The essential purpose of the GoB is to defuse the social conflict created by, and
undermine the political base of, movements such as the MST. The government is
using access to land in much the way that Henry Ford used higher salaries to defuse
the union movement. The government (as opposed to individuals in the government)
has no real interest in land reform and, once the social movements are undercut, will
return to the minimally active stance it followed prior to the rise of those movements.

•

Through stressing land purchases, the government is giving the large owners the
essential choice as to which land they will make available. They will tend to keep the
best lands for themselves and sell more marginal lands to the workers. Thus the old
patterns will be maintained.

190

e.g., The highway to Rondonia, which in the 1970s opened the southern Brazilian Amazon to migration
and significant degradation, was financed with a $440 million loan from the World Bank. (Soroos, 45)
191

This summary is my own, but based on extensive reading, discussion, and personal experience. (See,
e.g., Aslam c. 1999, Global Exchange/Economic Justice Now c. 1999, Latin American Report 1999, Plevin
1999, Schwartzman 2000, Stedile c. 1999)
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•

The community associations established for MBLR program are often not authentic
community organizations but have only been put together for the purposes of the
program, and in many cases are controlled by political figures identified with
1

landowners or other elite.

M

This situation arises in part because neither the World

Bank nor the government is interested in undergoing the long (minimum three year),
arduous process of building genuine grass-root organizations.
•

Decentralization of the project to state and municipal levels puts power in the hands
of those levels of government where large landholders and anti-land reform lobbies
have the strongest influence; this is especially the case in the poorest regions of the
country, the North and Northeast.

•

Access to land should be viewed as a right.

The landless should not be unduly

burdened with debt on their farms. The process serves to subjugate the small farmers
to the agro-industrial-financial complex.
It has also been noted that the original project was presented by the government and
the World Bank as a fait accompli with no input from representatives of the landless or
other elements of civil society, and that the representation of civil society on the
Caretaking Council is "almost non-existent... already indicating serious limitations as to
its role and the positions to be defended" (Schwartzman 2000, 1; Bittencourt 1999, 6).
A 1999 analysis by an NGO technician expressed concern that, with the birth of
MBLR, the number of expropriations was falling (he noted that, except for the World
Bank participation, the funds for MBLR come out of the funds for land reform). He
phrased the issue as follows:
[We] understand that the carrying out of an agrarian reform that promotes
structural changes in land concentration (with expropriation of latifundios that do
192

Brazil has a history of such non-authentic community organizations
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Tania Bacelar de Araujo (1998) draws an important distinction between what she calls
"deconcentration" - the passing of tasks from a more central authority (e.g., the Federal Government) to
less central authorities (e.g., state governments or state offices of federal agencies) as opposed to what she
believes to be true decentralization, the passing of real decision making power to beneficiaries and local
communities. "For non-liberals, decentralization is not confused with privatization or the hegemony of
atomized decisions of individuals or businesses, but means 'transfer of competency, means, resources and
power from the central spheres to the local spheres'." (p. 5) By her definition, it might be fair to say that
the Cedula da Terra program includes some elements of both deconcentration and decentralization.
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not fulfill their social function) should not be viewed only through the economic
and social aspects of job and income generation, but also from the political point
of view (of the power structures at the three levels of government) and that of
sustainable development. Therefore, the objectives of agrarian reform are not
summed up in the distribution of land for settling families, they should also
contribute to the decrease or breaking of the power of the latifundio, which is
responsible for the political, economic, and social backwardness of many
Brazilian regions.

Only with the breaking of the latifundio culture... which

signifies a change in conception and policies that to this day dominate the
Brazilian government, will it be possible to realize the potential of family
agriculture and... advance in the construction of sustainable development for rural
regions. (Bittencourt, 1)

2) Results
There are at least three views of the results which land reform may bring about:
•

Providing the landless with land will allow them to minimally sustain themselves and
their families, relieve the country of a significant social problem, and perhaps reduce
the pressure on overburdened urban slums caused by rural migration.

•

Small farmers will be integrated into modern agriculture as part of the agro-industrialfinancial system. The disadvantage of smallness can be offset, to a certain extent,
through cooperative structures.194

•

Small farmers represent the possibility of a truly alternative agriculture and way of
life, geared to solidarity rather than competition, use of appropriate technologies,
environmentally sound (often organic) farming methods, and more just social
structures.

Note that these three positions are not mutually exclusive. Agribusiness people
recognize a niche for organic products, even the most solidarity-based groups recognize

194

Among some groups supporting market-based reform, prejudice against small farms is diminishing and
there is recognition that family owned farms are "the most efficient and sustainable" (SDdimensions, p. 9).
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that farmers need to market their crops,195 and everyone recognizes that agrarian reform
will help resolve a significant social problem. The difference lies in one's primary vision
of what agrarian reform is meant to achieve. The average person on the street (if s/he
thinks about it at all), many politicians, and a significant sector of government officials
on all three levels, think in terms of the first of these models - resolving a social problem.
Those in the government more seriously involved with agrarian reform and agriculture,
the agribusiness and financial sectors, the World Bank, and some academics think more
in terms of the second model.

Many NGOs and popular movements, and some

academics, think in terms of the third one.
Perhaps one of the key points that focuses these philosophical differences is the
view of land as a commodity. J. Molina (2001), a supporter of market-based land reform
writing in an FAO publication, notes that "...the new model of development emphasizes
the market as the principal force or factor to distribute resources in the rural sector, both
land and labor capital."

Recognizing that classical economic theory requires a

competitive market to have fungible goods, freedom of participation for buyers and
sellers, and a great number of buyers and sellers, and that all participants should have
complete information, he states:

In the case of the land market, these requirements are not fulfilled because said
markets are highly imperfect.... First, the degree of heterogenity of land (which
has to do with soil type, availability of water and other natural resources,
existence of infrastructure and access to markets, among other factors). Second,
the availability of capital to purchase land.... Third... the land market tends to
be fragmented and/or segmented.

Finally.... the high cost of obtaining

information respecting the size and characteristics of property....

[emphasis

added] (Molina, 2-3)

195

"...it is important to note that this ideological opposition has little correspondence, in the case of MST...
with the concrete situations which they influence, in various regions of Brazil, where the economic projects
which they sustain normally have a strong sense of economic integration and inclusion in the commercial
and financial relations of the municipalities...." (Navarro 1998, 9)
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Molina's use of the term "imperfect" is standard economic language. Yet it is ironic
that in classical economic terms the uniqueness of land is viewed as an "imperfection,"
whereas an environmentalist or one who loves land would see this as a valuable quality.
Once again, the ability of classical economics to ignore the reality of natural resources,
the "conceptual chasms that divide modern economics from ecology" (Hempel 1996, 11),
is brought into play.
Within the classical model, virtually all the prerequisites of a classical free market
are missing in Brazil with respect to land. In addition to land not being a fungible item,
there is no equality of bargaining power between the parties, few clearly defined property
rights, no "effective and creditable mechanisms for resolutions of property rights
conflicts" or "information systems so that the diverse agents in the market can participate
and operate in the same efficient and effective manner." (Molina 2001, 2)
Some of these failings can be alleviated. The MBLR legislation and regulations
take steps to facilitate the legal transfer system, reduce conflicts as to property rights, and
equalize (through the creation of technical units and the contracting of NGOs) the access
to information. While an efficient and credible court system and overall equality of
bargaining power are very long-range problems, the land bank regulations create
mechanisms that help to deal with these issues.
None of the "good faith" players in our situation would deny the ultimate value of
greater equality, clear property rights, effective conflict resolution, or greater access to
information. But the reason for advocating those things can be disputed. A World Bank
publication states one position clearly:
Land markets... are subject to regulatory constraints that significantly affect the
operation of the market and equilibrium prices and sales, contribute to reduced
efficiency, and have negative equity implications. The role of government in land
market reform is to remove such regulations, establish a system of predictable
market rules, and focus on the provision of information, adjudication of border
disputes, enforcement of property rights, and valuation and assessment of land for
tax purposes (Brandao and Feder 1995, 1).
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Here is a clear concept of land as a commodity.196
It is this factor, I believe, which underlies much of the initial resistance to and
continuing discomfort with MBLR concept. Brazilians - especially poor Brazilians have no particular reason to be enamored of the capitalist system and the market
economy, which have not notably worked to their advantage.

Other models of

relationship to the land may lead to greater social, cultural, and environmental
sustainability. A Brazilian sociologist has spoken of the attractive aspects of peasant
autonomy, noting that it involves specialized knowledge of work and of a place, the
ability to vary work and organize one's work time, and the possibility of living and
working "close to the place of origin, conserving social and neighborly relations...."
... these are clearly a pre-industrial relationship with work.... [T]his leads us to
admit that industrial work represents, at least apparently, a loss of autonomy
that suffers a disaggregation when compared with work as it was previously
conceived.... [T]his is not to say, necessarily, that these propositions-aspirations
and these experiences of peasant autonomy are retrograde. In fact, one cannot
deny that such a system has an internal logic that is dynamic and at times
effective from the microeconomic and technical viewpoint when compared with
the modern matrix; at the same time, it appears to have preserved certain
characteristics of tradition that industrial society, as it is known today, has
erased. (J. Almeida, 149)197

196

At the time of resurgent donor interest in land reform, "...there was an emerging new consensus on neoliberal theory of economic growth... and a related group focusing more on fiscal and trade reforms broadly
known as the Washington Consensus. This new paradigm was inherently opposed to policy interventions
aimed at achieving social equity. There was a growing body of literature that pointed to development
policy overcoming market distortions that prevented resources going to the best use.... Land and natural
resources markets did not work because economic policies had favoured subsidies, protectionism and a
whole gamut of interventions.... Almost all the major donors are now supporting land reform programmes
in conceptual terms that are compatible with the Washington Consensus " (SDdimensions, 4-5)
197

Note also Bryner, 178: "An alternative view of development begins with the interests and desires of
local residents, who identify their problems, propose solutions, and work alongside those who can provide
external technological and financial support. Crops are produced primarily for domestic consumption
rather than export.... These efforts are sensitive to how change effects traditional cultures and to the need to
reinvent community and individual identity in response to change.... [Alternative technologies are
appropriate, small-scale, compatible with local knowledge and culture...."
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From both a social and environmental standpoint, treating land as a commodity
can have negative results. The breakdown in rural community life is notable when land is
sold and, particularly, accumulated into larger parcels for commercial farming.

The

process tends to dispossess small farmers: impressed by the money offered (coming from
near-subsistence, a relatively small amount of money seems like a fortune), they often
sell land and subsequently discover they have insufficient funds and skills to support their
1 QR
families.

(e.g., Powers 1987a and 1987b)

From an environmental standpoint,

viewing land as a commodity pushes one away from the personal relationship to land,
necessary to good husbandry, and towards short-term economic returns dependent on the
use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, (see, e.g., Netting 1993) The World Bank and
neo-liberal vision of converting land into a commodity would, thus, seem to be an
example of what has been termed "misplaced concreteness" — applying the classical
economic model to policy making as though it represented reality, with a inevitably
distorted impact on real human culture, communities, relationships, and undertakings.
(Daly and Cobb 1004; see also Middleton 1993, 110)
Evolution of the Program
As noted above, for approximately fifteen years prior to 1996, the World Bank
and other large donor agencies had virtually dismissed land reform as a viable
development mechanism. As the Sustainable Development Department (SDD) of FAO
(which never stopped advocating land reform) noted, this situation changed:
What is surprising... is the rapidity with which land and agrarian reform has been
returned to the development agenda by the major donors.... First and foremost
land reform is back on the agenda because rural populations have put it there.
(SDdimensions 2000, 1) [emphasis in the original]
The MST in Brazil is cited by SDD as one of the forces that has brought about this
change.

Also noted as factors in this change of agenda are growing awareness of rural

issues on the part of urban populations, increased demands for rural rights, and greater
international networking by NGOs and farmers groups, leading to pressures from civil

198

From 1985-1996, an estimated 4 million family farms ceased to exist. Dias & Amaral 2000, 242
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society such as the document from the 1998 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace,
"Towards A Better Distribution of Land." (Ibid., 2)
In light of these pressures, the World Bank and other major donors were obliged
to reconsider land reform. Historically, imposed redistributive land reforms have had
mixed results, representing "both the most successful and the most unsuccessful
examples of land and agrarian reform." Given the risks of such programs, World Bank
rules prohibit it from financing such land reforms. Furthermore, such programs were not
in tune with prevailing neo-liberal economic theories.

Thus "...negotiated and market-

led land reform programmes [became] the 'flavour of the month' in the donor
community...." (Ibid., 3, 5, 8) "Paradoxically, such [market-oriented] land policies have
been much driven from above by the State and international agencies." (Kay, 28)
The World Bank therefore had a strong vested interest in the success of the
market-based approach. In the two years following implantation of the Cedula da Terra
program, the Bank's Inspection Panel turned down two requests for an investigation of
the program from the Brazilian National Forum on land reform, a group consisting of
most of the major civil society groups dealing with the issue (CPT, MST, ABRAAssociagao Brasileira de Reforma Agraria, etc.). The Panel contended that the Forum's
critiques of the program arose from an ideological bias against market-based mechanisms
and unawareness of program successes. (Schwartzman 2000, 1)
By 1999, the World Bank was declaring on its web page that "New Approach to
Land Reform Proves Successful," a claim echoed (at a more moderate level) in the neoliberal press. (Schwartzman, 5; The Economist 1999) The Bank's web page went on to
state that:
...the three year project achieved its objectives one year ahead of schedule. A
follow-up $ 1 billion adaptable program loan is being prepared for this fiscal year
to capitalize on the current project's success and maintain the momentum that this
kind of land reform has generate (quoted in Schwartzman, 5).
The rush to expand the program caused tremendous concern, especially as it was
recognized that such a large program would draw considerable funds away from land
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reform expropriation.199

The Bank's own Preliminary Evaluation stated that "...the

Cedula da Terra program is still too recent to permit an evaluation of its socio-economic
impacts, either on the beneficiaries of on the communities" and noted that it was an open
question whether beneficiaries would be able to manage their properties and generate
sufficient income to meet loan commitments. (Ibid.) Schwartzman points out:
Even were information available on the productivity of the land... and the
management capacity of the beneficiaries, it would still be extremely
precipitous to call the program a "success," since there is a three-year grace
period for project loans, and the first beneficiaries will only have to begin
repaying their loans in 2001. (Ibid.)
During the 2000 Grito da Terra ("Cry for the Land" - an annual event in Brasilia
organized by the Church to advocate for land reform), representatives of CONTAG met
personally with President Cardoso. CONTAG's primary demand with respect to MBLR
was not philosophical but highly practical - easier credit terms. On this basis, the GoB
entered into dialogue with groups representing "organized civil society" that resulted in
an agreement to move forward with an adapted Project of Land Credit and Combating
Rural Poverty. The Project, announced by the government in July and approved by the
World Bank in December, 2000, sought to provide access to land, community
infrastructure, and technical assistance to 50,000 families over a three-year period, at a
cost of US$ 400 million ($8,000 per family), half to be financed by the World Bank.

Analysis of the Issues
1) The issues related to methodology
The methodology arguments against MBLR were not without merit at the time
that they were made. Certainly one of them - that the GoB was seeking to undercut the
influence of the MST - rang true. Prior to the election of Lula, the MST was allied to the
opposition Workers' Party (PT) and consistently criticized the Cardoso government.
During the Cardoso administration, the MST's civil disobedience frequently irritated the
government, and that irritation seemed to turn to personal dislike on the part of the
199

Plevin notes that in 1999 GoB "cut funding for INCRA 47% while spending $220 million on Banco da
Terra." He also notes that the World Bank loan increases Brazil's foreign debt. (4-5)
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President in 2002 when the MST invaded and vandalized his family farm in Minas
Gerais. (This act also embarrassed the PT, which began to distance itself from the MST.)
The Cardoso government overstepped itself occasionally in reacting to the MST, and a
World Bank preliminary evaluation of the Cedula da Terra Program "...found that the
Cedula [community] associations typically define themselves in opposition to the MST"
(Schwartzman, 4). Undoubtedly the Cardoso government would have liked to have seen
the MST's influence wane, and this in part explains the government's repeated praising
and willingness to work with CONTAG, in some sense a less radical, "well-behaved"
rival of MST in the representation of rural workers.200 (Jungman 1999a; NEAD 2000a)
The criticism of the community organization component of the program - i.e.,
that the community organizations undertaking land negotiations were created for that
purpose and are not truly authentic - may also have had validity in some cases.

A

preliminary evaluation of the program found that
the majority of the associations originated from the populist tradition, in which
representation is based on co-optation, subordination, and social and political
control over poor populations. Even many of the associations that are being
created exclusively to participate in the Program appear not to escape this
context. It is however necessary to call attention to the fact that programs such
as Cedula da Terra presuppose autonomous associations, with the capacity to
take and implement strategic decisions on the use of assets under their control....
(quoted in Schwartzman, 7)
One observer noted the inability of the community organizations to negotiate
directly with landowners, the actual negotiations being carried out by state technical
advisors (Xavier 1999, 22). It is probably this type of situation which led to allegations
of state officials in Pernambuco receiving bribes and acting as though they were real
estate agents (Carvalho 1999).
How 'authentic' these community organizations are warranted study, both in the
sense of whether they are be able to represent the interests of their members and manage

200

Evaluators contracted by the World Bank noted the political/ideological dispute with the MST, Church,
and other sectors of civil society and suggested that participatory inclusion of these groups would reduce
opposition to the market-based programs. (Schwartzman, 4; Navarro 1998) I suspect it is GoB hostility to
MST which led the World Bank to officially include only CONTAG in the new program.
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ongoing program issues, and in the larger political sense of whether they support
significant change or simply become part of the electoral "corral" of local elites. Weak,
ineffective, or co-opted community organizations would cut to the very heart of the
validity of the program.

For this reason, evaluation of the community associations was

a central theme of our case studies.
Closely tied to this argument is the issue of whether decentralization places
agrarian reform in the hands of those local elites that have traditionally been most
opposed to it. There were allegations that "Some associations, urged by landowners,
pressured [state technical authorities] that the purchase be made for the price asked by the
landowner, at times the landowners promising extra benefits so that some of the
ocvy
community leaders would pressure the government"

(Xavier, 22). In this respect, it

should be noted that the pilot project "involved extensive evaluation and intensive Bank
supervision" (World Bank 2000, 9), factors likely to diminish manipulation and
corruption on the part of local power groups. Would a broader, nationwide program with
less active Bank supervision would be more open to the types of manipulation that such
groups have engaged in in the past?

The primary mechanism for avoiding such

distortions in the program, per se, would seem to be that the community organizations are
negotiating for their own benefit and therefore have an interest in obtaining the best land
at the lowest price. But if these community organizations are not authentic, they can
themselves be manipulated by local elites.
With respect to the issue of owners keeping the best land for themselves and only
selling marginal lands to the program, possibly at inflated prices, initial studies seemed to
show that this did not widely occur (note, however, that in three of our seven case
201

"...it is only by reestablishing the primacy of community in political life that the social and
environmental sensibilities needed to manage the global reach of technology and capital are likely to
emerge.... The relationship between strong communities and effective governance has been documented in
numerous studies.... The point of the community restoration argument is... that it permits rooted
engagement and face-to-face deliberation... The central premise of this book is that only by linking
community ecological values with democratic design of policies and markets can the goals of
environmental governance be realized in a sustainable fashion." (Hempel 1996, 8-10)
202

My experience in rural community organization indicates that these charges may or may not be true;
because corruption is frequently present in Brazilian society, rural workers (like most other Brazilians) especially those who do not have significant solidarity-based training - are quick to suspect (and spread
rumors about) corruption whenever anything even potentially suspicious arises.
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studies, owners did sell less desirable land to the program).

The early studies showed

that the beneficiaries negotiated purchase of good land at per family and per hectare costs
substantially lower than those of land reform expropriations during the same period.204
However, it should be noted that expropriation itself is not free from the marginal land
argument: the system gives landowners so much leverage in fighting expropriation that
the GoB frequently opts to expropriate lands which the landowners are willing to have
expropriated, and these are often less valuable lands. (There is support here for the MST
position: there are indications that land expropriated as a result of MST land
occupations/invasions is better land, especially in terms of location, than that otherwise
expropriated by the GoB, and thus leads to more sustainable small farms (Sussuarana
2001)). Furthermore, the market-based approach permits acquisition of medium-sized
parcels and "productive" land, which are exempt from expropriation under Brazilian land
reform law; indeed, the new program aims to focus primarily on lands that are not subject
to expropriation. (World Bank 2000, 11)
One final point on methodology is worth noting. Jose de Souza Martins, a highly
respected sociologist, believes that "Those who fight for the rural workers want an
agrarian reform that is confiscatory and punitive for the latifundio," a position he thinks
is pointless and ahistorical. He notes the danger of thinking of the land struggle as "a
holy war," and the "manicheism" of seeing it as a struggle between good and bad.205
(Martins 2000a, 25) He criticizes the MST and CPT for failing to dialogue with the
government, recognize the plurality of post-dictatorship Brazil, and the inevitability of
203

Opponents of the program alleged in 1999 the most expensive land purchased under the Cedula da
Terra Program "did not have agricultural potential because of its topography" and that the study of land
values undertaken by the University of Campinas for the World Bank was flawed because the technicians
responsible for the purchase were the same ones who filled out the study questionnaires. (Forum Nacional
de Reforma Agraria 1999, 3)
204

Reydon & Plata (1999, 18-19) found that, in comparison with 1998 Cedula da Terra costs, average
expropriation costs per hectare during the 1996-98 period were 66% higher in Ceara, 62% in Maranhao,
49% in Minas Gerais, 43% in Bahia, but only 14% in Pernambuco. World Bank 2000, 10, states that the
Cedula da Terra lands cost "...about 28% less per family than the present value of initial expropriation
prices in the Northeast.
Since expropriated owners often obtain additional compensation through
subsequent judicial actions, the final cost of expropriated lands can be as much as three times the initial
compensation amount."
205

Martins believes that middle class leaders and pastoral agents in the MST, CPT, and other movements
tend to ideologize the struggle in a manner that is alien to the way the workers themselves think. There is
some truth to this, though I think his cited article overstates the issue.
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government management of agrarian reform 206 (Martins 2000b 13-15, 22). I believe that,
though uncharacteristically one-sided in his criticism, he is right to the extent that the
literature of the MST often fails to distinguish among opposing parties, classing the GoB
and the World Bank in essentially the same mode as it would the "landowners" - whom
907

themselves vary greatly in attitudes and methods.

On the other hand, it is possible to

make the opposite mistake, of thinking that there are no "bad guys" here; greed,
corruption, and violence on the part of some
landowners and government officials are
very much a part of the agrarian problem.208

2) The speed of the process
With respect to the issue of whether the GoB and World Bank acted precipitously
in expanding market-based agrarian reform from a pilot project to a US$ 200 million
program, the vocal criticism that occurred in 1999 (e.g., Aslam, MST 1999a and 1999b,
Plevin, PT) became somewhat muted, and probably rightly so. Certainly the critics were
right that the World Bank announced victory at an early stage. It has been correctly
pointed out that full evaluation of the impact of an agrarian reform program probably
requires a thirty-year period, and even then may not be conclusive (Kay). But public
policy is not an exact science - decisions have to be made on the best evidence available.
The landless families in Brazil need access to land as quickly as is reasonably possible.
In this sense, a great deal of study, analysis, and thought went into examining the
pilot project (e.g., W. Brandao 1998, Buainain et al. c. 1999, Navarro 1998, Reydon &

206 "j[j e (Jisjuncture is, most of all, in the fact that MST and the Church managed to put the agrarian
question on the agenda of the Brazilian state and, at the same time, did not legitimize this inclusion... when
they refused to accept it as a political fact, that has as its necessary and inevitable implication negotiation
and agreement as to the viability, extension, form and quality of the reform. Because this is a pluralistic
and complex society, different from societies with a more simple social structure, that are the reference
point of these organizations, such as Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala...." (Martins 2000b, 25-6)
207

Martins argues that the GoB has actually gone beyond the vision of MST/CPT by seeking to reassert, for
the first time since 1822, government authority over public lands held by landowners in posse. Indeed, the
GoB has been able to reclaim an impressive 20 million ha. of land in this way. Min. de Des. Agrario 2000a
208

Having approached land reform both as a field worker and academically, I am aware how easy it is to be
overcome by hate when you are working in the field (especially when your life is threatened and people
you work with are murdered). This can be a blinding and negative factor, (see, Powers 1987a, 1987b,
1987c). On the other hand, in the comfort of one's academic study, it is easier to be cool-headed.
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Plata 1999, Vegro & Garcia c. 1999, Xavier 1999).

By the standards that the GoB and

World Bank set forth, the pilot project was very successful:
With a stated objective of reaching 15,000 families in three years, the Projeto
Cedula da Terra... will benefit some 23,000 families with about 617,000 hectares,
at a per hectare cost of about R$193 and per family cost of about R$4,759. With
complementary investments of R$4,114 per family, the results are significantly
below the costs of traditional interventions. (World Bank 2000, 2)
Furthermore, the Bank noted lessons learned from the pilot and adapted the
subsequent program accordingly (World Bank 2000, 9-11). This included, especially,
greater input from civil society, particularly the active participation of CONTAG and the
rural unions in represents.209
The GoB and World Bank would thus seem to have been justified, within their
own context, in having moved forward with the larger program.

Within its own

framework, the analytical and technical work of the Bank, particularly, was impressive
(see, e.g., Stiglitz 1998a and 1998b, von Amsberg c. 1999, World Bank 2000) and an
attempt had been made to open dialogue with at least some of the other players (although
I found no evidence that the GoB or World Bank had followed the advice of their
evaluator that including "the participation (decisive and not merely consultative) of the
MST... in the process could greatly reduce its opposition...." (Navarro 1998, 9))

3) The issues related to results
The question remains, however, as to the type of results a market-based land
reform will produce. As stated above, I think it is this question that underlies much of the
resistance to and discomfort with the World Bank model.

Will the market-based

approach, with the debt burden it places on the new farmers and the technical assistance
provided by groups oriented by the GoB and the World Bank, inevitably lead toward land
being viewed as a commodity, to the valuation of "modern" techniques and the high use
of commercial/chemical inputs, and to farmers being absorbed into the agro-commercialfinancial complex, losing their autonomy and solidarity?
209

Plevin states (3) that World Bank management had questioned the legitimacy of the National Forum for
Agricultural Reform and Justice in Rural Areas, consisting of CONTAG, CPT, MST and other groups, to
request investigation of the program, but that a World Bank inspection panel confirmed their right to do so.
177

This is not a question to be taken lightly. As noted above, the instruments used to
achieve a purpose do have an effect.

Prior to undertaking our case studies, I was

personally more comfortable with - and confident of the results of ~ methods used by the
MST and, especially, the CPT - which actively build into the process a strong community
and solidarity component, critical of the excesses of capitalism. I felt that one was not as
likely to see these attitudes reflected in World Bank orientations.
Yet it needs to be remembered that the primary executor of the program is not the
World Bank but the GoB. In Brazil, by the early 2000s, neo-liberalism had reached an
apex and its influence was declining. A constructive nationalism was reasserting itself.
The inevitability of neo-liberal models was being questioned and there was a growing
articulation among those who doubt the wisdom of allowing market thinking to dominate
the culture.

This had a concrete impact politically - both inside and outside of the

government.
At the same time, both in Brazil and elsewhere, the model of "modern"
commercial agriculture has been under attack. There is growing recognition that the
family farm is not a relic, but a vibrant unit essential to rural production and social well
being. As an FAO document noted:
For some time there has been a growing body of scientific investigation that has
noted the inverse relationship between farm size and production of food crops....
The data indicates clearly that all other things being equal the family farm is the
most efficient and sustainable. This does not emerge through romantic wishful
thinking but rather through the fact that, on average, a farm family achieves a
much higher density of management than do any other types of farm enterprise
arrangement.

This greater density of management exists because there is

motivated family labour available on a continuous basis. (SDdimension 2000, 9)
A World Bank economist stated that "...studies undertaken in Northeastern Brazil and
confirmed by the 1995-6 Agricultural Census have shown that, on average, family farms
are more efficient... than large farms...." (von Amsberg c. 1999, 6-7)
From an environmental standpoint, also, there has been a growing realization
within certain sectors of society and of the government that modern commercial
agriculture, as it has widely been practiced, may be harmful.
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Among matters being

questioned are genetic manipulation of seeds, use of chemical pesticides,210 excessive
dependence on commercial fertilizers, and emphasis on monocultures.

Given the

tremendous commercial interests involved with these matters, it would be naive to
believe that they will be resolved quickly or to expect that large producers of agro-inputs
will stop courting and orienting agronomists, agricultural extension workers, and farmers
(small, medium, and large).211 Small farmers who have been active in MST, CPT, and
similar programs may have more tools for critiquing this commercial orientation, but
there is no reason, per se, why such critical information cannot be shared with farmers
who have obtained their land through market-based mechanisms, especially where the
participation of NGOs is part of the planned process.

210

Paalberg 1995, however, noted, 312, 330-1, the difficulty encountered by FAO in getting World Bank
support for even a moderate pesticide limitation program.
211

"Everyone is aware of the dangers of contemporary industrial farming, the problem is that it is locked
into a huge social and economic complex that renders any alternative difficult to achieve." Middleton 1993,
111
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CHAPTER V
CASE STUDIES
Overview of Case Studies
Introduction
In March and April, 2006, our research team212 visited seven Cedula da Terra land
reform settlements in the Nordeste (semi-arid Northeast) and Litoral Norte (North
Coastal) regions of Bahia (see Maps V-O-A, B, and C). In all cases we interviewed a
substantial sampling of settlement area residents, and we also separately interviewed
(usually in their offices) technical advisors to those settlements.
In selecting the settlements, we expressed an interest in seeing areas that had
experienced some measure of success. We did this for the following reasons:
•

In light of substantial criticism of the Cedula da Terra!Banco da Terra programs,
we wanted to see whether any successful results had occurred.

•

In our experience, failure in development projects (especially community
organization projects) is easier to achieve than is success; we believed that
relatively successful programs would prove to be more interesting.

212

The team consisted of Brenda King-Powers, a sociologist and trained community organizer with 25
years experience in Brazil (including nine years rural/small town community organization - two of them in
Bahia - and three years experience working with farmers' cooperatives in the Brazilian Northeast including Bahia); Daniel Carvalho, the former director of Caritas (Catholic Charities) in Bahia, with over
20 years experience working with rural community and production groups - he is also the son of a small
farmer and grew up in the region we studied; and the author.
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•

Although one can learn from failures, in many cases of land settlement failure, the
original settlers have dispersed.

•

We believed that examining what went right -

and the problems and

vulnerabilities of those settlement areas that have been relatively successful would allow us to develop information that might be useful to planners and policy
makers with respect to future programs of a similar nature.
Settlement areas were initially selected on the basis of interviews with technical
people who had supported the program on a statewide basis. Our team intentionally
selected the northern, primarily semi-arid region of the state rather than the more fertile
southern region, for the following reasons:
•

The semi-arid region, which extends north from Bahia, better represents the
reality of the rural Brazilian Northeast, the area of greatest poverty in Brazil,
where there is a high proportion of rural population and an ongoing notable need
for successful development strategies.

•

The agricultural and ecological challenges of implanting settlements are greater
in the semi-arid region; we believed that successful experiences there were
particularly worthy of observation.

•

We, the team members, all have substantial experience with, and an affinity for,
the semi-arid region.
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Summary Description of Settlement Areas

21

The seven settlement areas are briefly described below. All of the communities
are in the officially designated Semi-Arid Region of Bahia with the exception of Nova
Lusitania and Boa Vista III, which are in the North Coastal region, although this area is
still substantially dry.214
All of the communities follow the agro-vila model of organization (developed in
Bahia by CELANOR in conjunction with the first settlements in 1997). In this model,
each settler family received a house/garden lot in the residential portion of the settlement
and a larger agricultural lot in the surrounding fields. This is in contrast to a model in
which families have their residences on their agricultural land, preferred in certain parts
91S

of Brazil.

The agro-vila model makes it easier to deliver electricity, running water,

and other services to the residents' homes.
The land in each settlement is divided as follows: 50% individual lands
(both
9 i f.
housing lots and fields), 30% collective lands, and 20% ecological reserve.

The

original purpose of the collective land was to be worked jointly by the settlers, under the
213

Throughout this discussion and in the case studies themselves, the present tense is used to indicate
conditions at the time of the studies - i.e., March/April 2006.
214

The Cedula da Terra program financed twelve settlements (a total of 468 families) in the Semi-Arid
(Northeast) region of Bahia, and twelve (463 families) in the North Coastal region. In the entire State,
there were 111 Cedula da Terra settlements with 4,263 families. During 2002-2005, the succeeding
program, Credito Fundiario, established eleven more settlements (343 families) in the Semi-Arid region,
three more (74 families) in the North Coastal region, and 88 more (2,999 families) statewide. (Oliveira,
Olalde, and Germani 2006, 7-8)
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A few settlers did not like the agro-vila system. Some do not like living that close to neighbors, finding
the agro-vilas noisy and intrusive (these people may be classified as "truly rural" - the level of noise in the
agro-vilas was very low in comparison with most Brazilian towns. Several families had built small shelters
or houses on their agricultural plots, where they stayed during key seasons such as planting and harvesting.
At least one family had moved permanently out to a house on their agricultural lot, where they lived
without electricity or water, but expressed great contentment as to the peace and quiet of their home.
216

Communal areas are often close to the residential area; ecological reserves are usually distant.
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direction of the association, with the income used, first of all, to make land payments, any
surplus to be administered or distributed by the association.

The evolution of the

collective area in each settlement - how settlers think and feel about it, how it is
administered - constitutes one of the most interesting (and often polemic) aspects of our
study.
Vila Canaa is in the municipio of Euclides da Cunha in the heart of the semi-arid
region.

Founded in 1998, the settlement has 73 titular families (plus 4 additional

households) in an area of 1649 hectares. The economy is based on agriculture with beans
as the primary cash crop, supplemented by manioc, corn, cattle and sheep. Leadership in
the community is provided by a group of Seventh Day Adventists, most of whom (with
some of the other settlers) came from a community that was a land reform settlement in
the 1970s.
Veneza is also in Euclides da Cunha, although in an area even drier than Vila
Canaa. Founded in 2002, the settlement area has 30 titular families in an area of 1004
hectares. The economy is based on goat raising and cultivation of sisal. Almost all of the
settlers came from an area that was declared an Indian reservation and which they were
required (as non-Indians) to leave.
Passos da Esperanca is in the municipio of Olindina.

Founded in 2001, the

settlement area has 30 titular families in an area of 450 hectares. The economy is based
on agriculture (manioc, beans, corn) and fruit raising (passion fruit, oranges). As in the
case of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III below, the majority of settlers have cultural
roots in the neighboring State of Sergipe, a people who highly value fruit raising
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(especially oranges) and who view themselves to be, in contrast to their view of the
Bahians, hardworking, steady, and reliable.
Moita Redonda is in the neighboring municipio of Inhambupe.

Although

purchased in 1998, actual settlement did not take place until September of 2001. The
settlement area has 50 titular families in an area of 677 hectares. The economy is based
on fruit raising.

This settlement has been more directly affected by local political

interference than any of the others.
Nova Lusitania is in the municipio of Esplanada. Founded in 1997, it was one of
the first four settlements (all purchased simultaneously) under the Cedula da Terra
program, and suffered the effects of early organizational problems in the program. The
settlement has 26 titular families (plus 12 other households) in an area of 806 hectares.
The agricultural economy was intended to be based on fruit trees - principally oranges,
but also coconut palms and others. However, with the failure of many of the trees, due to
soil problems, the settlers have moved to subsistence farming with a few attempts at cash
crops, and most of the settlers also depend on oil revenues (42 Petrobras oil wells occupy
240 ha., and the settlement receives a monthly payment from Petrobras; part of the initial
payments from Petrobras went to purchase an additional -240 ha. in a nearby, nonadjacent area, on which 10 of the families have their agricultural plots). Almost all
settlers have roots in a 1960s sergipano orange growing land reform colonization in the
municipality of Rio Real, on the border of Sergipe (this characteristic shared with Boa
Vista III).
Boa Vista (Biritinga) is in the municipio of Biritinga (the community is referred
to as "Biritinga" by the technical assistants in order to distinguish it from other land
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settlements named "Boa Vista"). Founded in 2001, the settlement has 37 titular families
(plus two other families) in an area of 807.4 hectares, plus two non-titular families
(grown children of settlers). The economy is based on cashew, manioc (with three casas
de farinha owned by individual settlers), and apiculture.
Boa Vista III is in the municipio of Esplanada, a few miles from Nova Lusitania.
Founded in 1998, the settlement has 55 titular families (plus several additional
households) in an area of 1375 hectares.

The economy is based on fruit trees -

principally oranges, but there is concern that oranges may not prosper due to soil issues;
attempts have also been made to set up a bolacha (cookie/cracker) factory and other
cottage industries.

As in the case of Nova Lusitania, most settlers come from the

sergipano orange growing culture with roots in earlier land reform colonizations in the
municipality of Rio Real. Many settlers came from relatively well off circumstances
(with personal property such as motor scooters) before settling on the land.

The Cedula da Terra Program In Bahia
As noted in Chapter IV, following a small World Bank experimental project in
Ceara, in 1997 the World Bank, at the request of the Brazilian government, approved
Land Reform and Poverty Alleviation Pilot Project 4147-BR - the Cedula da Terra
Project. Bahia was one of four states included in this program. The initial budget was
US$ 150 million (i.e., $10,000 per family), allocated 30% for land purchases, 56.2% for
infrastructure, goods and materials, 2.6% for community development and technical
support, 6.7% for state government level administration, and 4.5% for Federal
Government evaluation and dissemination. The program in Bahia is administered by
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CDA

-

Coordenagao

de

Desenvolvimento

Agrario

-

Agrarian

Development

Coordination - a State Government agency.
In Bahia, the program had a number of key features. Based on work done by the
NGO CELANOR, discussed in more detail in Case Studies 1 and 2, the standard agrovila approach was developed for the Cedula da Terra land settlements. In addition to the
house and farm lots, each community has a collective area (usually 30% of the land) and
an ecological reserve, the latter following the Federal legal requirement of 20%.
Two major funds constitute key elements of the Bahia Cedula da Terra program:
SAT - subprojeto para aquisigao da terra — the land acquisition subproject.
These are the funds for actual purchase of the land, including the purchase price and
directly related costs such as title registration. Funds are administered through the Banco
do Nordeste do Brasil (BNB) and are disbursed at the time of purchase to pay the selling
landowner and related costs.

The land is owned by the group in the name of the

Association - it is not individually held. The settlement has a three year grace period and
then seventeen years (a total of twenty years) to repay.217 Interest is between four and six
percent annually (a highly subsidized rate in Brazil). If for any reason payment is not
made, all other financial resources (SIC, PRONAF, etc.) are suspended until payment is
received.
SIC - subprojetos de investimentos comunitarios - community investment
subprojects. These are funds are a grant allotted to Cedula da Terra land settlement
communities for post-purchase investments in community infra-structure, and are
administered through the Banco do Brasil (BB). The first disbursement is usually for
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In the newer Credito Fundiario program, the grace period was reduced to two years, with a total of
fourteen years to repay if the loan is up to $ 15.000 and seventeen years if it is over that amount.
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construction of housing and basic infrastructure. Beyond that, SIC funds can be used for
projects developed by the community under the guidance of their technical advisor.
Projects may include planting fruit trees, seed and fertilizer, livestock, equipment, water
and electric resources (although frequently the State provides those through special
programs), productive facilities such as casa de farinha (facility for making manioc
flour), and other efforts approved by CDA.
Beyond the funds available through SAT and SIC, the government of Bahia made
available other development funds. Most notable among these are funds from CAR Companhia de Desenvolvimento e Agao Rural - Development and Regional Action
Company - a state-owned development company in Bahia, which provided funding usually in grant form through the CAR PRODUZIR program - for a number of projects
91Q

in the settlement areas.

Another state agency, SECOMP, financed the cookie factory

in Boa Vista III, for instance.
In addition, the state government aided settlement areas in obtaining water and
electric infrastructure. Basic water infrastructure - including, in the case of Vila Canaa
and Veneza, piping of water from distant sources - is underwritten by a combination of
state (EMBASA), municipal, and association funds.

Starting in 2003, meters were

installed in settler homes to measure and charge for actual usage. If settlers wish to have
water in their fields, the settler and/or association has to provide installation. Electrical
218

The World Bank model envisions a fixed amount per beneficiary. That portion used for land purchase
(SAT) is subtracted from the total and treated as a loan; the remainder (SIC) is provided as a grant. The
purpose in this structure is to provide an added incentive for the purchasing farmers to negotiate lower land
prices, while the SIC portion is seen as providing resources to allow the new settlements to move quickly
into production and economic viability, (e.g., Deininger 1999; Borras Jr. 2003, 372-373).
219

CAR PRODUZIR projects require a 10% contribution from the community, but this can be in the form
of labor, use of the community tractor, etc. PRODUZIR II, in effect from 2001 to 2005, was a $75 million
progam - $54.4 million from the World Bank and $20.6 million from the State of Bahia. PRODUZIR III,
which was going into effect at the time of our visit, was expected to be approximately the same size.
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infrastructure is carried out with help from the State Secretariat for Infrastructure's rural
electrification program "Light For All" ( "Luz Para Todos").
Settlers also qualify for Federal subsidized agricultural loans. The first and most
basic of these is PRONAF-A,220 a fund set aside for settlers in land reform areas.
PRONAF-A loans had a value of up to R$13,500221 with very low interest, usually had a
three year grace period (although up to five may be permitted), and are then repayable in
seven annual installments with a rebate of 40% of principal if paid on time.
Once a farmer has used PRONAF-A, s/he can take out additional loans locally
referred to as custeios. These are officially PRONAF-A/C loans, valued up to R$3,000 at
2% per annum interest, payable in up to two years, with a rebate on interest of R$200 if
paid on time. In order to qualify for these loans, farmers must have a gross annual family
income of between R$2,000 and R$ 14,000, not counting agricultural retirement pensions.
Most families in settlement areas qualify, and many of the farmers took out these
custeios, almost always to support specific agricultural projects.
For farmers with a lower family income, PRONAF-B loans are a possibility these are loans of R$ 1,000 with interest of 1% per annum, up to one year grace period,
and up to two years to repay, with a 25% reduction on the entire debt (principal and
interest) if repaid on time.

Farmers with family income in excess of R$ 14.000 can

qualify for larger PRONAF D loans at 4% interest, up to five years grace period, with a
total of eight years to repay and a 25% reduction of interest if repaid on time.

220

PRONAF - Programa Nacional de Fortelecimento da Agricultura Familiar - National Program to
Fortify Family Agriculture. The program was created in 1995.
221

Maria Djalma informed us, interview of March 21, 2006, that she is able to put in an additive that
increases the maximum amount to R$ 16,000. In 2005-2006, the average exchange rate was approximately
R$1.00 = US$0,425.
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Other funding sources include PRONAF MULHER - a small loan fund for
women who are wives of titleholders; this program, initiated in 2004 and expanded in
2005, permitted an initial loan of R$3,000 repayable in one year with discount if repaid in
time. PRONAF JOVEM is a similar program for teenagers and young adults.
In 1998, the Brazilian Government created the Land Bank {Banco da Terra) a
parallel program which also sponsored MBLR projects.

The experts we spoke to

preferred the Cedula da Terra program primarily because the Land Bank did not provide
222

for a fund such as SIC and this seriously weakened the viability of the communities.
Both programs were superseded by the Credito Funiario program,

and it was generally

felt that this new program was superior to both of the others, a number of lessons having
224
been learned and the procedures having been streamlined.

222

Interview with Berta Veloso and Antonio Fernando da Silva, January 31, 2006.

223

The Credito Fundiario program began in 2001, overlapping with the Cedula da Terra program, which
ran through 2002.
224

See, e.g., interview with technical advisors Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida and Edna Moreira de Brito
Batista, March 27, 2006.
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Map V -0-A. The Brazilian Northeast
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Map V-O-B. Micro-Regions in Bahia at the time the case studies were carried out. Five
of the settlements studied were in the Nordeste, and two were on the western side of the
Literal Norte.
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Map V-O-C

The northeast of Bahia (Northeast and North Coastal micro-regions, showing the
municipios. The settlements studied were in the following municipios: Nova Lusitania
and Boa Vista III in Esplanada (54), Vila Canaa and Fazenda Veneza in Euclides da
Cunha (14), Moita Redonda in Inhambupe (49), Passos da Esperan^a in Olindina (45),
and Boa Vista in Biritinga (42).
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Case Studies 1 & 2

Introduction - Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III
These two settlements, located approximately 10 miles apart in the municipio of
Esplanada, are introduced together because they share three important factors:
historical/cultural roots, climate, and a major agricultural and land quality problem. The
unique aspects of each of these two settlements are discussed in the individual case
studies that follow. As these two settlements were part of a pioneering program that
helped set standards (such as the agro-vila pattern) for the entire Cedula da Terra
program, the history here related is relevant to the other case studies as well.

Common Factors - Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III
History:225 In 1960, a large number of families from the neighboring state of
Sergipe moved into an area of Atlantic rainforest in what is now the Bahian municipio of
Rio Real, located on the border with Sergipe.

In accordance with the agricultural

traditions of their region, the Sergipanos were orange growers. Each family settled 20 ha.
of land and, with financing from the IDBA, cleared the land and planted orange groves
and passion fruit. The families had difficulty repaying the IDBA loans and their credit
was suspended.
225

Except where otherwise indicated, this history is based on our April 27, 2006, interview with Rafael and
Eduardo Carlos, respectively coordinator and agricultural technician of CELANOR.
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In the mid-1980s, the IDBA wanted to start refinancing the orange groves (which
were now 25 years old), but required the formation of community associations to do so.
Four such associations were developed in four villages (all in the municipio of Rio Real):
226

Lagoa Seca, Lima, Tanque, and Lagoa de Baixo.
In 1995, Miguel Arcanjo, a local leader who emerged out of the Catholic CEBs
movement, developed a plan through which the four associations could work together.
They founded CELANOR - an agency made up of member associations. They hired an
agronomist (Manzinho) and jointly bought inputs and sold produce.
As the families in these communities grew, and children came of age and married,
the 20 ha. lots were often split up among siblings. However, a minimum of 5 ha. is
required in that region to provide basic support for a family. A strong interest arose in
finding more land.
In 1996, the joint associations, in conjunction with CELANOR, arranged a large
PRONAF financing and bought land in the neighboring municipio of Esplanada, on
which they formed the Colonia de Coco - a rural settlement area. This land was settled
by approximately 26 families from the various associations, who divided the area in
accordance with each settler's ability to pay: "Those who had more money got more
land" (Rafael - CELANOR). This was prior to the Cedula da Terra program, and was a
private undertaking on the part of the associations.
By this time, CELANOR had 12 member associations.

CDA (then CORA -

Comissao Organizadora de Reforma Agraria) approached CELANOR regarding the
226

Our team visited this area on March 3, 2006 when we went to meet with Miguel Arcanjo, who still lives
there. A good dirt road passes through several very small villages, each with a Catholic church and a few
commercial enterprises. The road is lined on both sides with small but well-kept and reasonably
prosperous looking farmsteads, the houses not far from the road and the fruit groves stretching out behind
them.
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Cedula da Terra program.

CDA offered to help settle 600 families, and offered

CELANOR a R$1 million budget if it would assume primary organization of this
undertaking. CELANOR began developing plans - including the agro-vila concept that
would subsequently become a mainstay of the Cedula da Terra program in Bahia.
CELANOR helped to set up the first four Cedula da Terra settlements in the state: Nova
Lusitania, Novo Orizonte, and Antonio Conselheiro in the municipio of Esplanada and
Cachoeira in the neighboring municipio of Conde.

The official founding (contract

signing) date for all four was November 9, 1997. Subsequently CELANOR helped in the
founding of other Cedula da Terra settlements, including Boa Vista III, founded on June
8, 1998.227
Although these projects became something of a showcase for the government
("We spent a lot of time with visits..." from the World Bank, United States, etc. [Rafael
- CELANOR]), the money promised from the state did not arrive fully as planned. In
1998, however, CELANOR entered the Fairtrade Labelling "Just Juice" program and
began to receive international support, so that it was able to continue work without
government funds.

The Just Juice program provided a better price to growers for

passion-fruit and orange juice, and CELANOR received US$100 for each ton of juice so
sold. These funds permitted CELANOR to purchase a small house in Rio Real as its
headquarters and to continue paying its agronomist and field workers.
In 2000, however, CELANOR had to suspend giving technical assistance to the
settlements. Technical assistance is based on 8% of the SIC, and the SIC had not been
227

Berta Veloso (interview January 31, 2006) noted that, during the 1990s eucalyptus prices fell and many
of the reforestation companies were willing to sell land. In the decade of 2000, eucalyptus prices were
improving and the companies in some cases tried to convince settlers to grow eucalyptus, and even
expressed interest in repurchasing land, offering to remove population to other land. However, this does
not directly impact the communities studied.
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disbursed (see below). At the same time, a sharp decrease in the world market-price for
passion-fruit juice diminished income from the Just Juice program.

CELANOR was
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unable to pay its people, or even buy fuel for its vehicles.

This situation improved as

PRONAF financing became available for the settlements (PRONAF provides a technical
assistance fee) - as of 2006, CELANOR was still active in advising on PRONAF
projects. Eventual release of the SIC and improvement in the fruit juice market prices
also helped, so that CELANOR was able to return to full functioning ability.229
Culture: Almost all of the settlers in both Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III come
from community associations in Rio Real. Although most were born in Bahia, they are
culturally Sergipanos, and view themselves that way. These Sergipanos see themselves
as hard-working and goal oriented, and their cultural model of agriculture is one strongly
based on orange growing.
Climate:

Although Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III are officially in the

Northern Coastal Region rather than the semi-arid region, which they closely border, the
228

Mazinho, the original CELANOR agronomist, who had worked with only partial payment during the
early years, left at this time, formed a private agronomist firm and took on much of the advising work on a
volunteer basis. He is now a PT alderman in Rio Real.
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Rafael also discussed land settlements that had not proven as successful (Rafael CELANOR 27/04/06).
Foremost among these was Cachoeira, which he termed a "mystery." Located in the municipio of Conde, it
started with 32 families, now has 10; 3 people died there. CDA intervened and indemnified 20+ families
who left. The remaining 10, he told us, are living well; they have tractor purchased with SIC funds.
Another settlement with problems is Malombe, which was not a CELANOR project. Located in
Esplanada - its borders touch those of Boa Vista III - Malombe was the only settlement with primarily
urban settlers from Esplanada. According to Rafael, it got the worst land and no agro-vila. The settlers
have very large house lots, and the collective area is small and has poor land. In general Malombe is very
poor, but there is disparity of wealth there - the prefeito's brother has two lots with a swimming pool.
When we were in Boa Vista III, we were informed that there is violent crime in Malombe. However, the
middle school children from Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III attend school there.
According to Rafael, the settlements of Timbo and Novo Paraiso are very similar to Malombe.
Indeed, when we were first looking into land settlements to study, we were warned to stay out of several in
the area north of Salvador, as they had become similar to urban slums and were considered dangerous.
Rafael also mentioned Nova Canaa (not to be confused with the Vila Canaa of our studies). Nova
Canaa was described by Rafael as a pauperized minifudio ("minifundiaria pauparizada") where each
family has only 1.5 ha. This is not a Cedula da Terra settlement.
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climate is dry - similar to that of the southern portion of the semi-arid region where
Moita Redonda, Passos de Esperan^a, and Biritinga are located. Like those communities,
Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III had, at the time of our visit, experienced a dry period,
though a less severe one.
Officially, the climate is classed as sub-humid and the natural growth of the
region semi-decidual seasonal forest {floresta estacional semidecidual), although to us it
looked very similar to the cerrado found in the southern portion of the neighboring semiarid region.
Agricultural Issue:

In both Boa Vista III and Nova Lusitania, the settlers

discovered, after buying the land,

that much of their land suffers from highly

compacted sub-soil. The compacted soil forms an almost rock-like strata, impenetrable
by most forms of plant roots, starting anywhere from 20cm. to 2 meters beneath the
surface.

Thus plants, which seem to thrive in the fertile top soil, bud and grow

vigorously but, in the case of fruit trees, will begin, sometimes as early as the second
year, to shrivel and die.
This is particularly disheartening to farmers whose goal is to grow orange groves.
Most of the settlers we talked to in these two settlements consider the growing of annual
crops, such as beans and corn, to be something one does for family consumption only, but
not the kind of agriculture they want to engage in professionally.

And the subsoil

problem is not limited to fruit trees: in many places the compacted subsoil negatively
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"When the land was purchased, we looked at it from the surface, and it looked good." (Rafael, interview
27/04/06). Most people we interviewed who had an opinion believed that the reforestation companies
selling the land were aware of the problem. "We had access to the worst reforestation lands. The best went
to a company based in Singapore. Here the best lands went into eucalyptus, the worst into agriculture."
(Frei Chico) It is not clear whether the government was aware of the problem.
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affects drainage, so that - especially after heavy rains - root crops such as manioc rot,
and crops like passion fruit, corn, and beans can be harmed by overly wet soil.
CAR, CDA, EMBRAPA, and EBDA have all come to the area to examine the
sub-soil problem. According to most of the settlers we interviewed, the consensus of
these agencies is that this problem makes the land unsuitable for citrus trees. EMBRAPA
has dug experimental trenches in both Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, and has a soil
specialist studying the problem.
One solution is to break up the subsoil.
machinery and is expensive.

However this requires large-scale

A neighboring reforestation company, COOPENOR,

reportedly paid R$350 per ha. for such a process.
The land seems to be slightly better in Boa Vista III than in Nova Lusitania.232 In
addition, because the cycle of settling, financing, and growing started earlier in Nova
Lusitania, that community has had to face the problem, while many in Boa Vista III have
not yet had to. We found that settlers in Nova Lusitania had given the problem a good
deal of thought.
In an interview with community leaders in Nova Lusitania (4/5/06), they
discussed this matter in depth. The men expressed frustration with the land - "We
weren't able to bring much [with us when we came]. We relied on the land - but were
mistaken" (Manuel).

They discussed various crops that they had considered or

experimented with.
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Meeting with Nova Lusitania representatives, April 5, 2006; meeting at Boa Vista III church, April 28,
2006.
232

Interview with Frei Chico, April 5, 2006
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Six settlers tried raising pineapples; only one was successful and, because he was the only grower, he
had trouble getting buyers to pick up his crop. Several had their manioc die. Another turned part of his
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Edivaldo, one of the most articulate of the farmers in Nova Lusitania, admitted
that, because of the subsoil issue, he has considered giving up his land and leaving the
settlement. But he added that, besides the problem with the land, "We have another
problem - ourselves. We won't change our thought, but have to." He believes that the
settlers are fixated on oranges, manioc, and cattle, and have to consider alternatives.234 It
is clear that these men have considered the matter in depth, and they discussed a number
of alternatives - including carrots, cucumbers, anise (which they told us the Brazilian
natural cosmetics company, Natura, will buy), tobacco.235
Edivaldo,

Petro,

Wilson,

and

twelve others in Nova

Lusitania

began

experimenting with organic farming. Of the original fifteen who did so, seven (including
those three) have stayed organic. They believe this to be a valid option on the land, but
note that organic agriculture also presents issues, including the cost of natural fertilizer
and the cost of certification with IBD (representatives of IBD have visited Nova
Lustana). I had an opportunity to spend time in the fields with Sr. Petro and Edicarlos,
the CELANOR agro-technician, and was impressed by the creativity and dedication Sr.
Petro brought to experimenting with possible crops.
In our meeting with Dr. Penedo of CDA (April 26, 2006), an agronomist and state
administrator of whom the settlers spoke of with considerable liking and respect, he
stated that the State Secretary of Agriculture is concerned about the sub-soil situation in
Nova Lusitania, Boa Vista III, and neighboring settlements. The state does not have

land into pasture and has three cows - "But you can have 12 cows maximum - then you live on what? If
everyone produces milk, it will drive the price of milk down." (Manuel).
234
Several settlers who do not utilize organic methods mentioned spontaneously to us that they believe that
the organic method is the best long-term solution. One stated that, although he does not use organic
methods for his cash crops, he does use it for the food his family will consume.
235

One settler experimented with tobacco. See case study below.
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adequate equipment for dealing with the subsoil problem.

When we noted that the

settlers had told us that the local municipal government had purchased a tractor for
breaking the subsoil, he stated that, while he believes the local government's intentions to
be good, and the tractor purchased is better than the state's equipment, it is still not really
strong enough to deal with the compacted subsoil.
However, he feels that the concern about the subsoil has been overstated by some
and agrees with the settler's assessment that they need to consider alternatives. Viability,
he believes, cannot be based only on suitability for citrus growing. He noted that yams
have done well in the area, although this is not a plant which makes up part of the
Sergipano culture, and feels that passion fruit can be successfully raised if drainage issues
can be resolved. He also emphatically stated that the settlers should work with organic
methods, and that, over the long run, such methods can be helpful in dealing with the
compacted subsoil issue.

He emphasized that organic methods are a holistic way of

managing land, not simply the use of organic inputs.
This being said, he noted that the settlers are in need of additional funding to work
this issue. The government is working to provide an additional two year grace period for
land payments; Petrobras has been approached about assisting the settlement associations
in developing projects. Noting that Federal funds for agrarian reform are spread very
thinly, he hoped that the local government would be willing to help with technical
assistance.
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Case Study 1

Name of Settlement: Nova Lusitania
Families in Settlement: 26 title holding families + 1 2 additional family homes
Location: Municipio - Esplanada
Area: 806 ha.
Contract Date: November 9, 1997
Dates Visited: April 5-6, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 15
Family size (persons): 1-3/

4-6/

Individuals: 22
7-9/

10+

Persons Interviewed: 10 men, 9 women, 3 youth (one male 18 married, one male 17
single, one female 16 married)
Ages: -20/3, 20-29/2, 30-39/6, 40-49/3, 50-59/6, 60+/2
Schooling: 0-2/ 7, 3-5/12, 6-8/2, unknown/1
In 8 families, wives have slightly more education than their husbands - usually
two years or less. In one family the husband had more education (2 years).
Technical Assistance: CELANOR
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In two cases, families interviewed were not official settlers. Anselmo Rodrigues' father is the title
holder of their farm, but his father is 75 and Anselmo effectively runs the farm. Vagner de Jesus, on the
other hand, is the son-in-law of a settler (Vagner is 21 and his wife is 15); he works on his father-in-laws
land but was not knowledgeable about production or sales. Both men are worker members of the
Association.
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Figure V-l-A. Nova Lusitania - plaza with football field and Catholic chapel, with the
settlement primary school in the background.

Association headquarters.
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Figure V-l-C. Settlement youth in school uniforms outside of a small store operated by a
settler family.
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Geography: The settlement consists of 26 landholding families and is located in the
municipio of Esplanada, 23 kms from the municipal seat: 20 km on paved roads, and 3
km on poor quality dirt roads that wind in and around a Petrobras oil drilling district.
Each of the families has a dwelling lot (20 x 110m) in the agro-vila and a farm lot
varying between 19 and 20 has. The communal farm land constitutes approximately 120
has. and the natural reserve 160 has. In addition to the land-holding families, twelve
other families (grown married children of settlers) have been provided with small
residential lots at the edge of the agro-vila and have constructed homes there.
The agro-vila is strung out along two sides of a winding dirt road that passes
through the settlement to Novo Horizonte and other locations.

At the entry of the

settlement (the west end), there is the cluster of twelve houses built for non-landholding
adult children of settlers, each with a small yard. The new Association headquarters are
located approximately half way down the road on the south side. A small parallel street
runs north of the road. Because the presence of oil wells led to purchasing additional lots
(discussed below), some of the farm lots are reached by continuing down the road beyond
the neighboring Novo Horizonte settlement, a distance of approximately three miles.

Climate: See Introduction to Case Studies 1 and 2, above.

History: As mentioned above, Nova Lusitania was one of the first four Cedula da Terra
projects in the State of Bahia, the contract for all four being signed on November 9, 1997.
Twenty of the original settlement families came from the Community Association of
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Loreto,237 and the remaining six came from the Community Association of Lima, both in
the municipio of Rio Real, member associations of CELANOR. On July 31, 1997, these
twenty-six families formed the Association for Community Development of the
"Loteamento" of Nova Lusitana.238
The land was purchased from Duraflora S.A., a reforestation company, which
promised to remove the pine (pinus eliotus) trees from the land.

The company was

supposed to harvest the trees in three phases during the first three years after purchase,
but was not able to meet that schedule.

It therefore negotiated with the settlers and

provided certain benefits (use of tractors, digging of water storage trenches [tanques],
etc.) in compensation for the delay.

Some of the settlers did not negotiate this, and

retained rights to the trees on their plots.
Actual entry on the land did not take place until 1998.
financing for the settlers was not released for several years.

However, the promised
In 2002, the settlers

protested at INCRA in Salvador during a visit of Raul Jugman, Minister of Agrarian
Reform, with the result that their PRONAF financing was released.240
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The Loreto Association was formed in 1987. Vitor Rodrigues, 75 at the time of our visit, was President
of that Association when the new project began; he is now a settler in Nova Lusitania, and his son,
Sebastiao Rodrigues, also a settler, was President of Nova Lusitania in 2006. Petro was for four years
Treasurer of the Association in Lima
238

Of the original 26 families, 12 or 13 (our informants were not sure) have left due to various reasons,
most notably family issues and agricultural problems. These families were replaced with new families.
Some of the "new" families arrived quite early; for instance, Judite and her husband arrived after the
housing lots had been selected but before the farm lots were. There had been no further attrition in the
three years prior to our visit (2003-2006).
239

Edivaldo Rodrigues said that they began work on the land in late 1997, then moved there in tents in
early 1998. His was the last house to be built because, as a leader, he did not have time to work on it.
240

In this protest, they occupied the INCRA building. Their target was not INCRA, per se, but getting the
attention of the Minister. Five settlement areas (including Boa Vista III) participated in the protest. The
municipal Secretary of Agriculture provided them with two buses to transport them to Salvador.
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PETROBRAS, the Brazilian oil company, has 42 oil wells that occupy 240 ha. of
settlement land. PETROBRAS paid a royalty to the former owners, but did not pay the
settlers after formation of Nova Lusitania. The settlers hired a lawyer and, in 2003,
reached a settlement with PETROBRAS in which they were paid a lump sum for past
royalties and ongoing royalties based on production. The lump sum was used in part to
purchase approximately 240 ha. of nearby, but non-adjacent land, on which 10 of the
families now have their agricultural plots (this land is approximately 3 km. from the agrovila; one passes through the neighboring agro-vila of Novo Orizonte to reach it).
Three years prior to our visit, the settlers were informed that Nova Lusitania had
reached the stage of emancipation from government tutelage.

However, this was

communicated to the settlers verbally, no document to this effect had been provided to
them. The settlers received training to assume their own autonomy, but they felt that the
training was not sufficient.241 At the time of our visit, Government personnel were still
•

visiting the settlement sporadically, and would come if called.
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Demography: All interviewees were of rural origin except for Zelia, who claimed urban
origin.

Of the men, five had owned minifundios; three of these supplemented their

income as daily farm workers and/or sharecroppers. One other owned 10 has. of land in
241

At the group meeting, Edivaldo said that CDA tried to prepare them, but it was not sufficient. The
workshops should have been earlier. When Edivaldo was Treasurer, for instance, he was oriented one year
after he started. After money had been spent, he was told that it should not have been spent in that way.
For instance, they opted to buy a simpler tractor than the one CDA indicated, and used the money in other
way - for instance, for fencing to keep out animals. They had been told they should decide how to spend
money, but then were told they should have gotten permission first. He got receipts, but they were invalid
and he did not know that. CDA sent a person to work with him for seven days. He said that at one point
some of the CDA were rude and looked at him askance, but that subsequently they understood. We were
told that CDA now recognizes the shortcomings of the training the settlers received.
242

Edivaldo, at meeting with settlers, April 5, 2006. The settlers will never receive individual title to their
land.
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Colonia Coqueira, but the land was so poor he had to supplement his income as a daily
laborer. Three worked family land, one of these supplementing his income as a tractor
driver and another as a daily laborer. Three were rural employees: one administrator of a
small pineapple farm, one a driver/orange worker for a landowner, and one a general
farm laborer paid weekly. Two of the women worked in restaurants. Judite's husband
was a small shop owner in a village in Rio Real.

Race/Ethnicity: white, afro-Brazilian
Gender:

Four of the 26 title holders are women.

Of the 15 households

interviewed, 13 are titular families; of these, in three cases the titles are held by
the wife (in two cases, because the husbands were too old to qualify).
Religion: There are nineteen Catholic families and seven Evangelical Protestants
(Congreca9&o Crista do Brasil) in the settlement. Of the families interviewed, 11
identified themselves as Catholic (in one of these the wife is Catholic, the
husband does not claim Church membership) and 4 as Congreca9§o Crista. Both
have active chapels in the settlement.
Age: The title holders of the land interviewed ranged from in age from 25 to 65.
Average age of title holders here was slightly older than in other settlements
studied.
Attrition: In the period prior to 2003, thirteen or fourteen (our informants were not
certain) of the original families left the settlement. Reasons cited for their leaving
included hunger, family issues (separation), urban background, 243 and the soil
problem. No settlers were expelled. New settlers took their places and, from
243

"If a person comes from the city, unless they were raised in the country, they don't stay." Manoel Paixao
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2003 on, there has been no further attrition. Some members of the community,
however, feel that this is due more to the ongoing oil royalty payments than to
increased satisfaction with community life.

Education:

Most interviewees were satisfied with the education system. Twelve

interviewees classed the schools as good or excellent, one as so-so, and one as weak.

"In the city (Esplanada), people say that the children from the settlements have
more privileges than those in the city. Children here are more organized and
developed than the children in the city." (Elenice)

th

Children attend pre-school to 4 grade in the settlement. The school, built with CDA
funds, is owned by the Association.
5th through 8th graders are bused to school in the Malombe settlement. The bus
picks up students from the settlements of Cequeira, Novo Orizonte, and Nova Lusitania;
there are 60 to 70 kids on the bus, some have to stand for the half hour trip. There are
150 students in the Malombe school. Parents were satisfied with the education; Antonia
stated that the teachers are excellent but that the students are "wild" ("bravos "). Beyond
eighth grade, students have to go into Esplanada to study.

Health: Four interviewees stated that the health system is bad, one stated that it is good.
Edivaldo pointed out that the health system is difficult in the whole country, but stated it
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is adequate for the settlement. A health agent comes to the settlement periodically; there
was divided opinion as to her effectiveness.
There is a doctor every Monday at the health post in the Antonio Conselheiro
settlement. Residents have to take the bus, which requires that they be gone most of the
day. At times they go and find that the doctor is not present.

Water: The Association administers an artesian well with the capacity of 2400 liters per
hour. A water tower with 10,000 liter capacity was constructed with CAR funding; the
project was administered by the Association. The water is of good quality. One issue
under discussion in the Association is whether or not to install water meters in the homes.
The Itairi River borders the settlement, and Barro Branco Creek runs through it.
The community tried to dam the latter to make a small reservoir, but the project was
unsuccessful - the dam failed to hold water.

Association and Collective Area:

The Association has its headquarters in a house

constructed for that purpose on the main street. It also owns and administers the school
(built with CDA funds), a tractor, a galpao, and the water well, and administers the
payments received from Petrobras. These payments cover most Association expenses.
However, there are also monthly dues of R$10 for full members and R$3 for worker
members. There are 26 full members and 8 worker members.
The collective area is located close to the agro-vila. It was planted with oranges
and coconuts.

In 2005, these began to die, and we were told at the general settlers

meeting that they consider most of these trees to be lost.
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Eleven interviewees stated that the Association is representative of its
membership, and none said that it was not.

However, Jocemaria mentioned that

representation is not always equal, that some members have more influence than others
(she mentioned Milton, Raimundo, Branco, and Sebastiao).
Wilson was one of those who said the Association is representative, but he stated
that "problems in the Association" is what he likes least in the settlement. He was one of
two who stated that they would not belong to the Association if they did not need
membership to obtain credit.
Several interviewees stressed that, while there are differences of opinion, these
are discussed in meetings, voted upon where necessary, and the majority opinion
prevails.
"It's rare that people [all] think alike. Some[one] will always disagree. What the
majority chooses is what counts." (Ivonete)

"People think differently. [They] take it to the Assembly." (Judite)

Edivaldo, a former President of the Association and now a member of the Fiscal
Council, said that in the beginning they had serious disputes and always had two slates of
candidates for elections. More recently, they have put together a single slate, and he said
that everyone's reaction was "Thank God!" However, he stated that there continue to be
important differences, one of them being the discussion between organic and non-organic
farmers. But the major difference in his eyes is "associativsmo, " i.e., one's view on the
value and role of associations.
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"All that we have is via the [Association], Each directory had a different manner
[of carrying this out]....

I learned a lot.

I'm a defender of

associativismo"

(Edivaldo)

He noted, however, that many members do not share this value. "[They] only work
together because [they are] required to do so." Others confirmed that the participation in
the collective work was low.244
This may be in part due to discouragement. We were told at the general settlers'
meeting that participation in work projects had been higher until 2005, when the trees in
the collective area started to die. After that, participation decreased.
For this reason, a decision was reached to divide up the collective area, with each
family taking responsibility for a portion of it, the goal being that income from that
portion would go to each family's land payment. However, we were informed that many
of the parcels so distributed have been essentially abandoned.

Petro stated that the

division of the collective land had not worked out, and he felt that the situation was now
worse than previously.
Edivaldo stated that, when he was President, about two years prior to our visit, the
Association tried to change the by-laws to allow non-titleholding spouses (mostly wives)
the right to vote, but "the law wouldn't let them." However, in the last election, with

244

At one point, the Association considered expelling members who continuously refused to meet their
obligations. However, the neighboring settlement of Novo Orizonte expelled a member who then took
them to court, and the matter has been pending for years, with the expelled member receiving a portion of
the sale of eucalyptus and retaining control of his farmstead, although he put another person there and
never lived on the land. This experience discouraged Nova Lusitania from taking sanctions against
members.
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CDA and CAR present, the women were allowed to vote. Elenice pointed out that, while
non-titleholding spouses could now vote, only titleholders could hold office.
Only one woman interviewed listed herself as being "very active" in the
Association, and a few others said they attended meetings when they were able to.

We

also interviewed two worker members of the Association, one of whom (Anselmo) listed
himself as being very active.

Ecological Area: The ecological reserve is divided up into small areas. All of the
lowlands are reserved areas, as is a 30 meter wide strip along the river. Interviewees
understand that the ecological reserve cannot be removed; those who spoke of it see it as
positive for preserving nature and for wild animals. Also mentioned were that reserves
help promote rainfall and/or that removing the ecological areas would be harmful to the
river. "The reserve is like our lung." (Jose Martins da Cruz) One woman mentioned
that, while it was prohibited to remove wood from the ecological area for sale, it is
permitted to remove it for fence posts.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factor: Oil Revenue - The oil royalties in 2006 generated an
income of between R$7,000 and R$ 10,000 per month. The Association uses these funds
to pay certain Association expenses, and the remainder is distributed evenly among the
settler families, deposited in their bank accounts. This amount averages around R$300600 per family monthly,245 and several families interviewed stated that they depend on it.

245

Petrobras funds distributed to landholding families were R$ 520 in January 06, R$ 490 in February 06,
and R$ 330 in March 06.
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Land: The land purchase took place on November 9, 1997. The purchase price
was R$130 per ha, for a total of R$104,780.

SAT funds were R$110,119, and SIC

R$ 131,967. Payments are R$310 per year.246 Most families seemed to be less worried
about their ability to meet this payment than they were about PRONAF-A and custeio
loans.
The subsoil problem (discussed in detail above) is the overriding factor with
respect to land. At the general meeting with the settlers, we were told that they had
invested in the area and that they felt that it would now be impossible to recover that
investment. The felt the land would serve to survive, but not to progress. When there is
a lot of rain, the soil becomes overly wet, even affecting corn and beans. When there is
less rain, it is better, but still weak. With fertilizer, they are able to grow something, but
rain seems to wash fertilizer away. The soil does not seem to improve.
A soil expert has opened trenches to study the land problem, gathering
information for CDA, CAR, and the bank. With the help of the Church, a letter has been
sent to the Minister of Agriculture from several settlements in the municipios of
Esplanada and Conde, all with a similar problem.
Ten of the families stated that the soil is not fertile. Jose Viana said that "...the
land doesn't produce - [you] work the entire year and at the end of the year have
nothing." He noted the uncertainty as to what to plant.
One farmer stated that he believed further study necessary before determining the
fertility of the soil. Jose Martins da Cruz, the only farmer with a significant commercial

246
At the beginning of the program, land payments were to be spread out over 10 years, but a change to 20
years was negotiated.
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plantation of grain and vegetables (see below) noted that his two ha. near the
fertile, and that the remaining 20, while clay, are workable ("dar para plantar
Guimaraes, an organic farmer who opted to plant Tahiti lemons on a commer
rather than oranges, stated that the land is of medium fertility. Only one
Jocimaria Paixao, stated that the soil was "good" - she and her husband •
oranges, manioc, passion fruit, and coconuts (see below).

Financing: Twenty-two of the twenty-six families took out PRONAF A
These loans are repayable in four installments of R$ 1300 each, with a rebait
timely payment is made. When the first repayment fell due in 2005, only sixfamilies were able to repay, and these did so by selling motor scooters, hor.v.
The remaining families negotiated repayment.247

The second parcel was

shortly after our visit, and settlers generally expressed concern as to whether
paid.
Almost all of the households we interviewed had PRONAF-A financing
cases, PRONAF-A funds were used to plant orange and coconut trees, thougV1
mentioned he also used them to plant manioc. In three cases, the families had uthe homesteads from earlier settlers and had assumed their PRONAF-A debts.
Six of the households had taken out custeio loans. In three cases ih
finance manioc planting, in one passion fruit, and in one fertilizer for orange
Two of the households had repaid their loans, and one of these had taken out f.
loan for R$1800. In most cases the landholders seemed confident that they co s ,
247

"If we pay PRONAF, our families will go hungry; better to negotiate with the bank." (Man
Each family that renegotiated repaid the portion of the loan taken for oranges, but was allowe
payment for the remainder until May 2006. If the remainder is paid on time, they will get the
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the loan, with the exception of the purchaser of fertilizer, who said that the loan had not
produced any appreciable income.
The Association submitted a project to the EBDA for PRONAF-Mulher funds to
raise livestock. When asked why they chose that over, e.g., additional passion fruit, we
were told that they had been informed that PRONAF-Mulher had to be for something
they did not already have. They were told that the first R$1000 per family PRONAFMulher funds would be released only after currently due PRONAF payments were made.
If the first R$1000 is repaid, then additional funds would be available.

Production and Income: Fourteen families were interviewed with respect to their
agricultural production. Four of those families use purely organic methods; and three
others are transitioning to organic.248 We were told that fifteen families total had moved
or were moving to organic fertilizer.249 Jose Viana said that he would like to transition to
organic, but did not have sufficient funds to do so.
In accordance with Sergipano custom, 11 of the families interviewed

planted

oranges as a cash crop.250 For 7 of the families, oranges were significantly their single
largest investment. The approximate size of the orange plantings ranged from 450 to
1800 trees.251

In many cases, the trees had not reached full maturity, but where

248

Anselmo Rodrigues is one of the farmers transitioning to organic. In his opinion, their land will only be
viable with organic methods - "The soil is hot, and doesn't work with chemical (fertilizers)."
249

Meeting with the community, April 5, 2006

250

In addition to commercial planting, all of the families planted fruit trees in their yards. These included a
wide range - banana, acerola, guava, avocado, mango, seringuela, jack fruit, cashew, tangerine, gravida, as
well as oranges, lemons, etc. The yard trees were generally reported to be doing well.
251

These numbers are approximate; farmers variously stated their orchard sizes in number of trees, in
tarefas, or in hectares.
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production was occurring, it was reported as weak. Edivaldo Rodrigues, with 3 ha. of
trees, reported that he harvested only 10% of what he expected; Petro Oliveira, with 2 ha.
of oranges, harvested and sold 3 tons252 at prices varying from R$60 to R$200 per ton;
Antonio Nascimento dos Santos, with 750 trees, harvested and sold (for R$120) one ton;
David and Jocimaria Paixao harvested and sold (for R$80-90) one ton. However, Jose
and Maria Lucia Paixao, with six tarefas of oranges (700-800 trees) were able to harvest
5 tons in 2005, which they sold at prices varying from R$80 to R$150.
Two of the farmers invested heavily in lemons. Sebastiao Rodrigues and his wife,
Ivonete, found them to be "better than oranges" - with 700 3-4 year old lemon trees, they
were able to sell 5 tons @ R$300 each. Wilson Guimaraes planted no oranges but 7
tarefas of Tahiti lemons; he sells to a middleman (25 kg. for R$ 6).
Eleven of the families had commercial plantings of passion fruit. Jocimaria
Paixao stated that, when passion fruit is producing, it fetches R$ 0.60 per kg., adding
$100 to $200 weekly to family income. Isabel and Eliezer Martins receive R$ 0.60 per
kg. Edivaldo Rodrigues reported selling 4-5 tons a year @ R$ 0.50 per kg.
However, the soil drainage issue may affect passion fruit. In a visit with Petro
Oliveira in his fields, he stated that the soil problem causes passion fruit to wither and die
after approximately a year of production (normal life span is 2 Vi years).
Ten of the families have commercial plantings of coconut, but the trees are not
fully mature. Coconut is sold at a price ranging from R$20 to R$30 per 100. Only two
families mentioned coconut as a significant source of income. Other commercial fruit
252

1 ton (tonelada) = 1000 kg.
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Passion fruit grows on vines suspended from arbors. If carefully tended, the vines produce fairly
regularly throughout the year. Tending includes the delicate task of removing buds
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production included Jose Martins da Cruz' 2 ha. of papaya (mamao) and Cosme Silva's 1
ha. of pineapple.
With respect to non-fruit crops, almost all of the families plant manioc, usually in
relatively small areas (< 2 tarefas). This is milled into manioc flour (farinha) - a staple
of the Brazilian diet - at a casa de farinha - the miller keeps 18% of the total. Excess,
beyond that needed for home use, is sold at the farmer's market254 in Esplanada.
Families recorded sales prices ranging from R$20 to R$30 a 60 kg. sack, with yearly
sales ranging up to 30 sacks.
Drainage problems also affect manioc - which is usually allowed to stay in the
soil and harvested as needed. Antonio Nascimento noted that, where he lived before,
manioc could stay in the soil up to two years, but that here it cannot - "it is very weak."
One farmer, Jose Martins da Cruz, has a significant planting (7 ha.) of beans,
corn, peanuts, squash (abobora), watermelon, and okra which he sells in the farmers
market in Espanada; for the prior year he reported earning R$800 from watermelons,
R$200 from beans, and R$150 from peanuts. Other landholders have only relatively
small areas dedicated to this type of non-fruit crop.
At the general settlers meeting, we were told that the soil issue may also affect
beans. Settlers stated that they should be able to harvest 12 sacks of beans per tarefa, but
were harvesting half that amount.
The Brazilian tobacco company, Souza Cruz, recruited farmers to raise tobacco.
Only one farmer, Sebastiao Rodrigues, attempted this. Souza Cruz provided inputs and

254

At the group meeting, we were told that, with the presence of the settlements in the area, the farmers'
market in Esplanada has grown 50-60%, and now operates on both Friday and Saturday instead of just the
latter. Food has become less expensive for those living in town; they are "undercutting the middleman"
(Petro). In addition, it has expanded the products available, with more varieties of fruit and vegetables.
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he planted 60,000 tobacco plants, but the resulting crop was very small and did not
recompense the labor.
Eight of the families raise chickens - on the average about 20 chickens per
family. Six of the families have a mule or horse. The most diverse in terms of stock
raising are Jocimaria and David Paixao who, in addition to 10 chickens, have two pigs,
two sheep, and three goats.
Eight of the families receive the Bolsa Familia,

which - depending on the

number of children - is up to R$95 per month. Only one family has a member receiving
an old-age pension.256
Nine of the landholders interviewed work as daily laborers, ranging from about a
week a month to "almost every day." Daily laborers earn R$12/day working for the
settlement (on settlement programs) and R$15/day working for others.

The most

common labor mentioned were agricultural work, loading trucks, and cutting pine trees
for the reforestation company.
Other sources of income: Jose Domingos owns a tractor and rents it out with his
time in other settlement areas (but not in Nova Lusitania, which has its own tractor),
usually paid by the prefeitura.

Elenice (his wife) started a small store in 2005 - she says

business is slow; when she can she buys goods wholesale in Feira da Santana (about four
hours away) - her brother has a truck and goes there with her. Antonia Ferreira crochets,
and sells Avon and Hermes products (earning about R$30 month). Maria Lucia Paixao
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The Bolsa Familia provides a stipend to low-income families with school age children on the condition
that the children are vaccinated and attending school.
256

This is a bit unusual, as in most rural communities in Brazil, old-age pensions are a major source of
local income. In our small town in the State of Tocantins, for example, the day old-age pensions were
distributed was the single most active day for local commerce.
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also sells Avon products - she earns about R$10 per month, 20% of what she sells. Other
families reported selling tanks of gas (used for cooking stoves) with earnings of R$ 40/m;
and selling ice cream & popsicles, with earnings of R$ 45/m.

Sufficiency of Income: When asked if family income was sufficient, only two
householders (both men) responded "yes." Most others stated that there is enough to eat
but not for other perceived needs:

"There is a lot lacking. But we get by (da para viver). Food is no problem Thank God. Clothes and shoes are more difficult." ( Elenice Rodrigues dos
Santos)

"You work the whole year and it isn't even enough to buy a shirt." (Ivonete
Maria de Jesus)

Jose Ferreira stated that there is enough to eat but not enough to pay for necessary
investments: hiring a tractor, buying fertilizer. Several mentioned the importance of the
Petrobras income and other income not generated from the land. But, when discussing
other matters such as the future of their children, many were eloquent about the
advantages of having enough to eat and a place to live (see below).
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Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction:
encountered.

Nova Lusitania suffered the highest attrition rate (-50%) we

That was prior to 2003, but has since stabilized.

However, there are

indications that stabilization (i.e., settlers not leaving) may be due in part to the oil
revenues received by each family. The expressed level of satisfaction was not high: 17 of
22 people interviewed said that they would be willing to trade or sell their land given
certain conditions.

Sixteen of the respondents believe that their life is better in the

settlement than before they moved there,257 and only one felt her life is worse (she came
from a small landholding in Rio Real with producing fruit trees which they owned
258

outright).

Many had favorable comments about the community,

but there was an

overall sense of disappointment as to the quality of the land (especially with respect to
raising fruit trees), concern about the cost of fertilizer, worry about the ability to meet
259

payments, and a sense of apathy with respect to the future.
Future: Most interviewee responses with respect to the future of the settlement
were general and superficial - things would be better in two years, much better in 10
years, or the interviewee hoped things will be better. A few expressed more specific
insights. Edivaldo Rodrigues believes there are two possibilities: if the land problem is
resolved, he believes it will be a new start for the community; if the problem is not
resolved, he believes he will make it through, but is concerned that many of the others
257

Some responses were nuanced. Edivaldo Rodrigues, who had previously been an administrator for a
small pineapple farm, noted that he is now better off in terms of infrastructure (his term) - owning a house
and land - but less well off financially - he is currently earning less money.
258

Edivaldo Rodrigues - "It's the best place in the world" - but he would sell or trade for another
community because of the soil problem - he emphasized that was his only issue. Antonio Nascimento dos
Santos - "If the whole community could get better land and decided to move, we would too."
259

One interviewee, Eliezer, said that he did not like anything about the settlement.
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may fail. Petro also feels the future depends on the soil, and Eliezer Martins believes
things will get worse - the soil is weak and oranges won't grow. Ivonete de Jesus wants
the prefeito to do more - especially in establishing a health post.
Deeper feelings emerged in some instances when discussing the future of their
families. Antonio Nascimento wants his children:

".. .to study well so as to progress in life. Not like me. But to stay around here.
Out (in the world) only (works) if you have a very good job. This is rare. The
good of man is the land.

There are so many people unemployed, without

anything to eat. If you have a house and food, everything is okay. Out there {la
ford) everything is purchased - here in the countryside we have everything."

Edivaldo Rodrigues also wants his children to stay in the country, close by, but hopes
the financial situation will ease up. Elenice hopes her children can go to college - which
she sees as requiring them to study in Salvador - but hopes they will return to live in the
interior. Maria Lucia thinks that in the future working in the country will become easier
- she hopes for jobs for children so their life will be easier.260
Socio-Political Awareness: Generally the level of social-political awareness among
interviewees was similar to the level one would expect among Northeastern rural
Brazilians who are not active members of political parties, landless movements, active
unions, or Church social justice groups (such as CPT or the CEBs movement). When
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One settler's teenage son was present at this point in the interview. Alair (17) wants to go to Sao Paulo
to spend a year. His uncle and godfather live there; his uncle will get Alair a job if he finishes high school.
But he ended by saying he would stay in the settlement if he could earn enough to "buy a shirt" (i.e., to
have some ready spending money).
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asked who helps/is in favor of the rural worker, answers included Lula/the President (3),
the prefeito/municipal government (3)261, the Church/churches/Frei Chico (2), and people
or agencies within the government (2). Edivaldo stated, "The [Federal] Government says
it is concerned, but doesn't help much." Cosme noted that "the person [worker] himself
has to be in favor." Alair stated that the producers of fertilizer and inputs, and the
commercial intermediaries, work against the rural worker.
Attitudes toward the MST were similar to those current on Globo Television.262
Of the 13 interviewees who expressed opinions, six felt strongly negative toward the
263

MST and its methods, three had more nuanced negative opinions,

and three expressed

approval; one of these last was the lay leader of the Catholic Church who is actively
involved in diocesan social justice matters.264

One interviewee commented that she

resented the MST in part because the negative image it creates rubs off on land reform
settlement dwellers, and that people in town refer to the people in the settlements as "sem
265
terras" (landless in a pejorative sense).
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The municipal government has, in fact, provided help to the settlers to a greater extent than any other
municipio in our study.
262

During the several months prior to the interviews, the image of the MST as portrayed in mainstream
media was largely negative, emphasizing invasions of productive land, isolated acts of violence, and the
presence of MST militants who were allegedly not legitimately landless farmers.
263

One interviewee stated that he found MST methods disagreeable, but it was good that people were
winning the land; similarly, another said she disagreed with invading land, but people do need land and
have to go after it ("correr atras"). Similarly, Edivaldo, one of the more articulate interviewees, stated that
he did not approve of MST methods - he clarified that he is not against the people who are trying to get
land, but against their leaders, whom he felt are using them.
264

Alair, 17 years old, provided an interesting response. He stated that MST land invasions call attention to
problem - that MST is helping people who are seeking (correndo atras) a means of working (meios de
trabalhar) - taking land from those who do nothing with it and giving it to people who want to work it.
265

Researcher Brenda King-Powers noted that, in informal conversations, many of the women felt strongly
about they and their children being ridiculed as "sem-terras. " See also Case Study 2.
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With respect to politics, the interviews showed 19 votes in the last election for
Lula, 3 for Serra, and 3 non-voters. With respect to the forthcoming election, of those
who responded, 13 were undecided, 7 for Lula, and 3 for Serra. Only two interviewees
expressed strong party affiliations, one with the PT, and one with Antonio Carlos
Magalhaes - the long standing political boss of the State of Bahia.

Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations:

Nova Lusitania is the oldest of the

settlement areas studied, and one of the four oldest Cedula da Terra settlements in Bahia.
Partly because it was among the first, the settlement experienced considerable difficulties
in the organizational stages.

Financing was delayed, attrition was high and settler

satisfaction is the lowest that we encountered.
The subsoil issue speaks directly to one of the points that critics of market based
land reform often make: that landowners will sell off the worst portions, while keeping
the better portions of land themselves.266 It seems fairly clear that the company that sold
the land was aware of the compacted subsoil.
Discovery of Petrobras oil on the land has been a mixed blessing. On one hand, it
halted attrition and provided settler families with some income while potential solutions
to the subsoil issue are examined. On the other hand, it seems to have created some
dependency, and perhaps removed impetus for some of the settlers to be as active and
creative as they might otherwise be in seeking alternatives to orange growing.

266

As mentioned earlier in this essay, however, this critique is somewhat offset by the fact that, in Brazil, it
is very difficult for the government to expropriate land that the owner does not want it to expropriate. We
have seen the same issue arise in traditional land reform projects: landowners allowing the government to
expropriate poor land while successfully resisting expropriation of good land.
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Short of a massive investment in turning the subsoil, which no agency seems both
capable and willing to make, it is difficult to imagine that the land will readily be
converted to growing fruit trees. This is justifiably disappointing to most of the settlers to ask a fruit grower to become a farmer of seasonable crops is asking a person to
completely change his profession.

Some of the farmers, especially those currently

experimenting with organic methods, may be able to transition and find new crops. A
way may yet be found to successfully extend the productive life of passion fruit and to
grow other non-tree fruits. But as one farmer said to us, he has risked considerably and
lost - he would want a thorough soil analysis and good technical guidance before he
would be willing to risk again.
Government funds for land reform are stretched very thin, and the priority has to
be landless families. The amount available to be invested in areas that have already
received both land and considerable additional funds is limited. Nonetheless, and partly
because the subsoil problem affects more than one community, a sincere effort seems to
be being made to study the problem and develop alternatives.

We doubt that these

alternatives will be satisfactory to all of the settlers, and some may decide to leave or to
simply remain relatively passively on their land depending primarily on Petrobras
payments. But creative alternatives could help to revitalize that portion of the community
that is able to adapt, and - perhaps via a certain percentage of replacement - the
community itself.
Despite all of the difficulties, it is important to note that sixteen out of nineteen
adults interviewed felt that their life was better in the settlement than it had been before.
Interviewees were also on the whole positive about their neighbors and (aside from the
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subsoil issue) about living in the settlement. Despite the very real disappointment of not
being able to realize their dream of citrus raising, and the real costs of lost investment in
time, effort, and money, this says significantly that Nova Lusitania is not a failure - that
it has had a positive impact on settlers' lives.
When we first visited Nova Lusitania, we became very concerned that, as the
oldest of the settlements, it represented a pattern. In other words, we saw a danger that,
once SIC, SAT, and PRONAF A moneys have been spent, the tendency would be for
settler enthusiasm to wane and for disillusion to set in, sapping communities of their
vitality and making sustainability less likely. We do realize that this is a potential danger,
but in most of the other settlements studied, while the period following expenditures of
funds and of obtaining emancipation from government tutelage is a vulnerable one, the
realistic expectation of improved future production and income is a real impetus. In
Nova Lusitania, where this expectation/hope seems to have vanished - or at least become
much more difficult to envision - we admire the tenacity and resilience of those settlers
who continue working to produce what they can, to try new approaches, to create a solid
community life.
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Case Study 2

Name of Settlement: Boa Vista III
Families in Settlement: 55 landholding families plus several additional families
Location: Municipio - Esplanada
Area: 1,375 ha.
Contract Date: June 8, 1998
Dates Visited: April 28-30, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 19
Family size (persons): 1-3/2

Individuals: 32
4-6/11

7-9/3

10+/1

Persons Interviewed: 17 men, 15 women (including 2 20-year-old single daughters)
Ages 20-29/3, 30-39/7, 40-49/17,50-59/5
Schooling: 0-2/14, 3-5/13, 6-8/3, (one of the young women completed high school)
In 9 of the families interviewed, the wife had more education than the husband - in three
cases, 4 or more years more. In four families the husband had more education than the
wife, but in only one case was the difference substantial.
Technical Assistance: CELANOR
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We were not given an exact number, but we saw the street with several of the new houses, at least one of
which was under construction.
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Map V-2-A. Boa Vista III Settlement. Cross-hatching indicates collective areas, dotting
indicates ecological reserves. Settlers have two agricultural lots - a smaller one along the
river and a larger one removed from the river. Unlike most settlements, ecological
reserves are largely within the agricultural lots. Note that there are neighboring
settlements both to the north (Baixa Grande) and south (Malhombe).
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Geography: The settlement consists of 55 landholding families and is located along both
sides of the small Ovo River in the municipio of Esplanada, 12 kms from the municipal
seat on a good quality dirt road. The total area is 1375 ha. Each of the families has a
268

dwelling lot (15 x 30m) in the agro-vila, an additional 1 ha. lot (discussed below),

a

riverside lot (average size 3.4 ha.), and a farm lot (average size 15 ha.) The communal
farm land is located in three areas totaling approximately 260 ha, and the natural reserve
269

is 101 ha. (primarily an allocated portion of each riverside and farm lot).
The agro-vila is constructed in the shape of a U, with a large central plaza in the
center and a Catholic church in the plaza. Using the additional lots mentioned above, the
community has also set up three streets of new house lots (15 x 50m) for grown married
270

children of settlers, and several have constructed homes there.

Climate: See Introduction to Case Studies 1 and 2, above.
History: Boa Vista III was one of the second wave of Cedula da Terra projects in this
part of Bahia, the contract being signed on June, 1998. Many of the 971
original settlement
families came from the Community Association of Lagoa de Baixo,
and most of the
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The original plan for the community provided for 1 ha. house lots, but a technician from Salvador told
the settlers they had to use smaller (15 x 30m) lots (presumably to facilitate basic services); the delta
between the lot sizes was retained by each family in a separate lot close to the agro-vila. Meeting at
Church 28/03/09.
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Meeting with settlers at church
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Ibid.
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Rafael (interview April 27, 2006) referred to Boa Vista III as "a child (filha) of Lagoa de Baixo)
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others came from other community associations
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in the municipio of Rio Real, member

associations of CELANOR.
The land was purchased from FERBASA (Cia. De Ferro Ligas da Bahia S/A), a
reforestation company. The company cut the pine trees before the settlers moved in. The
273

settlers we talked to believed that the pines had a negative impact on the soil.
Initially, many settlers continued to maintain their families in Rio Real; the men
came to Boa Vista III to work during the week, often returning to Rio Real on the
weekends. Some began moving onto the land at the end of 1999 and seriously working it
in 2000.274

According to interviewees, in late 1999 or early 2000, Dr. Penedo, the

agronomist responsible for the settlement, informed the families that they had to move to
the land or they would lose their rights. Twenty-five of the fifty-five families on the
original list (including the first President of the Association) decided not to make the
move, and were replaced by twenty-five other families.
The initial SIC allocation for construction of houses was R$1300 per family, an
amount that Rafael of Celanor feels was too little. But many of the settlers brought
resources from Rio Real and used them to establish themselves in Boa Vista III. Some
275

had tractors and other equipment.
Mico Preto's story was fairly typical of the early settlement period. When he first
arrived in late 1999/early 2000, there were only seven houses in the settlement area.
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Waldemar Correio de Jesus, for example, still maintains his membership in the Association of Lima, as
well as in Boa Vista III. Interview, April 29, 2006.
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Meeting with settlers at church, April 28, 2006
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Meeting with settlers at church, April 28, 2006.
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Rafael, interview, April 27, 2006
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Initially he lived in a temporary hut (barraca); his family stayed in Rio Real and he went
back there every week end. When the house was built, he moved two of his daughters to
the settlement with him. Blanca, the elder, remembers that there were twelve families
when she arrived. When he had put in the floor and built an addition, he moved the rest
of his family from Rio Real, sold the house there, and used the money to plant 280
orange trees.
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Water and electricity were installed in 2002.

In that year Boa Vista III was

considered a highly successful settlement, receiving the highest rating given by CDA.
The settlement was featured in a 2003 article in Revista Cedula da Terra.

Demography: Only four of the adult interviewees claimed urban origins, and all of those
grew up on farms. One of these, Ivone, had been working as a hairdresser in Salvador
before moving to the settlement, but all interviewees had come to the settlement from
rural settings. Ten of the men had minifundios (the largest 20 tarefas, the smallest 1
tarefa) and six (including the minfundista with 1 tarefa) worked land belong to their
families. Eight of these men supplemented their income as sharecroppers, daily farm
laborers, or - in one situation each - as a fruit seller, and as owner of a small bar. Only
three of the men were entirely landless - all three worked as daily farm laborers, one also
worked as a sharecropper and one as a bricklayer.

Race/Ethnicity: primarily white, some Afro-Brazilian
Gender: two of the 55 titleholders are women
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Interview, 29 April 2006
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Religion: The great majority of residents are Catholics. Sixteen of the families
interviewed were Catholic, two did not declare a religious preference, and one
said that they "had been" Jehovah Witnesses.

The Catholic Church is in the

central plaza; there is an active parish, with catechism and youth ministry.
Age: 17 of the 35 residents interviewed were in their 40s, eight in their 30s, five
in their 50s.
Attrition: Approximately 35 of the original 55 settler families remain at Boa
Vista III.277

Education: The settlement has a public school that goes up to the 4th grade. The director
and two of the teachers come in from the city (Esplanada), and four other teachers are
from the settlement. Most of the interviewees stated that the school was good, although
two rated it as only fair. Students travel 15 kilometers to another settlement, Antonio
Conselheiro, to attend middle school.

Health: Residents did not feel that health care was good. The nearest health post is in
Antonio Conselheiro. The school bus takes patients there, but it ends up being an all-day
trip. The doctor is there only on Tuesdays, and sometimes does not show up. There is a
health agent at the health post, and people thought highly of her. There is also a local
health agent resident in Boa Vista III, the daughter of one of the settlers; she does home
visits, but there was some feeling that she was not sufficiently trained.
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Meeting at church, 28/04/2006. In the early days of settlement, of the 55 families originally scheduled
to be settled on the land, twenty-five did not take over their land and were replaced. This replacement has
not included in the calculation of attrition.
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Water: The Association well, opened in 2002, can produce 6800 liters per hour. The
water tower has a capacity of 20,000 liters and is eight meters high, providing good water
pressure to the houses, which can have water tanks located up to five meters above
ground. Several interviewees cited the water - both having running water in their home
and the quality of the water - as one of the things they like about the settlement.

The

riverside lots can be irrigated from the river, the farm lots have no running water on them.

Association and Collective Area: The collective land is planted with 25 ha in oranges
and 15 ha in coconuts (approximately 7000 trees of each). Initially collective work went
well, but participation waned. Approximately a year prior to our visit, the Association
assigned a portion of the collective area to each family to maintain.

However, this

system did not work out, and - shortly prior to our visit - the community returned to the
original system of collective work.
Not surprisingly, the collective work was cited as one of the major areas of
discussion for the Association. Although settlers are only asked to work one day a month
(or contribute R$15 to pay a substitute), there continue to be difficulties in getting
everyone to participate. The Association Treasurer, Ze Sana, told us it gives the directory
"a lot of work."
Mico Preto, who was elected Vice President in the February election, focused on
the importance of this issue:

"We have to sit and organize [the collective area]. We have to determine how
much work is needed. We could divide in sub groups. If 30 go and 25 don't,
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[we] have to explain, call a meeting. [They] can pay rather than go. Those who
don't want [to work] can give up their right the collective [income] in writing
through an Act of the Assembly."

Jose Irmao, the Vice Treasurer, pointed out that all associations have the problem of
people who do not work. "It's always that way, every place."

Nilton agreed: "These

things always happen."
However, Ze Sana said that, despite the problem, they manage to get the work done.
Mico Preto agreed, saying that already, having returned to the collective system, they are
back to cleaning (limpando) the orange groves. Isodoro estimated that 90% of the settlers
are participating; if true, this is a higher percentage than in most settlements.
In addition to the collective land, the Association owns the school, the well, the
bolacha factory (see below), the soccer field, and a large tractor. Tractor charges are
R$35/day for members, R$40/day for non-members.278
Shortly prior to our visit, the Association constructed, with SIC funds, an electrified
casa de farinha with a capacity of producing 20 sacks of manioc flour a day, and also
capable of making tapioca. The Association Treasurer told us that there is not sufficient
manioc for the casa, and that there is relatively little manioc being planted.

The

Association had approximately R$5000 in SIC funds remaining when we visited.
The Association plans to set up a day care center where mothers can leave their
children when they go out either to work in the fields or to jobs outside of the settlement
area. They intended to use the second parcel of the SECOMP funds (the first parcel was
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There are also five smaller, privately owned tractors in the settlement that charge R$35/day to members
and non-members alike.
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for the factory) for the center, but due to delays in accounting for the first parcel, the
second parcel was cancelled. They therefore were planning a new project for SECOMP
which they believed would be submitted to more rigorous examination due to the
previous delays.279
The Association had five Presidents since its inception; the sixth, Luis Carlos, was
elected in February 2006, shortly before our visit, in a 23 to 19 vote victory over former
President Fausto. According to several interviewees, the two slates had no substantial
difference in platforms, and the election did not cause significant hard feelings or
divisions in the community.

Most prior elections have had at least two slates of

candidates; the election of 2000 had three, but the election of 2002 was undisputed.280
Luis Carlos, 30, was said to be a calm person but a hard worker who dedicates
most of his time to the Association. Natalia said that he travels a good deal, striving
(lutando) to benefit the settlement.

Waldemar noted that the Association should

represent all of the settlers, and that Luis Carlos is doing that.
In an interview, Luis Carlos spoke of his experience (he was Treasurer before he
became President) and that being part of the Association has increased his knowledge.
He said that he thought that differences among the settlers at the Association meeting
were not that great. Among the things he would like to see for the settlement are a juice
factory, a scale for weighing oranges, the day-care center, a medical post, and paving the
streets.
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He noted that, in addition to the Association, the Church and sports (the

Meeting with group representing the settlement, April 28, 2006

280

Bosco was elected President in 2000 with 15 votes, over 14 for Fausto and 10 for Agostinho. Bosco was
reelected without opposition in 2002, but only served one year of his second term.
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settlement has a soccer team) are strong uniting factors in the community (several other
settlers also cited these two as unifying factors).
Overall support for the Association seemed to remain strong. Fausto mentioned
that the Association is important for coming up with productive ideas.

Blanca, 20,

emphasized that working together they accomplish more than each one working alone.
Antonio Gago used the example of toothpicks - one alone can be broken, but it is almost
impossible to break a bunch of them held together.

"We have to live today in Association. [We] all need the Association. It makes
it easier to get things, gives [us] more force." (Antonio Gago)

"Who governs [the settlement] is us....

If [for instance] the fertilizer [we

received] is not good for the oranges, and everyone votes on it, we handle the
situation. The Association is for everyone." (Ivone)

Several interviewees noted that differences of opinion are natural, and that
differences are worked out through the meeting process. Natalia noted that they discuss
the factory, the collective, and the fact that many members do not have money to pay for
the land and PRONAF - these matters are discussed in meetings. Bosco noted that there
are small differences of opinion: "People are different." Renato, the current Secretary,
said that there is diversity of opinion; the Directory tries to understand why a person is
opposed to a proposition, and seeks to provide answers and convince members.
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Although article 6 of the Association by-laws allows non-titleholding spouses to
vote and be elected, this provision was not being observed in practice at the time of our
visit. This seems to have arisen from a lack of understanding of the contents of the bylaws.

When the content of the article was explained to them, the Directors of the

Association said that they would take steps to implement it.
Another barrier to full participation is lack of education. Waldemar, for instance,
was invited to hold a leadership position but said that he did not feel comfortable doing
so as he did not know how to read. The case of Isodoro, however, had an interesting
twist: although he had only a first grade education, he was elected Secretary of the
Association in the past administration because the members wanted his daughter, Carla,
then in her late teens and a high school graduate, to actually perform the job (she carried
it out successfully).

Ecological Area: Unlike the other settlements studied, the ecological area(s) in Boa
Vista III is a designated portion of each settler's riverside and farm lots, as well as of the
collective land, sufficient in total to make up the 20% legal requirement. We were told in
the general meeting that the ecological reserves are not used at all (e.g., for bee keeping,
firewood), but are for "only wild animals." However, one woman said that it provides
firewood (lenha) for cooking.
Adilson noted that it is difficult to control the environmental areas because they
are distant, and that there have been incidents of outsiders lighting fires and taking out
wood. Natalia confirmed that the Association cannot control the areas, and that, where
problems occur, they are not reported to IBAMA. Fausto, who was the second President
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of the Association, believes that it is the Association's job to protect the areas, but - in
addition to being distant - the areas are not fenced; he says that they are being destroyed.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factor: This community has gone further than most others studied
in trying to industrialize. In addition to an electric-powered casa de farinha (manioc
flour mill) financed with SIC funds,281 the community has a factory (fabrica) to
manufacture bolachas, inexpensive cookies and crackers (the difference being whether
989

they are made with sugar or salt) made with very fine manioc-flour (polvilho).
The project, based on the knowledge and experience of women in the settlement,
was developed by the Association President, the technical advisor, and Rose from
Celanor. Rose purchased the material and supervised building the factory. SIC money
was supplemented with additional funds.

The factory consists of a kitchen and

additional tiled room for preparing dough, packaging, etc. Firewood for the oven comes
from the ecological reserve and from the orange groves.
281

The casa de farinha has a median daily production of 20 sixty-kilo sacks. Meeting at church, 28/04/06.
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Alice Prima Aguiar, wife of one of the titulars, provided interesting background. She had made
bolachas at her home in Rio Real, and taught the other women at BVIII how to do so. "We began to work
with a small clay oven." They then moved to Neide's house, and eventually formed a group of 25 women.
She considered herself a leader of the group, but subsequently desisted due to disagreements on how to
carry forward the activities. Interview 29/04/06
283

Frei Chico developed a project through SECOMP ("Projeto Mulheres Rurais Empreendodoras do
Litoral Norte") that included projects for four settlement communities - BVIII, Palmeira (manufacture of
clothing), Mata Verde (home-made sweets) and Sabauma (artisan goods).
SECOMP provided
R$68,267.09, the prefeitura R$5,780 and BVIII R$3,750; the contract was signed on 10/11/02. As the
other settlements did not have their accounts in order, money for their projects also flowed through BVIII.
Each settlement had a tecnico to accompany it - Rose for BVIII. After the factory was built, Maria Lucia
dos Santos was chosen as treasurer for the project. There was a problem with accounting for the project
funds; that was resolved in September, 2005, but the delay led to losing a second parcel of SECOMP funds
that was intended to establish a day care center. However, when we visited, they were discussing with
SECOMP putting in a new proposal for the day-care center, in order to free up the women in the settlement
to work. Visit to the factory 28/03/06
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In addition to bolachas, the factory can make bread, but was not currently doing
so. The market for bolachas is small. The settlers we spoke to believe they have the
necessary equipment but need to find the market, and that they really have not yet made a
sufficient effort to identify markets.
Bolachas are sold in 60 gram packages and have a 60 day shelf life (but are most
flavorful during the first week or two). One intermediary buys 100 packages every 15
days or so for R$0.50, and the factory sells directly in the town market for R$0.70. At
the time of our visit, three women were working; a problem was noted with other women
working part time and wanting a full monthly salary.

Marlene, one of the women

working in the factory, noted that, in the beginning the settlement kids and young people
bought a lot, but they got tired of them.
Land:286 The land purchase took place on June 8, 1998. The purchase price was
R$130 per ha, for a total of R$ 178,750. SAT funds were R$ 194,425 and SIC R$301,925.
Opinions varied as to whether the land should be described as good, adequate,
weak, or - perhaps most realistically - some parts better and some weaker.

But all

settlers agreed that the land needs fertilizer
284

Visit to the factory 28/03/06. Alice Aguiar, op cit., wanted to try selling bolachas in the Municipio of
Conde, on the coast, but others did not agree.
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Alice Aguiar, op cit., feels that the factory is not being well run. "There, everything is wrong (Ali tudo e
errado)" She thinks the factory should make cake, and should be open to new ideas wherever they can get
them - for instance the ideas appearing in Globo Rural. She says the factory needs (1) unity among the
women working there, (2) firm management, and (3) clear rules to be followed (regimento). When she was
in charge of the factory, she was able to go to Esplanada with 200 packages and sell them all. But she
found being both administrator and sales person was too much. She also sought to impose rules, setting
working hours, and doling out measured portions of dough to each woman; but she was criticized for
wanting to be the "dona" of the factory.
286

Rafael of CELANOR mentioned that "family life in Boa Vista III is [sometimes] guaranteed by land in
Rio Real. We encountered four incidents of this. Waldemar still owns two tarefas of land in Rio Real and
maintains his membership in the Lima Association. Del also owns land in Rio Real. Galego has 400
orange trees that he maintains on his father's land in Rio Real. Ivone's father bought the lot in Boa Vista
III from another settler and put it in Ivone's name; he continues to own land in Rio Real.
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"This land isn't bad, nor is it the best. But if you fertilize, take care of the land
and don't let the weeds take over..." Mico Preto

"It's good.

There is the problem of the subsoil, but it's good.

That only

hampers oranges. [The land] is good for coconut, manioc, beans." Ze Reis

"Those who take care [of the plants] harvest." Antonio Gago287

As in Nova Lusitania, soil experts have dug trenches in Boa Vista III and are
mapping the soil. An attempt was made to turn the subsoil using an EDBA tractor;
however, the tractor only had the capacity to cut 40 cm into the soil as opposed to the
tractor used to by the neighboring reforestation company, which can cut up to 1.2 meters.
Financing:

In 1998, each family received R$2210 to plant passion fruit - an

amount not sufficient to plant one hectare. The passion fruit was excellent in quality.
But about two years later world prices began to fall dramatically.

288

98Q

Of the nineteen households interviewed, sixteen had taken out PRONAF A loans,
in most cases for oranges, although the loans could also be used for land clearing,
fencing, and/or coconut planting (only one of the interviewees used part of the funds for
coconuts).
287

"Quem zela, colha."

288

Interview with Rafael at CELANOR, April 27, 2006

289

One interviewee was barred from taking the loan due to an old outstanding bank debt. The other two
did not state their reasons for not taking out the loan.
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Twelve of the households had taken out custeio loans, in all cases but one to plant
manioc.290 One farmer mentioned that he had repaid two of the three payments on the
loan, and was contemplating taking out an additional custeio. Two of the farmers took
out the loans but felt the weather was too dry and did not plant. "The Bank Manager is
from the country and understands," Natalia stated. Her family was negotiating a new
custeio for R$3000 - R$ 1200 to repay the bank and the remainder to plant manioc.291 Ze
do Roque and his wife De stated that she had submitted a proposal, prepared by Renato
of CELANOR, for a PRONAF Women's project that provides R$1000 capital for
projects started by non-titular female spouses - which they planned to put into pig
raising.
Antonio Gago is negotiating via COPEF, using his passion fruit on the vine as
collateral for purchasing fertilizer. He states that this method will work with oranges
also. He sees it as the only near term option for financing. "The Banco do Nordeste
would finance a larger loan (custeio) for one year, but our production is [currently] too
small to warrant this."
Production and Income: With respect to agricultural practices, only two families
used fully organic methods. "Chemical fertilizer is throwing money away," Mico Preto
said. He uses chicken manure, which costs him R$70-90 a ton; he stated that passion
9Q9

fruit needs 2 kg per plant, oranges 5 kg per tree.

lane mentioned that she and her

husband would like to put 2-3 tons of chicken manure on the land, but at the cost of R$70
290

The exception, Waldemar, took out the custeio to plant oranges. He repaid the full value (R$2000) and
was contemplating a new loan of R$3000). Interview 29 April 2006
291

Interview, 28/04/06. The bank manager had been expected to visit the settlement, with a bank inspector,
the week before to study the situation and make recommendations, but he did not arrive. Ze do Roque,
interview, 28/04/06.

292

Interview, 28/04/06
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per ton, could not afford to do so.293 Antonio Gago said that he uses chemical fertilizer
rather than organic because he can pay for the former over time, and that makes it
affordable.294 Several families said that they use a combination of organic and chemical
methods.
As mentioned above, the settlers in Boa Vista III are of Sergipano background, in
which orange raising is an important aspect of the culture.

All nineteen families

interviewed had planted commercial orange groves, ranging from 400 to 2500 trees, the
average being 1450. However, due to the relative immaturity of the trees, only four of
the families reported selling oranges during the preceding year. One of these, Ze Sande
- the owner of the largest grove - earned R$1600 from oranges, and Mico Peto earned
90S

R$440, but the two remaining earned around R$100 or less.

Del and Ana also have a

commercial grove of 400 lemon trees, and reported selling approximately R$ 15-20 of
lemons each week at the market in Esplanada.
Due to the immaturity of the orange groves, at the time of the interviews, passion
fruit was the most important cash crop (it begins producing 6-9 months after planting).
Seventeen of the nineteen families had commercial plantings of passion fruit, ranging
from 500 to 2300 plants. Fifteen families reported income from sale of passion fruit. For
2005, two families recorded selling 10 tons (1 ton = 1000kg), one family sold 8 tons,
three sold 4-5 tons.
high of R$0.60.

Prices were generally R$ 0.40 per kg, with a low of R$0.20 and a

For some families, this added R$2000-4000 to annual income - a

293

Interview, 28/04/06

294

Interview, 29/04/06

295

Prices received for oranges ranged from R$110 to R$200 per ton.

241

significant amount.296 As the fruit is harvested during a ten month period each year, it
provides a useful flow of income. Del mentioned that he sold 1500 passion fruit mudas
(seedlings, saplings) at R$0.12 - 0.15.
Twelve families had coconut groves, the largest being 400 trees. However, the
trees are not yet producing in quantity, and only one family recorded moderately
significant sales (R$300) during 2005.
Thirteen families had manioc planted, in all cases one hectare or less. Six families
recorded sales of manioc flour (farinha) the standard price during 2005 being around
R$30 per 60 kg sack. One family earned R$1200 in such sales during the year, but for
most it was considerably less.
Other significant cash crops planted included one farmer with 1700 inhame plants,
three with significant plantings of papaya (mamao), one with three tarefas of watermelon,
and one with 50 banana trees. Only one of these farmers recorded sales during 2005 R$280 for papaya.
Waldemar noted that he had experimented with cotton, sunflowers, and castor oil
plants (mamona); all three did well and he plans to plant more when he takes out a new
loan (he repaid his first loan). He also experimented with rice and sugar cane, and said
both did well.297 Adilson experiemented with 250 acerola plants, but the experiement
was not successful.

296

Antonio Gago noted that passion fruit sales were the basis of his family's survival. Interview 29/04/06.

297

Interview, April 29, 2006.
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Most of the farmers interviewed planted black beans,298 corn, squash, and
vegetables for family use and for sale in small quantities at the farmers' market in
Esplanada and other towns. Isodoro maintained a stall at the market in Acajutiba, a small
municipio (population 14,000) north of Esplanada, which he stated earned his family
approximately a minimum salary per month. Most families have a variety of fruit trees
on their house lots; one mentioned that he planted coffee on his house lot and it is
growing well.
Stock raising was not a significant source of income. Although many families had a
few chickens, only three of the interviewed families had significant flocks of poultry
(ranging up to 25), mostly chickens, although one had 15 ducks. Only three farmers had
a horse or mule, and one of these owned - in partnership with a neighbor - a twowheeled horse drawn wagon (carroga) used for carting.
In eight of the households, the men work part time off their land. In five cases, the
men work as day laborers earning R$ 15 a day, although one of these mentioned that he
also takes on fixed price tasks (empreito) such as cleaning orange groves. One of the day
laborers reports that he works outside only "as needed," and one spends 20% of his time
working off his farm, but three spend about half their working time on such jobs.
Three others who work outside have a higher skill level. Antonio Gago is the local
representative of COPEF,299 receiving and weighing passion fruit each Saturday,
receiving a commission on the amount so received; he also works 2-3 days a week in the
casa de farinha, earning R$20 a day (R$25 a day if they work overtime). Fausto works
298

"Some people think that planting beans isn't worth the effort," Antonio Gago told us. He laughed. "But
I plant them."
299

COFEP had more than 30 members altogether, four of them in Boa Vista III - Antonio Gago, Bosco,
Zinho, and Nato. However, it also purchases from non-members.
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as a mason, carpenter, and electrician, earning R$25-40 per day. Bosco hires out as a
tractor driver/maintenance person at R$30 per day; he also owns his own tractor and nets
R$600 a month in hiring it out (the standard fee for renting a small tractor is R$35 per
day).
Ideas for additional investment were mentioned.

As noted above, Luis Carlos

envisions a juice factory as a possibility. Alice, who is a seamstress, says that there is not
enough work for her in the settlement; she would like to set up a sewing atelier and could
teach the other women, but needs a plan, a place to work, machines, and a place to sell
goods manufactured. Several men mentioned the need for additional capital to better
work the land.
Ten of the nineteen households receive bolsa escola/familia ranging from R$30 to
R$95 a month, and one other family is in the process of registering for the bolsa. In one
family, the husband receives a government retirement pension (a minimum salary per
month). In two families, young adult children living at home have municipal teaching
positions, earning a minimum salary per month.

Renato's wife earns approximately

R$40 a month selling cosmetics.
At the time of our visit, Petrobras was preparing to dig three oil wells on settlement
land. If the wells were successful, the Association would receive some payment. The
Association had contracted a lawyer (who worked on a 30% commission) to represent
them in dealings with Petrobras.300

300

lane, interview 29 May 2006, expressed the hope that by next year Petrobras would be paying an
amount equivalent to R$300 for each settler, and with this the settlers would make their land payments.
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Sufficiency of Income:

Only two of the nineteen households interviewed answered

"yes" when asked whether household income is sufficient (again, both these respondents
were men). Five families simply stated income is not sufficient - in one of these the
father and three eldest sons work as day laborers to supplement income. Several other
families indicated that they are able to make do with the income:

"Sometimes it's sufficient, sometimes it's weak ifraco), but it serves to make a
living (da para viver)" (Waldemar)

"We dance in accordance with the music. I don't have, but I will have. This
year, if God gives me half of what I ask, I'll accept it and carry forward." (Mico
Preto)

Mico Preto's hope for the future - seeing the current hard times as an investment toward
future harvests - was mentioned by three other men, and two others mentioned that,
during passion fruit harvests, income is sufficent.
Day-to-day maintenance and health concerns were most cited by settlers among
their worries. Delmina jokingly mentioned her devotion to Our Lady of the Grocery Bag
(Nossa Senhora da Sacola) as she faced the weekly concern of whether there would be
money for the Saturday farmers' market and basic bills - water and electricity. Money
for transport in the event of sickness, and for the purchase of medicine, was mentioned as
a major worry by several interviewees.

245

Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction: The early years at Boa Vista III were difficult. Rafael of CELANOR
used very strong language: "Este povo foram massacrado "301 Attrition was relatively
high, with approximately 20 of the first 55 families (27.5%) leaving. At the time of our
visit, based on the agricultural events occurring in Nova Lusitania and other nearby
settlements, settlers were beginning to express concern about the subsoil, but most had
not experienced problems yet.

However, attitudes among those interviewed were

relatively positive. Of 37 people interviewed, only six (two married couples and two
others) expressed mild interest in selling or trading their land.

Four of the couples

interviewed were emphatic about not leaving, and several mentioned that they had had to
work hard to achieve what they now possessed in the settlement area.

25 of those

interviewed stated that their life on the settlement was better than it had been before
moving there,304 and only 4 stated that things were worse.
Future: Responses to questions about the future were generally optimistic. Several
interviewees mentioned expectations for improved harvests. While orange harvests were
cited by several people, there did not seem to be as much focus on oranges as in Nova
Lusitania. Other crops were discussed, including truck farming, manioc, passion fruit,

301

Literally, "These people were massacred." Interview, March 27, 2006

302

Nilton mentioned the need to study other plants that can substitute for oranges.

303

lane, one of the two female titleholders, was thinking of selling and was offered R$25,000 for her land;
she went to Salvador and saw "many things there I didn't like," so decided to stay in the settlement.
304

Waldemar & Alice, a couple who stated how much they love their land, noted that economically they
were just as well off prior to moving to BVIII, but that they love the land and community, so feel better off.
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and papaya. Several respondents mentioned hoped-for improvements such as pavement,
a plaza, a sports area, a public telephone post, a health post, a child-care center, and even
a middle school. Three respondents mentioned the need for additional commercialization
of local produce, two suggested scales for weighing large quantities of oranges, and one a
juice factory.
With respect to long-range views, of the seven communities studied, the interviewees
at Boa Vista III were one of the two most focused on having their children remain in the
area. Mico Preto wants to help his children build houses in the area. Ze de Roque
mentioned that his son moved to Salvador but was assaulted there and wants to return to
the land - each of his sons has their own area to plant, and Ze de Roque intends to retire
and leave his land to his sons. Antonio Gago wants his children to graduate, but wants
them to learn to value the land and crops, to have pride in being "children of the
countryside."

Natalia mentioned that one of the reasons to promote local
305

commercialization is to provide jobs for children so that they can stay in the area.
Isodoro mentioned the need for the family to obtain additional land so that the children,
when grown up, can stay in the area.
Socio-Political Awareness: The level of socio-political awareness in Boa Vista III
was similar to the settlements visited. When asked who helps/is in favor of the rural
worker, answers included Lula/Federal Government (11), the Church/Frei Chico (5), the
Program/CDA, etc. (5), the Rural Workers' Union (2), and the prefeito (2). Ivone stated
that it is "groups of workers" who support the rural worker.

305

Blanca, 20 year old daughter of community leader Mico Preto, with a high school education, also
mentioned that a factory is needed to generate income; she is dating a young man from the settlement and
wishes to get married and live there.
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Opinions of the MST were largely negative. Thirteen interviewees did not approve of
it, citing invasion of land, violence, and death. Ivone added that she thought the MST is
badly organized. Del said: "How we entered here is right, invading is wrong."
Four interviewees had mixed opinions. Gamelao said the MST is "one part right, one
part wrong." Isodoro thought they are "good when they make demands (cobram) on the
authorities, bad when they invade." Ze Reis said he is neither for nor against them, but
that the MST lost a lot of credibility when they invaded land and then were forced to
leave it. Renato stated: "It is just to demand [land], [I am] in favor as long as it is
peaceful."
However, Blanca, 20, supports the MST. "They invade because they need land to
work and to provide food for their children."

Ze do Roque observed that the large

demonstrations carried out (by the MST) in the South of Brazil help the rural workers.
A factor that emerged more at Boa Vista III than at any other settlement, and which
may impact the settlers' reluctance to identify with the MST, is the prejudice that they
feel in town against the "landless." Gamelao stated that there are people in the city
(Esplanada) who do not like the people from the settlements, to the extent of saying they
are "nauseated" by them.

"The Prefeito isn't bad, but some of the people in his group treat us as though
we were landless." (Antonio Gago)

Waldemar is able to joke about it:
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"People call me Waldemar sem-terra (landless) and I respond, call me semdinheiro (money-less) but not sem-terra."

With respect to the last election, 19 interviewees voted for Lula and 10 for Serra.
With respect to the next election, 25 interviewees intended to vote for Lula, three were
undecided, and one said she would vote against him (interestingly, this was Blanca, 20,
who listed the PT and Lula as factors that help the rural worker, but said that she simply
did not like Lula). Only two interviewees had strong party affiliation, both with the
Workers' Party, but one of these clarified that he identified with the party at the national
level only, not at the local level.

Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations: Boa Vista III has not yet been hit by the
subsoil compacting as hard as has been Nova Lusitania. Although there is an awareness
of the problem, it seems to lie on the horizon - we heard no significant reports of trees or
crops failing because of it. Indeed the problem may be less severe in Boa Vista III than
in Nova Lusitania; there are indications that the top soil may be deeper, and that portions
of the settlement - such as the riverside lots - may not be affected by it. We heard no
reports of the problem affecting passion fruit, a major cash crop with significant
potential.
It also seemed to us that the settlers' hopes were not quite as much fixated on
oranges here as in Nova Lusitania. There is a willingness to diversify, to experiment with
inhame (which Dr. Penedo told us does well in this soil), castor oil plants, and papaya none of which require deep soil. But there is no doubt that, if the land turns out not to
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support oranges, coconuts, lemons, and other fruit trees, it will be a severe blow to the
community.
In speaking of the people of Boa Vista III, Rafael of CELANOR used the term
"resilient." He stated it is interesting to see how some communities bounce back from
adversity. He attributed this in part to the fact that the settlers arrived with above average
material and cultural resources, and that many retained a safety net in the form of small
fields and/or orange groves in Rio Real. But he acknowledged that resilience is not a
phenomenon that can easily be explained
This spirit has shown itself also in the push to move beyond agricultural
production into processing. The bolacha factory, initially a success, has encountered
significant difficulties, leading to some disappointment. But the feeling we received was
not that of the community giving up on the idea, but of regrouping to decide how to move
forward.
The Association is encountering the tensions - especially with respect to the
collective areas - that most of the associations studied are encountering.

Leadership

seems to be good, and there is a reasonably strong consensus on the value of the
Association - not only to administer local needs, but to search out resources and
solutions. The group had the ability to experiment with a new way of administering
collective lands and, when that did not work out, to change back to the former method. It
is clear that they are examining alternatives.
There is also evidence that, although participation in collective work continues to
be problematic, participation may be at or above the level of most other associations.
Efforts to include women, and perhaps to extend educational activities so that less
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educated members can participate more fully, may well increase participation, as well as
adding to the potential leadership pool.
Largely due to the unknown extent of the compacted subsoil, it is not possible to
paint as bright a future for Boa Vista III as it is for some other settlements, in which it
seems simply a matter of time until abundant crops bring a certain level of prosperity.
Nonetheless, Boa Vista III seems to us to be a well-rooted community with strong
unifying factors, which has shown itself able to envision and pursue opportunities. It is
our impression that the settlement will be able to navigate the future and to confront
whatever issues may arise.
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Case Study 3

Name of Settlement: Vila Canaa (Associa9ao dos Pequenos Produtores Rurais Vila de
Canaa)
Families in Settlement: 73 officially settled + 4 additional families
Location: Municipio - Euclides da Cunha
Area: 1,649 ha.
Contract Date: May 25, 1998
Dates Visited: March 16 & 19, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 27

Individuals: 41

Family size (persons): 1-3/7; 4-6/16; 7-9/2; 10+/2
Persons Interviewed: 22 men, 14 women, 5 youth (2 female - 16, one female - 15, and 2
male - 16, all unmarried)
Ages: -20/5, 20-29/1, 30-39/12, 40-49/14, 50-59/7, 60+/2
Education: 0-2/18, 3-5/17, 6-8/3, 8+/3 (all youth)
Husbands and wives tended to be in relative parity in terms of education,
with the exception of five households; in four of these the women had
more education than their husbands, in one the husband had an 8th grade
education (the highest level of education among adults interviewed) and
his wife a 4th grade education
Technical Assistance: Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu of NATE Nucleo de Assistencia
Tecnica Agropecuaria Ltda.
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Map V-3-A Nova Canaa: The agro-vila, showing seventy-three residential lots, four
institutional lots, plaza, and football field.

Figure V-3-C. Seventh-Day Adventist church in Vila Canaa
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Figures V-3-D and V-3-E. Association buildings in Vila Canaa. Above: the community
galpao. Below: the casa de farinha. Both buildings are clearly marked with the names
of the sponsoring entities - the World Bank (BIRD), the Government of the State of
Bahia, CAR, CDA, and MDA.
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Figures V-3-F and V-3-G. Settlers in Vila Canaa. Above: Ari Souza and his wife, Bela,
in front of their home. Below: Decio dos Santos, leader of the opposition, and his
daughter in front of the school bus that he partly owns and operates as a concession from
the municipal government.
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Figure V-3-H. Researchers Brenda King-Powers and Daniel Carvalho (left) with settler
Gerson de Jesus next to water tank on his agricultural lot.

Figure V-3-I. Settlers in the living room of Veraluce and Adilson Souza (on the right),
primary leader in organizing to purchase the land and first president of the Association.
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Geography: The settlement is located in the semi-arid Northeast Region of the state of
Bahia. Approximately 18 km. east of the town of Euclides da Cunha over 10 km. of good
dirt roads, 8 km. of good sand roads (although we were told the sand roads are difficult to
travel in the rainy season). The area of the settlement is less arid than other portions of
the region, and has developed, in the last ten years, into an area of brown bean (feijao)
growing (Euclides da Cunha has become the second greatest producer, after Irece, of
feijao in the State of Bahia). Because of this development, the value of the land since its
acquisiton has risen almost ninefold, from R$150/ha. to R$1350/ha.

Each of the landholding families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila and a farm lot
of approximately 11 ha. (according to local calculations, approximately 50 tarefas306).
30% of the land is collectively held by the Association. As required by law, 20% is an
ecological reserve.

The agro-vila consists of one wide main street running roughly west from the
entry road, with two small parallel streets, and four small cross streets (see map). Houses
range from very simple rough brick,307 to more standard smooth white plaster (reboco),
to one or two that are more elaborate and resemble middle class homes in town.

There is no through road, but small roads run in three directions from the agrovila to the farm lots. At the end of the agro-vila, at the edge of the settlement property,
the community has a good soccer field. Just beyond it - outside of the property - are two
306

1 5 ha. divided by 50 is 3000 m2; a tarefa in this region is 3025 m2, so the actual size in tarefas would
be 49.57.
307

External or internal brick that is not covered by smooth plaster is usually a sign that a home is either
unfinished or the owners cannot afford to plaster it. The funding to construct houses included plastering.
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bars (these are a matter of minor controversy in the community, some residents
contending that the bars are a source of rowdiness among some of the youth and visiting
youth from other communities).

Climate: Vila Canaa is located in the semi-arid region. The natural vegetation would be
cerrado.
1AO

History: In 1997, Adilson de Silva Souza, a small farmer in Lagoa dos Matos

(located

about 35 km away in the neighboring municipio of Quijinge), learned of the Cedula da
Terra program.309 Adilson traveled to Salvador, met with persons in CDA, brought back
information, and began forming a group, primarily of neighbors and relatives, to seek
land under the program. The group considered land close to Lagoa dos Matos, but was
not favorably impressed.
One member of the group, Decio dos Santos, was familiar with the region where
the settlement is now located and believed that the land owner, Carlos Sampaio, might be
willing to sell. Several members of the group, including Adilson and his wife, Veraluce,
Adilson's brother Ari, and Decio, visited the site and liked it. They began negotiations
directly with the landowner and, according to the tecnica, Maria Djalma, handled the

308

Lagoa dos Matos was itself a land occupation area. In 1972, families from the area of Rio do Pombal
entered what was apparently abandoned land and started to farm there, gradually claiming their rights.
Some of the settlers in Vila Canaa, including Adilson and his elder brother Ari, were children of these
families. According to what they told us, Lagoa dos Matos is highly accidented land with relatively small
lots and, after thirty years of farming, the land is wearing out. This last point is possibly significant in
considering the future sustainability of Vila Canaa.
309

Prior to learning about the Cedula da Terra program, Adilson, Ari, and other persons (mostly Adventists
from Lagoa dos Matos) entered onto land next to their parents' land in Lagoa dos Matos. Their apparent
goal was not so much to gain the land (which was of poor quality) but to call attention to their need for
land. Although the land was not being used, the landowner reacted strongly and "forced them to run"
("botou eles para correr.")
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negotiations very well. She felt that this was "an important factor" in the formation of
the group.310
Carlos Sampaio had purchased the land some years before from the son-in-law of
a man who had reportedly obtained it through grilagem. Sampaio, a former prefect of the
municipio of Ruy Barbosa, was aging and had lost interest in the land. He was willing to
sell.311 However, the negotiation process was lengthy, stretching from May, 1997, until
the actual contract date in May, 1998.
The settlers' original objective was to purchase the entire fazenda.

However, it

was discovered that part of the land held deposits of lime. Under Brazilian law, mining
rights are separate from surface land rights; holders of mining rights can take over the
area by paying indemnification to the surface holder. For this reason, the Cedula da
Terra program would not finance the purchase of land covering mineral deposits. This
factor seemed likely to kill the deal, but the members of the association approached the
landowner regarding the possibility of purchasing that portion of the fazenda that did not
have lime deposits, and the owner agreed. This deal was carried out.
Negotiations also almost foundered over the purchase price. After considerable
negotiation, the government was willing to pay R$ 150 per hectare, but the landowner
wanted R$180, a difference of R$30,000.

The landowner agreed to take a personal

promissory note from Adilson for the difference. Each family contributed R$300 and the
amount was paid. The land so purchased was sufficient to settle 100 families in two
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Interview with Maria Djalma, March 15, 2006
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Adilson told us that initially Sampaio was hard to contact, and seemed to be wary of the group. But
when he realized they were proposing a peaceful transition, he opened up and "in the end became a good
friend."
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distinct areas, which subsequently became the settlements of Vila Canaa (73 families)
and Alto Paraiso (27 families).
The 100 families had been made up of families from Lagoa dos Matos and a
neighboring community.

According to interviewees from Vila Canaa (we did not

interview in Alto Paraiso), the division into two groups occurred with facility. Within the
Vila Canaa group itself, rather than distributing fields purely by drawing lots (as is the
usual case), the association decided to divide into five sub-groups (based on kinship
and/or affinity); each of these sub-groups was assigned a number of fields (in accordance
with its membership) and these were distributed by lots among the sub-group members.
Once the land was purchased, many settlers came and lived in temporary huts
covered with plastic sheeting while they began work on the land. Carlinhos and Aliene, a
married couple, came together and lived in such a hut. They liked it from the beginning,
and had good memories of working during the day and conversing with other settlers in
the evening. But they said the beginning period was hard, especially during the first two
years.
This was in part because funding for the program was blocked for a year and a
half. According to Maria Djalma, the blockage was caused by charges, levied by the
MST, that landowners were being unduly favored. However, this matter was cleared up
and funding was continued in 1999. In July of that year, Maria Djalma facilitated the
group in a "participatory diagnostic," in which settlers met, discussed the strengths and
weaknesses of their community, and drew up immediate and long term goals.
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"Due to the necessity of creating a referential model for training for the pilot project 'Cedula da Terra'
Settlement, a training was carried out between July 13 and 17, 1999.... As this project is a pilot, up to this
time some activities were stumbling (atropeladas), various projects being in the phase of execution without
there having been clearly defined their priorities and potential. This training event seeks to salvage this
261

By the early 2000s, Vila Canaa came to be viewed as one of the communities that
was functioning well. Visitors were frequent. In 2004, an international conference was
held and the community received visitors from various parts of the world.

Demography: All of the interviewees were of rural origin except for Ana Francisca
Souza, who was born in the city of Santos, Sao Paulo, and Maria Josefa de Jesus, who
was from the town of Euclides da Cunha; both were working on the land when it was
bought and were included in the project. Of the men interviewed, prior to moving to the
settlement, five were sharecroppers (one of these also had an employment relationship
with a landowner), four worked land belonging to parents or parents-in-law, four had
minifundios (one of these also sharecropped on the side), and four simply said they
worked in agriculture without defining the type of arrangement (one of these also sold
cattle as a sideline). Three had larger areas of relatively poor land - one 30 tarefas, one
40 tarefas, and Manoel Santana 86 tarefas that he had received in an INTERBA land
reform project - he said the land was so bad that only 3 tarefas were arable. One man
had grown up on a farm, but was running a small store in the town of Ribeiro do Pombal
before moving to the settlement.
Three of the men had grown up on small farms that had to be divided among
numerous children. Ernesto had so many brothers that there was no room for him on his
father's land, and he was selling roasted corn on the streets in Euclides da Cunha (hence

fault of execution of the program, bringing forth first a diagnostic of the project so that, in a second event
of training, a participatory planning may be developed.... A principal goal of this diagnostic is to waken
the community so that it may identify its principle potentials and consequently permit their ordered and
sustained development. The difficulty of perceiving good opportunities for production and business are
elements that impede the growth of this project." "DPA - Oficina Diagnostico Participativo - Comunidade
Vila de Canaa" (NATE, Euclides da Cunha, 1999)
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his nickname - "Milho Assado " - Roasted Corn). Antonio Santana, as the youngest
brother, was in a similar situation - he went to Sao Paulo and worked there as a cook for
eight years.313 Gerson was one of 20 siblings (17 brothers), and was selling books, sugar
cane juice, and pasteis (light pastry filled with meat or cheese) in Sergipe before moving
to the settlement.

Race/Ethnicity: Principally white, some Afro-Brazilian
Gender:

In one of the twenty-seven households interviewed, a woman was

titleholder. Women were not very active in the Association, although some attend
the meetings. However, a number of women held active leadership positions in
the Adventist Church.
Religion:

About half the community (Decio estimated 40 families) were in some

manner connected to the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

Sixteen of the families

interviewed identified themselves as Adventist, and in two others one of the spouses was
Adventist. Those identifying themselves as "Catholic" tended to be largely unchurched there is no Catholic chapel nearby and the priest has never been to the settlement. The
Adventists tend to dominate leadership, but this is probably in part because their church
teaches them leadership and participatory skills. In fact, those skills are probably one of
the factors leading to the success of the community. One Catholic interviewed felt that
Catholics are marginalized in the community; it is interesting, however, that the main
"opposition" figure in the community is an Adventist.
Age: Leadership in the community is provided by settlers now in their 40s; most
of these would have been in their late thirties at the time of settlement. As in the
313

"They telephoned me [about founding the settlement] and I didn't think twice - 1 came. Here is good - 1
don't even think about returning." (Antonio Santana)
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case of Fazenda Veneza, this may be a factor in community success. 25 of the 37
people interviewed were in their thirties or forties.
Attrition:

Interviewees estimated that attrition since the beginning has been

between 20 and 30%.

Replacement of families leaving is governed by the

Association. It was noted, however, that no families have left recently.314 Of the
families interviewed, 23 were original settlers and four newer settlers.

One

interviewee stated that some attrition had been due to lack of adequate health care
in the area - one child could not be treated in Euclides da Cunha, was sent to
Salvador and died.

Education: The school in the settlement teaches approximately 80 children in pre-school
through 4th grade. Opinion about the schools was divided. Whereas 15 respondents
classed them as "good," fifteen others rated them anywhere between "so-so" to terrible.
One noted that books and school supplies were lacking. It was stated that, although there
are teachers who live in the settlement, for political reasons they are not appointed to the
public school. Jo said that she wished there were evening classes for adults.
After 4th grade, students go into Euclides da Cunha to study. A bus, owned in part
and driven by Decio, transports the students under a contract paid by the municipal
government. Jose Domingos felt that transport to schools in Euclides da Cunha for older
students does not work well. Joice, 15, confirmed that they missed some school because
of transport issues. Currently, however, she is attending regularly and likes it; she says
that it is "good and organized," and that there is little distinction between town and
country students.
314

"Those who didn't like it have left." (Jose Hilton)
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Health:

Interviewees were almost unanimously dissatisfied with health services.

Fourteen stated that there essentially are no health services, and twelve that they are
terrible, while nine classified them as mediocre or "not good."
We were told that there is a health agent who comes at times to weigh the
children. However, the agent did not seem to be very active. Jose Rodrigues said that he
would like the prefeitura to open a position for health agent and fill it with someone from
the community. Several interviewees said there should be a health post in the settlement.
For medical help, it is necessary to travel to Euclides da Cunha. According to
Adalia, "one has to leave very early, wait in line - at times [even then] one does not get
an appointment." However, when one does get an appointment, she says the doctor is
good. If one has to hire a car to go to town, it costs R$30.

Water: The Association has an artesian well that was opened in approximately 2000,
with a water tower and water piped to the houses and to the fields. However, the water
from the well is not good for drinking and several interviewees mentioned the water as
one thing they do not like about the settlement.
At the time of our visit, CAR had a project underway to pipe water from Monte
Alegre to the two settlements of Vila Canaa and Alto Paraiso, a distance of 93 kms. It
will be good quality water, but the settlers will have to pay based on consumption.315 The
project calls for piping parallel to the existing piping, so that settlers can continue to use

315

Since 2003, CAR has insisted that all such projects use water meters; consumers pay approximately R$1
per 1000 liters of water. This includes the cost of water and an operating fee for the entity that administers
the water system, which can be IMBASSA, a municipal government, or another organization. Meeting
with Marcos Gonpalves Adriano, CAR engineer, March 17, 2006.
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the existing well (which has less good quality water) for irrigating their gardens, house
plots, and fields. The project is undertaken via the PRODUZIR program, which is a grant
requiring 10% participation by the community - the 10% can be in the form of labor.316

Association and Collective Area: At the time of our visit, the community was reaching
the stage of emancipation, i.e., freedom from government tutelage. Maria Djalma, the
technical advisor, stated that the programs and infrastructure planned for the community
had been accomplished.

SIC and PRONAF A funds have been invested, and the
317

community now has individual financing.
As is generally the case, 30% of settlement land is allocated to the collective area
administered by the Association. The goal of the collective area is to produce income
sufficient to pay for the land. Pursuant to rules set forth by the Association assembly,
each titleholder is required to provide one day labor per month in the collective area.
As long as there were SIC funds, the Association was able to pay settlers for work
done beyond their one-day commitment, and this was a source of income important
especially to some of the poorer settlers. "When the Association was paying, people
were working a lot." (Ari) From approximately 2003 on, however, the Association no
longer had the funds to do this.
The tension between collective and individual interests
is, as in most of the
IIO
settlements, the primary issue confronting the Association.
The current president, Jose
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Interview with Marcos Gongalves Adriano, CAR engineer, March 17, 2006
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Interview with Maria Djalma Andrade de Andreu, March 15, 2006
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Among other issues that were reported to have been serious ones was whether the collective area should
be dedicated to manioc or to grazing land.
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Rodrigues, told us that the collective is his biggest worry. Interviewees repeatedly said
that Association meetings frequently resulted in debates about the difficulty of getting
settlers to perform their collective labor days and/or the advisability of keeping the
collective area or of dividing it up among the settlers. Maria Djalma informed us that the
Association proposed that the land be divided up among the settlers, but that CDA had
vetoed the idea. Apparently it seems to have been carried out in practice anyway: we
were told that five tarefas of collective land were allocated to each settler and that these
areas were distributed by drawing lots.

Even with emancipation from government

tutelage, however, such an arrangement will have to remain extra-official until the land is
completely paid for.
"3 1 Q

In addition to the artesian well, the Association has a tractor,

a casa de farinha,

a galpao, and a corral. The Association also administers a seed bank and has silos for
storing beans.

Symptomatic of its current difficulties, the Association also has bee

hives in storage: the project has stalled due to a dispute as to whether apiculture should be
a collective undertaking or the hives distributed to individual settlers.321
There are differences in view as to the purpose and goaf of the Association.
Adilson, the founding president and the single most respected leader in the settlement,322
319

As in some other settlements, maintenance of the tractor is a challenge. Decio told us that, for awhile,
he was in charge of the tractor. When he assumed responsibility, the tractor was in a state of disrepair; he
got it fixed and running, and maintained it with its income, but - within a year after he passed control to
someone else - it was again in disrepair. Adilson also said that administering the tractor is a problem.
320

Maria Djalma (interview, March 15. 2006) helped the settlers negotiate a bank loan so that they would
not have to sell beans during harvest season, when prices are low, but would be able to store them until
prices rose.
321

We were informed that there are 15 families very interested in apiculture and that the Association was
considering turning the hives over to them as a sub-group within the Association. Another group within the
Association wanted to put together a project to plant cashew trees, but that had not been approved.
322

In questions about leadership, his name was almost unanimously cited.
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sees it as essential for moving forward with community-based projects and efforts to
secure funding:

"We have to find a path for continuing. The Association can't stop. We have to
develop plans."

Adilson feels that most Association members still do not understand the collective well.
Antonio Santos Reis sees the collective as good for the settlers:

"I think it would be good to return to the collective. The members would get
something; [and] they could maintain the tractor that is falling into disrepair."

But Jose Moraes, a member of the fiscal council in the first directorate of the Association,
believes that it has served its role. He believes that the function of the Association was to
get the land and the early financing, and that it is no longer viable.

In talking about the

future, Antonio Andre said that he thought that in ten years the Association would
probably be nearly dissolved.
Within the Association, some interviewees felt that there was a division between
the Adventists and the Catholics, the Adventists being generally more in favor of
collective work, the Catholics more in favor of individual effort.

323

394

There certainly

"The collective doesn't function anymore. In the beginning it was different." (Isacale)

324

"The Adventists want to do things their way." (Antonio Andrade) He was the most outspoken on this
point. He stated that the Adventists have their political group, but that he belonged "to the other group."
He said that, although there are more Catholics in the settlement, the Adventists are more united (among
themselves).
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seemed to be a difference in participation: of the fourteen settlers who classified
themselves as mere members of the association, attending meetings and, in some cases,
doing their monthly stint, eleven were Catholics and only three Adventists. On the other
hand, of the seven who indicated that they were current or former officers, all but two
were Adventists.325
Jose Rodrigues confirmed that the Association is divided to a certain extent in two
groups. There have always been two slates of candidates for Association elections, and
he said that these parallel to a certain extent the division in municipal politics between the
'I'jf.

PFL and PMDB parties.

The local Adventists are fairly united in supporting the PFL,

although many Catholics do so also.327 In the last municipal election, the PFL won 150
votes in the settlement and the PMDB 94. However, these divisions are by no means
hard and fast: Carlinho and Aliene, for instance, are Catholics who voted PMDB, but
they cite the Adventist and PFL supporter Adilson as the leader they most respect in the
community, and are very pleased with the (largely Adventist) leadership of the
328
Association.

325

Of those settlers not recorded here, four interviews were with non-titular wives.
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Nationally, the PFL is viewed as a conservative party; the PMDB is the largest party in Brazil, and is
generally centrist, although it is largely opportunistic and has a wide range of membership. In Bahia, the
PFL was at this time identified with Antonio Carlos Magalhaes, the most powerful political boss in Bahia
for over thirty years. However, local political party affiliations may have little or nothing to do with the
national ideology of the parties. Note that most of those who supported the PFL locally voted for Lula of
the leftist Workers' Party for president.
327

However, Decio, an Adventist who lists himself as being very active in the church, was the opposition
candidate for President of the Association in both 2002 and 2004, in both cases losing by "a little more than
20 votes." He supported the PMDB in the local election and, when that party won, was awarded the
contract to bus students from the settlement to town (a contract previously held by one of Adilson's
brothers-in-law). Although he cited the church as a divisive factor, he thought that only about 10% of the
settlers are against the Adventist Church.
328

Other Catholics who feel the same way included Antonio Andrade Silva, Ernesto "Milho Verde"
Ribeiro da Silva, and Cecilio Lopes Dantas,
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In any event, settlers seem to remain active in the Association, if not in the
collective work. Both Adilson and Jose Rodrigues individually stated that there is 8085% participation in monthly meetings. Meetings are, by all accounts, lively, with active
discussions; many settlers mentioned that issues were raised in meetings, discussed,
voted on, and resolved.329 Some were less sanguine about the degree to which they were
resolved: Jose Moraes thinks that only a minority agrees with the Association norms "but they let it go;" Isacale finds the discussions tiresome and says they don't resolve
anything.

"I support what's right; what's wrong, I keep my mouth shut.

[But] not

everyone is the same - each one has different ideas." Gerson

Of the ten settlers asked the question, eight felt that the Association represented
well both the interests of their own family and those of other families, while only two did
not feel it was representative. Sonia felt the representation was good, but could be better.
Aliene stated, "Up until now, it's good - the Association has made good decisions, and
we agree [with them]."

Twenty-four of the twenty-seven households said that they

would continue to be members of the Association even if they did not need it to obtain
credit; only three said they would desist from membership.

329

"Each one gives his opinion. Collective v. individual.
agreement. Sometimes it is more difficult." (Marineide)
330

330

[They] converse in the meeting, arrive at an

Ari mentioned that they used, at least in one situation, a leadership technique which we have seen work
well in other organizations. When a member complained about how a certain project was being carried out,
the Directorate invited him to take over leadership of the project. The member did so, and came to realize
the complexities of the matter he was dealing with.
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Sonia noted that the Association handled a delicate matter of stealing and drinking
on the part of adolescent children of settlers. The young people were called in, talked to,
and required to work on collective land to repay the damage they had caused.
Women tend not to be active in the Association. Jo, for instance, stated that women
support and watch "but the voice is the men's - [this is our] tradition." Like many other
women, she is active in the Adventist Church, where she is chief deaconess. She also
stated that, as a woman, she has a concern about her husband becoming too active in the
Association.

Marlene attends the meetings and feels that she learns from them, and

sometimes gives her opinion. Adalia, who was knowledgeable about the Association,
said that the women support the Association from outside; she also noted that the young
people were not represented in the Association. Catya, who is not an active Adventist,
stated that there are no activities for the women; Tereza, also not an active Adventist, said
that the women tend to stay in their homes, and that there are no activities for them.

Economics:
Land: The land purchase took place on May 25, 1998. The purchase price was
R$150 per ha, for a total of R$247,350.

SAT funds were R$259,118, and SIC

R$335,945. (Note also, as discussed above, that each settler contributed an extra-legal
R$300 to make up the difference between the price the landowner wanted and the price
the government was willing to pay.)
Land payments are R$280 per year for seventeen years (twelve years remain to be
paid). Maria Djalma, the technical assistant, who knows the financial situation of settler
families, believed that, at that time, 40% of the families would be able to pay up the full
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remaining value of the land (R$3360) if they needed to.

However, a relatively

prosperous settler, Ari, noted that, although he used not to worry about paying for the
land (as that was the function of the Association through collective production), since the
"paralyzation" of the collective area, he is more concerned.
Observation indicates that the land is good quality. Twenty-one of the twentyseven households interviewed stated that their land is fertile; only one stated that his is
not.332 Five noted that parts of their land are fertile and other parts not. Twenty-two of
the households said that they use no fertilizer on the land, and twenty-three that they use
no pesticides.
An interesting note is that several settlers have begun plowing with animal
traction. There seemed to be a growing interest in this alternative technology.
Financing:

All twenty-seven families interviewed had taken out PRONAF A

loans in the amount of RS9205.25. Although there was some flexibility according to
personal preferences, typically the loan provided funds for:
•

planting 4.1 ha of grazing land, 1 ha each of manioc and palma, and 0.5 ha
of either leucena or andu beans

331

•

purchase of 40 female and 1 male sheep or goats

•

construction of 1.5 km of fencing and a small corral

•

purchase of a small cart

•

technical assistance

Interview March 15, 2006
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This is Antonio Andrade, who stated that his land is sandy and dry.
weaker land because it was closer to water.
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But he said that he chose that

Three families were unable to make the first PRONAF A repayment, and the
Association covered the debt for them. This is considered a loan from the Association
that the families will have to repay.333
Twenty settlers interviewed (and over sixty of the settlers) also took out custeio
loans, almost all of them to plant beans and corn. The loans were from the Banco
Nordeste, and the bank manager visited the settlement.
According to Jose Rodrigues, the settlers went to the Bank in April of 2005 and
applied for a loan to be disbursed in April. Actual disbursement of the first parcel of 60%
of the loan did not take place until June 10. This meant that some settlers had to get
advances from private money lenders in order to plant (private money lenders charge
very high interest). The second parcel (20%) was disbursed in July/August, and the third
(20%) in September, after the crop had been harvested and sold. Another issue he raised
was that the custeio loans only came in amounts up to R$3000: Jose Rodrigues said that
he only needed R$1500, but others needed up to R$6000 - although the manager was
solicitous, he apparently did not have flexibility on this point. (The actual custeio loans
granted to settlers were R$2900.)
Similar concerns about financing were expressed by other respondents. Antonio
Andrade, one of the less prosperous settlers, also complained that financing often arrives
too late for planting. He stated that it is necessary to plow two months prior to planting.
"But how can I get money to plow? If I don't repay in time, [I] enter into a vicious circle.
[But] how can I pay to plow and pay the debt?" Three other interviewees felt so strongly
about these delays that they cited bank bureaucracy and bank delays as the factor that
causes most difficulty for the rural worker.
333

Interview with Maria Djalma, May 15, 2006.
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According to Adilson, the prior President and one of the strong leaders in the
community, of the 60+ families that took out custeio loans (R$2900), only 10-12 have
been able to repay on a timely basis. The remainder are being negotiated with the bank
(according to Decio, about half have already renegotiated their loans).

Valdino, for

example, was able to pay 30% in December and extended the remaining 70%.

But

Ernesto Milho Assado told us that he had been unable to renegotiate the custeio'?^

"I'll

pay it if I can - if not, I can't."
Cecilio was able to renegotiate his custeio, but still worries about it "a lot"
("demais"). Thirteen of the interviewees listed repayment of the loans (PRONAF A and
custeio) as a major worry. For Marineide, it is "agony." Ari and Antonio Costa (neither
of whom took out custeio loans) said that they thought custeio borrowers underestimated
the difficulty of the short-term pay back period
Production and Income: Black beans (feijao) were virtually the only cash crop in
the settlement. All 27 families have some land in beans, ranging from 6 to 50 tarefas (the
latter the entire farm lot). In all but one case, farmers co-plant corn with beans, but corn
is far less important economically. Carlos Joao dos Santos harvested 560 sacks of black
beans and sold 500 @ R$60 each - an income of R$30,000. He was also one of the top
sellers of corn, selling 30 sacks @ R$20 = R$600. Other relatively prosperous settlers
reported income from beans ranging from R$11,500 to 25,000.
Nineteen of the families also have planted grazing land (capim), ranging from 4 to
35 tarefas, and ten have plantation of palma (used for animal feed), ranging from 1 to 5

334

We were informed by other interviewees that Ernesto is very poor; our own observations tended to
confirm this.
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tarefas 335 Sheep are the most common livestock - 21 families have sheep; the largest
herd is Adilson's, with 80 head; another herd has 50 head, and two have 30 each, but
most families have 20 sheep or less. We were told that goats do not do well in the area,
and only five families raise them - two with herds of about 25, the others considerably
smaller.
Fifteen families have cattle - usually including at least one milk cow. The largest
herd is 16 head. Fourteen have one or more donkeys, nine have a horse, and three a
mule. Sixteen families raise chickens, mostly in small quantities, although Sonia has 70,
two other families have 50, and three have 40.
Only one interviewed family is attempting to raise non-bean cash crops: Adalia
and Joao Jose experimented with Vi ha. each of tomatoes/okra and mango/coconut trees,
and have 1 ha. of watermelon. When we spoke with Adalia, the tomato experiment,
which they had financed themselves, had not gone well. She expressed as her major
worry investments that do not produce a return.
Although the PRONAF A financing encouraged manioc planting, only one family
— Jose Gois and Nilza - had a commercial planting of manioc, and they only had two
tarefas.

In 2005 they sold 25 sacks of farinha at R$40 each - an income of RS1000.

Sonia and her husband had previously two tarefas of manioc, but harvested it all and did
not replant. Other families had small amounts of manioc on their house lots. There was
a substantial planting of manioc on the collective land.
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Gerson Felix de Jesus has the largest palma crop. "We needed land - God gave us land. A rose has
thorns. [Ours is] the problem of drought. I planted palma. We have to think not only of ourselves, but
also of the animals - they provide us with meat and milk. If I could, I would plant 10 tarefas of palma.
Many people criticize, but I don't like to see animals suffer."
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Antonio Andrade Silva said that he would engage in truck farming if he could
irrigate his farm lot. He said that he has water available there two days a week, but needs
irrigation equipment.
Several families plant squash and other vegetables alongside their beans and corn
and/or use the bean fields to raise vegetables during the off-season, almost always
primarily for consumption. Families use their house lots to plant a wide variety of fruit
trees - we noted coconut, guava, tangerine, orange, lemon, pinha, banana, graviola,
seringuela, cashew, acerola, jack fruit, mango, jambo - as well as garden vegetables and
aipim.
Although the community enjoyed a prosperous year in 2005, there are poor
families.336 It is interesting to compare the situation of two farmers. Jose Hilton (one of
the poorest residents) has 2 sheep and 6 chickens. In 2005 he produced 12 sacks of corn,
and sold 3 @ R$10 each. He produced 14 sacks of beans, sold 10 @ R$ 45. He sold 2
kids for R$60. His family receives R$90/month from the bolsa escola. His sons - 17 and
16 - help in fields. He owes R$280/yr in land payments, R$830 in Pronaf A, and R$2900
for custeio. Not being able to repay his debt is one of his principal worries: "I worry - I
nearly went crazy."
Jose Domingo carries exactly the same debt - and also admits to some worry
about repayment. In 2005, he produced 500 sacks of beans and 80 sacks of corn, selling
"almost all of it" @ R$50 and R$16 respectively. He has 20 sheep, 7 head of cattle, and
30 chickens. Marlene, his wife, sells sweets and homemade popsicles. They also receive
a bolsa escola. The family is relatively prosperous.

336

Adilson stated that the stronger families try to help the weaker ones.
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Only three men mentioned working as daily laborers (a common source of income
in other settlements); daily laborers in the area receive only R$10/day, lower than in most
areas. One man reported working as a daily laborer only three days a month, the others
12-15 days. Carlos Joao owns a tractor in partnership with his father and charges R$25
per tarefa for its use in cultivating and harvesting.
Non-farm income seems to be less diversified in Vila Canaa than in most the
other settlements studied. The main source is the bolsa escola - which fourteen of the 27
families interviewed mentioned receiving. This can be an important element of income;
for instance, Ernesto Milho Assado's 2005 family income was approximately R$3500, of
which over R$ 1000 came from the bolsa escola.
Only one family mentioned receiving government pensions - they receive two.
One woman reported earning R$30/month selling cosmetics, and one family earns about
R$50/month reselling natural gas for cooking. Decio owns a bus in partnership with his
brother-in-law, and rents it to the municipal government for R$2400/month to transport
students to school in Euclides da Cunha.337

One couple interviewed expressed their

interest in setting up a small store in the settlement, which they felt would be a good
source of income. (There is already one small store and a bakery - that produces bread in the settlement area.)

Marlene and Catya both mentioned independently that they

would like to have a job in order to provide their children with a better chance to study.

337

This is a highly political appointment: the contract depends on the prefect's continued patronage. Decio
is the primary "opposition" leader within the settlement, and there was an undercurrent of comment linking
him to the prefect, whom the majority of settlers did not support in the last election.
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Decio, the opposition leader within the Association, mentioned the need for a small
factory - perhaps one making fruit sweets.

IIO

Sufficiency of income: When asked if family income was sufficient, seven families
interviewed answered with a definite "yes."

Eight answered "no" with respect to basic

needs (and in most cases their physical situation seemed to confirm this).

Two noted

that it is sufficient in years when there is rainfall and not sufficient in dry years.

"One year of drought wreaks havoc ("acaba com tudo"). [You can] store up
food, but it would be difficult to pay the bank."

"When there are beans it is [sufficient], when there are not beans, it isn't."
(Josevanda)

"It's not enough, but we have learned to live with it. Summers are difficult"
(Marlene)

Three families answered "no" because they needed specific additional income.
Adalia would like additional income so as to be free to experiment with more crops,

338

"[You] pass the whole year without wages. When winter [the rainy season] comes, you are burdened
with debt; it's difficult. [This is] why I think about an industrial area and irrigation." (Decio)
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Decio in order to purchase a health plan,339 Sonia because her daughter has medical
needs.

Other responses were nuanced:

"A little more would be nice." (Jose and Ana)

"The financial [loans] is the most difficult. We keep hoping." (Jose Rodrigues)

"[It is] more or less [sufficient]. You have to be careful, but it's sufficient. 100
sacks [of beans] at R$40 equals R$4000 - for one year, it's little. You have to
plan." (Gerson)

Ze and Nilza felt that income was insufficient because they have to sell a sheep each
month to break even (they have a flock of 50 sheep and 4 goats). Marineide also noted
that at times "a little is lacking in terms of basics" - then her family sells beans, corn, or
livestock.

Adilson felt that income is sufficient for basic needs, but noted that

diversification of income is important: he mentioned crops, goats, and that his family
resells cooking gas.

Settler Attitudes:

339

Private health plans are very rare among rural Brazilians, who essentially depend on government
medical services.
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Satisfaction: Satisfaction was high. Interviewees were unanimous in saying they
would not sell their land, and many of them were emphatic about it.

"For no money in the world. I came here to stay." (Cecilio Dantas)

"No way ("de jeito nenhuniy.

I'd buy more land if I could. (Carlinho)

"Not even for a lot of money." (Manoel)

"Deus me livre!" (Zequinho)340

Thirty-one interviewees stated that life in the settlement is better than it had been
previously, one said it is a little better, one noted that it got worse at first but then got
better. Only two respondents felt that it was worse.
Jo mentioned that, in the beginning she was afraid that it wouldn't work out for her
family without water, with fields to be cleared. But now she feels that this is the right
place for them.

Ivaneide, however, is lukewarm about living in the settlement, although

her husband likes it.
Marlene expresses as her chief worry the "culture" (i.e., education) of her children
("cultura dos filhos "). With four children ages 16-20, all studying at the 8th grade level
or higher, she is doing very well for this region. Yet, even in this prosperous family,
there is an awareness of how dependent they are on the weather. Jose sums it up: "If the

340

Literally "God deliver me!" - a very strong negation in Portuguese.
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winter341 is good, it's okay; if the winter is bad, it isn't." Jedeone, their sixteen year old
son, expresses as his greatest worry the connection between this factor and his own
education: "You plant and you don't know if you are going to harvest - if you lose the
crop, you lose a year at school."

Future:

Settlers were generally optimistic about the future, envisioning larger

harvests, greater prosperity, and more infrastructure (better appointed homes, paved
streets).

However, once again there was a realization of the importance of weather.

Adilson and Veraluce said that, if it rains sufficiently, things will go well - if it does not
rain, they hope the government will provide work projects to help families bridge the
drought. Josevanda said, "If there isn't rain, it will fail." Isacale said the future would
be better "if the weather is good."
Antonio Andrade, one of the poorer settlers, said that it is difficult for him to see the
future; he mentioned that he needs the help of his family, that he needs another chance.
Antonio Santana said that some families will not make it, but those who do will thrive.
Ari estimated that 10% of the families would not see their situation improve. Cecilio was
generally optimistic, but felt there would be greater progress if there were greater unity
among the settlers.
Visions of the future for their children vary. Cecilio's son, 22 and married, will take
over his father's land. Zequinho also said that his sons and daughters (30, 28, 24, and 19)
will take over his area. Antonio Andre says his children (ranging from 28 to 1 year old)
will stay in the settlement. Aliene thinks that country life is better for her daughters.
341

Throughout northern Brazil, "winter" is used to mean the rainy season, and "summer" the dry season.
These terms more closely coincide with Northern Hemisphere months than with those of the Southern
hemisphere, "winter" usually beginning in October and ending in May.
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Josevanda envisioned her children staying and working with them, and Jose Domingo
said he hoped his children could marry in the settlement and stay there, especially as jobs
outside the settlement are hard to find. His 20 year old son has obtained a lot, and is
building a home next to his father's.
But Jose Rodrigues wants his children to study and not to work in agriculture:

"I worry about the young people. They want to study and get jobs. I cannot
predict what will happen."

Adalia wants her children to go to university and realize their dreams - have a
house in town. Ari's daughter, Eliane, 15, wants to become a veterinarian and live in
Salvador.

Her cousin, Adilson's son Renato, 16, also wants to be a veterinarian.

Marineide wants her children to have jobs, as does Ernesto Silva.
But, as Jose Rodriges implied, the dreams and reality may not mesh. As Sonia
notes, "The young people would like to find work outside of the settlement, but they
can't find it." Ze Nelson envisioned the possibility of starting up a small business in
order to provide jobs for his children.
Maria Djalma estimated that about 20% of the youth want to continue farming, and
that the need for land for growing children has become a topic of discussion among the
families. Adilson mentioned that he is concerned about jobs for his children once they
graduate, as the land is not sufficient for all of them; if possible, he would buy an
additional lot in the settlement.
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Given the number of young people interested in having land - including an additional
38 young people from the neighboring community of Alto Paraiso - Maria Djalma was in
the process of putting together a project for a new land reform area, to be carried out in a
modified form of the Cedula da Terra known as Credito Fundiario.

One of the

difficulties she faced, however, was the tremendous increase in value of land in the local
area.

Socio-Political Awareness:

As in most of the settlements, the socio-political

awareness of settlers was at a level that one would expect from rural Northeastern
Brazilians not actively involved in social movements. Unlike portions of the Catholic
Church (which were not present among the largely non-practicing Catholics here), the
Adventist Church, while providing its members with excellent organizational and people
skills, and a genuine concern for community, does not tend to get involved in larger
political/social justice issues. This was reflected in the comments of interviewees.
When asked who was in favor/supported the rural worker, answers included Lula/the
Federal Government (7), the Cedula da Terra Program/institutions (5), and the Rural
Workers' Union (4). When asked who is against the rural worker, answers tended to be
generic. Four interviewees answered citing bank delays and/or lack of financing, two
mentioned bureaucracy, and three said that only people who do not understand (or are
crazy) could be against the rural worker.
With respect to attitudes toward the MST, ten were primarily negative, most citing
violence and/or invasion as the problem. Four had basically positive reactions. Marlene
noted that the settlement came into existence due to the momentum caused by the MST;
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her son, Gedeone, 15, said that the MST is fighting for what people need. Similarly,
Marineide said that the MST "helps the needy to get land." And Antonio Andre listed the
MST as the foremost group helping the rural worker.
Other answers were more nuanced. Jo, Decio, and Ari all stated that they are in favor
of the MST's objectives, but not of their methods.

Antonio Reis answered with a

question: "It's difficult to tell - are they [the MST] struggling sincerely or simply prone
to violence?"
Regarding elections, 28 interviewees voted in the last election for Lula, three for
Serra. In the next election, 26 said they would vote for Lula, two for Alckmin, and five
were undecided. Only two interviewees said they had party affiliations, one with the
Workers' Party (PT) and one with the PSDB, the party running a candidate against Lula;
but the latter said that he was going to vote for Lula rather than for the PSDB candidate
because "Lula did much more in four years than FHC [Fernando Henrique Cardoso] did
in eight."
Jo mentioned the prejudice that the people in the settlements feel in town because
they are identified with the "landless." She said that initially, for that reason, stores in
town did not want to give her credit, but that is no longer the case.

Strengths/V ulnerabilities/Recommendations:
Vila Canaa appears to be a highly successful settlement with indications that it
can continue to be so. The community is blessed with excellent, fertile land - and it has
successfully integrated itself into the area's growing vocation for bean raising. As Decio
stated: "We were privileged to find the right location for the program."
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Harvests have been good, and - as the land has not needed fertilizer - costs of
production have been relatively low.

Yet these very factors may speak to future

difficulties, of which more below.
Maria Djalma and other observers noted the presence of the Adventists settlers as
an asset. Our observations tended to confirm this. In any settlement, especially of this
size, there will be (and should be) dissent, and not everyone is going to agree with the
leadership. But, overall, the organizational and administrative skills of the Adventists
seem to have been helpful to the community.

Adilson, particularly, who led the

settlement for many years and was almost universally sited as a leader even though he is
currently not the President, seemed to be a person of unusual vision and compassion,
honest and sincerely concerned with the community.
The major point of dissension - administration of the collective land - is one that
haunts almost every one of the settlements (the possible exception being Veneza, where
the wealth of the collective area, underwritten by sisal production, is sufficient to be able
to pay settlers for their work). The community has tried some solutions - dividing up
work groups according to vocation, semi-privitization of responsibility. None of these
has worked astoundingly well, but the Association seems to continue to function
adequately.
The community has two major sources of potential income and maintenance: black
beans and livestock - principally sheep. Of these, beans are by far the economically more
important, although the livestock could provide an important supplementary source of
income and a safety net for difficult years.

Dependence on beans has some of the

disadvantages of monoculture discussed elsewhere - dangers of disease, overdependence
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on the prices of a single market - but it is far less dangerous than fruit tree monocultures
as fields dedicated to beans one year may easily be switched to other crops in another
year.
Of more concern is the land itself. It is our impression that the settlers are taking
the fertility of the land for granted, and are in danger of over-farming it. When asked if
they practiced crop rotation, twenty-one farmers said "no" and only one, Antonio Andre,
answered positively: he keeps 3-4 ha fallow each year. Unless some conscious practice
of maintaining and renovating the soil is engaged in soon, the fertility is likely to
decrease, creating the need for fertilization and the likelihood of lower yields.
The success of the bean crop may also have dimmed the need for creativity in the
leadership and in the community at large. Unlike most settlements, we heard little talk of
creative ideas for processing or industrialization. Granted, beans lend themselves less
than fruit or sisal to such activities, but early on in the life of the community thought was
given to processing goat milk and setting up systems for better marketing meat, and these
were not mentioned during our interviews.
But we emphasize that, if our impression in this sense is correct, it is a matter of
circumstances and not of personal capacity; the people of Vila Canaa seem to us to be
intelligent and capable of creativity when the need arises. The willingness to consider
alternative technologies (e.g., animal traction plows) may be a good sign in this respect.
With respect to participation of women in the Association, we have - in other
communities - cited this as a significant area of possible improvement.

It may be

somewhat less so in Vila Canaa. The Adventist women seem to find satisfaction and
leadership roles within the church, and their tradition - which should be respected - may
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(as one of them said) make them more comfortable with exercising their skills in that
arena. The non-Adventist women, however, do not have this outlet for their skills, and
active inclusion in the Association could provide them with a means for developing
activities that would both interest them and be advantageous to the community.
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Case Study 4

Name of Settlement:

Moita Redonda (Associa^ao dos Pequenos Agricultores da
Fazenda Moita Redonda)

Families in Settlement: 50 title holding families +
Location: Municipio - Inhambupe, Bahia
Area: 677 ha.
Land Purchase Date: September 18, 1998
Dates Visited: March 29-31, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 24

Individuals: 36

Family size (persons): 1-3/6; 4-6/10; 7-9/4; 10-12/0; 13-16/3
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (male 16)
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/8; 30-39/9; 40-49/7; 50-59/8; 60+/3
Schooling: 0-2/20; 3-5/11; 6-8/3; 9+/2
In 10 of the families interviewed, the wife had 2+ years more education
than the husband; in only two cases do the husbands have substantially
more education than their wives.
Technician: Jose Eduardo Rocha Reis

Geography: The settlement is located 13 kms north of the town of Inhambupe, three
kms from the village of Entrocamento. It is a short distance to the east of BR 110, the
paved two-lane Federal highway between Inhambupe and Olandina.
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Figures V-4-A and V-4-B. Above: Associate President Walmir Reis, his wife, Irelice,
and their children. Below: Students in the settlement primary school.

289

Figures V-4-C and V-4-D. Above: Moita Redonda agro-vila. Below: settlers working
with passion fruit vines.
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The agro-vila has the appearance of a sizeable village - with a large open area at
the entrance and dirt streets: three running north-south, and three crossing them east-west
in a grid pattern. Houses are small but made of brick, varying between ill-kept messy
exteriors to neatly smooth stuccoed white-painted exteriors.
The land is flat. Farm lots extend principally to the east of the agro-vila along
342

three wide straight dirt paths (adequate for a jeep, truck, or horse cart to travel),
gridded by shorter perpendicular paths that occur after every other farm lot.
House lots are 20 x 40m. The farm lots are approximately 8.5 ha each, with slight
variations due to topography. Collective lots make up 30% of the area. As required by
law, 20% of the land is set aside as an ecological preserve.

Climate: This is a semi-arid climate. At the time of our visit, the area was suffering
from a drought that seriously affected production. For instance, we were told that passion
fruit production was not even 20% of what it had been during the pre-drought period.
The community's future is dependent on orange trees that are in the process of
maturation, and the drought undoubtedly has had a negative impact on their growth.

History: Moita Redonda's history and existence has been more closely tied to local
politics than any of the other of the settlements we studied. According to interviewees,

342
The central of these paths ends at a fence, on the other side of which is a road. Some of the settlers
would like to open a gate here for ease of access, but others are opposed as there would be no easy way to
control outsiders coming through settlement lands.
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the purchase of the land was arranged, at least in part, by the prefeita, Simone;343 she
called the absentee landowner, Jose Marques, a personal friend, and asked him to sell.344
She was also active in encouraging the Association and in negotiations.345 According to
Jose Eduardo, who is not her supporter, and several interviewees, Simone has continued
to be involved with (or, depending on the viewpoint, interfere with) settlement matters.346
A local movement, headed by Carlos Alberto (Carlito),347 began seeking land as
early as 1996. Carlito, who worked for EBDA as a security guard, is a controversial
figure. Nearly all the interviewees spoke of him as the leader of the movement, and he
was said to be intelligent, but some thought he was dishonest (a "bandit" in the eyes of

343

Simone Simoes Neri served as prefeita from 1997-2001 and from 2005-09. Leonidas Simoes de
Azevedo, from an opposing party (PFL) served a s p r e f e i t o from 1993-97 and 2001-05; one interviewee told
us that, in 1998, Leonidas was interested in buying the land for himself and questioned its suitability for
land reform, generating a visit from CDA to examine the quality of the land. As prefeito, however,
Leonidas left the settlement alone, neither supporting nor interfering; Jose Eduardo felt that this was better
for the settlement.
344
One interviewee said that Jose Marques told settlers that he only sold them land because the prefeita had
asked him to.
345

Israel Santos, who had been president of the Association Boa Sorte, was in 1998 secretary of the
Association Moita Redonda and is one of the original signatories. He confirmed that the idea to buy the
land came from Carlito and Simone, and that Simone was active, with the EBDA and others, in negotiating
the purchase of the land. In an open-ended question, ten other founders and early settlers mentioned
Simone's participation as a leader/negotiator in obtaining the land. In addition to Simone's involvement,
two founding members told us that they were called into the Association by a municipal alderman.
346

Of the 20 interviewees who voted in the municipio and told us for whom they voted, 18 said they voted
for Simone in 2004. Irandi stated that Simone had always helped the settlement, and stated that she had
won 36 out of 55 votes cast in the settlement. (Although there are many more than 55 adults in the
settlement, some - especially the newer settlers - are not registered to vote in the municipio.) Cecilia, wife
of former Association president Zito, stated less approvingly that Simone was deeply involved in the wrong
direction the Association was taking ("A prefeita esta no meio desta coisa.") Lindoval, who voted for her,
said Simone was a worker but "false" ("falsa ") - that she uses people. Simone's active involvement in the
settlement was also confirmed by Benone Reys, a former priest and ex-prefeito in Inhambupe (interview
29/03/06); he indicated that Simone was essentially responsible for organizing the Moita Redonda
Association.
347

Jose Ribeiro, who said that he participated in every meeting relating to the land purchase, stated that
Carlito formed (fez) the Association. This type of leadership - an organization dependent on a single leader
- is common in Brazil.
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Lindoval).348

The technical assistant, Jose Eduardo, spoke of him being a good person

and a hard worker. It seems clear that Carlito was closely tied to political figures, and
that he used his connections to help find and purchase the land. 349
Purchase of the land occurred September 18, 1998. The land had essentially been
abandoned, although Lindoval (who later became a founding settler) had been resident on
it since 1982 as an employee caretaker. A few settlers moved onto the land in tents
and/or began planting in the fields in late 1998/early 1999. But most families did not
move onto the land until the end of September, 2001, when funding for housing became
available. PRONAF funding to plant orange trees was not available until December 23,
2002 - so that most orange groves were planted in 2003 (three years prior to our visit).
The settlers came from two associations - Moita Redonda and Boa Sorte - each
of which had about 40 members.

The Moita Redonda Association was based in the

nearby village of Entrocamento (3 km) and Boa Sorte in the village of Gameleira in the
neighboring municipio of Olandina. The two associations were merged into one - the
current Association. CDA made the selection of which members would be settled onto
the land. Almost all of the original settlers were from nearby surrounding areas - some
had minifundios quite close to the settlement. According to Jose Eduardo, the prefeita
was instrumental in merging the two groups, and she also added some urban people from
the town of Inhambupe; apparently CDA approved these people, but they turned out not
to adapt to farm life and most had left the settlement well prior to the time of our visit.

348

In our experience of rural communities, it is not uncommon for leaders to be suspected by some of
taking funds. Such rumors are not always true. However, the circumstances here are certainly unusual and
would warrant further investigation.
349

Carlito never became a settler because he worked as a security guard for EBDA and would therefore not
be eligible to receive land; he chose to retain his employment rather than enter the settlement.
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Demography: 32 of the 36 interviewees stated they were of rural origin. Those claiming
urban350 origin were Marcos Silva, Coho, and Jose Vincente and his wife, Hilda, but all
four of them had farming experience prior to arriving in the settlement (Jose Vincente
and Hilda are among the most successful farmers in the settlement). Two other men
interviewed said that their wives (not interviewed) were of urban origin.
Except for Walter, who worked as a bricklayer for the prefeitura of Olandina,
almost all the men were engaged in agricultural work immediately prior to coming to the
settlement. Eleven had minifundios of from two to eight tarefas. Of these, seven also
hired out as day laborers, and two worked as sharecroppers (one of these also as a
bricklayer). Three others were sharecroppers without land of their own, three were
landless daily workers (one of these also worked as a barber), and two were employed
farm workers. Two lived and farmed on their parents' land.
Race/Ethnicity: Principally white.
Gender: Two of the families interviewed are female titleholders. One of these,
Daci, served as vice secretary - one of the six directors - of the Association from
2002 to 2004.
Religion: Most families are at least nominally Catholic. There are six Adventist
families in the settlement and one family from the Igreja Crista (literally,
Christian Church), an evangelical Protestant denomination. Of the households
interviewed, fifteen stated that they were Catholic, and three Adventist.

350

"Urban" in Brazil may mean that a person was born in a city or in the seat of a municipio, which
includes many very small, primarily rural towns.
294

Age: Most of the founders we interviewed were in their forties or older; but
Walmir (the president of the Association) was 36, and his wife 29, and founders
Marcos Silva and his wife Maria were both 28. The families that entered since
2004 were all in their twenties and thirties.
Attrition: Only 27 of the original families remained on the land when we visited.
23 families were new. We were told that 10 families (not necessarily original
ones) had left "in recent times" (i.e., the last couple of years).351 Jose Eduardo
attributes the high attrition to a combination of selection of unsuitable settlers and
local public mismanagement. Of the families we interviewed, 14 were founding
families, one each the wife and daughter of founders who had left the settlement,
and three not founders but early settlers (2001). Of the newer settlers, one had
arrived in 2004, two in 2005, and one in 2006 less than a month prior to our visit.

Education: The settlement school has two classrooms and offers education through the
fourth grade during the day and at night. The morning session has pre-school and 1st
grade, the afternoon 2nd and 3rd grades; 4th graders (and other adult students) study at
night.
Settlers were overwhelmingly positive about the settlement school. Seventeen of
those interviewed said that it was good or excellent, two said it was fair. Only one said
that it was weak: her children had previously studied at an Adventist school, which are
very strong academically in comparison with Brazilian public schools. Two interviewees
mentioned the higher grades in Inhambupe - one thought they were good, the other only

351

Raimundo, who arrived in 2005, claimed that there were 15 new families in the last six months, but this
may be an overstatement.
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fair. Cecilia's daughter studies at the Escola Agricola (a cooperative agricultural school);
she is excited about her studies there and has developed ideas for investing in their land.
We interviewed the night school teacher (last year she taught the children),
Edivania da Silva, 26, the daughter of settlers. She has a normal school education. We
were impressed by her attitude. "I learn together with them [the students]; they have
much to teach me."

Health: A health agent comes to the settlement once a month, and doctors are at the
health post in Entrocamento (3 kms distance) on Tuesdays (pediatrician), Thursdays
(gynecologist), and Fridays (general practitioner). Settlers here were more positive about
the health system than at most of the settlements we visited.

Six said the health

attendance is good, two thought it was so-so, and only one felt it was bad. Most simply
described the system without stating whether they thought it was good or bad, but their
overall attitude was moderately positive. Raimundo Rodrigues noted that the Brazilian
public health system is pretty much the same everywhere - not an accolade, but a sign
that he doesn't feel that health care in the settlement is any worse than elsewhere. Two
interviewees expressed concern about distance: Maria Angelina felt that Entrocamento
was far, Jose Batista noted that one has to hire a car if anyone is really sick. Josefa stated
that she felt the health care at the settlement was not a problem, but that the level of care
in town (Inhambupe) was.

Water:

Very early in the settlement history (c. 1999), a significant issue arose which

has created a continuing problem. As president of the Association, Carlito, authorized
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the digging of a well on his father's farm (Fazenda Caraiba), where it serves five homes
(not in the settlement) including, apparently, a home that Carlito built for himself. The
well was not completed, and the prefeita, Simone, has pressured the Associaiton to
commit itself to signing a new project for amplification of the work. Shortly before our
visit, a meeting was held in the Association in which the Municipal Secretary of
Agriculture was present, pressuring the community to remove Israel as Treasurer because
he refused to authorize additional expenditures on this well. Although the attempt did not
succeed, the meeting increased tensions within the community, and Israel told us that he
is thinking of leaving because of what is occurring there.
In CERB's records, therefore, the settlement has two wells, when in fact there is
only one in the settlement area. The second well provides water for house lots; settlers
are charged a monthly fee of R$14 for water and electricity.
Raimundo stated that only twenty people - the newcomers - pay this fee.

The

president of the Association, Walmir, confirmed that there are families that have not paid
their water bill for ten months, and that the new people have a better record for paying
than the old settlers do.
At this time, water is not piped to the farm lots. Irrigation is being discussed in
the Association as a possible project using remaining SIC funds.

Association and Collective Area:352 As mentioned above, the present Association is the
fusion of two earlier associations - Moita Redonda and Boa Sorte.

352

Each had

Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section was provided at the initial meeting with the
settlers in the galpao (storage area), March 30, 2006. The meeting was attended by fourteen men and one
woman from the settlement, Jose Eduardo, and our team.
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approximately 40 members and the selection of the settlers was made by CDA. (Jose
Eduardo)
Originally each family donated one ha. of its land to augment the collective area.
The collective area is planted with coconuts, oranges, and pasture.

Jose Eduardo

informed us that the pasture was in place when the land was purchased; the Association
fenced it and rented it out for grazing cattle, income going to the Association, but that
contract was ending and will not be renewed. The grazing land will be available for a
collective sheep flock and for settlers to graze livestock.354
The Association also developed what appears to be a viable program of planting
passion fruit on the collective land. The association plowed the land and provided wire.
Two thousand passion fruit plants were planted.

30% of the revenue goes to the

Association; the remainder is divided among the settlers in accordance with the work
they provide on the passion fruit - those who do not participate have no right to the
income. Passion fruit and harvests from the maturing orange trees (which produce three
harvests a year) account for most of the Association's agricultural income.
Association dues are R$2 per month. The Association has a galpao (a metal
roofed structure used for storage) that was used as the school until a new school was built

353

Israel Santos, the current treasurer of the Association, was president of the Boa Sorte Association.
When it was merged into the Moita Redonda Association, in 1998, he became secretary of the latter.
354

Jose Ribeiro stated that the decision to set aside 1 ha as pasture land was never approved by the
Association. He also stated that the members are not informed as to the Association accounts - what has
been earned and spent - and that there is need to present an accounting. He stated that the Association sold
oranges, and when asked about it, the treasurer responded "are you calling me a thief?" He claimed that
the Association had a horse and wagon, that it was sold, and that nobody knows what happened to the
money. Nonetheless, he pays his dues and generally supports the Association. Coho also felt that the
treasurer does not provide sufficient reporting. But other members, e.g., Pedro Xavier, state that the Fiscal
Counsel provides good reports.

298

in 2005. It also owns a tractor, which was obtained from CAR-PRODUZIR; it hires out
to settlers at the subsidized rate of RS25/30 per day - the market rate is R$40-45.355
When a family decides to leave, three replacement candidates are presented to the
Association.

The Association votes to pick one of these.

The family picked then

negotiates directly with the family that is leaving, without the participation of the
Association.356

However, all the new families were currently waiting for CDA in

Salvador to officially recognize their presence.

Until that confirmation occurs, the new

settlers are not completely certain that they can stay.358
According to Jose Eduardo, the system for new entries worked fairly well until
2005, when some families entered without prior approval from the Association. Five
families represented at our initial meeting stated that they had entered without the
Association approval process. Jose Eduardo, who was present, stated that they must be
treated as though they are in a trial period, and must go through approval.359

355

Some settlers have failed to pay for tractor services; Walmir, the President Association, told us that the
tractor is what gives him the most problems.
356

Raimundo paid RS7.000 to take over the rights; he found the orange groves badly neglected. Jose
Batista paid R$2.000 for house and fields, both of which he said were essentially "abandoned." Both
agreed to take over PRONAF debt.
357

Jose Eduardo told us that CDA has delayed so much in registration of new families that people who
entered onto the land three years previously through the official approval process were still not registered.
358

Raimundo Rodrigues, one of the new settlers, told us that this situation made him nervous to the point of
feeling ill. He is very uncomfortable because he has not been fully approved. He pays his monthly dues to
the Association (R$2). He has seven tarefas of oranges planted by the previous homesteader, which were
so neglected that he had to "save" them. He has only been able to plant 100 passion fruit vines and 2.5
tarefas of cowpeas. He paid R$7.000 to the prior settler to take over the land.
359

Walmir and Israel traveled to Salvador to discuss with CDA the process for these new families. They
were told that the old titleholders must sign a document saying they are desisting and that the new
titleholders must sign a commitment and go through a 90 day trial period. Only two families have not yet
signed the required commitment.
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In the beginning, there was a good deal of orientation as to the value of the
Association and how it should function. The Association by-laws were read aloud at
least three times for the benefit of those who have difficulty reading.
However, in our initial meeting with a group of settlers, we were told that
currently the by-laws of the Association were not being fully respected. The group stated
that there are people who say they will not obey because, in that settlement, nobody is
expelled for not obeying. They traced this in part to a fight in the fields with machetes
that ended up in court. The Association decided to expel the guilty party and sent that
decision to CDA in Salvador, but no action was taken. However, the guilty party left the
settlement of his own accord.
By 2003, the Association directorate had stopped functioning to the point that,
when a new family (Raimundo and Gedilsa) entered, Jose Eduardo had to call a special
meeting to get them approved. They signed a commitment. Raimundo said that he feels
marginalized in the Association meetings. The directorate takes the position that only
those new members approved by the Association can participate. Raimundo fulfilled his
duties, but it took seven months for him to get approved.

He did courses in

associativismo and cooperativismo, and his wife did courses in associativismo and
apiculture.
The technical assistant, Jose Eduardo, said that the new members want the
Association rules enforced.361

Most of the new members are Sergipanos (a few are

second generation Sergipanos from Colonia Roberto Santos, the established land reform
360

However, there are some sanctions. Pedro Xavier told us that members who have not paid their monthly
dues (R$2) cannot graze animals on Association pasture. He is six months behind in his dues.
361

"Everyone has to follow the by-laws." (Walter de Souza, a Bahian new settler who entered in 2004)
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area in Olandina), who are seen by themselves and others as being more industrious and
organized.362 Benival, a former president of the Association and a Bahian, summed it up
this way:
"It's going to get better [here] because the new settlers are Sergipanos and like
to work. They are truer friends than the settlers who left."

Israel dos Santos, a founding settler and a Bahian, is currently treasurer of the
Association. He has been severely criticized for trying to maintain the rules, but feels
that they are important:

"I came to work, follow the norms and rules, obey the by-laws (estatutos). Who
enters on the land and is qualified [to do so] should know the by-laws and obey
them"

He feels that the Association is deeply divided, in part because its work has gotten mixed
up with local politics. He states that the Association directorate is not listened to, that the
members do not accept the actions of the directorate and wish to be consulted on all

362

The new Sergipano settlers we interviewed were attractive couples in their twenties and thirties,
dynamic, enthusiastic, and apparently excellent farmers. They also showed a strong community spirit,
spoke favorably of coopertivism and associativism. Jose Batista and Anuncieta, for example, organized a
group of 10 families to begin giving parties in the school; she is organizing group of women to make and
sell embroidery.
363

The group meeting confirmed that many of the new settlers are working better than the original ones much better ("100%") than the people they replaced, and that the new settlers are paying their monthly
fees. But some new settlers have not worked out and have left. Jose Eduardo feels that the selection
process is inadequate.
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matters. Even as one of the leaders, he stated that the Association does not adequately
represent all the families in the settlement.364
In the last election, as in previous elections, there were two slates of candidates.
In the view of some, these slates reflected a division between local political parties.
Walmir, a supporter of prefeita Simone, won the election for president over Saval.
However, Israel, who was on the ticket with Walmir, was a supporter of another
candidate for prefeito.
Walmir confirmed that "individualism" divides the group, and that there is an
issue in getting people to work the collective land. He has begged CDA to intervene. He
notes that, up until now, income from the collective lands has been sufficient for the land
payments. "[If we] lose the collective, we're losing our heart." The depth of his concern
is perhaps reflected in his response to the question "In your view, who is against the rural
worker?" His answer: "The rural worker himself. The government is providing the
365

conditions [for succeeding on the land], but the people don't take advantage of them."
Work in the collective area is carried out by groups of 10 settlers - there are five
groups, each with a coordinator.

The groups were formed taking into account each

settler's interests and the days when it was best for him to work. The president of the
Association determines the work to be done by each group. The collective work is one
matter that generates discussions and divisions during meetings.
We were told that only one of the five groups is fully functioning - in the other
four up to 50% of the members fail to turn up. Jose Eduardo stated that, overall, the
364

Israel, however, is positive about the settlement. "Life here is good. Our concern is with development.
[Otherwise] it is calm."

365

Walmir also noted that being president of the Association caused him to "lose a lot of time."
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collective work had 70-80% participation.

To overcome the need for work in the

collective area, a contract was entered into to pay for work on the collective land. This
created further issues, as settlers prefer to be paid for their work rather than donating their
free days. We were told that there were members who owed the Association as many as
30 work days.366
The day prior to our visit, it had rained, indicating the end of the drought. The
president of the Association declared all settlers free from collective work for that week
in order that they could start planting their private fields, in order to take advantage of the
wet soil. This was a sensible decision, as much collective land work is maintenance not
notably affected by rain.
Jose Eduardo informed us that the Association still has approximately R$200.000
in SIC funds. Jose Eduardo's contract as technical assistance ended in 2005, but - after
six months - the community called him back because CDA told them they needed
technical assistance with the remaining SIC. He stated that the community is considering
a casa de farinha and possibly irrigated castor-oil plants (mamona).
In the meetings the women who are not titleholders listen but cannot talk, only
whispering their opinions to their husbands.367 They have no vote. However, when CDA
comes, the women participate - especially if the CDA representative is a woman. New
by-laws proposed by CDA would allow both members of a couple to be members, and
would also allow for worker members (socios trabalhadores), a membership used in

366

Presence and absence for workdays is recorded in a notebook. Jose da Conceigao, a member of the
Conselho Fiscal, told us: "[They] say they are going to pay their days [missed], but they don't pay."
367

Pipio, a Sergipano who entered in 2005, said that, in their orientation, they were told that women who
are not titleholders could not participate in Association meetings. Neide confirmed this, and most of the
non-titleholding women said that they do not participate.
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some settlements for, e.g, grown children of settlers who live in the area and help work
the land. However the new by-laws have not yet been officially adopted.
The presence of a substantial number of new settlers who have not been officially
recognized by CDA also makes the Association less effective.

Though these new

members seem to be diligent about paying their dues and performing their collective
work, their lack of full standing limits their practical participation, especially with respect
to voting and holding office.

Ecological Area: Most interviewees did not seem to have a clear idea of the purpose of
the ecological area. Some mentioned that you cannot hunt on it, or disturb it in any way.
They understand that it is protected by IBAMA. One interviewee suggested that the area
should be deforested in order to make room for fields and homes for landless people.
Walmir mentioned that, when the settlers had use all the land available, he would petition
the government to let them use the ecological area.
Jose Eduardo told us that the fence protecting the ecological area from outsiders is
not well maintained, and that - especially during the drought period - there has been an
issue with outsiders putting cattle to graze there. He himself encountered a neighbor of
the settlement there with twenty head of cattle.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factors: This settlement has been more affected by local politics
than any of the others, in a way that has been detrimental to its development.

Jose

Eduardo believes that political involvement has caused a series of problems: (1) Because
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of the relative ease of securing the land, the settlers perhaps did not value the land as
much as settlers in areas that experienced a greater struggle.

(2) The prefeita's

intervention resulted in certain families being given land who were not suited to it, did
not properly care for the land and eventually left it, but in the process slowed the
agricultural development. (3) The continued mixture of Association issues with local
politics is disruptive to the Association and therefore prejudicial to socio-economic
development. Regarding the first point, Lindoval compared the settlements history with
those of MST settlements: "If we had to fight [for the land], I would be the only one left no! even I would run."
Land: The land purchase took place on September 18, 1998. The purchase price
was RS254.48 per ha, for a total of R$ 172,355.04 total. SAT funds were R$ 186,500, and
SIC R$313,209.60.
Land payments are made by the Association from sale of products from the
collective area.

At the time of our visit, four payments had been made.

Only two

interviewees mentioned land payments as one of their chief worries.
Sixteen of the households interviewed said that their land was good/fertile. Two
said it was fair, one of these pointing out that it needs a lot of fertilizer.

Four

interviewees said that their land is weak or very weak. These statistics coincide with Jose
Eduardo's observation that 4-6 of the farm lots have poor soil.
Only two families are using exclusively organic fertilizer: Jose Vincente and
Hilda, and Raimundo and Gedilsa. Raimundo noted that natural fertilizer is expensive.
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According to Jose Eduardo, the land is good for raising fruit (oranges, passion
fruit, coconut, papaya, watermelon, cashew, jackfruit, mango) as well as pepper, okra,
corn, beans, and manioc.
Jose Batista, one of the new settlers from Sergipe, found that the land he took
over had been abandoned. It was weak land - half of his acreage was especially weak.
He applied fertilizer three times, and he also kept the trees on the land. "It is getting
better;" he says that his land went from being the worst in the settlement to being "one of
the ten best areas." Anucieta, his wife, stated succinctly: "The land was dead - now it is
alive."368
Israel, one of the founders, stated that his land is weak. His parents own land
nearby and he farms 8 tarefas on their land, which he says does not require fertilizer. He
is using chemical fertilizer on his settlement land to try to improve the soil.
Financing: Forty-five of the fifty settlement families took out PRONAF A loans.
All the families interviewed except one (see below) received this financing. The amount
was approximately R$9000, intended for the planting of orange groves (approximately 3
ha per family). The loan was signed in late 2002, and the first parcel disbursed in March
2003 for preparing the land. An Association commission was sent to Sergipe, where they
purchased 65,000 saplings; they also purchased 20 sacks of fertilizer for each sapling.
Subsequent disbursements were made in the second and third years to maintain the
orange groves, but the bank made an error in the third year and disbursed only R$1000
per settler rather than R$ 1800.

368

We visited a farm lot that had clearly been almost abandoned, and were informed that the new owner
was in the process of recuperating it.
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The first installment of PRONAF A loans was to come due in December, 2006.
There are seven installments of R$1300 each, or R$780 with a 40% rebate if the
installments are paid in a timely manner.

Walmir, the president of the Association,

estimates that 70% of those owing will not be able to make timely payment.
Five interviewees listed payment of the debt as their chief worry. Jose Ribeiro
stated that the directors were trying to get the first payment, due in December 2006,
postponed until 2007; if the paper work is not processed, the settlers will lose the rebate
(for timely repayment) and then he believes "nobody will have conditions to pay."
However, he believed that, if the payment is postponed until 2007, many will be able to
pay.

Walter also believed that, once orange groves reach full production, it will be

sufficient to pay the debt.
Although others did not indicate PRONAF payments as a chief worry, it may still
be a matter of some concern. In a joint interview, Irindi stated that she was more worried
about PRONAF payments than here husband, to which he responded: "Who isn't worried
about this?"
With respect to additional financing, Lucia - a former treasurer of the
Association, no longer resident in the settlement - attempted to get together a group of
1ZQ

women to apply for PRONAF-Mulher, but was unable to do so.

Two teenage children

of settlers, both of whom studied at the Escola Agricola, obtained PRONAF-Jovem
loans.

369

Interveiw with Benone, March 29, 2006.
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Jose Eduardo has also encouraged settlers to become members of the Credit
Cooperative in Inhambupe, which will facilitate taking out smaller loans for agricultural
projects. However, only about six settlers had become members at the time of our visit.
Production and Income: Although the contract was signed in 1998, Moita
Redonda was not actually settled until 2001, which places it in practice among the newer
settlements studied. It has also suffered a high rate of turnover. PRONAF funds were
disbursed in early 2003, and production has been slowed by drought and other factors.
The PRONAF financing was for planting of orange trees. All of the households
we interviewed except one370 received PRONAF financing and had orange groves, in
most cases around three ha, although two homesteaders noted that they had planted
additional orange trees at their own expense.371
Because of the high turnover, many of the new families inherited orange groves
(and PRONAF debt) from earlier settlers. In some cases, the inherited orange trees had
not been well taken care of - either due to neglect by previous owners or to lag time
between owners. Raimundo Rodrigues, who moved onto the land in 2005, stated that he
had "saved" the orange trees abandoned by the prior owner. Three other new settlers,
Jose Batista, Walter, and Reninho also mentioned that the orange groves they inherited
from earlier settlers were in poor condition.
The orange groves that did receive adequate care are mature enough to have
begun production. Fifteen of the twenty-four families interviewed reported some income
from the sale of oranges. Jose Vincente and Hilda had significant production, selling 3
370

The exception was Neia and her husband; they do not have orange trees; they had been on the land three
years, had planted 3000 passion fruit vines, one tarefa of papaya, and one tarefa of lemons.
371

According to Olga, some orange trees were planted as early as June, 2001. The majority, however, were
planted only after PRONAF financing became available.
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tons in 2005 at R$100 each; already in 2006 they had sold 4 tons at R$150, one ton at
R$180, and (the day before we arrived) 1700 kgs (1.7 tons) for R$350, 2006 to-date
orange income for them totaling R$1140. Neide and her husband sold 5 tons of oranges
in 2005, Olga 2 tons, Pipio 1 ton.

The others settlers sold smaller amounts, often

relatively insignificant as sources of income. Many of these sold by the 30 kg crate
rather than by the ton.
A more significant source of income for at least three families was passion fruit.
Altogether, thirteen of the interviewed families had significant plantings of passion fruit,
ranging from 100 to 3000 vines, but only six families mentioned income from sales.
Again, Jose Vincente and Hilda were one of the biggest producers, selling in 2005 10,000
kgs at between R$0.60 and 0.80 - income of between R$6000 and 8000 - notably more
than their income from oranges.372 Another settler, Jose Batista, who had been on the
land a little less than a year, planted 1000 vines of passion fruit and stated that he lived
off the passion fruit, averaging R$150/week in sales. Walmir, who also has 1000 vines,
stated that, during 2005, he sold an average of 200 kg a week at R$ 0.30-0.50. However,
he noted that, because of the drought, production this year is not even 20% of what it was
in the prior year.
Jose Ribeiro noted that he had previously had passion fruit, but gave it up. He
found it to be "a lot of work" and needed significant inputs - stakes, wire, and fertilizer.
He now plants pepper, which he sells at R$3 per kg. He is also retired with a government
pension, and his wife earns a salary as a school teacher.

372

Neia, who with her husband, has the largest planting of passion fruit (3000 vines) simply stated that they
had sold passion fruit but did not tell us the quantity sold or the price.
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The only other commercial plantings of fruit were relatively small areas: lemon (1
tarefa), coconut (maximum 1 ha),373 cashew (50 trees), papaya (1000 plants), and
watermelon (maximum 1 ha). Except for watermelon (see below), no income from these
was reported. On house lots, most settlers had a number of fruit trees, including mango,
guava, pinha, banana, jack-fruit, acerola, avocado, seringuela, and sugar cane.
The third significant source of agricultural income was manioc. Sixteen families
plant manioc, some small amounts, most around 1 ha, the largest being Cecilia and her
husband with 3 ha. Eleven families reported earnings from manioc, Cecilia's being the
most significant - 8 tons sold in 2005 at R$80 per ton - for a total of R$640. Daci sold 5
tons at R$ 100 each to an intermediary truck. Benival sold 2-3 tons, Pipio sold 1 ton, and
Pedro Xavier sold lA ton.
Jose Vincente, who was 62 and retired at the time of our visit, but also one of the
most productive farmers, did something that we have not seen anywhere else in our
study. He had a sharecropper work his 1 ha of manioc land. The crop resulted in 60
sacks of manioc flour, of which Jose Vincente's share was 30; he sold 10 at R$20 each
and kept 20.
The only other significant income from manioc was earned by Lindoval, who
owns a non-mechanized casa de farinha. where he charges 10 litres of manioc flour for
every 60 kg sack processed.

Lindoval was a farmhand resident on the fazenda before it

was purchased, and has lived on the land since 1982. He received R$8000 in severance
pay, and says it is this that has sustained his family. A jovial man of 46, he heads an

373

Marcos Silva also tried planting coconuts, but they failed. He was not sure whether it was the seedlings
he purchased or the land in which they were planted that caused the problem.
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enormous family (at least 16 persons374), officially divided into two households, although
essentially living as one.375 He and his children farm the land and also have staked out a
20 tarefa area on a neighboring abandoned farm that has been invaded by landless
workers. In this latter area they run a brick-making facility which earns them R$500-600
per month "when everyone [in the family] works," and have 40 banana trees from which
they sell 50 caixas a month at R$30.

He has a triturator (agricultural shredder) that he

uses to make fertilizer and animal ration from manioc stalks and castor oil plants.
Settlers recorded small earnings from other crops. The most significant in terms
of income is beans; nine interviewed families sold some beans, the largest seller earning
R$440 in 2005 from sale of beans. Ten families sold corn, the largest selling 30 sacks at
R$23 (a total of R$690), but most selling only a few sacks at low prices. Coho sold one
ton of watermelon at CEASA for R$230; Dudu sold 1000 watermelon in 2005 (he did not
recall the price). Other settles sold small quantities of peanuts, peppers, cowpeas, and
squash. Most of the families raise vegetables for consumption. Hilda and Jose Vicente
are planning to plant 1 ha of okra.
None of the families interviewed reported significant income from sale of
livestock. Five families have chickens, the largest flock being Lindoval's (50). Four
have pigs: Jose Ribeiro has six, Lindoval five. Two have cows; a third, Antonio Alves
Santos, has a herd of five cows and a bull, which he keeps on his son's land outside of the
settlement area.

Jose Batista said that he intends to raise sheep if he can obtain

permission to graze them on collective land.

374

He named 16 in the interview, but later mentioned they had 23 in the household.

375

This allows them to draw two bolsa familias.
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Seven families have at least one horse, mule, or donkey. Four of these have carts.
Pipio mentioned that carting freight was a significant part of his income; Jose da
Concei^ao charges R$5 for freighting within the settlement area.
Four families reported that their men work as daily farm laborers up to eight days
a month at a wage of R$12/day.

Of these Pedro Xavier, who is single, hires out

exclusively to neighbors in the settlement.

A certain prejudice against this form of

earning was reflected by Anuncieta, who was happy that her husband "does not have to
be humiliated by working in the fields of others."376 Joseneide's husband drives the
Association tractor, earning R$15/day.

Lucineia's husband occasionally works as a

driver for his father-in-law's tractor in Entrocamento.
Fourteen of the families interviewed received bolsas escola/familia.. Five families
have members who receive retirement pensions.

Dominga Silva earns a salary as a

teacher. Raimundo Rodrigues works (part time) as a barber in Entrocamento. Anuncieta
who, prior to moving to the settlement, sold embroidery as artisan work in Aracaju (the
capital of Sergipe), has identified three other women in the settlement who do embroidery
and intends to carry forward with that activity. One settler, not interviewed, borrowed
money from the Credit Cooperative to open a small store in the settlement, but was
reportedly having difficulty repaying the loan.
Other non-farm income is trivial.

Jose Batista and Anuncieta resell bread.

Walter's wife earns R$20/month selling clothing and costume jewelry. Israel's daughter
earns R$10 doing odd jobs (biscates).

376

We encountered this feeling among small farmers when we worked in Tocantins; a farmer who needed
to work for pay (as opposed to trading work days) on the land of others, was often pitied as either going
through hard times or not able to succeed on his own land.
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Sufficiency of Income: In considering settler attitudes toward sufficiency of income and
overall satisfaction, it is important to realize that some of the settlers interviewed are very
new to the community, have not yet been officially recognized as settlers, and have not
yet been able to fully develop their agricultural plots. Even for more established settlers,
this is a transitional period between intense government involvement, with SIC and
PRONAF A programs, and full agricultural production, as orange groves are not yet fully
mature. It has also been a period of drought.
Raimundo and Gedilsa, are newcomers from Sergipe, Adventists, and have been
on the land about a year. They seem to be a highly motivated young couple - both are
th
intelligent and articulate (she has a complete 8 grade education, which makes her one of
the more educated settlers). He is a trained barber, and supplements their income by
barbering in Entrocamento.

Their home is neat and clean, with a TV, a CD stand,

comfortable sofas, a framed photograph of their daughter, a nice hutch in the kitchen.
They have noted the lack of means of sustenance in the community. "The last seven
months, people who didn't have an income suffered."
When asked whether income is sufficient, ten of the twenty-four families
interviewed answered in the negative.

"It doesn't make it. The oranges don't produce income. They only serve to
maybe pay the [PRONAF] debt." (Dudu)

Three households answered positively. In one household, the husband answered
positively, the wife negatively.
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"Yes - up until now [it has been sufficient]" (Jose Vicente)

"No - because there are many mouths to feed and other things [to buy]" (Hilda)

Other responses were more nuanced:

"It depends on the year - [you] save from one year to the next." (Bernival)

"Sometimes yes, sometimes no." (Neia)
"It serves for the household, but not for the field [i.e. agricultural expenses]"
(Raimundo)

"At times it doesn't do - we have to economize, sell bread, use the bolsa
familia." (Jose Batista)

Three families mentioned the importance of the bolsa familia/escola in meeting their
economic needs. "It's slow - if it weren't for the bolsa escola we wouldn't make it"
(Lindoval) But Cecilia noted that the bolsa only serves to buy one week of food ( "fazer
uma feira "), and that they depend on help from relatives. One other family also noted
that they received help from relatives.
Lindoval sounded a note that reflects a general concern with the program. He stated
that family income was good as long as the government program was in place (SIC,
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PRONAF A). Now it is "sufficient to eat, but not to buy meat." He noted that in this
year (2006) there would be no additional government investment. "It will be difficult.
The oranges are not [yet] producing - it is going to be tight." About his own situation (he
has at least sixteen in his household) he joked: "R$200 for our family is only one fava
bean."

Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction: 27 of the interviewees stated definitely that they would not sell or
trade their land.377 Maria Angelina said she would think of trading only if the other land
were much better: "We don't want to throw away what is ours." Irandi stated that she
and her husband had thought of selling but had decided against it.

"Don't even think about it! My dream has been to have a place [land] to work"
(Walmir)

"No way!" (Liazinho)

"No - we struggled to make it better here." (Joseneide)

"We didn't buy to sell." (Olga)

377

Pedro Xavier, who is single, also said he was not thinking of selling, although he is widely rumored to
be thinking of leaving.
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Raimundo and Gedilsa Rodrigues, the couple who expressed deep worry because
they have not yet been legally recognized as owners, said that they would sell if they
knew that they could buy land in another area. Lindoval expressed the same sentiment
(he previously had 80 tarefas of land in another area that he bought in 2001 for R$3400
and sold for R$9000). Jose Ribeiro said that he had not previously thought of leaving,
but might do so because of the technical advisor.

Israel, the treasurer of the

Association, who was criticized by some (and supported by others) for trying to enforce
Association rules, said that he was thinking of leaving; he and his wife stated they saw
many wrong things happening.
Twenty-nine interviewees said that life was better (or much better) on the
settlement than it had been previously.

"What we harvest is ours - before we worked harder and harvested less"
(Marcos Silva)

"Every year we have beans, [sweet] potatoes, manioc." (Maria Reis)

Jose and Josefa Correia qualified their satisfaction by saying that, although life was
better, they now have more worries.

Irandi said that they passed through many

difficulties, but that it was beginning to get better. Raimundo and Gedilsa, Jose Ribeiro

378

Jose Ribeiro was very angry with Jose Eduardo. This may have been in part because Jose Ribeiro's
son's application to take over one of the vacancies in the settlement was denied and/or for political reasons.
Jose Ribeiro is closely tied to the prefeita Simone; while his daughter is reportedly a very good teacher, her
appointment as a municipal teacher was made by Simone. Jose Eduardo has attempted to help settlement
leaders resist pressure from Simone, e.g., with respect to making further payments to finish the well that is
not on settlement land.
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and Dominga, and Walter all felt that it was neither better nor worse than where they had
been previously. Lindoval, who has been on the land (as an employee of the former
owner) since 1982, stated: "It was better [now] for me because I know how to live here but for the others it had to be difficult."
Anuncieta, who with her husband Jose Batista, arrived relatively recently in the area,
said that on the first day she didn't like it here. They had moved from a village in
Sergipe where they had a new, bigger house, and which had "everything" - such as paved
streets. But she thinks it is better here because they have their own land, because her
husband does not have to work on land that belongs to others (he previously had only 2
tarefas of land, so also had to hire out as a day laborer).
Future:

Most interviewees were optimistic about the future.

Seven settlers

specifically mentioned expectations of increased orange production within the next two
years:

"We'll be selling more than 10 tons of oranges. [There will be] more comfort in
the home." (Walmir)

Two settlers mentioned expectations of increased passion fruit production, and eight
increases in crops generally.

"It will be the double of today." (Jose Concei<?ao)
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"I believe that, if it rains, it will be better - [but] lack of fertilizer will be a
problem." (Lindoval)

One settler was notably pessimistic about the future:

"The way it's going, it's going to be worse.

If new [Association] directors

enter, it could get better. In two years, none of the old settlers will be left."
(Jose Ribeiro)379

Other interviewees expressed concern about the Association and divisions within
the community, but in no other cases did such concern override essential optimism about
the future of the settlement.
With respect to the longer term future of the families, few of the families voiced a
desire for their children to remain on the land. Benival expressly stated that he does not
expect his children to remain in the country. Other interviewees expressed desires that
their children could study for a profession, would get jobs, perhaps be a teacher. Jose
Batista and Anuncieta want their children to study for a career - which could be in
agriculture or something else - but which will get them a job. Only Jose Concei9ao said
that he wants his children to understand that, if they help, the land he has will be worth
double what it is today. And Lindoval - who has a large family - stated that his lot is
only sufficient for two families - he needs more land for his children as they grow up.

379

As noted above, Jose Ribeiro's son was not selected as an applicant for one of the openings that
occurred in the settlement, and Jose Ribeiro was angry about this.

Gedilsa - who is in her twenties - stated that "In the city everything is difficult.... We
will stay in the countryside."
Socio-Political Awareness: The level of political socio-political awareness was, as in
many of the other settlements, what one would respect from Northeastern rural Brazilians
who are not active in political parties or social movements. To the question of who is for
or against the rural worker, most interviewees had either no answer or very general ones.
Sixteen interviewees stated that Lula and/or the government were on the side of the rural
workers. Three interviewees mentioned that the rural workers unions are for workers,
and one mentioned cooperatives. Jose Ribeiro made the observation that the workers
help themselves; Coho similarly said that "we ourselves" help the rural worker.
Most interviewees either knew nothing of the MST or had only seen about it on
television. At this time, TV Globo, the dominant station and the only one available in
most rural areas, had focused on negative stories about the MST, and this was reflected in
answers. Thirteen interviewees had negative opinions of the MST, three had mildly
favorable opinions, and Neide stated: "If it weren't for the violence, they would be great
(otimo)." Some other comments:

"A lot of fear, death - if it were I, I wouldn't go with them. I doubt that they are
really after land." (Walter)

"Invasion doesn't work. It's better to buy [the land]." (Jose da Concei^o)

"Negotiation is better." (Edivaldo)
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Most settlers rejected the MST strategy of "invading" land. Benival and Israel both
compared this strategy to grilagem.
More telling were the comments of those who did have experience with the MST.
Raimundo Rodrigues participated for four years in the MST in Sergipe and identifies
with the Workers Party (PT); he stated that the MST "is only talk - it was a failure." Jose
Batista was in an MST camp for two years - he came to believe that their strategy of
invasion was wrong and left.
Respecting politics, 27 respondents voted for Lula in the last election, and four for
Serra. Interestingly, in three households, the husband voted one way, the wife another.
In the next election, twenty said they were voting for Lula, and six were undecided. Only
two interviewees expressed strong national party identification, both with the PT. Jose
Batista and Anucieta expressly stated that they support Lula himself, not the PT.

Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations:
We visited Moita Redonda at a time of considerable tension - the Association had
just held a meeting in which an attempt was made to unseat the treasurer.

This

highlighted several underlying issues - the off-site artesian well and the role of local
politics (the Municipal Secretary of Agriculture was pressuring for the treasurer's
resignation), but also the issue of obeying the by-laws (the treasurer was an advocate of
strict enforcement) and the question of old v. new settlers. Some of the new settlers felt
that the treasurer was against them, although his resistance seems to be aimed more at
strictly enforcing the rules of Association acceptance rather than any antipathy to the new
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settlers themselves, whom he respected for being rule-abiding and paying their monthly
fees.
Certainly this settlement experienced more internal conflict than any other
settlement we studied.

Political interference may be partially responsible for this,

especially insofar as political influence caused the presence of early settlers who did not
have an appropriate background or motivation for rural settlement life. Attrition always
takes a toll, and in this case it seems to have been more rancorous than usual; many of the
families who left failed to care for their land, did not perform their share of collective
work, and left owing the Association monthly payments.
There are indications that the prefeita was essentially responsible for organizing
the Moita Redonda Association. To the extent this was the case, it touches on concerns
of critics of the Cedula da Terra (and other market based land reform) programs that local
politicians will form paper associations for primarily electoral purposes.

However,

whatever its origins, the resulting Association in Moita Redonda has not turned out to be
a paper association. Although flawed in many respects, the Association is an active body
capable of reaching conclusions contrary to the wishes of the prefeita.

Immediate

emotions aside, the problems of the Association - administration of the collective lands,
difficulty collecting dues and utility payments, problems with the tractor - are pretty
much the standard problems that most associations face.
Indeed, in actual practice, the 70-80% estimated participation in collective work is
higher than some other associations.

And the Association has shown ingenuity in

developing solutions to problems - leasing out grazing land for income, and then
bringing the lease to a successful close when other income starts to become available;
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coming up with an innovative concept for raising passion fruit on collective land with
voluntary participation accompanied by corresponding rewards.
But divisions within the community could paralyze Association leadership and
hamper the Association from moving forward with the organizational process necessary
to carry the settlement further along the road to sustainability. A settlement of this size
should be actively engaged in thinking of ways of leveraging its produce through
commercializing and processing crops. A great deal will depend on how the Association
invests the remaining SIC funds, and whether it is able to go beyond those funds into
other development projects.
Certainly one key element to getting the community working together is the
registration and official recognition of the new settlers and their integration into the
community; we note that Walmir and Israel were taking steps to effect this. Community
organization and/or facilitation by a neutral outside party might help the community to
come to terms with some of the factors that currently divide it.

Another factor of key

importance is the adoption of the new regulations which will allow non-titleholding
spouses to become full members of the Association, allowing the Association to draw on
the talents and ability of the women who are now essentially excluded.
Economically, with the end of the drought period and the maturing of the orange
groves, there is good reason to believe that settler income will substantially increase. It is
unlikely that most settlers would be able to make the December 2006 PRONAF payment,
but the chances of getting that repayment extended, especially in light of the drought, are
reasonably high.

Once orange production increases, loan repayment should be more

feasible. Orange and passion fruit harvests from the collective area should be adequate to
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cover land payments, and these may be supplemented by a collective flock of sheep and
other income.
One serious area of concern, however, is the monoculture of orange groves;
monoculture both makes plant diseases more likely and more devastating when they
occur. It also exposes settlers to fluctuations in the orange market.

In order to help

hedge against these risks, we would recommend continued production of passion fruit
and the consideration of additional possible cash crops.
An additional concern is the attitude of settlers toward the ecological area. Not
only is this troublesome in that it shows a lack of concern with that area, but it throws a
light onto the question of whether settlers are really aware of the complexity and
interlinking of natural systems. An understanding of ecology is vital for any farmer to
achieve sustainability, and especially so in a vulnerable, semi-arid climate.
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Case Study 5

Name of Settlement:

Passos de Esperan^a - Associa^ao Desenvolimento Rural
Passos de Esperanija (Footsteps of Hope Rural Development
Association)

Families in Settlement: 30
Location: Municipio - Olindina
Area: 450 ha.
Contract Date: December 28, 2001
Dates Visited: March 27-28, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 19
Family size (persons): 1-3/2;

Individuals: 33
4-6/10; 7-9/5;

10+/2

Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (female 13 years old)
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/6; 30-39/8; 40-49/10; 50-59/7; 60+/1
Schooling: 0-2/19; 3-5/10; 6-8/3; in HS/1 (21 yr old daughter)
Note: In six households interviewed, the wife had significantly (3+
years) more education than the husband; in the remainder of the
homes, the educational level of husband/wife were roughly equal.
Technical Assistants: Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida and Edna Moreira de Brito
Batista of TECPLATA, both interviewed March 27, 2006
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Map V-5-A - Passos de Esperan^a settlement area sketched onto a pre-existing map
of the property. Environmental reserves are located at the southern tip and along the
eastern border, and the collective area in the southwest.
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I *

Figures V-5-A and V-5-B. Above: meeting with Passos da Esperan«?a settlers in the
village school.
Below: settlers in front of school following the meeting.
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Geography: The settlement is located in the semi-arid Northeast region of the State
of Bahia, 25 km. from the town of Olindina: 20 km south along paved federal
highway BR110 (two kilometers south of a highway-based village called Dona
Maria), and 5 km west of the highway by dirt road.
Each of the landholding families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila (20 x 37m)
and a farm lot of 9 ha. (according to local calculations, approximately 20.66
tarefasm)

About 20% of the land is in two collective areas - one area of 60 ha.

located on the southeast of the settlement, and one of 30 ha. located in the southwest
near the larger of the two ecological reserves.
One enters the community through a wide gate. The main street lies straight
ahead, and a secondary street - on which the school and association headquarters are
located - parallels it to the east. Both are dirt streets - and the secondary street
develops a huge puddle of water after rain.
The agro-vila was designed by an outside expert from Feira de Santana. We
were told by community leaders that, if they were to do it over, they would have
wider streets and would put the school in another location.
Some fields are fairly distant from the agro-vila.

For instance, Jose

Nascimento's field is about 1 km. from his home; he owns a motorbike to get there.

Climate:

The region is classed by IBGE as semi-arid, with the natural growth

ranging from cerrado to caatinga. Our visit here coincided with the end of an eight

380

The settlers here use the Bahian tarefa - 4,356 M2 - and roughly calculate it at 2.3 tarefas per
hectare.
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month drought period. We were told that this was the first serious drought in sixteen
years - although there had been a shorter one in 1993. (Joselito)

History: Within three kms of the settlement is the village of Gameleira, and beyond
that the older land reform areas of Colonia Roberto Santos. The Colonia (as it is
called locally) was formed through invasion of vacant land381 in the mid 1980s,
principally by settlers from Sergipe, and was eventually administered by INCRA.
When the Cedula da Terra program was announced, meetings were held in
Gameleira with the support of a state legislator, Aderbal Fontes Caldas, sparking the
interest primarily of adult children of the settlers in the Colonia. Many joined the
Rural Workers Union (STR). One of the original settlers in Passos de Esperan9a,
Americo dos Santos, was president of the STR from 1997 to 2005 and is currently its
treasurer; he still lives in the settlement and was interviewed.
In 1998 the Association was formed to try to locate land. The primary leader
of the group and first president of the Association was Anselmo, who later became
one of the original settlers of Passos de Esperan^a (although he no longer lives there).
Railda Dantas Oliveira learned of the program and entered into it, as she said, "body
and soul." She became voluntary secretary of STR in 1998.382 She told us that 10-12
of the original sixty Association members now live in the settlement - some others

381

According to Americo, the land had been fenced in and claimed by a company that had no legal
right to it. They planted pine trees, but then abandoned the land. The Sergipanos invaded this land and
occupied it. As most of the settlers in Passos come from this area, this is interesting background.
382

Edna, the tecnica, stated that Railda is "a natural leader."
observations tended to confirm this.
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Interview March 27, 2006.

Our

went to other settlement areas. Dona Edna, the tecnica, accompanied them the whole
way - she is their "godmother."
In 2000 the Association located the land, and purchased it on December 28,
2001. The landowner,383 who had approached the tecnicos (Sergio Ricardo and Edna)
about the possibility of selling his land, wanted to sell 500 ha., but INCRA only
agreed to buying 450, so they had to diminish the area of each settler. The land cost
R$ 130,000.
The initial settlement included some families from the city of Olindina whom
Dona Edna recommended. All of these families left the settlement and were largely
replaced by families from the Colonia, many of them relatives of Colonia families
already in the settlement.

Demography: The settlers were almost entirely of Sergipano stock and background.
Almost all of them had roots in the nearby older settlement area, Colonia Roberto
Santos,385 located around the nearby village of Gameleira.
All but four of the interviewees classed themselves as being of rural origin.
The four who classed themselves as "urban" were women; one of these had moved to
a rural area when she was sixteen years old. Before moving to the settlement, six of
the men were rural day laborers (although one of these also said he was an
383

The landowner, Glaudson Jose de Almeida Chagas, was from Sergipe. According to Josefa, many
of the people from Gameleira worked for him on his land; he was a "good person" and paid his
workers "certinho" (i.e., the right amount at the time it was due).
384

Edna stated that she was impressed by the attrition rates: "What are these people thinking [when
they enter onto the land]?" Sergio Ricardo noted that "99% of urban people don't work out - the
problem is learning to survive on the land." Ultimately, he pointed out, there is a process of selfselection.
385

People from this Colonia also were among the founding and new settlers at Moita Redonda.
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electrician), three were sharecroppers, two were employed farm hands, one a
cowhand, one a rural security guard, and one worked his parents' land. Two had
previously had small landholdings of their own, but had lost them.
Race/Ethnicity: White, Afro-Brazilian
Gender: Four women are titleholders. One of them, Railda, was Secretary of
the Association from 2001-2005 (and is currently Secretary of the Rural
Workers' Union); she holds a leadership role that goes beyond formal offices.
Religion: All of the interviewees were Catholic except for two women - one
Adventist and one Evangelical Protestant. A number of Catholics attend mass
in Gameleira (2-3 km distance). There is no chapel in the settlement.
Age: Eighteen of the thirty-three interviewees were in their thirties or forties,
and this seemed representative of the settlement. Key leader Railda was 40,
and directory members ranged in age from 38 to 55.
Attrition: In the initial stages, there was considerable attrition, and only about
a third of the present settlers are from the original group. Vacancies were
filled primarily through family connections, so that there are many related
families presently in the settlement. Six of the fifteen families we interviewed
were original settlers. Most of the others arrived fairly early, the most recent
in January 2005 (a little over a year prior to our visit).

Education: There is a school in the settlement that teaches pre-school through 4th
grades. It has 46 students in the morning session, and 21 adult students at night. The
school building is owned by the Association, the teachers are provided by the

330

municipio.

The school has two classrooms, bathrooms, and office and a cantina

(small kitchen). The school building is in good condition, with ceramic flooring,
good quality desk-chairs, blackboards, large open windows. The rooms are light and
airy. There were a few pictures drawn by students on the walls.
Twelve respondents stated that the school is good to very good (one said
excellent). Two thought that it is so-so ( "mais ou menos "). One simply stated that it
is simple ("simples ") - a term roughly translatable as "nothing fancy."
Approximately six 5th through 8th graders from the settlement study in the
nearby village of Dona Maria. For 8th grade and beyond, students go into the town of
Olindina. Dessiene, 13, is one of these; she said that she enjoys going to school in
Olindina - fifteen students go there together on the bus.

Health: There is a health agent who lives in the neighboring area of Gameleira (3
kms. distance) and who comes once a month to the settlement. She performs some
basic services, such as weighing the children and checking for dengue fever, and
marks appointments for settlers to visit the doctor. There is a health post in Dona
Maria. The nearest pharmacy is in Olindina.
Three respondents stated that the health agent herself is good, although one
felt that she was limited ("muito devagar"); Americo noted that she is overworked.
However, most of the respondents felt that the health system itself is mediocre to
terrible.
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Water: There was an artesian well on the land when it was purchased; it is currently
owned and operated by the Association. The municipality donated 600 meters of
pipe. Americo told us the pipe is too thin (affecting the flow of water). However, the
settlers themselves installed the piping through a mutirao and now receive water in
houses. Previously they had to fetch it from a central tank (tanque).
The water tower holds 10,000 liters. Water is pumped into it from a diesel
driven pump (the electric company did not yet installed the 3 phase electrical
necessary for an electric pump).
Although there is running water for the settler's vegetable gardens on their
house lots, there is no water piped to the fields for irrigation. Irrigating the fields has
been discussed; it would entail extending water pipes or hosing to faucets on the
agricultural lots. Josenito, a member of the Fiscal Council, stated that he thought
such irrigation was not feasible, but other settlers cited irrigation as one of the goals
of the community.

Association and Collective Area: The Association meets weekly on Mondays, and
attendance was reported to be good. Members pay monthly dues of R$5. Several
interviewees stated that they thought attendance at meetings to be important.
Interviewees generally stated that there was not significant dissension within the
community, and that matters were discussed in meetings and - when no consensus
was reached - voted on. In each Association election, there has been only one set of
candidates.

332

Women generally attend the meetings, and nine of the women interviewed
listed themselves as being "very active" in the Association.

Marivalda, wife of

former President Edilson, stated that it is good that the wives participate, and that
386

many women think this way.

Holding office is limited to women titleholders:

Railda was secretary of the Association, 2001-2005, and Josefina was currently 2nd
Secretary. Railda stated that she finds the men to be more united than the women,
and that the women participate less than the men do.
Of the men interviewed, nine were members who had held no officer
positions, although all said that they attended meetings, and several mentioned
working in collective projects, paying dues, and generally participating.

Of the

others, Edilson had been president (2002-2004), Jose Pereira is currently vice
president, Americo is treasurer, one had been vice secretary, and three members or
substitute members of the Fiscal Council.
The collective land is planted with 20 ha each of passion fruit, oranges, and
cashew. There is also manioc on the collective land. Americo noted that the orange
trees on the collective land are not being fertilized due to lack of funds.
An issue in the past was whether a portion of the collective land should be
devoted to oranges or sheep (oranges prevailed). Another recent issue, peacefully
resolved, was the gate that was erected at the entrance to the community.387

386

Her husband agrees: "The two need to participate." (Edilson)

387

Due to the proximity of the highway, some of the settlers wanted the gate locked at night. Others
thought that would be inconvenient. The solution found was to lock the gate and provide each family
with a key.
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The primary current discussion topic at meetings is the care of the collective
crops - especially oranges, which require more care than do cashews. Railda stated
that administration of the collective lands does cause some division.

388

Josenito

mentioned that the failure of some to participate in the collective work causes
differences.
There is a rule that, if a settler misses three work days, he is suspended from
the Association. However, one settler who was suspended took the matter to court,
and the judge initially showed signs of supporting his claim. CDA's lawyers are
fighting the issue and say that legally the settler should not have a case. However,
there is a sense that the local judge does not understand the nature of the Cedula da
Terra settlements.
There are varying opinions as to how funds - including future funds - should
be spent; currently there are three opinions as to what should be the next investment:
a tractor, a casa de farinha, or irrigation (water piped to the fields). The disagreement
is only one as to which of these should come first; most settlers agree that all three are
desirable. "Tractor, casa de farinha, irrigation - these are our dreams but we don't
have resources." (Americo)
Jose Nascimento stated that, "For the time being, it's okay.

But [the

Association] could do more projects." He felt the prior President, Edilson, was more
active, traveling to Salvador in search of resources.

388

She also stated that the settlers who arrived later were generally more individualistic than the
original group that had worked together to form the Association and obtain the land. This is an
interesting point and is in line with those who believe that the struggle to obtain land may be an
important factor in community cohesiveness.
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The Association owns the school. When the school was constructed, R$1600
was left over in the building fund. The community constructed a covered bus stop on
the road and the entrance gate.
The last of the SIC funds - R$48,000 - were paid to COELBA (the state
electric company) to install electric energy. It is expected that the government will
reimburse the settlers this cost, in which case they would use the funds either to
construct a casa de farinha and a casa de mel, or to pipe water to the farm lots.389

Ecological Area: As required by law, 20% of the land is ecological reserve. This is
in two parcels - 25 ha. at the eastern edge of the settlement, and 65 ha. along the
settlement's southern border. Settlers spoke relatively little about the ecological area;
when they did it was merely to state that it was an area that could not be cleared and
was important for wild animals.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factors: The economy of this settlement is directed at diverse
fruit raising - principally oranges, cashews, and passion fruit. Manioc is an important
secondary crop. Livestock is not permitted.
Land:

The land purchase took place on November 13, 2001. The purchase

price was R$288.88 per ha, for a total of R$130,000. SAT funds were R$143,906.40
and SIC R$201,645.

389

Sergio Ricardo, interview of March 27, 2006. Railda believes that the decision will be for the casa
de farinha.
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The land cost R$ 130,000 (R$4334 per family). Payments are R$305 annually
for seventeen years. Most interviewees expressed no concern about land payments.
390

Income from the collective area is expected to be able to cover those payments,

although last year the settlers had to contribute a portion from their own pockets.
Thirteen of the nineteen farmers stated that their land is good. One said that
part of his is good, part weak. Two said that it is not good. Josenito and Mauricio
stated that it was not initially good, but is improving with care.
All of the farmers use fertilizer. "If you don't use fertilizer, you don't harvest
anything." (Americo) Several use commercial pesticides. Edilson, one of the most
productive farmers, uses only organic inputs, as do Xiquinho, and Gabriel. Americo
stated that he would prefer to use organic, but that "it doesn't work fast enough."
Five of the farmers mentioned that they would like to have more land. "If I
could arrange for more land, it would be good." (Xiquinho) Edilson, specifically
mentioned that he could work 15 ha. (he has nine); he hopes that his profits from the
land will allow him to buy more outside of the settlement area. Gabriel (Bie) stated
1G 1

that the settlers have too little land.

The tecnico, Sergio Ricardo, also stated that he

felt that 9 ha. is insufficient.
Financing: All of the families interviewed received PRONAF A, which was
earmarked for planting passion fruit, oranges, and cashews. The amount of the loans
reported ranged from R$ 13,000 to R$ 15,000, and they were drawn down in three
390

A possible exception is Gabriel, who stated that he would have to sell something ( "desfazer alguma
coisa ") in order to make the payments.
391

"Too little land, too little money - it's not good." (Gabriel)
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Interview March 27, 2006
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installments. The first repayment parcel is due in 2009. Three interviewees included
repayment among their chief worries.
According to Sergio Ricardo, the PRONAF A financing was appropriate for
7-8 has. He stated that the settlement was now ready for a new stage in financing, but
it had yet to take place. Seven families told us that they intended to take out the
special PRONAF loans for women (PRONAF MULHER - subsidized loans of
R$1000 - if paid in a timely manner at the end of the year only R$800 needs to be
repaid.) Four stated that they would use the loans to plant additional passion fruit,
one was deciding between passion fruit and beans, and two were undecided.

In

addition, Josefa told us that she and her husband were in the process of obtaining a
custeio loan to plant manioc, and Edilson stated that he was going to do the same.
Production and Income: As noted above, the PRONAF A financing was for
orange, cashew, and passion fruit, and all of the households interviewed had
commercial plantings of these three fruits. Most families had 2 ha. of orange trees,
the largest grove being 3 has. Cashew plantations ranged from 1 ha. to 3 has.393 All
families had 1 -2 has. of passion fruit, except for Edilson, who had 4 has.
Because passion fruit vines mature more quickly than orange or cashew trees,
passion fruit was at the time of our visit the major source of income for most of the
families.394 In 2005, Edilson harvested 16,500 kgs of passion fruit - which he sold at
R$0.50 - 0.80 per kg. He stated that his 2005 profit from passion fruit was R$3000 -

393

Sergio Ricardo stated that Sergipanos tend to see oranges as the basis of their security, but in fact
orange markets fluctuate a great deal, and only one in every three to four years is really profitable. The
big juice factories really set the price. He believes that, in the long run, cashew will be a much more
important and stable element of settler income. Interview March 27, 2006
394

Only one farmer mentioned selling small amounts of oranges and cashews.
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in 2006 he was expecting R$2000 - 3000 per harvest (passion fruit in the area can
render three to four harvests a year). Mauricio sold 12,000 kg at R$0.50, equaling
revenue of R$6000. Josenito did not have an annual figure, but said that he sold
R$200-300 a week when the passion fruit was producing, and that it produced fairly
continuously during the year.
Thirteen other families reported 2005 passion fruit sales of between 500 and
2500 kgs, all sold at R$0.50 - 0.60. The three remaining families sold little or none.
Sergio Ricardo noted that passion fruit had been providing a constant good price, and
stated that it guarantees the basic income ("feira ") of most of the families, who are
able to sell at least small amounts throughout the year.
Passion fruit is generally sold to middlemen who bring trucks from Salvador,
Feira de Santana, or Sergipe. Settlers noted that they could get a better price for the
passion fruit at CEASA - the produce wholesale center in Feira de Santana.
Increasing production will allow them to institute better selling practices.
Fifteen of the families have commercial planting of manioc, ranging from 1 -3
has. In some cases the manioc is planted alongside cashew trees, but most seemed to
be dedicated fields. Thirteen families reported some income from manioc.
Manioc is sold in a number of ways. Unharvested manioc may be sold - the
buyer harvests it and pays for it. Thus, for instance, Xiquinho sold 25 tarefas of
unharvested manioc for R$120 each, for revenue of R$3000; Denicio and Neide sold
nine tarefas at R$100; Josefina and her husband earned R$1700 from manioc sold "in
the land."
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Harvested manioc may be sold in small quantities or by the truckload. Or it
may be processed into manioc flour {farinha) and sold by the sack; prices vary
depending on the market and the quality of the flour, reported price per sack ranging
R$20 - R$60. Americo was possibly the top earner in this area, selling 60 sacks of
manioc flour at R$33 each, for revenue of R$l,980. 395 Because the settlement does
not have a casa de farinha, the settlers have to take their manioc either to Gameleira
or Dona Maria to be processed into flour, and the casas in those localities keep 20%
of the production in payment for processing.
Ten families had commercial planting of beans, normally 1-2 has., although
Railda and Edmundo had 4 has. Josefina and her husband sold 35 sacks of beans at
R$50, for income of R$ 1,750. The other families sold 20 sacks or less at prices
ranging from R$45 to R$60.
Three families had commercial plantings of watermelon. Jose Pereira has had
3 ha. dedicated to watermelon for the past four years and said the he "harvests a lot."
He sold 2000 watermelon in 2005, but did not state the price he received (as with
manioc, the price of watermelon can be affected by whether the farmer or the buyer
harvests the field.) Josefa and her husband received R$0.20 per melon - they sold
about 250 melons.
Railda and Edmundo have 500 papaya (mamao) plants and 500 banana trees.
She reported that they sell about 30 crates of papaya a week at RS10 a crate. Their
bananas were almost ready to produce at the time of our visit.
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Settlers also use a manioc by-product (goma) as starch for clothing. Manioc is also used for animal
ration and its remnants can be used for fertilizer.
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Most settlers have production of corn, squash, sweet potatoes, and other
vegetables (green beans, okra, inhame, maxixe, etc.) for consumption. Some sold
small amounts of these. For instance, Joao Firmo sells squash and watermelon at the
feira in Olindina.
All of the settlers interviewed have fruit trees on their house lots, often around
20-25 of them. In addition to fruits already mentioned, these include avocados, sweet
limes, lemons, coconut, acerola, mango, graviola, seringuela, pinha, guava, jack fruit,
persimmons, cacao, and others.
Livestock raising is not permitted in the settlement.

Only two families

interviewed indicated that they would like to raise livestock.396 We were told that the
rule extended to raising chickens; however five families have flocks of chickens,
Railda and Edmundo's flock, with forty chickens, being by far the largest.

One

family has a horse, and Antenio has three sheep that he keeps on his parents' land
outside of the settlement.
Only three of the men said that they hire out as daily laborers, earning R$8-12
a day. A fourth, Edilson (one of the most prosperous farmers), said that he worked as
a daily laborer until the PRONAF financing enabled him to really invest in his land.
Unlike some areas, we were told that it was common in this settlement for the women
to work in the fields.397

396

Sergio Ricardo pointed out that it is not practical to raise livestock with passion fruit, especially in a
small area. He believes that it is an illusion for small farmers to think they can depend on livestock for
a living. Interview March 27, 2006

397

Although on most subsistence farms in Brazil, everyone in the family helps out in the fields during
times of peak activity (especially planting and harvest), we found that in Tocantins farm families in
which the women had to work regularly in the fields were looked upon as being particularly poor - or
the husbands were looked upon as being shiftless, lazy, incompetent, almost abusive. This attitude
also seemed to be present in some of the settlements in this study. However, where - as here - the
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Two men receive retirement pensions.

Eight families receive the bolsa

familia or similar government subsidies, ranging up to R$95/month. Railda, who has
been the volunteer secretary for the Rural Workers Union in Olindina since 1998,
began in January, 2006, receiving a salary of R$300/month - she works there
Tuesdays, Fridays, and Saturday mornings. Josenito's wife is janitor at the school
and earns R$276/month when school is in session.
Other non-agricultural income seems to be less here than in some settlements.
Donice earns an average of R$10/month selling magazines. Antenio resells gas for
cooking - he sells about six tanks a month.
Josefa Carvalho mentioned that a primary need of the community is jobs for
women and youth. Railda mentioned a possible project with passion fruit fiber.
There are no stores or other commercial enterprises in the settlement. Several
interviewees mentioned that this made it difficult when they needed to make small
purchases.398

Sufficiency of Income:

When asked whether income was sufficient, eleven

households responded positively, six negatively, one said "sometimes," and an older
settler - who had just started receiving his old age pension three months previously said "yes and no" - that it is adequate for him because of the pension. Of the positive
responses, one noted the dependency of weather, and three indicated that the income

activity is fruit raising rather than heavy agricultural labor, the attitude may be different. Several
settlers noted that women are particularly adept at picking the flowers from passion fruit vines - a
delicate operation necessary to make the vines produce.
398

When Joao Firmo made this point as a minor complaint, however, his wife, Angelita pointed out
that, before moving to the settlement, she used to have to buy everything - now she also has something
to sell.
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was barely sufficient. Three of the negative respondents said that things are getting
better as the fruit production increases.

"Yes - it serves to live very well" (Jose Almeida - but he noted that the
bolsa escola helps)

"Yes - Thanks be to God!" (Xiquinho)

"We get by with what we have" (Gabriel)

"We make do ( "da um jeitinho ")" (Railda - but her home is a comfortable
rural middle class home with nice furniture)

"Something is always lacking - you have to think that way." (Jose Firmo but he noted that his passion fruit will produce better this year)

"It's tight. We do not have good nourishment (alimentagaoy (Americo and
Martinha - but they felt that this would get better with increased production)

Railda mentioned that some families have sold all their beans and were now
finding it hard to get by. Ilsa, who is the janitor at the school, stated that some
children arrive at school hungry. Her husband, Josenito, noted that this is partly due
to the drought and especially to its impact on the passion fruit harvest.
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Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction: Settler satisfaction was high. Of the adults interviewed, 29 said
they would not trade or sell their land - four emphatically.399 One said he would do
so only if the community became weak.

"It's our patrimony for securing our daily bread." (Gabriel)

"Here is to live and to keep for my children" (Jose Almeida)

Several other settlers also mentioned that their land was for their children.
Twenty-five of the interviewees stated that life in the settlement was better
than previously, and for thirteen of these it was much better. None said that it was
worse. One said that it was about the same.
Future:

Settlers were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future.

Many

envisioned a more abundant future when the fruit trees begin producing in quantity.
Jose Nascimento pointed out that the greater level of production will not only be good
in itself, but will enable the community to commercialize its produce more
effectively.
Confidence in agriculture as a future for their children was higher in Passos
than in any other settlement. In response to an open ended question about the future,
several settlers envision their children continuing to work in agriculture, either in the
settlement area or on nearby areas. Joao Firmo envisions his children working with
399

Eurides' statement in response to this question - "Hail Mary - God deliver me" ("Ave Maria - Deus
me livrel") does not translate well, but shows the depth of her feeling that she would never leave the
land.
343

him on his land - he notes that they could put up to three more houses on their agrovila lot. Edilson also noted that his son (who was then 17) will want his own house Edilson has already given each of his children a part of the land for which they are
responsible, and they each keep the profits from their portions. Railda stated that she
would not want her children getting jobs in town - that she would want them to stay
on the land. Joselito says that his sons, now in their twenties, like the land and will
stay in agriculture.

Jose Almeida wants his children to study, but to use their

education in agriculture. Xiquinho, Jose Almeida, Josefina Carvalho, Americo and
his wife, Marinha, all mentioned that they wanted their children to have land. Unlike
most settlements, no one interviewed stated that they wanted their children to get jobs
and work in the city.
This situation produces a certain pressure. Edilson mentioned in passing that
the collective land could be divided up for adult children of settlers, although it is
difficult to see how this could be accomplished in a fair manner (there would be only
90 ha of collective land to divide among 30 families). He mentioned that he initially
thought that 9 has was a lot, but is now realizing that he will need more for his
children, and hopes that the income from his lots will allow him to buy land for his
children outside the settlement. Donice and Bolero said they hoped their children
would form a group to obtain their own land.
Socio-Political Awareness:

When asked who helps the rural worker,

responses included the Federal Government (7), Lula/the President (6), the Rural
Workers' Union (4), CDA/CAR/the program (2), other unnamed politicians (2), and
banks - one specifically mentioning the Banco do Nordeste (2).
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There was one

mention each of the Association, the Coopertive (although nobody in the settlement is
yet a member), and the prefeito.
Opinions of the MST were mixed.

Of the twelve interviewees who voiced

opinions, five were favorable. Valdina stated that the MST had a "good idea: they
pursue [the land] and they get it."

Josefina Carvalho said that she thought the

Movement important because "so many people don't have land to work." Edilson
stated that the MST benefits thousands of families.
Six settlers had negative opinions, including two who have above average
knowledge of rural issues. Americo, president of the Rural Workers' Union, said he
participated in an MST activity in Salvador, but didn't understand well their program
objectives. He doesn't approve of invading land, but believes the government should
require non-productive landowners to either produce or sell. Railda admitted she
only knows of the MST via television, but questioned whether their real objective is
to obtain land - if so, she thinks that they are going about it in the wrong way.
Mauricio stated: "It is right to want land, [but] wrong to invade land."
In the last election, 25 of the respondents voted for Lula and five for Serra.
With respect to the next election, 25 intended to vote for Lula and five were
undecided (interestingly, these five did not include any of the Serra voters, all of
whom said they planned to vote for Lula). Four families stated strong identity with a
political party - three with the Workers' Party (PT) and one with the Liberal Front
Party (PFL) - a conservative party strongly identified in Bahia with the then state
political boss, Antonio Carlos Magalhaes.
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Railda noted that, with Lula in office, the rural worker was being helped from
the top down, as well as from the bottom up. Jose Almeida, who voted for Serra but
planned in the next election to vote for Lula, stated that Lula is "the only president
who has helped the small farmer." Edilson agreed: "Now the small [people] are the
priority" ( "Agora o pequeno e a prioridade. ")

Strangths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations:
Passos de Esperanq;a seems to us to be a highly viable community. Despite
difficulties of early high attrition, delay in disbursement of PRONAF A funds, and
drought, and the real need some families were experiencing at the time of our visit,
settlers showed a high level of satisfaction and optimism with respect to the future.
This optimism, based on the maturing fruit trees, seemed to us to have a solid basis.
The resilience of the community is perhaps due in part to the relative
homogeneity of the current settlers, and their roots in the old land reform area of
Colonia. Having been raised in a land reform area, the settlers have a realistic set of
expectations with respect to difficulties and goals. They have also not been very far
displaced, and are able to maintain friendship and family ties.
Even taking into account Railda's comment that the new settlers (who
constitute two-thirds of the community) are more individualistic than the original
group, it seems to us that the settlers have a relatively high degree of community
participation. The issue of collective labor, which almost inevitably tends to create
tensions in most settlements, has arisen but has not yet developed to the point of
having to seek an alternative solution.

Leadership in the settlement seems to be
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capable, creative, and recognized by the settlers, and divisions in the community
seem to be minor. Participation of women in the Association is positive, although we
would recommend that office holding be opened to non-titleholding spouses.
Technical guidance seems to have been very good.

The community has

avoided monoculture, and has at least four major sources of potential agricultural
income: oranges, cashews, passion fruit, and manioc. With Sergio Ricardo, we agree
that the other three crops will be useful in offsetting less profitable years for oranges.
We also agree that cashews may prove to be the real mainstay for the local economy,
especially if the community can engage in small-scale processing.
Cashew processing can be done on a very small scale - even a single family
can significantly add to its income by processing the nuts. However, both for general
processing of produce and for commercialization, it would be recommended that
Passos, as a relatively small community, consider combining efforts with other
nearby small farmers (in Colonia and elsewhere), to create a larger base for
operations. (We were informed that the Rural Workers' Union in the municipio has
over 3500 members, which indicates a strong population of small farmers.) This
could be carried out through cooperatives, which already exist in the area, or through
agreements among local associations.
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Case Study 6

Name of Settlement: Biritinga ("Assentamento Boa Vista")400
Families in Settlement: 37 titleholders + 2 houses of non-titleholders
Location: Municipio - Biritinga
Area: 807.4 ha. (842.622 ha.)
Contract Date: June 19, 2001
Dates Visited: April 18-20, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 21

Individuals: 33

Family size (persons): 1-3/7; 4-6/12; 7-9/2
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 16 women, 1 youth (male 16)
Ages: -20/2; 20-29/5; 30-39/9; 40-49/9; 50-59/5; 60+/3
Schooling: 0-2/13; 3-5/14; 6-8/4; one complete HS and one some university
In most of the families interviewed, husbands and wives were more or
less equally educated. In two families, the husband had three or more
years schooling than the wife.

One wife (not interviewed) had a

normal school degree - which allows her to teach school. Jurandi had
three years of university in mechanical engineering and Josi, his wife,
has a full high school education.
Technical Assistant: Sergio Ricardo Matos Almeida of TECPLATA, interviewed
March 27, 2006
400

Assentamento Boa Vista (Good View Settlement) is the official name, but "Boa Vista" is such a
common name among settlement areas that the community is often referred to as "Biritinga."
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Map V-6-A - Boa Vista (Biritinga) settlement.
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Figures V-6-D and V-6-E. Settler homes in Boa Vista (Biritinga).
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Geography: The settlement is located in a semi-arid region approximately 15 kms.
east of the town of Biritinga via a poorly paved state highway (BA-85),401 and less
than one km. north of the highway by dirt road. The town of Biritinga, however, is
very small, and settlers have at least as much contact with the larger town of Serrinha,
25 km to the west of Biritinga.
Each settler family has a house lot (15 x 50m) in the agro-vila and a farm lot
of 11 has. Two months prior to our arrival, the association divided up the collective
lots (see below) so that each family received an additional 3+ has. of grazing land and
135 additional cashew trees. The manioc, however, continues to be held collectively.
The current President of the Association, Antonio Sales de Silva, told us that
the settlers were not consulted as to the design of the agro-vila. They would have
preferred larger housing lots. The community has also opened a new street to
construct houses for grown children of settlers. Two families interviewed complained
about the distance of their farm lots from their houses (one other family decided to
live on their farm lot).

Climate: This area is classed by the IBGE as cerrado arborio aberto - a semi arid
vegetation type that occurs in the interface between cerrado and caatinga - consisting
of grasslands interspersed with small twisted trees.
Our visit to the community was at the tail end of a period of drought. One of
the older settlers, Lourival Ferreira Lima, summed up the situation well:
401

There was formerly a bus from Biritinga directly to Salvador that ran on this highway. This was
convenient for the community, but the bus was discontinued due to the bad quality of the road.

"Normally it rains well here. But once in awhile we have had these dry
spells. Usually there are a few thunder showers in the summer, but last
summer no."
He noted that, whereas they can usually plant cowpeas, watermelon, and other food
crops, it was more difficult this year.
The drought is an underlying theme in the case study.

Several settlers

mentioned losing cashew trees - some as much as 20%, although others almost none
(the cashew is well adapted to the semi-arid climate). The weather also partially
explains the relatively low agricultural production.

History:

In 1995, the Association Boa Vista, a group of sixty families led by

Antonio Cezar Mota de Carvalho (Lila), occupied a 22.000 ha. area called
Campolandia which had belonged to the Barreto Araujo company but was abandoned.
However, that settlement had problems as INCRA judged that the land was unsuitable
for agriculture, and the land was under mortgage to a bank.
In approximately 2000, Antonio Pedreira Lobo, who had been two terms
prefeito of the municipio of Biritinga, sought out Lila, who was his childhood friend.
Lobo had been an unsuccessful candidate for political office, had campaign debts, and
wanted to sell part of his land to cover them. The portion of land he offered the
Association was without water.
By this time the Association had approximately 80 families. Of these, only
twenty families qualified for the Cedula da Terra program and additional families
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had to be found.402 Lila and other families began moving onto the land in 2000,
although the Cedula da Terra land purchase was not effected until June 19, 2001.
Life was hard during the first several years. Settlers lived in tents while they
built their houses. There was neither water nor electric energy. What water they had
came from a reservoir on a portion of the farm that had not been sold to them. There
they bathed, washed clothes, and fetched water for construction of the houses; they
also drank that water. Water was considered a luxury - settlers stated they fried food
because there was insufficient water for boiling. Subsequently they dug a shallow
hole, lined it with plastic sheeting, and the municipal water truck would fill it once or
twice a week. CERB - the state water company - stated that they were going to drill
but failed to do so. The Association used its own funds to hire a private company
(CRIAR - Construfao e Engenharia Ltda.) based in Salvador to drill a well. This
well, drilled in 2004, caved in. The Association petitioned CAR to allow them to use
money earmarked for a casa de farinha to dig another well; CAR authorized this and
the new well was successfully drilled in August 2005 at a cost R$56,000.403
Lila continued to serve as president of the Association after the move.
According to those we interviewed, he was something of a dictator. Anyone who
spoke out against him he would threaten to expel from the community. He was also
said to have administered the funds of the Association unfairly, paying some people
for working when they did little or no work.

402

Interview with Lila's brother, Jose Rubens Mota de Carvalho, March 18, 2006.

403

According to Firmino Dos Santos, who was president at the time, CAR has pledged to reimburse
these funds. Inteview April 20, 2006
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Per CDA rules, Lila could not remain indefinitely as president. He selected
his successor, Firmino.

Once in office, however, Firmino refused to obey Lila,

generating a split in the community.404 In the next election (2004), Firmino's chosen
successor, Antonio Sales de Silva, defeated Lila by 36 to 35 votes.405 Sergio Ricardo
helped mediate the dispute. Lila ended up leaving the settlement, and currently only
eleven of the original families remain (and one son of original settlers406) - the other
twenty-five families are "new" settlers, not from the Campolandia group.
Attrition continues to be fairly high. During the year prior to our visit, two
families left, one because he accepted a job in the town of Serrinha, and one because
the wife had not wanted to come to the settlement in the first place and did not adapt
there.
However, the settlers considered 2005 to be a "blessed" year in several
respects. In addition to drilling the well and constructing the school (see below), the
community received electric energy.

The settlement had petitioned for electric

404

Firmino told us that as president "he lost a lot of time." A group of settlers who did not want to stay
left the land, but wanted to return in 2003 when money to build houses was disbursed. They created a
false document with the son of the prior landowner (apparently this document indicated that the
plaintiffs were the true directors of the Association) and demanded R$30.000. The Association won
the case, but spent R$3.000 on a lawyer, and Firmino had to spend a lot of time dealing with the case
405

This was the first election to have more than one ticket of candidates. Lourival, the current Vice
President, stated that part of the problem was that the newer families were feeling marginalized; by the
time of our visit, however, he believed that "Now everything is better - now we know each other
better."
406

Manoel; his mother was the original titleholder. Manoel had been working in the mechanic's shop
for the local Serrinha bus company, but lost his job. He was married with three children; his mother
called them to live with her (his father had had a prostrate operation and was away for six months).
His mother transferred the title to Manoel. Manoel's wife left him in 2005, taking their three teenage
children to live in Feira de Santana; Manoel met Luciene and she and her seven year old son are now
living with him.
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energy in 2003. Installations were finally installed on December 31, 2005.407 The
energy was turned on in the late afternoon, failed, and returned just before midnight.
At the time of our visit it had been functioning for three months.
Demography:

All of the men interviewed are of rural origin except for

Jurandi Nilo, who is a trained metallurgical technician from Sao Paulo.408 Five of the
women classified themselves as being or urban origin.
Before settling in the area, six of the men had possessed minifundios, and five
had worked small parcels of land owned by their families. Many of these had to also
sharecrop additional land or work as daily laborers. Three were sharecroppers who
also worked out as daily laborers. One was a bricklayer and agricultural laborer, one
was a full time bricklayer in Serrinha (where his wife was a domestic servant), one
had worked in the mechanic shop for the Serrinha bus company but had lost his job,
another was unemployed in Serrinha doing odd jobs.

One was an unemployed

security guard in Salvador, and one was living in an MST camp for landless workers.
Race/Ethnicity: Mostly white; one woman is the daughter of Gypsies.
Gender:

Four of the 37 titleholders are women; we interviewed three of

these 409 Joao Rocha and his wife, Del, are joint titleholders;410 Del was a

407

Electricity was originally requested under the "Luz no Camp" (Light in the Countryside) program.
This program required that the municipio enter with 10% of the cost, and there was a great deal of
lobbying and bureaucracy involved at the local level. The Federal Government then replaced that
program with "Luz Para Todos" (Light For All), which no longer required 10% from municipalities.
Jurandi Ferreira Nilo, one of the settlers who had been a Workers Party activist in Sao Paulo, was in
Sao Paulo on other matters and went to the party's central headquarters there with the request. This
was sent to the Ministry of Agriculture and funds for the project were authorized.

408

Jurandir left Sao Paulo and worked on his father-in-law"s land in Cipo (a rural area in Bahia not far
from the settlement) for two years before seeking his own land. He came to visit the settlement, loved
it (in his wife's words, he "adored" it [adorou]), and put his name in with the association in the event
of an opening. When another family left, he and his wife were called in. Because he receives a
government pension, she is the titleholder. Both are leaders in the community.
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member of the Fiscal Council. Zefinha is the Secretary of the Association
even though she is not a title holder.
Religion: This settlement is more religiously mixed than most. We were told
that there are four Assembly of God families in the settlement, and two in the
neighboring settlement of Boa Sorte; they are in the process of building a
temple in Boa Vista. We were also told that there are two Baptist families.
Among families interviewed, eleven were Catholic,411 three Assembly of God,
one Baptist, one Adventist, one mixed Catholic/Assembly, and one mixed
Adventist/Assembly. Two respondents stated that religion is a divisive factor
in the community.
Age: Eighteen of the 33 persons interviewed were in their 30s or 40s, and this
seemed to be representative of the community.
Attrition: Only eleven of the original 37 founders, and the son of another
founder, remain on the land.

Of the families we interviewed, eight were

founders. Many of the newcomers were persons who had some tie to the

409

Eugenia is separated from her husband and runs her land with the help of her two sons, who are 25
and 20. Josi is titleholder because Jurandi, her husband, has a government pension and therefore
cannot qualify as a titleholder. Jane was living with her husband on her father-in-law's land in the
municipio of Serrinha - there were 2 tarefas of land for 8 houses of relatives; her mother called her to
live in the settlement; she and her husband arrived in 2002, worked with her mother; her husband left;
in 2003, an opening came up and Jane got it in her own name; she is now living with Erivaldo.
410

Although rare under the Cedula da Terra, this was legally permitted where the couple is married
under civil law. Registration of land in the name of couples has since become standard.
411

Maria Jose coordinates religious education and Josefina, Nalva, and Gracinha help teach it. Jose
Marivaldo is one of the leaders of the Church. There is a Thursday prayer group. The priest comes,
alternately, every three months to the settlement and to the nearby settlement of Boa Sorte, and most
Catholic families attend mass at these two locations. The Catholics would like to build a chapel, but
have held their services in the Association building.
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community and were on a waiting list for openings.412

Most of the

newcomers we interviewed arrived in 2002 or 2003. We were told that two
families left and were replaced in 2005. Very early on, one family was asked
to leave.413

Education: Until the end of 2005, the school functioned in the Association building,
but the Association built a two classroom school. The municipio agreed to provide
the roof to the school - at the time of our visit, only one classroom had a roof, and the
school was beginning to function in that classroom. Twenty children study in the
morning pre-school to 4th grade.
classes.

In addition, 28 adults were signed up for night

The teacher is Elaine Pereira Lima, who lives in the settlement and is

daughter of the vice president of the Association.
Most interviewees felt that the school is improving. Five interviewees said
that the teacher is good to excellent, and three more classed the school as good.
Three said that the teaching is so-so ("mais ou menos "), and one said the teacher "is
not bad."

One said the school is not very good. Luciene stated that the school is

"normal for this region." Lourival stated that the educational system in Brazil is not
good.
Beyond the fourth grade, students go to school in the town of Biritinga. Only
one interviewee mentioned the schools there - she thought they were good.
412

Juraci, for instance, put his name on the waiting list in 2000; he waited two years for an opening.
Similarly, Jose Carlos had his name on the waiting list from the beginning; he worked with one of the
other men on the waiting list, Paulo (their wives are comadres [co-godmothers]), on a contract to clear
settlement land. In 2002, there were 13 families on the waiting list; the directory met and selected Jose
Carlos; Paulo was admitted later when a subsequent vacancy opened. Although Jose Carlos did not get
his own lot until 2002, he considers himself to be "almost one of the founders."
413

"The family was no good. Even the kids were no good." (Jair)
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Health: The Association has a small health post for a nurse who is supposed to come
every fifteen days. Several interviewees stated that she does not come that often perhaps once a month, that the attendance is poor, and that there is no privacy in the
health post. But five women and one man, in separate interviews, told us the nurse is
attentive, that she "helps a lot," that she is good. All acknowledged that the space she
works in is not adequate.
For any other health care, the settlers have to go to Biritinga. This usually
means walking to the highway (about a kilometer) and waiting for the bus.

Water: The difficult history of this settlement with respect to water is set forth
above. A successful well was drilled in August, 2005. The well has a capacity of
28,000 liters per hour. Although the community obtained electric energy at the end of
2005, at the time of our visit the well was still operating with a diesel motor as the
Association did not have funds to purchase an electric pump. We were told that
Petrobras would be donating a two-phase pump to the community.
The well has a 20,000 liter water tower. The Association charges a monthly
fee of R$10, covering dues, water, and electricity. Water is pumped to the houses.
Each residence has a 310 liter water storage tank. Because the tower was placed
lower than it should have been, the water pressure is low and there is some difficulty
in the flow to the houses.414

414

They received orientation from a geological engineer, Antonio Marcos Santos Raimundo (since
deceased), who told them that locating the tower 2.5m above ground would be more than sufficient.
They opted for 3m, but even that is not sufficient.
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Association and Collective Area: The collective land was planted with 5000 dwarf
cashew trees, and an area was set aside for grazing land. The community also planted
manioc; some was harvested and the income used to make the first land payment.
The pasture was used to graze sheep but "nearly all died - they were a total loss" ( "so
deu prejuizo "), and the community is discussing planting additional manioc on that
land.
Because very few settlers were participating in the collective work projects,
the Association divided the cashew and pasture collective area among the settlers.
This occurred two months prior to our arrival. Each family received seven tarefas415
(slightly more than 3 has.) of pasture land and an average of 135 cashew trees.
The intention is for each family to care for and harvest from those trees.
According to the President, Antonio Sales, the produce from the collective cashew
trees still belongs to the Association, and will be used to make land payments.
Differences among members in production level will be duly accounted for. The
Association manioc is still completely collective; a collective work day ("mutirao ")
is held every couple of months to keep the field clean, and "nearly everybody
participates."
Manoel is an enthusiastic supporter of the new system. He stated that the
collective work never reached 50% participation, and admitted that he himself owed
many days due to sickness. Today he says that his area of the collective is all cleaned
up - that he did it in a month. He feels that the Association is now moving forward
and can concentrate on finding new resources.

415

This community uses the Bahian tarefa (4.536 M2)
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Firmino, who was President from 2002-04416 and is now a member of the
Fiscal Council, told us that formal voting in Association meetings is rare - that many
decisions are made by consensus following discussion.

The meetings foster free

communications:
"Matters are well discussed.

People speak openly, each one giving his

opinion." (Gracinha)
Manoel noted that at times differences can be great, and that people can become
rude.

But both Jair and Jane said that the biggest disagreements arose from

administration of collective work, a matter that seems to have been resolved.
Dissension reached its peak in the 2004 Association election where, for the first
time, there were two slates of candidates. According to Lourival, the dissension arose
in part because the newer arrivals felt marginalized.417

Antonio Sales won the

election by one vote - Sergio Ricardo helped to mediate the dispute. Lourival feels
that the dispute is behind them - "Now we know each other better." Maria Elena
agrees:

"The two groups didn't have different proposals [ideas]. It has now returned
to normal."

416

Firmino, a jovial, upbeat person with a good sense of humor, noted something that several
presidents in the associations we studied encountered: that the time spent serving as president takes
away from their agricultural activities and puts them behind.
417

As noted in the History, above, it may also have been generated in part by the personality of Lila.
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Joao Rocha and Del said that there is now only one family that causes difficulties that the rest are "everyone is for everyone." Firmino stated that the Association is
well organized, representative, and "works for the benefit of all."
Jose Rubens believes that the Association could do better. He thinks it should
actively lobby for government help. He emphasized that this is not only the job of the
President. "[It's as though], for the municipal government and the banks, [we] don't
exist." He believes the Association should be constructing a water tank - and that the
A

settlement needs industry - he mentioned, as possibilities, a bolacho factory

1O

and a

broom factory. Josi, the current Treasurer, stated that she thinks the association is
weak, needs to be more united, and needs bigger objectives: "[The settlement] still
lacks a lot of things."
Josi, who is the current Treasurer, says that, when she took over, the
Association had no money in its account and owed the bank R$180 in fees, the
municipio R$490 for water, and various amounts for taxes.

She estimates that -

including amounts owed for days not worked and unpaid monthly fees - settlers owed
(and owe) the Association approximately R$5000.

She took measures, including

selling the remaining sheep (see below) and organizing expenditures, and the
Association now has R$1600 in its account.

She keeps clear books and posts

information regularly. Nonetheless, she stated that in January, for instance, only ten
families paid their full dues/utility bills. She said that there are two families who are
very economically strapped (both single mothers).419
418

See Case Study 2.

419

Josi also feels that community festivities are important, and (as a community member, not as
Treasurer) she helped organize festivities for the June Fetes (Festas Juninhas), Mothers' Day,
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There is also an issue with one family that does not live in the area, but has a
home in Serrinha. This is illegal. However, the Association expelled a member in its
early days and the experience was "horrible." So they now work on the basis of
trying to dialogue.
Miguel, who was Treasurer and is now a member of the Fiscal Council,
stated: "We gain a lot as members - including knowledge." Juraci agreed - he did a
sustainable agriculture course through the Association and went on an educational
trip. But he noted that all this had stopped occurring.
In two areas, the Association is advanced beyond most of those we studied.
They allow "worker members" (socios trabalhadores) - a category that recognizes
and gives voice (but not a vote) to non-titleholding residents who work land primarily grown sons or other relatives of settlers.
The Association also encourages the participation of women. Women who
are not titleholders are free to participate in Association meetings and leadership, and
many of them do so. Josefa, who is not a titleholder, is Secretary of the Association.
Joao Rocha and Del are joint titleholders; both have served as officers in the
association - he as vice treasurer, and she as a member of the fiscal council.

Ecological Area: The ecological area is distant from the rest of the community. The
settlers use it for bee-raising.

The President, Antonio Sales, told us that the

ecological reserve was not in the best place, that what is now the pasture area was

Christmas, New Years, Easter, the Cora Harvest Queen, and others. She taught a number of women
how to bake cakes.
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filled with trees which should have been saved. However, we were told that the
ecological area protects the source of a small spring of water.
Consciousness of the value of the ecological area was higher here than in any
other of the settlements. Three settlers also told us that they had set aside part of their
own land as additional ecological reserve.

Juraci said that he has a personal

ecological reserve that he would not remove for any reason ("de jeito

nenhum"),

consisting of a grove of trees with a large canopy. Manoel told us he keeps 5% of his
land in its natural state. Jane also noted that she and her husband have a private
ecological reserve that they believe is important "for the animals and for the rain."
Eugenia said that she hoped she would not have to clear all her land - if she had
money she would buy more land to avoid the need to clear it all.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factor: Biritinga has the highest percentage of organic farmers
of any settlement we studied.

Of the farmers interviewed, seventeen are fully

organic, one uses chemical pesticides only to kill ants and is moving toward using
only organic methods, and only two use a mixture of chemical and organic methods.
Land: The land purchase took place on June 19, 2001. The purchase price
was RS91.99 per ha, for a total of R$74,280. SAT funds were R$82,434 and SIC
R$294,750. The first land payment of R$5600 was made in December, 2005.
Ten of the farmers said that the land is fertile, three said it was not fertile,
three said it was so-so, and one said some is fertile and some not. However, their
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answers seemed as much based on expectations as on objective factors. Every one of
them stated that the land needs fertilizer to produce well.
Evandro stated that, for manioc, the land is of the best quality. Jurandi stated
that it is good for cashew, manioc, and vegetables. Joao Rocha said that the land is
good and, with fertilizer, very good. Firmino stated that, with fertilizer "everything
grows," and that by the third year of fertilization the land is good for beans. Paulo
said, "There is no such thing as bad land" - indicating that it is how you treat the land
that matters.
Jose Carlos, one of the least satisfied of the settlers, stated that without
fertilizer a tarefa of land produces 15 sacks offarinha, with fertilizer it produces 50.
He noted that you need a cartload of fertilizer per tarifa and the investmentt may not
be worth it. However, if his calculations are correct, it would seem to be worth the
effort: at a median sales price of R$25 a sack, the difference between the value
produced by the unfertilized and fertilized tarefa is R$875, and the cost of a cartload
of fertilizer is about R$200.420
Financing: All of the families received PRONAF A financing. Settlers had a
choice between opting for only cashew trees (in which case they received financing
sufficient for 1284 trees) or for cashew and apiculture (in which case they received
1070 trees and a kit including 10 beehives). Twenty-four of the thirty-seven families
opted for apiculture. A portion of PRONAF A could be used for manioc.
Nine of the farmers stated that they have applied for and/or are waiting for the
custeio, which they will use for manioc. The amount of the loan will be R$3000 per

420

Jose Carlos further detailed his costs as follows - R$55/hour for a tractor to prepare the land - it
cost him nearly R$ 1.000 to prepare 20 tarefas.
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homestead, repayable in 20 months at 2% interest, with a R$200 rebate for timely
payment.
As Firmino points out, the custeio is not really for manioc, but for the
fertilizer to make the manioc grow. The cost of fertilizer is a concern expressed by
many interviewees.

Chicken manure was R$800 per truckload in 2005, and one

interviewee said that he had heard it had risen to R1100; sisal residue was R$250 and
said to have gone up to R$300. Firmino expressed hope that the custeio would be
disbursed before the rains came, as he believes that after the rain starts the price of
fertilizer will rise and it will be more difficult to work with it in the fields.
Firmino purchased two truckloads of chicken manure last year (paid with
PRONAF A funds). He stated, however, that often two or three farmers will get
together to purchase a truckload. In addition to chicken manure and sisal residue,
Lourival bought cow manure.

He also emphasized that they need to buy by the

truckload - transport costs make smaller purchases more expensive.
Production and Income: Boa Vista (Biritinga) is a relatively new settlement,
subject to difficulties in getting started and a high rate of turnover in its early
population. PRONAF A funds were initially disbursed in 2003, but production has
been slowed by drought and other factors. As a result, this settlement has the lowest
agricultural production of any that we visited.
The primary PRONAF financing was for dwarf cashew trees, which had not at
the time of our visit begun to produce in significant amounts. All settlers initially
planted (approximately) either 1284 or 1070 cashew trees (depending on whether
they opted for apiculture), but nine of the farmers interviewed reporting significant
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loss of trees (100 or more) during the drought. Sebastiao said that he lost nearly 40%,
but this was unusually high. Seven farmers reported little or no loss. No farmer
reported income from cashew.
PRONAF A also supported bee hives (apiculture), providing 10 kits - each
with one hive - to farmers who opted for it. Thirteen of the farmers we interviewed
owned hives - almost all the standard allotment of ten. Not all the hives had bees, but
many did. Joao Rocha and Del had sixteen active hives and they sell honey at R$10 a
liter, R$8 a liter if the buyer buys in quantity. One other farmer mentioned that he
was beginning to harvest honey, but no other reported income from honey.421
However, at the general meeting we were told that settlers sell it in Serrinha at
R$5/liter.
The only crop from which significant income was derived is manioc. All of
the households interviewed have manioc, the largest planting being 9 tarefas. Manoel
told us that he had lost 80% of his manioc in the drought; he stated that, because the
second parcel of PRONAF A was disbursed late, he planted late and this resulted in
losing most of the crop. But no other farmer reported significant losses.
There are three private casas de farinha in the settlement, owned by settlers.
Maria Elena and her husband, Jose Maria, told us that theirs was the first casa de
farinha in the settlement.

They had operated it where they previously lived and

brought it to the settlement in approximately 2003.

Maria Elena told us that, since

the arrival of the other casas de farinha, she and her husband no longer process
421

Firmino established a "sharecropping" system (his term); a young man from the settlement who
understands apiculture agreed to take care of his hives, and they intend to split the produce 50/50.

422

Although they are original settlers, she did not fully move to the land until that date.
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farinha for other families; they have two tarefas of manioc, which they process for
themselves, selling a couple of sacks "from time to time." Other than that, in 2005
they sold two sacks of corn and some firewood (see below) and receive a small bolsa
escola. She said they live off their land, growing food for consumption.
Nininho and his wife, Aliene, own the second casa de farinha.423

His father

helped them finance its construction. They go to the feira in Serrinha every Saturday
and sell two to four sacks offarinha there each week (this is income of approximately
R$50-100 per week, or around R$3750 per year).

A truck from another nearby

settlement transports them, charging R$5 per person and R$2.50 per sack. Nininho is
also a bricklayer and painter, and earns money on jobs outside the settlement.
The third casa de farinha is owned by Sebatiao. He rents it to other settlers,
receiving 10 liters o f f a r i n h a from every 80 liter sack processed there. He stated that
the establishing of a new casa de farinha owned by the community would not affect
him as he has 9 tarefas of manioc of his own and will continue to use his own facility
to process it. In 2005 he sold more than 100 sacks offarinha at prices ranging up to
R$36/sack.
Antonio Sales earned in 2005 approximately R$3000 from the sale offarinha.
Four other farmers earned R$600-700 each. Jacira stated that her family had five
harvests of manioc in the last four years, and Joao Rocha and Del indicated they sell
it whenever they need to. None of the other families reported significant sales.
There were minor amounts of other produce sold, including corn and mangaba
(a native fruit that grows wild in the fields), but neither in economically significant

423

When I visited Nininho's casa de farinha a group of women were cleaning manioc in preparation
for making flour (see Figures VI-6-F and Vi-6-G).
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quantities. Lourival indicated that he usually plants watermelon for sale, but did not
do so in 2005 due to the drought; he said that his brother did plant and lost 60% of his
crop, and that the rest was dwarfed. Three families reported gathering and selling
lenha - firewood used in cooking stoves; they sell it at R$6 per meter to trucks that
pick it up and take it into town.
Almost all the families grew vegetables for family consumption, including
beans, corn, cowpeas, squash, onions, watermelon, and various herbs. Three families
had passion fruit (ranging from 30 to 100 plants). Most families had fruit on their
house lots - often 20 trees or more; the varieties included mango, acerola, banana,
coconut, orange, pinha, graviola, jack-fruit, sugar cane, seringuela, guava, papaya,
coffee, castor oil plants, avocados, lemon, and - in one case - grapes.
Ten families raise chickens - most in fairly small quantities, but Eugenia has
160 free range chickens; she told us that they were 2-5 months old, and start laying
when they are 6 months old. Lourival had plans to buy 200 chicks to start seriously
raising chickens. One family has 5 ducks. Five families have 1-2 pigs each, five
families have horses or mules and three have donkeys (three families have horse or
donkey carts).
Six families received government pensions: four retirement pensions and two
pensions for retarded children. Nine families received bolsa familia.
Sebastiao works as a driver for the municipio

of Serrinha, earning

R$600/month. Marivaldo's wife works as a teacher in Serrinha (she has had that job
23 years). Lourival works as a bricklayer in Biritinga and Serrinha, earning R$2530/day; he often spends the week away from home. His daughter will be teaching
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night school in the settlement and will earn a minimum wage (approximately
R$350/month). Paulo also works as a bricklayer. Jacira's husband works as a daily
laborer a few days a month earning R$15-20/day; Jane told us that her husband also
works at times as a daily laborer, but earns only $R10/day. Firmino's daughter works
in Serrinha as manager in a store; she sends money to help care for her son, who lives
with his grandparents in the settlement.
Juraci noted the need for economic activity to provide employment for women
and young people: his specific suggestions include a factory to process cashew pulp with a seal of quality, a honey factory, and a cooperative to sell their products at a
good price. Aleine also mentioned the need for a factory of some type to provide
employment for the women; she misses working and would participate in such an
undertaking. She says that this idea has been discussed but not acted upon; as the
cashew starts producing, possibilities may occur.424 Jose Rubens mentioned various
possibilities, including a bolacho factory425 and a broom factory.
The Vice President of the Association, Lourival, mentioned a proposal to form
a cooperative.

However, the community viewed the group proposing it as being

political. He noted that the people are not united with respect to this issue.

Sufficiency of Income:

As mentioned above, agricultural production in this

community is still at the beginning stages, and the community had experienced

424

Family and/or community scale cashew-nut processing is feasible; the equipment is relatively
inexpensive (and can sometimes be funded through grants); in programs carried out by GARD, a
development agency, local processing increased family income R$350 or more a month. (B. KingPowers, former director of GARD). Juice can be extracted from the pseudo-fruit, and the pulp can be
used preserves, candy, animal ration, or fetilizer.

425

See Case Study 2
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drought.

It is therefore not surprising that, when asked if income was sufficient,

thirteen of the households interviewed replied in the negative, while only three
replied "yes."

"Income from the land is zero." (Lourival)

"For the time being, no." (Antonio Sales)

"No. But we're beginning now. It should get better." (Manoel)

"It's nothing! It's not [sufficient]! It doesn't even serve to buy medicine."
(Isidora)

Settlers almost all took the question to apply to farm income.

Three families

mentioned that they live off of government pensions, and Jose Rubens said they live
on his salary as a driver in Serrinha.
The families that said that they have sufficient income include Nininho and
Aliene (they own one of the casas de farinha and sell 2-4 sacks of farinha a week,
and he supplements his income working jobs as a bricklayer and painter), Sebastiao
(he also owns a casa de farinha and has nine tarefas of manioc), and Joao Rocha and
Del, who have opted to live on the farm lot and have an approach which is closer to
subsistence farming than other settlers.426

426

"He who works has enough to eat." (Joao Rocha)
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Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction: The months before our visit saw two major victories for the
community - the opening of the well in August and the arrival of electric energy on
December 31. It is therefore not surprising that the overwhelming majority of settlers
said that they would not sell or trade their lots:

"It's going well -the difficult phase has already passed" (Leso)

"No - we'd have to do everything over again [somewhere else]" (Jane)

"We already suffered here. On the outside, the money would just come to

an end. We'll never leave." (Jair)

"I like it here - I came to stay." (Firmino)

"We worked before but never got any place. Here it is ours." (Aliene)

"[I ] got out of the slavery of working for others." (Juraci)
Fifteen of the interviewees were emphatic in their statement that they would not
trade or sell.

Gracinha - a particularly articulate and intelligent woman, simply

stated, "No [we won't leave] - this is our victory!" and her husband added, "We will
never leave - never!" Sebastiao stated, "We already struggled so much - we will not
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sell!" However, one couple was more doubtful and said they would not sell because
they were afraid. One woman said she would trade for another piece of land if she
could live in the country - she did not like living in the agro-vila in close proximity to
neighbors.427
Twenty-three of those interviewed felt that life was better or much better in the
498
settlement than it had been previously.

Zefina noted that it in the beginning it was

worse, but now it is better due to having water.
Maria Elena, who with her husband previously had 3 tarefas of land in another
location, was one of two who stated that things were worse in the settlement than
previously. At her old home, she had water readily available and planted a garden,
selling the produce.
Interestingly, the other person who said it was worse was Josi (Josenilda de
Gois Bento). She is a dynamic 33-year-old woman, with a full high school education,
a titleholder and an acknowledged leader in the community. She is committed to the
community and has no intention of leaving.

But she admits she came to the

community reluctantly because her husband really wanted to - he loves it there. 429
Future:

Interviewees were almost unanimously optimistic about the future.

Several mentioned expectations of increased production and income - especially from
427

We encountered this attitude occasionally in other settlements, and have seen it in other regions
where we worked. In certain rural areas it is customary for people to live fairly far apart, and some
people find village life, even in very small villages, not to their liking.
428

Gracinha, whose husband previously worked 'A tarefa of his father-in-law's land, stated: "How was
I to raise five children on XA tarefa of land? Where would they work? God helped this to happen. It is
a dream come true."

429

See note 528. Brenda King-Powers, who interviewed Josi and talked with her at depth, believes
that Josi, who is better educated and better off financially than the other women in the settlement, at
times feels isolated, especially when her husband travels to Sao Paulo to take jobs that supplement
family income (he is a trained metallurgical technician).
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cashew and honey.

Others foresaw processing activities of various kinds (as

discussed above) that will provide income and jobs.

Juraci sees projects for

additional land settlements surrounding them, bringing life and economic growth to
the region.
There are differences with respect to their visions of the future of their children.
Maria Elena wants her children to study and move to the city - she mentioned Sao
Paulo, Salvador, Feira de Santana.

Aleine also said she wants her children to

graduate and get jobs. Julia and Joao Carlos hope their children will be doctors,
lawyers, or teachers. But Gracinha is pleased that her seventeen year old daughter is
almost engaged to a young man from the settlement and that they will be working on
the land. Jailson, the sixteen year old son of Joao Rocha and Del, said that he wants
to work with his father in agriculture. Nininho says that his eldest son (now 12)
wants to be a cowhand.
Socio-Political Awareness: From our brief survey, the level of socio-political
awareness was somewhat higher in Boa Vista-Biritinga than in some other
communities. While many answers were typical of what would be expected from an
average rural person in the Northeast - based largely on current television opinion others were quite insightful.
Most observers identified Lula and/or the Federal Government as helping rural
workers. Jurandi, a Worker's Party activist, also noted the positive role of former
Brazilian President, Fernando Henrique Cardoso (from the PSDB), under whose
administration the Cedula da Terra program began. Others mentioned, among those
who help the rural worker, the Worker's Party (8 mentions), CDA and/or the Cedula
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da Terra Program (5), the Rural Workers Union (2), and the World Bank (2). Cited
as against the interests of the rural worker were politicians and/or parties who oppose
Lula (7), big business (5), and the local prefeitura (2). Jose Rubens, when asked who
was against the interests of the rural worker, responded "500 years of the elite." He
also discussed briefly the need for land distribution, and cited the law of sesmaria.
Although recent television had shown images of MST violence that alienated a
substantial portion of Brazilian people, including Worker's Party activists such as
Josi,430 responses to the MST among those interviewed were varied and nuanced.
Three interviewees mentioned that the MST essentially generated the demand for
land reform that led to the Cedula da Terra program.

"[I'm] in favor of the struggle for land, against invasion and violence. But
without [the MST], we wouldn't have entered here into the land." (Juraci)

Jacira, who spent two years in an MST camp before coming to the settlement, and
who still volunteers with the MST, stated: "They do so many good things - [the
experience] gave me courage to stay on the land." Other interesting comments:

"[MST] has good ideas in principal, but leads people at times into violence
and death." (Jane)

430

She stated that she was startled/afraid when she saw the MST violence on TV and that they were
invading land that had owners, which she felt was not acceptable.
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"Some parts are good, others no. Invading land is okay, but it has to be
thought through more carefully." (Antonio Sales)

"People can organize these days [as opposed to in the past] - they can now
organize and do this legally." (Gracinha)

"The Movement is good.

There are people who enter it who create

trouble... but the movement itself is great (otimo)" (Firmino)

With respect to politics, twenty-eight of the interviewees voted for Lula, and
thirty-one intended to vote for him in the next election. Eleven interviewees were
affiliated with a party - all of them the Workers' Party (PT), and two others said they
voted mostly for the PT.

Strengths/V ulnerabilities/Recommendations:
Boa Vista - Biritinga had a difficult beginning marked by high attrition,
struggles for leadership, water shortages, and lack of infrastructure. It has the lowest
level of agricultural production of the settlements studied.
However, there are indications that the settlement may have come through
these difficulties and may be headed toward a high level of sustainability. Most of
the families who do not really want to farm have left the community, to be replaced
by those who do. The dynamic leader who helped start the community, but who may
have been a barrier to its growth, has moved on.
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2005 was a banner year for

infrastructure - with the community finally receiving both electricity and water, as
well as a school building. And the cashew trees that are to provide the economic base
for community agriculture are maturing and should soon be producing significant
income.
Although settlers will undoubtedly continue to plant manioc and to have
sidelines such as bees and bananas, the planned economic basis of the community is
essentially a cashew monoculture. As mentioned elsewhere, monoculture is almost
never desirable.

It leaves crops more vulnerable to diseases, and proves more

devastating to the community when those diseases occur. However, the cashew is a
hardy plant, native to the Brazilian Northeast, more resistant to drought and disease
than most.
Another drawback in monoculture is that it exposes growers to the impact of
international markets - in this case, the market for cashew nuts.

This is a real

problem, but can be dealt with in part if the community goes beyond simply growing
cashews and gets into processing them. Equipment for community based cashew nut
processing is relatively inexpensive, and it can add R$350 or more to monthly family
income.

In periods of low prices, it can also facilitate the storage of nuts in

expectation of future increasing prices.
In addition to the nut (which is the true cashew fruit), cashew produces a
pseudo-fruit or pulp which can be processed into juices or sweets, or used in a
number of other manners, such as animal ration and fertilizer. With proper planning
and investment, the settlement could develop a series of processing activities that
would both increase income and provide jobs.
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The Association has shown an ability to resolve issues creatively.

This

creativity was illustrated in the decision resulting in the private administration - but
continued collective ownership - of the collective cashew trees. Steering a course
between collectivization and privatization, the Association removed a major source of
dissension (participation in collective work days) while assuring that income would
continue to be available to make land payments.
It is hoped, as Manoel suggested, that with this issue behind them, the
Association will be free to focus on larger objectives - such as the cashew processing
facilities mentioned above. This will require leadership, vision, and a certain unity of
purpose. Our interviews indicate that the potential is present, if not yet fully tapped.
Yet another hopeful sign is the high ecological awareness of the community.
This is illustrated not only by the unusually high value placed on ecological areas, but
by the large number of organic farmers - a factor which, in itself, increases the
likelihood of sustainability.
Finally, the inclusion of women and worker members, as active participants in
the Association, increases the diversity and number of potential contributors. It also
increases the sense of ownership of these groups of community residents in the
activities of the Association and the settlement.431

431

When working with small landless workers and small farmers in Tocantins, we discovered that
families in which both spouses were active were far more likely to stay on the land than were families
in which only one spouse was active.
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Case Study 7

Name of Settlement: Fazenda Veneza (Assoc. Produtores Rurais da Fazenda Veneza)
Families in Settlement: 30
Location: Municipio - Euclides da Cunha
Area: 1,004.79 ha.
Contract Date: October 4, 2002
Dates Visited: March 18 & 20, 2006
Number Interviewed - Households: 18

Individuals: 28

Family size (persons): 1-3/1; 4-6/15; 7-9/2
Persons Interviewed: 16 men, 11 women, 1 youth (male 18 years old).
Ages: -20/1; 20-29/6; 30-39/12; 40-49/1; 50-59/3; 60+/5
Schooling: 0-2/10; 3-5/9; 6-8/5; 9-10/1; HS complete/1
Note: Generally the women have more education than the men. Among
wives not present at the interviews, one has a university education and is
doing post-grad work, one has a normal school diploma and is doing
th
university; and one is a former teacher with an 8 grade education.
Technical Assistance: Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu of NATE (Nucleo de Assistencia
Tecnica Agropecuaria Ltda.)

Geography: The settlement is located 30 km. northeast of the municipal seat (19 km. of
good paved road, 11 of good dirt road). The area is semi-arid and relatively flat. The
total area is 1004.79 has. Each of the families has a dwelling lot in the agro-vila (20 x
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35m) and a farm/grazing lot of 15 has.

The collective area is 344.97 ha., and the

ecological reserve is 200.96 ha.
Houses in the agro-vila are located on four dirt streets around a very large
rectangular central open area (100 x 280m). Each house faces the open area. The open
area contains a soccer field and sites for construction of a school and a health post. The
Association headquarters - community center is located on a corner lot, kitty corner to
the northeast from the open area. The farm lots are located to the east of the agro-vila,
the collective land immediately to the west, and the ecological area at the far western
extremity of the settlement.

Climate:

Vila-Canaa is located in the semi-arid region, and is the most arid of the

settlements we studied. The native growth is caatinga.
History: Massacara, a village {povoado) dating from the 17th Century, was the original
seat of the present municipio of Euclides da Cunha. In the early 1990s, Massacara and
the area surrounding it were declared to belong to the Caimbe Indians; the land was to be
marked (demarcado)
432

as an Indian reservation

and the non-Indian

population

removed. Local resistance and bureaucracy resulted in delays, but in 1999 this was

carried out. Non-Indian residents were indemnified by the state for land (if they were
landowners) and improvements (both landowners and others), and many moved to the
town of Euclides da Cunha.
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According to interviewees, following generations of intermarriage, the distinction between Indians and
non-Indians was based on lists maintained by the Indian bureau (FUNAI) and was somewhat arbitrary.
Some respondents contended that the list was based upon those who had signed up for FUNAI benefits
some time in the 1980s. There seem to have been families in which one brother was a registered Indian and
another was not.
382

I

PLANTA PLAN1METR1CA
ftESIW D&$ XR6AS:
LOTE-PAOflfo-T00m««J0. tuOOOt*
RIMS E AVE N [OAS
- 11.960*'
PflAfAS E A.IMST!TUeiONtt> 18.000<»«
TOTAL • 90360 m*

FAZENDA

VENEZA

PR0JET0 00 LOTEAMENTO OA AQROVILA
MUNICfPIO OE EUCLIDES DA CUNHA - 8 AMI A
associacXo 003 Moounnes aurais oa fazenba veneza
<*SM/0
I 03
&MMUNM UAMuMAMRS
5 . 0 6 hectores

Maps V-7-A and V-7-B. Above: Fazenda Veneza agro-vila. Below: full plant of
settlement, showing the agro-vila (center south), with agricultural fields to the east,
communal lands to the west, and the ecological reserve at the far western edge.
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In 1997, Joao de Deus de Carvalho (Janjao), a non-Indian resident of Massacara,
formed an association of residents dwelling in Massacara who wanted to find alternative
land. The original association had approximately 60 households. Joao and most of the
others were moved to Euclides da Cunha in 1999.

They became aware (through

television and radio) of the Cedula da Terra program and began the process. Not all the
members of that association qualified for the program, and some of those who did
decided not to remain in the settlement. Twenty of the present settlers came from the
original association (which changed its name to Fazenda Veneza after they purchased the
land); the others were friends and relatives, except for Francisco Dias, who was the
watchman on the property for the original owner and who received a lot.
The owner of the land that they are on was a mechanic (garage owner). The land
had been rented out to a neighboring farmer but was, as one settler (Edeon) put it, "semi
abandoned." The owner sold them 749.5 ha. at the rate negotiated with the government,
then included the remainder (255.29 ha) at no charge.
Several of the settlers came and saw the land before it was purchased. After
purchase, as in other settlements, the men came first and began work. Most kept their
families in Euclides da Cunha until their houses were built.
The settlement was named Veneza (Venice) because the settlers had heard of
Venice, Italy, and liked the name.

Demography:

Almost all the original settlement dwellers were families who were

removed from Massacara during the demarcation process.

Two of the families

interviewed include registered Caimbe Indians who could have remained in Massacara
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but elected not to. Two families interviewed, in both cases not original settlers, were
formerly small landholders from an area close to but not included in the demarcation
zone.
All families interviewed were of rural origin. The great majority had been small
landholders previously, although one had been a share cropper, one had worked on land
belonging to family, one was a rural day laborer and bricklayer, and one simply described
himself as an agricultural worker.433

Race/Ethnicity: White, Native American, Afro-Brazilian
Gender: Six of the thirty titleholders are women (we interviewed three of these)
Religion:

Virtually the entire population of the settlement is Catholic. (One

interviewee told us his wife is Assembly of God.) However there is no chapel in
the settlement area; few of the participants listed themselves as active in church,
and those few put their participation at a low level. Two young men (18 & 21 yrs
old) from the same family mentioned that they would like to build a chapel, and
one other couple mentioned spontaneously that a chapel would be something they
would like to see to better the community in the future.

One interviewee

mentioned that the Catholics would like the priest from Euclides da Cunha to visit
them, but that he has not been responsive.
Age: Average age of settlers is about 35 years old. The technical advisor, Maria
Djalma, believed this to be one factor that makes Veneza a successful community.

433

This interviewee, Adenor da Silva, also claimed to be a retired gunman, a claim confirmed by his
neighbors.
385

Twelve of the twenty-eight people we interviewed were in their thirties, and six in
their late twenties.
Attrition:

14 of the 18 families we interviewed were original settlers.

The

remainder took over vacancies - three of them fairly early (2002) and the fourth
in 2003. None of the late comers had to pay indemnifications to prior settlers.

Education: A municipal primary school with 60 students operates in the Association
headquarters pending construction of a school. There is one teacher (with one aide) who
teaches 1-2 grade in the morning and 3-4 in the afternoon. She is from the community
and holds a teaching degree from UNEB (a regional state university).

Interviewees

almost unanimously stated that the teacher is good but that the facilities are not (we
observed the school in session and agree that the room in the Association headquarters is
barely adequate). Several interviewees also mentioned a shortage of books.
Twenty middle and high students study in Euclides da Cunha; the municipal
government provides transportation. Respondents felt the schools there are good, but that
the transportation system is difficult. Only one couple (Raimundo and Monalisa) cited
studies/schools as a major worry.

Health: Interviewees felt that health care is inadequate. There is no health agent at the
settlement. Settlers have to travel 30 kms into Euclides da Cunha to get medical care.
One child died for lack of medical care. One respondent injured his leg and had to walk
eleven kms to the highway to get transportation into town. Two interviewees cited health
care issues as their major worries.
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Figures VI-7-C and VI-7-D. Students in temporary classroom located in the Fazenda
Veneza Association headquarters (top picture is an outside view of the headquarters).
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Figures VI-7-E and VI-7-F. Above: Association tractor and transportable water tank.
Below: Titleholder Duvalina Rodrigues da Sousa in her donkey cart.
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Water: The Association owns an artesian well with capacity for 1500 liters/hour, and a
3500 liter transportable water tank.
At the time of our visit, the community was waiting for better quality water to be
piped in from Monte Alegre, approximately 100 km. distance.

This project was

underwritten by CAR, part of the same project designed to provide water to Vila Canaa.
The piped in water would be used for drinking.
Only one interviewee cited water, per se, as a major worry.

However, many

interviewees noted the profound influence of climate - especially rain - on the settlement
(see below). The water being brought in by CAR will not resolve the issue of irrigation
needed for crops. Interviewees noted that, in their agricultural fields, they still depend on
water brought from their own well - a distance of up to four kilometers. In addition to
the Association transportable tank, some settlers carry water to their in barrels in their
two-wheeled horse carts - a laborious process.

Association and Collective Area:

Maria Djalma, the technical advisor, informed us

that the Veneza association is the strongest she has seen, and that it is one of the few that
she believes can fulfill the goal of undertaking complete payment for the land. When we
arrived at the settlement, we were favorably impressed by the good quality of the
Association building, which is used in part as a temporary school. Four men from the
settlement were constructing a galpao (covered area) for keeping the Association tractor,
tools, etc. We learned that the men were being paid for their work - and that, indeed, the
Association has sufficient income to pay settlement men for their work at $R14/day - a
significant source of income for some of the families.
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Claudio Carvalho, the treasurer, told us that the Association has savings. If a
family is paid up on their Association dues (R$2/month), the Association will cover
medical costs; when the son of one settler had to be taken to Salvador for health
treatment, the Association paid.

The Association contributed R$700 to the settlement

Christmas party, and sponsors parties when there are soccer games.
The Association owns a tractor. The tractor works out for R$100 a day for nonmembers (this was said to be market price) and R$80 a day for members. There are three
tractor drivers - all from the settlement; a driver earns 20% of the day's take.
The Association has 65 ha. of pasture land, 20 ha. of palmas, a machine that
processes palmas for animal feed, and a corral with a 50,000 liter water tank.

The

Association flock is 430 goats and 70 sheep. Annual production per year is 150 head.
Two men from the settlement are designated to care for the flock. They do not receive a
wage, but are compensated in the traditional manner - for every three kids born, they
keep one.
Much of the Association's income is due to the settlement's 90 ha. of sisal,434 35
of which are allocated to the collective area.

The Association owns a machine for

extracting fiber from sisal (decortication) - the residue is processed as feed for goats. A
2005 report (NATE) estimates the potential annual output of sisal fiber from the
community at 3500 kilos per ha, or 315,000 kilos, with a market value of R$0.80 per kilo,
for an estimated income of R$252,000, of which R$ 100,000 would be direct Association
income. Several months prior to our visit, a fire broke out in the collective sisal and 30

434

According to SINDIFIBRAS - the union of vegetable fiber producers in Bahia, Brazil in 2006 supplied
150 tons of sisal fiber (valued at US$130 million), approximately 42% of world production. 90% of the
fiber produced in Brazil comes from the State of Bahia. (International Fiber Journal - February 2006)
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tarefas435 (26% of the collective sisal) burned. The loss in value to the settlement was
estimated at R$30,000. Despite this loss, the remaining sisal is considerable and provides
income to the Association.
Leadership in the Association is primarily male.

One member of the Fiscal

Counsel (Marilu) and the Second Treasurer (Monalisa) are women, both are titleholders.
Duvalina, a titleholder who runs her lot with her two sons (21 and 18), stated that she
enjoys participating in meetings. Other women mentioned participating in meetings of
mothers for the school, and in a group of artisans organized by the Association.

We

briefly discussed with the community the legality of non-titleholder spouses (mostly
women) voting and/or holding office in the Association.
When asked about their participation in the Association, unlike other settlements,
most interviewees discussed participation in the work days rather than at meetings.
Collective work is performed every Friday morning (8-11 a.m.) and participation is
strong. We heard almost no complaints about collective work436 - on the contrary, many
interviewees cited collective work as a unifying factor, and as something they enjoyed.
Discussions over issues do exist. Several women organized a petition to have the
school constructed in the plaza area (as originally proposed in the agro-vila plan). They
presented this to the meeting, but a decision was reached - to which the women agreed that it would be better to construct the school in another location.

435

We were informed in Veneza that a tarefa is approximately 3.025 m2, a measure closer to the Sergipe
tarefa (3.052 m2) than to that typically associated with Bahia (4.356 m2). The calculation in Veneza is: 1
palmo = 22 cm., 10 palmos = 1 vara, 25 varas = 1 tarefa (in other areas of Bahia, 30 varas = 1 tarefa).
436

The only significant criticism came from Jose Tancredo, who felt that the work days were not used as
effectively as they could be. He stated that, as a result, some palma was lost and the project of using sisal
residue for ration was delayed.
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Ecological Area: The ecological reserve is a single area of 200.96 has. (the obligatory
20%) at the western end of the settlement.

Settlers had few comments about the

ecological area. One interviewee told us that the settlers use the reserve for grazing.

Economy:
Distinguishing Factors: Veneza is the most arid community we visited. It is the
only community we studied in which livestock raising is the most important activity. The
role played by sisal is also unique.
Land:

Each family's portion of the land cost is R$110 per year, paid in

September. There is a grace period of 3 years, followed by payment over a 17 year
period (the first payment was made in September, 2005). The settlers expressed no worry
about land payments, stating that the income from the Association, especially the sisal,
should pay the land costs.437
When asked if the land is fertile, eleven of the eighteen households interviewed
answered "yes." Two others remarked that the land is good when it rains, but that it is
weak when dry.

Jose Tancredo stated that the land is the best in that part of the

municipio. Dalvina modified her answer by saying that it is good for sisal and grazing.
Del^o, however, feels the land is "not the best" - that it is tired and overworked.
However, Edeon stated that, although the son of the former owner did work the land, the
land has lain fallow sufficiently to recover.
Twelve of the households stated they do not use fertilizer. However, the president
of the Association, Erico, informed us that virtually all of the families use animal manure
to nurture their palma. Jose Tancredo stated that beans and corn need fertilizer to grow;
437

In a separate interview, Maria Djalma, the technical assistant, concurred with this opinion.
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he and two others stated that they use natural fertilizer only. Only one farmer stated that
he currently uses chemical fertilizer, and one other (Claudio) stated that he had used
chemical fertilizer in the past but now uses goat manure.

Only three of the farmers

interviewed use chemical pesticides, and two of these said they use them only to control
ants.

Although these factors make most of the settlers in Veneza de facto organic

farmers, there did not seem to be as yet a strong sense of consciously opting for organic
farming, as there was among other farmers, most notably many in Nova Lusitania and
Biritinga.
Financing: All of the families interviewed participated in Pronaf A financing.
Each family had the right to a subsidized loan in the amount of R$ 15,000, drawn down in
three parcels:
1st parcel (15 March 2005) - R$6285 for clearing land and fencing
2nd parcel (June 2005) - R$4788 for planting of 1 ha. of palma, 2 ha. of sisal
(planted jointly with grass for grazing)
3rd parcel (March 2006) - R$2350 for purchase of 20 nannies or ewes and 1 billy
or ram [it was noted that, due to delays in issuing the parcel, it was
received after the rainy season began and the price of goats had gone up,
and would probably not be sufficient for the number indicated]
remainder - R$1577 for technical assistance.

The loan is repayable over seven years at R$1238 per annum, including a 46.5% rebate
for timely repayment of installments

438

The loan is for preparation of 21 tarefas of soil,

438

In cases where repayment has not been possible due to valid factors - e.g., weather - settlements have
been able to renegotiate the timeliness of payments.
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fencing, planting of 1 hectare of palma and 2 has. of sisal, construction of a covered
corral and drinking facility (for goats).
Three of the farmers, and the wife of a fourth, stated that repayment of PRONAF
is one of their chief worries. Edeon noted that he will have to sell sheep in order to make
the payment.

Claudio said that fifteen of the families will have problems repaying

PRONAF.
Production and Income:

Livestock raising is the chief activity in Veneza,

although economically sisal production is the most important mainstay of the community.
Goat and sheep raising are of primary importance.

Sixteen of the eighteen

families interviewed have goats: Janjao has 140 goats, Jose Tancredo has 80,
Raimundinho has 50, and two other families have 40 each. Seven families have ten or
less. Fifteen of the families keep sheep (which are raised for their meat - the climate is
not adequate for wool), the largest herds being around 30. Del90 buys and sells goats
both at the feira and to his neighbors
Erico sells one goat a month at R$5/kg. Rogerio sells 30 head a year. Adenor has
sold 4 goats over a 2 year period at RS70 each. Jose Carlos sells 4-5 goats a year at
R$4.50-5 per kg.
Raimundinho is one of two trained goat herders for the Association. As noted
above, the herders are not paid for their work but receive one kid for each three born.
Seven families have beef cattle - the largest herd (belonging to Janjao) being 11
head, but most around five or six. Two other families keep cows. Only two raise pigs.
Most families have chickens - usually around 11-15, although one family has 60.
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Eight families have a horse, donkey or mule. Four settlers have animal-drawn
plows.
Fifteen families planted grass (capim) for grazing, ranging in area from 4 to 21
tarefas. Fifteen families raise palma - a cactus usually used for animal feed (it can be
consumed by humans when necessary); fourteen of the families had 3 tarefas or less,
although Janjao and Irineide had 4 tarefas.

Many of the families have hog plum (umbu)

- a small, edible fruit that grows wild in the fields, which most also use for animal feed.
Sisal is the most important crop. As noted above, a 2005 NATE report estimated
potential sisal sales for the settlement as a whole at R$252,000, of which approximately
R$ 100,000 was from collective lands. The remainder, processed by the Association, is
from the family lots.

Allowing 20-30% for processing, this should result in family

income from sisal averaging between R$3500 - 4000 a year.
However, these are projections for the future.

Only one interviewee - Jose

Tancredo - reported significant personal income (R$1000) from sisal in 2005, although
several mentioned the importance of the collective sisal crop.
Sixteen families interviewed grew sisal, most of it planted after the purchase of
the land, although (in addition to the collective sisal) two interviewees - Francisco Dias
(who lived on the land prior to the purchase) and Jose Carlos - had some older sisal.
Most interviewees had approximately six tarefas of sisal, but others had considerably
more: Francisco Dias (30 tarefas), Jose Carlos (28), Getulio (16), and two (Adenor and
Renan) had none.
Eleven families raised corn interspersed with black beans in areas ranging from
two to seven tarefas. Two families raised corn alone. Janjao stated that he plants bean
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and corn only for consumption, and this seems to be the case for a number of families.
However, some sell their excess production.
Getulio, for instance, harvested fifteen sacks of beans, and sold seven in town at
$R45 each. He also sold 29 "colhidas" of corn (20 ears) at R$16 each. Rogerio harvests
20 sacks of beans a year, and sells half of them. Telfo sells 30% of what he produces
(bean & corn). Jose Tancredo sold 5 sacks of beans @ R40 and 10 sacks of corn @ 16.
Raimundinho also said that he sells beans, but did not indicate the quantity.
The only settler who reported more than a few hundred reais from bean sales was
Edeon. He reported that he sold 40 sacks of black beans in 2004 at R$55-60 each,
revenue in excess of R$2200.
Del<?o mentioned that he could rent land outside of the settlement area for
planting beans at R$100 per tarefa. He was apparently considering doing so. He owns a
Chevrolet pickup, which provides him with greater mobility than most settlers. He told
us that his father owns a 500 ha .fazenda 30 km east of Veneza.
Seven families interviewed had small plantings (<3 tarefas) of vegetables squash, manioc, cord beans, sweet potatoes, aipi cassava. One family had 14 tarefas.
Two families had small crops of castor oil plants (mamona).

Delfo tried planting castor

oil, but was unsuccessful.
On their house lots, settlers had planted fruit trees (guava, a^erola, orange, passion
fruit, etc.), cotton, and small quantities of vegetables.
Non-farm income can also be important.

Tel^o's household is an example.

Although he is sixty-four, he does not yet receive a retirement pension. He hires out as a
day-worker approximately seven days a month, earning R$14/day.

396

His wife is a

luncheon assistant (merendeira) at the school, earning a minimum salary (approximately
R$300).

Their 18 year old son also works half days as a day laborer, and studies the

other half. The family earns an additional R$25/month selling homemade sweets. The
family has 20 goats, a donkey, 2 ha. of sisal, 12 tarefas of grazing land, four tarefas of
corn, and three of palma.
Similarly, Walter, who is fifty-nine, is trying to get a retirement pension, but there
is a long waiting list. He earns about R$20/month selling tanks of gas for cooking. His
wife, Dalva, sews and sends clothes to her daughter in Sao Paulo to sell. Walter works as
a daily laborer when he can, sells beans, and sells livestock when necessary. The family
has over 60 goats and sheep, 8 beef cattle, 15 chickens, a donkey and cart, 5 tarefas coplanted with beans and corn, 2 ha. of sisal, 1 ha. of palma, and 20 tarefas of grazing land
(he also uses the ecological reserve for grazing).
In addition to Walter, Tel^o, and Te^o's son, two other men mentioned working
as day-laborers (at R$14/day) as a significant source of income. Joao Rodrigues, the 21year-old son of settlers, earns somewhat less (R$10-12/day) driving the Association
tractor.
Demo's wife is a teacher's aide in the school, earning a minimum salary. She is
studying for her undergraduate degree at the university branch in Euclides da Cunha.
Two interviewees receive old-age pensions. Eight of the families interviewed,
and five others in the settlement, receive the bolsa escola/familia, ranging between R$65
and R$95/month. One family had a $ 15 bolsa that was discontinued and another family
had registered for the bolsa and was waiting.
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Sufficiency of income: When asked whether family income was sufficient, only one
interviewee responded "yes." Five families answered "no." Most indicated that income
is barely sufficient.

"It has to be [sufficient]" ("tern que dar")- (Delijo)

"[It's] on the edge (meu balangado). There are tight weeks. At times [paid] work
is lacking [since] the sisal work stopped." (Raimundo)

"It is more tight than tranquil" ("Mais apertada do que sossegada") (Francisco &
Rosenilde)

Several interviewees mentioned that they were waiting for the land to produce.
Jose Tancredo stated that the land currently creates expenses, not income. Two families
mentioned that they were surviving based on the R$95/month they receive from bolsa
escola.

An underlying sense of hope was voiced by Rogerio, who - when asked if

income is sufficient - answered, "not yet."

Settler Attitudes:
Satisfaction:

Partially, perhaps, because it is the newest of the communities

studied, settler enthusiasm in Veneza was among the highest we encountered. Of 27
settlers interviewed, twenty-four were definite in saying that they would not trade or sell
their land. One woman said she would leave if she could find a better place, and one
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couple said they wouldn't sell, but would trade for a lot in another location if it were a
good one. Twenty respondents stated that life is better in the settlement than it was
before, and for eight of these it is "much better."

"In the beginning it was difficult... there wasn't either electricity or water. In
December [2005] they opened a new well." (Irineide)

"Some things are better. There we had more peace - we had water. What is
better here is that we have a chance to have livestock - there we had less than one
tarefa [of land]" (Ines)

"Before we had water but we didn't have land, we had meat but we didn't have
work." (Edeon)

Future: The interviewees were overwhelmingly optimistic about the future. Most
envisioned increased livestock and sisal production. Several mentioned that results will
depend upon their work.

"We will produce more. The Association will have good income. We have to
work to move things forward. It's not easy." (Claudio)

"We are gaining experience." (Edeon)
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In this, the most arid of the communities studied, there is an intense awareness of
climate:

"[Things will be] 100% better - if God sends rain." (Walter)

"If there is no drought, it will be better - if there is, it will be worse." (Adenor)

"If it rains, it will be better - everything depends on rain." (Irineide)

Attitudes toward the land as the future of their families varied. Edeon stated that
in five years his family hopes to have a house in town - one son, who likes the land, will
stay there. Raimundo wants his children to study and grow - but to really know the land;
he doesn't want them to go to the city, but to grow on the land. Jose Tancredo wants to
increase his landholdings - buy more land for the children that are with him and to enable
his older children to return from Sao Paulo.
But Francisco Dias feels that "The young people won't stay." Eighteen-year-old
Douglas wants to become more qualified as a mechanic and have his own garage in ten
years. Irineide wants her children to graduate from school and seek "a better life, other
fields of work."

Socio-Politcal Awareness: In answer to the questions as to who is for or against
the rural worker, most interviewees had general answers or none at all. Cited in favor of
the rural worker were Lula (6), the Federal Government (3), Maria Djalma (3), and
CDA/CAR (2). As against the rural worker, the responses included nobody/don't know
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(7), big landowners (2) - although Edeon clarified that it was only big landowners who
were politicians. He also felt that people from southern Brazil, who do not respect the
Northeast, represented a barrier. And Janjao mentioned politicians who pretend to be in
favor of land reform but who in practice are against it.

On a highly practical note, Edeon stated that the main force working against the
rural workers was the bank, which wasn't dispersing loans in a timely manner. Similarly,
Erico felt that lack of available land and financing were the biggest barrier to the rural
worker.

Attitudes toward the MST varied. Walter noted that there is an MST invasion not
far from them - Fazenda Jua - where twenty to thirty families had been for the last five
years: "I think it's wrong to invade. I wouldn't... but the guys want to work." Similarly
Renan stated that he doesn't favor invasion, but that "There are many who want land and
can't get it through agrarian reform - [so they] invade."

Perhaps exposure to a nearby MST settlement was one factor that made settler
opinions toward the MST more nuanced than in some other settlements. However, some
interviewees seemed to gain their information about the MST primarily from television.
Edeon stated that this explicitly in his case. He also had sympathy with the workers:
"[It's] a way of demanding rights." But he felt that a great number of them lost out in the
face of resistance from landowners and gunmen.

Raimundo Monies felt that "No one knows who is right."
MST's struggle, but said that it is sad when workers are killed.
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He respected the

Other comments included:

"We see ugly things - invasion. It is better to negotiate." (Delpo)

"There are people who need land. [The MST] helps." (Duvalina)

"[We are] against.

It provokes tragedy.

[They should] search for a

program similar to the Cedula da Terra." (Adenor & Raimunda)

"It's good and bad at the same time. It's wrong to break things as they
have been doing." (Telt^o)

"The struggle is right - to achieve agrarian reform. The manner in which
they [carry out the] struggle is wrong." (Raimundo & Monalisa)

"The Movement in itself is good. Certain actions are not good. Invasions,
for example." (Getulio)

"Some [participants of MST] want agrarian reform. Others only want...
[to create] confusion." (Janjao)

With respect to politics, as in all the settlements, the interviewees were largely
supporters of Lula.

Eighteen interviewees had supported Lula in the first round of

elections, six Ciro Gomes, and two Serra (the Ciro Gomes votes split 4-2 in favor of Lula
in the second round). Sixteen said they would support Lula in the upcoming election,
three Alkmin, and three were undecided; one other woman said she would not support
Lula but was undecided as to which other candidate to choose. Claudio stated that he
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thought Alkmin and Lula were both good candidates, but that "Lula understands the rural
Northeast."
Only five interviewees identified with a party - four with the PFL and one (Tel<?o)
with the PT. However, three of those who identified with the PFL intended to vote for
Lula.

Strengths/Vulnerabilities/Recommendations:
"I have never seen a project more sustainable than this one." (Maria Djalma,
interview, March 21, 2006)

Maria Djalma has served as technical advisor to several Cedula da Terra and
Credito Fundiario projects, and has visited many more. Her opinion carries weight.
During our interviews at Fazenda Nova, we noted a high degree of optimism. As
noted above, it is necessary to take into account the relative newness of the settlement when we visited, Fazenda Nova had been functioning for only four years and still had
SIC funds available. Although the first land payment had successfully been made, the
first repayment of PRONAF A funds had not yet fallen due. It is to be expected that
some of the initial settler enthusiasm would still be in place.
Bolstering that enthusiasm, and giving it a more solid footing, was the enviable
position of the Association with its substantial sisal crop.

Association income,

principally from sisal, allowed the Association to pay for medical expenses, contribute
funds for settlement celebrations, and pay settlers (and their grown children) to work on
Association projects. This last is particularly important for community morale, both
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ameliorating the issue of who performs Association work and providing a source of
income for families that are having difficulty with cash flow.

Some of the other

communities we visited provided such paid labor out of SIC funds but had to stop doing
so once SIC was used up. It appears that the Veneza Association may be able to continue
such payments on a permanent basis.
The accidental burning of a quarter of the Association sisal planting illustrated
community resilience. This was a significant set back - the estimated annual cost to the
community being in the range of R$30,000. But, although regretted, it by no means
seemed to discourage or even seriously worry the community, which was already looking
into replanting the burned area.
Also encouraging was that the Association had moved up the supply chain with
respect to sisal.

Having obtained the appropriate decortication equipment, the

Association extracts the fiber which allowed it to obtain a larger percentage of the total
final price.
The community is leveraging well the by-products of its produce. Animal manure
and manioc residue are both used for fertilizer, and sisal residue for goat feed.
The settlement does, however, have vulnerabilities. The one most noted by the
people themselves is climate. Sisal is well adapted to the semi-arid region and is highly
drought resistant. A prolonged dry period, however, would affect the settlers' ability to
grow supplemental food crops. We recommend that the community consider using some
of the rainwater cachement techniques developed for the semi-arid region by such NGOs
as MOC and CAATINGA.
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Drought could also impact stock raising. In this respect, the significant planting
of palma - a drought-resistant cactus - serves as an excellent hedge. Palma has long
been used in the Brazilian Northeast during dry periods to feed animals - and, in severe
droughts, human beings. It also serves as a source of nutrients when fed to animals on a
regular basis.
The danger of overgrazing needs to be considered. Though the use of animal
ration developed from palma, sisal residue, and other local ingredients can extend the
natural grazing capacity of the land, we saw no evidence that the community has
considered placing limits on the size of herds. We are concerned that some settlers are
grazing animals in the environmental reserve.
The de facto organic farming of the settlers is encouraging. Generally, chemical
fertilizer is not used in growing sisal. However, with respect to other crops, settlers may
be currently depending to a large degree on natural fertility, as the land was fallow for
some time. There may be a growing need to use fertilizers in the future. We would
encourage the settlers to seek orientation in organic methods and to more consciously
pursue organic practices. Especially given the delicate balance of the semi-arid area in
which Veneza is located, we would also recommend that the community seek to become
aware of the value of the environmental reserve and of best ecological practices
generally.
As with any commodity cash crop, sisal is subject to market forces beyond the
control of settlement dwellers. Current international demand for sisal fiber is strong, but
markets fluctuate. Given the limits of the semi-arid climate, the settlement has taken
steps to diversify: having two principal activities, sisal and stock-raising. Beyond the
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raising of food crops for consumption and small scale marketing, which the community
has already undertaken, it is difficult to envision what further forms of diversification
might be possible, but we believe that an effort should be made to examine all such
possibilities thoroughly.
This being said, it is our opinion that Fazenda Veneza exhibits characteristics that
make its sustainability over the next generation highly likely. The agricultural-economic
base is relatively strong, leadership seems to be reasonably capable, the Association well
organized, and there seems to be a high level of satisfaction and cohesiveness within the
community.
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CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Case Study Analysis

Is market-based land reform potentially an effective instrument to redistribute
land to working farmers in a socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable
manner?
This is the primary research question posed by our study. Case study interviews
and observations were structured to provide information that could lead us to predict
whether there is a reasonable probability that the seven land settlements we visited will
be sustainable. "Sustainable" was defined as follows: that the settlements be socially,
environmentally, and economically viable for at least a generation (±25 years). Questions
were based on the sustainability indicators discussed in Chapter II.
Even positive results from the seven settlements studied would not, of course,
definitively answer the research question. As noted in Chapter II, we purposely selected
communities that we believed to be relatively successful (see Tendler 1997).

The

success of these communities might be an anomaly; if only seven successful communities
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resulted from the entire market-based land reform program in Brazil, the program itself
would hardly be viable.
Case study research is seldom definitive; we agree with Seidman (1998, 111) that
"Much of what you learn may be tentative, suggesting further research." The current
study provides a strong basis for such further research. But our readings and interviews
also suggest that the cases here presented represent a sampling of a larger number of
reasonably successful MBLR settlements. Perhaps most important, our study - together
with those of other researchers - may aid policy makers and program technicians in
understanding what factors help or hinder land settlement viability.
Yin (1994, 102-103) notes that there are "few fixed formulas or cookbook
recipes" for analyzing case study results, and that a good deal depends on the
"investigator's own style of rigorous thinking, along with the sufficient presentation of
evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations." At the same time, and
in no way contradicting this rigor, the validity of the investigator's intuition needs to be
recognized, although it is still incumbent on the investigator to articulate as fully as
feasible the criteria used by intuition in selecting threads of fact (Seidman, 109).
In the present case, rigorous thinking included careful design of the interview
questions to respond to key research questions, and organization of the case study
presentations. These were done in such a way as to allow relatively easy comparison of
factors across the seven communities - demographics, water, income/production, etc.
Features that particularly distinguished one community from others were also flagged.
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Key Research Questions
In support of the primary research question, our Research Proposal set out six
secondary research questions.

Those questions are answered in summary form here

based on the experience of the seven settlements studied.
What

is

the

facility

of

the

process

(of

acquiring

land

and

establishing/maintaining the settlement) from the point of view of the purchasing
farmers?
This question needs to be placed in the context of land reform in Brazil. The
traditional methods for obtaining land in Brazil have been settler occupation (or invasion)
of land and/or expropriation of land by the Government. Both of these methods usually
take years to concretize.439 Occupation at times leads to violent conflict and is often
frustrated where the owner resists physically and/or legally. Expropriation (except in
cases where the owner wants the land to be expropriated) can be held up in the courts for
years.
Against this background, the processes in the communities studied were
comparatively less difficult and more certain, although they were in some cases longer
and more difficult than they should have been.
In some communities, the difficulty was not so much in obtaining the land - a
process that went fairly quickly - as in the following stages. Thus in Boa Vista III
(helped by the considerable experience developed by CELANOR over the prior three
439

For instance, Fernandes (2006, 7) states that "The land expropriation process can take as long as five
years..." and that "Some settlements existing for more than ten years still have few public services
available."
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years) and in Moita Redonda (see below), the land acquisition process was relatively
rapid. But release of funds - especially for housing construction - slowed settlement: in
Boa Vista III, a year and a half lapsed between land purchase (June 8, 1998) and real
settlement of the area (late 1999/early 2000); in Moita Redonda, the lapse between
purchase (September 1998) and settlement (September 2001) was two years.

In

addition, the continued failure of state officials to register replacement families in Moita
Redonda has undoubtedly been a factor in that community's slow stabilization.
Even where delays in funding did not slow settlement, they often delayed
investment essential to the long-range stabilization of the communities.

This was

especially the case with respect to the five communities in which fruit-raising is an
essential element, as fruit groves require three-five years to begin commercial production.
Thus, for instance, Moita Redonda was purchased in 1998, settled in September 2001, but
PRONAF-A funding that permitted full-scale planting of fruit trees was only authorized
in December of 2002 - allowing planting in early 2003. Full maturation of the orange
groves would occur in 2008 - 10 years after purchase. A key element necessary for
economic sustainability of the settlement was thus delayed up to four years beyond what
might have been achieved.
The birth of Nova Lusitania was very difficult, in part because it was one of the
first four Cedula da Terra settlements in the state - all organized by CELANOR and all
purchased on November 9, 1997. State officials and local technical advisors, as well as
the farmers themselves, were learning by doing.440 These were the first agro-vilas - a
concept promoted by CELANOR that subsequently became standard. Evaluation of the
440

"In the beginning [1997-8], nobody knew how to do it." Maria Djalma, interview March 25, 2006.
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land purchased was not adequate. SIC and PRONAF funds were not available until 2002.
Because technical assistance depended to a certain extent on such funding, technical
assistance was suspended for awhile in 2000.
Moita Redona's acquisition was facilitated through the influence of local
politicians, although it still took almost two years between the time the group initiated the
search for land and the purchase date. This political help may have come at a cost, partly
because of inclusion of some inappropriate urban background settlers (all of whom have
since left), and partly because continued intervention by local politicians in the
community is disruptive. In addition, in the opinion of the local technician, the relative
ease of obtaining the land may have caused some settlers to undervalue it.
In Vila Canaa, the acquisition negotiation was handled largely by the settlers
themselves. It proceeded relatively rapidly, being completed in less than a year. Settlers
did have to extra-legally contribute R$300 per family to meet the gap between the price
the landholder wanted and what the government was willing to pay; this is not permitted
in the program, but it worked and saved the deal from falling through.

Additional

funding (SIC) was held up for about eighteen months due to political issues, but was then
released.
In Passos de Esperan^a, the acquisition process was more difficult. It took the
association three years from the time it organized to locate and buy land. When the land
was located, the government only authorized the association to buy 450 ha of the 500 ha
available.
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Boa Vista - Biritinga actually had its birth in Campolandia, a semi-successful land
occupation; although in 2006 that occupation continued to exist, the settlers after eleven
years had not won legal right to stay on the land. Settlers from Campolandia, frustrated
by the lack of progress there, formed the core of the initial settlers in Biritinga (20 of the
37 families came from Campolandia). By comparison, legal right to Boa Vista - Biritinga
was obtained in less than a year. Interestingly, in this case, settlers began moving onto
the land in 2000, prior to the actual purchase in June, 2001. However, it required another
four years for settlers to obtain an adequate water supply - an essential component of
their settlement package. Shortage of water, together with a leadership struggle and the
presence of some settlers unsuited or uncommitted to rural life, led to high attrition in the
early years.

In Veneza, the newest of the settlements, both the acquisition process and
financing went smoothly.

Beyond the 749 ha purchased, the landowner donated an

additional 255 ha. The settlement was benefited by the substantial plantation of sisal
already on the land.
The Importance of SIC and PRONAF. Integrally related to the ease of acquisition
is the SIC component of the Cedula da Terra program. This program, discussed in the
Overview of Case Studies, provides funding - as a grant, not a loan - for housing,
fencing, basic infrastructure, and some initial planting (e.g., fruit trees), equipment, and
small productive projects.
Berta Veloso and Antonio Fernando da Silva, state agronomists who worked with
a large number of land reform programs throughout Bahia, briefly compared the Cedula
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da Terra to the Banco da Terra,441 another market-based land reform program that did
not include the equivalent of the SIC. They frankly stated that the SIC made the Cedula
da Terra much more viable. 442

SIC provided the groundwork for the communities to

move rapidly beyond land acquisition into productivity.
Closely related to this is the PRONAF-A program, which provides subsidized
agricultural loans for land reform settlements. In his study of the Cedula da Terra in
Ceara, Gomes de Alencar (2002) found access to such credit to be one of the positive
points that settlers mentioned as a result to land reform.443

Although none of our

interviewees explicitly stated it in that way, the great majority made use of the PRONAFA credit, and several had advanced to PRONAF-A/C - the shorter term "custeio " loans.
Indeed, several interviewees noted the need for greater amounts of working capital. In
Moita Redonda, the technical advisor encouraged settlers to join the local rural credit
union, and a few had done so. Access to credit and to financial information and skills is
an area in which these communities could develop significantly; we sensed a readiness to
learn if more opportunities to do so were made available. We recommend that further
training in this area be provided to settlers, beginning as early in the settlement process as
feasible.

441

The Banco da Terra, created in 1998, was a parallel program run by the Brazilian government with
slightly different goals. Unlike the Cedula da Terra and the Credito Fundiario, the Banco da Terra was
not aimed at poverty alleviation per se, did not limit beneficiaries to the poor, foresaw reimbursement of all
expenditures (not just land costs), and allowed for financings up to R$40,000 per beneficiary (compared to
a combined ceiling of R$ 15,000 under the other two programs) (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 30).
442

Interview January 31, 2006.

443

Germani and Carvalho (2001, 93) raise the question as to whether the nature of the title (i.e., that land is
titled through the association rather than individually) will inhibit future access to credit from other
sources. We have not heard this concern expressed elsewhere, but it merits further examination.
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What is the relative quality and value of the land purchased, in comparison
with other land reform procedures in Brazil?
A significant concern with land reform programs in Brazil has been the use of
relatively marginal lands for land reform. This is the case with expropriation, where
landowners may make available for expropriation and/or not resist the expropriation of
lands that they view as less valuable/desirable. In addition, under Brazilian law, only
non-productive land can be expropriated, a rule that tends to limit the availability of land
to lower quality parcels or to geographical areas distant from markets.

The non-

productive land rule does not apply to land purchased through the Cedula da Terra and
similar market-based programs, but the former factor - that the current landholder has to
be willing to part with the land - certainly does apply. Critics express concern that
landowners will retain the best land and sell marginal/less good lands to the settlers.444
In three of the seven cases we studied, this seems to have occurred. It is probable
that the reforestation companies that sold land with impacted soil to the Nova Lusitania
community and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Boa Vista III, were aware of the problem and
did not share this information with the purchasers.
In Biritinga, the landowner sold the settlers a portion of the land that was without
a readily usable source of water - although in this case the transaction was transparent,

444

"It is also not possible to avoid... that landowners put their worst land on the market." (Buainain, et al.
1999,26)
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the purchasers being aware of the situation.445 As noted above, it took the settlers four
years to obtain an adequate water supply, a considerable hardship.

However, the

essential fertility of the land seems to be adequate.
At the other end of the spectrum, the land in Vila Canaa, which had been fallow
(as pasture) for some years prior to settlement, is very fertile.

It has proven to be

excellent land for beans and other crops, and has substantially increased in value.
In the remaining settlements, the quality land seems to be neither substantially
better nor worse than the general land in each respective geographical area.

Biritinga,

Moita Redonda, and Passos de Esperansa are all reasonably fertile.
Veneza, although typical of the very dry area in which it is located, represents
something of a warning sign.

As land values increase, MBLR programs are pushed

toward areas where cheaper land is available.446

This issue was confirmed by Maria

Djalma, the technical advisor for Vila Canaa and Veneza. She noted the difference in
quality of those areas, acquired respectively in 1998 and 2002. She told us that, although
there is tremendous interest, especially among the young adult children of settlers, in
opening additional MBLR areas, it was becoming difficult for her to find land at the price
authorized by the government.447

445

It should be noted that Biritinga was also by far the least expensive land per hectare - see Table VII-A.

446

Deininger (1999) notes that, in order for MBLR programs not to raise the cost of land, the ideal ratio of
land supply to demand should be 3:1. In the region in which Maria Djalma is working, there is no
indication that the increase in land prices is a result of MBLR programs (this confirms Teofilo and Prado
Garcia's finding (2003, 31-32) with respect to the program generally). Prices have risen for other reasons,
most notably recent recognition that the region is excellent for raising beans.
447

Under both the Cedula da Terra and Credito Fundiario programs, the ceiling allowed for land purchase
plus grant (SIC) is R$15,000 (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 31). As to the importance of the program
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Table VII-A - Price per hectare
#
families

Contract
date

806.00

26

11/09/97

B. Vista III

1,375.00

55

V. Canaa

1,649.00

73

Settlement

N. Lusitania

Area
(ha)

Price per
hectare
R$

Land
price per
family
R$

104,780

130.00

4,030

06/08/98

178,750

130.00

3,250

05/25/98

247,350

150.00

3,388

269,250

163.28

3,688

V. Canaa 448

Land R$

Moita R.

677.00

50

09/18/98

172,355

254.58

3,447

Biritinga

807.40

37

06/19/01

74,280

91.99

2,008

P. Esperan.

450.00

30

12/26/01

130,000

288.88

4,333

Veneza

749.50

30

10/04/02

130,00044V

173.45

4,333

Veneza 450

129.38

1004.79

Table VII-A sets forth the price of the land per hectare and, perhaps more
important, per family settled - as comparatively higher per hectare prices (Moita
Redonda and Passos de Esperan^a) may be justified by the quality of the land being able
to sustain more families. In most cases, these figures for the settlements studied are

having a price ceiling, see e.g. Buainain et al (1999, 26), who suggest that the structure of the Cedula da
Terra program - with associations of buyers who know that they are going to have to bear the cost of the
land - is the best mechanism, in theory, for assuring a good balance between land price and quality.
448

Vila Canaa Settlers contributed R$300 each extra-legally to augment the land purchase = R$21,900.00.
This increases the real land price from R$150 to RS163.28 per ha.
449

Land price is estimated based on SAT.

450

The landowner contributed 255.29 ha. without additional charge. This decreases the real land price
from RS173.45 to RS129.38 per ha.
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roughly comparable to those for the entire Cedula da Terra program, which were an
average of RS191 per hectare451 and R$4,759 per family (Childress and Munoz 2008,
l). 452 The notable exception is Biritinga, where both the price per hectare and the price
of land per family are considerably lower than both the program average and the other
settlements visited.
Table VII-B sets forth the cost of each settlement in terms of SAT and SIC
investment. With the exception of Veneza, which is something of an anomaly (the owner
donated over 25% of the land, and the exchange rates for dollars were highly skewed),
cost per family ranged from approximately US$7700 to $9400, with four projects in the
$8500-9000 range.

This compares with R$ 11,975 (approximately US$80 00453) per

family planned for the Cedula da Terra program generally (Lambais 2007, 18).
These costs also compare favorably with the cost of land reform programs
generally.

According to INCRA (2002), the cost of land only for resettled families

ranged from R$ 19,412.74 (at R$382.67 per hectare) in 1995454 - when no MBLR

451

The average for Bahia was higher - R$230/ha (Teofilo and Prado Garcia (2003, 31).

452

Gomes de Alencar, in his study of the Cedula da Terra in Ceara (2002, 30-31), cautions against
overemphasis on low per hectare or per beneficiary costs. He studied three settlements where land cost
ranged from R$349/ha and R$6,825/family to R$89.35/ha and R$4,280/family. He concluded that only the
most expensive of these three was likely to be able to pay off its debts - the other two were not sufficiently
productive.
453

This figure is obtained by averaging the exchange rates for 1997-2000, when the majority of Cedula da
Terra programs were carried out. Pursuant to theory (see, e.g. Deininger 1998), the total for SAT/SIC per
beneficiary was to be identical for all program beneficiaries, the cost of land (SAT) being deducted from
that total as a loan, and the remainder remaining as a grant to the community. One purpose of this was to
encourage communities to negotiate hard on the land as they would thereby have more SIC funds (and less
high loans). Although the basic loan-grant structure was maintained, the equal distribution to all
beneficiaries seems not to have been followed.
454

In Brazil, with respect to INCRA expropriations prior to the Cardoso administration, "...anecdotal
evidence of excessive compensation abounds"
(Deininger 1999, 23 n. 32; see Ministerio de
Desenvolvimento Agrario 1999; Gondim 2001a and 2001b).
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programs had yet been implemented - to R$8,294.83 - 9,701.00 (at approximately R$260
per hectare) in 1998-2000 (Teofilo and Prado Garcia 2003, 22). Thus the average price
of land for all land reform programs was, in 1998-2000, almost twice that of the Cedula
da Terra program.
Table VII-B - Cost per family in US$455
Settlement

SAT R$

SAT US$

SIC US$

Total US$

US$ Cost
per family

N. Lusitania

110,019

99,565

131,967

231,532

8,950.08

B. Vista III

194,425

168,655

301,925

470,580

8,556.00

V. Canaa

259,718

225,254

335,945

561,199

7,687.66

V. Canaa *

+21,900

+18,994

+18,994

+260.19

Moita R.

186,500

157,917

313,210

471,127

9,422,54

Biritinga

82,434

33,361

294,750

328,111

8,867.86

P. Esperan.

143,906

62,029

201,645

263,674

8,789.13

Veneza **

143,907

39,589

55,473

95,062

3,168.73 4i6

If one compares years prior to institution of the Cedula da Terra, the price of land
alone under INCRA expropriation programs were over four times as much. The total

455

US$ figures for SIC are (except for Veneza) from CDA "Programa Cedula da Terra, Projetos 19972001 (c. 2002). SAT figures are provided in R$, converted to US$ as of the contract date for each
settlement. Numbers for Veneza were provided by the technical advisor, Maria Djalma, all in R$ - the US$
figure for Veneza's SIC is an estimate based on an average exchange rate for the years it was in effect.

456

In 2002 the exchange rate changed dramatically - from R$2.32/US$1 in December 2001, to
R$3.635/US$1 in October 2002. This accounts in part for the dramatically reduced US$ cost per family in
Veneza. However, even if adjusted to the 2002 exchange rate and allowing a 1.34 multiplier to the SAT to
account for the value of the land donated by the landowner, the Veneza cost per family would be
approximately $5670, considerably less than any other project.
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average cost per beneficiary of those expropriations has been estimated at US$30,000
(Deininger 1998, 23), again almost four times as much as the Cedula da Terra.
It should be noted, however, that the total government investment in the Cedula
da Terra settlement areas goes beyond SAT and SIC, including - in some settlements government subsidized water and energy projects and special projects such as the Boa
Vista III bolacha factory. In addition, in all land reform areas, there is the general cost of
subsidized loans (PRONAF), not to mention Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Familia subsidies,
which are available to low-income families throughout Brazil.457
What is the quality of technical assistance provided?
Berta Veloso considers quality of technical assistance to be one of the most
important factors in settlement success. She specifically focused on the person of the
technical advisor, stating that she has seen programs saved by dedicated extension
agronomists.458 Similarly, Maria Djalma noted that, in cases where the technical advisor
was not interested and stopped accompanying a program, the settlements were often not
successful.459

457

De Janvry, Finan, and Sadoulet (2006, 23), in a study of the impact of the Bolsa Escola in the Brazilian
Northeast, found it increased school attendance 7.8%.
458

Berta Veloso de Passos. Interview, January 31, 2006.

459

Maria Djalma Andrade de Abreu. Interview, March 15, 2006.
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On the whole, we were very favorably impressed by the quality and dedication of
the technical assistance provided during the early stages of settlement. This may be in
part because the settlements we studied were relatively successful.460
It should be noted that, while agricultural advice constitutes an important element
of such assistance, good assistance goes beyond that to include orientation in preparing
proposals, advice on loan programs, orientation on association rules and practice,
discussions regarding administration of collective areas, helping communities develop
strategies for the future, and a general willingness to accompany settlement dwellers and especially leaders - through the entire process of community formation and
maintenance. One of the most effective technical advisors, Maria Djalma Andrade de
Abreu, who accompanies Vila Canaa and Veneza, is not an agronomist but a dynamic
sociologist, deeply concerned with the welfare of the communities, knowing the
settlement dwellers personally and accompanying their activities on a regular, ongoing
basis.461
At Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, excellent technical assistance was initially .
provided by CELANOR. a non-governmental organization.

However, CELANOR's

experience raises certain concerns. Technical assistance is provided by non-government

460

Germani and Carvalho (2001, 49-50, 89), who studied three Cedula da Terra settlements in Bahia, are
very critical of the technical assistance provided generally. Nonetheless, with respect to the Antonio
Conselheiro settlement, a close neighbor of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III (the only settlement they
studied in the regions we visited), they acknowledge that the settlers were satisfied with their technical
assistance and that production had increased.
461

"Settlers leave family and structure to come to a new place with people they may not know, under rules
they are not used to." Maria Djalma, interview March 15, 2006. She points out that not all of the women
can arrive in the settlements right away - often the men go first. Some wives want to leave, some couples
separate, there can be issues of domestic violence. "The technical advisor must have sensitivity to family
problems."
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technicians - either non-profit groups like CELANOR or independent agricultural
assistance offices, as in the case of the other five settlements. The assistance is initially
paid for as a portion (8%) of SIC, and subsequently as a portion of PRONAF-A loans.462
When the government delayed considerably in disbursing these funds, technical
assistance had to be suspended.
As SIC is used up and the first phase of PRONAF-A loans finishes, these funds
become less available. If CELANOR had not been able to become part of the Just Juice
program, it might not have been able to continue giving assistance. Indeed in 2006, in
Nova Lusitania, the oldest of the communities, where SIC and PRONAF funds had been
spent, almost no ongoing support was being provided to the administrators of the
association (the settlement was considered "emancipated" from government tutelage,
although certain rules still applied until the land was fully paid for). CELANOR could
provide only very limited agricultural assistance, and only to those settlers who were
engaged in or tending toward organic farming.463
We identified a need in several of the communities for more in depth and
continuing assistance.

For instance, we found that communities needed help in

interpreting charters and by-laws (as noted, we were able in several communities to

462

In c. 1991, a CPT agent in Tocantins expressed concern to me that the payment of technical assistance
from loan funds inclines the technicians toward advising settlement dwellers to take out loans (such as
PRONAF) even when it may not be in their best interest to do so. Although we saw no evidence of that
having happened in the settlements we visited, her concern about a potential conflict of interest is valid.

463

In Moita Redonda, technical assistance lapsed due to political factors - the local politician who had
helped the community did not like the technical advisor, and vice versa. The community association
terminated the advisor's contract but called him back after six months because they needed his advice.
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explain that the charters allowed participation of non-titleholding spouses464). There was
also a need for accompaniment in the planning and carrying out of industrialization
projects - such as the bolacha factory in Boa Vista III and the possibility of
family/community cashew nut processing.

Several interviewees, including technical

advisors, noted that the trainings offered through CDA were useful but not sufficient. We
believe that ongoing technical support to these communities would significantly enhance
their ability to identify and carry out productive community projects.
In terms of continuing agricultural accompaniment, there is no provision to pay
for this other than the technical assistance fee connected with PRONAF loans. Other
regions of Brazil have well developed agricultural extension services, although our
experience is that most extension workers are not trained to work with small farmers or
with organic and alternative farming methods.465 The ongoing presence of either state
extension workers, adequately prepared to work with small farmers, or of a mechanism
capable of supporting independent agronomists (NGOs and/or private firms), seems to us
to be highly desirable in helping the settlements achieve and maintain sustainable
production.466

464

This issue arose in all of the communities except Biritinga, where the non-titleholding spouses were
actively participating.

465

In the State of Espirito Santo, in the late 1960s, AC ARES - the state agricultural extension agency established a well-developed program for small farmers, including not only agricultural advise, but social
workers trained in community organization. This was made possible in part due to the large number of
small farmers in the state and their consequent political clout. When we were living in Tocantins in the
1990s, the local extension worker in the municipio of Itacaja was knowledgeable about organic methods
and alternative technologies, but he told us that he was one of a very few in the state that had that interest.
Again, Itacaja was a district in which small farmers predominated.

466

Deininger (1999, 25-28), a World Bank economist who sets forth the basic argument in favor of MBLR,
believes that the mechanism that allows communities to select technical advisors (from an approved list)
and pay them with SIC/PRONAF funds gives the communities greater control over the technical assistance
that they receive. However, he also recognizes that, after the first two years or so (the period SIC is in
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Gender Differences. A final point is the role of women. We have repeatedly
noted our opinion that inclusion of women in the Associations is important. In 2002, a
government study showed that 87% of titleholders in traditional (INCRA) land reform
areas, and 93% in Cedula da Terra settlements, were men. As a result, in 2003 - the year
after the most recent of the settlements we studies was founded - the government issued
Portaria 981/2003 requiring that in future land reform settlement titles be granted jointly
to couples (Ciranda do PRONAF para Mulheres 2005). We believe this is a positive step.
In the communities we studied, the activity of women in agriculture was mixed.
Attitudes about this varied. It should be noted that subsistence farming is labor intensive,
involving heavy work. Some women we interviewed showed no interest in engaging in
field work, and thought it inappropriate that they should do so,467 except in special
situations (such as during peak planting or harvesting, or where the family had no sons to
help their father). Many women took family leadership in less heavy activities such as
maintaining vegetable gardens and tending poultry and small livestock, and many
engaged in non-agricultural activity to supplement family income (e.g., holding a
municipal job, sewing, reselling cosmetics or other products).

In the fruit-raising

communities, women often participated - and they were particularly respected for the
delicate work of removing passion fruit buds.

effect), local (or state) governments may have to help with technical support. Cassiano Sousa Lemos Jr.
(2003, 2), Coordinator of CPE/CAR, makes clear that the State of Bahia consciously opted for the
contracted technical assistance model in both the Cedula da Terra and Credito Fundiario programs, and
links this type of assistance to organic agriculture particularly appropriate to the semi-arid region.
467

When we lived in Tocantins, we found that farmers whose wives worked in the fields - except at peak
planting and harvest season, when everyone worked - were looked down upon as subjecting their wives to
inappropriate hard labor.
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Couples varied widely in the degree to which the wives were knowledgeable
about and participated in agricultural decisions. Many of our interviews were with wives
only, or with husbands and wives separately or together. In most cases, the women had a
good sense of the general nature of the farm activity, the relative value of crops, and what
was required to carry out the work. Some women were actively involved in planning and
strategizing - for instance, Adalia in Vila Canaa, when talking about her and her
husband's unsuccessful experiments with tomatoes and okra, made it clear that they had
both been involved in the decision to make those experiements.
In 2001 (Portaria 123/2001) the government decreed that 30% of PRONAF
should be preferentially directed to women. However, "...in practice, the 30% quota did
not have a greater impact because it was not accompanied by an effective confrontation
of the problems of access by women to credit." (Ciranda do PRONAF para Mulheres) In
2004 PRONAF Mulher ("Women's PRONAF") was created to finance small (R$3000)
agriculturally related projects. This program was expanded for the 2005-6 season, and
many of the women we interviewed were considering possible projects. We note that in
three of the settlements (Vila Canaa, Passos da Esperan<?a, and Veneza) the technical
advisor was a woman - and in the others, the advisors were supportive of women's
participation. We expect that a number of these projects were implemented.

What is the level of overall satisfaction of land settlement dwellers?
All of the settlement areas suffered attrition during the initial years. Table VII-C
graphs the attrition rates, which ranged from a low of 25% in Vila Canaa to well over to
over 60% in Passos de Esperan9a and Biritinga. These figures are somewhat higher than
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those noted in other studies. G.S. Costa (2002, reported in Oliveira, Olalde, and Germani
2006, 12), analyzing 26 Cedula da Terra settlements in 2001, found attrition averaged
36%, though it ranged from 10% to 80%. Another 2001 study (cited by Mattei c. 2002,
15, and by Martins 2004, 6), found that "In some cases, the study showed that almost
60% of the families left the settlement areas."
Similarly, Bruno, Medeiros, and Guaniziroli (2001, reported in IPEA 2002, 81)
found attrition to be 35% on the average in INCRA expropriation land reform
settlements, but only 21% in those promoted by grass-roots movements (such as the
MST).

Assuming this last number to be accurate, it points to better selection,

preparation, and/or support of participants - or perhaps simply to a higher level of
motivation.

Attrition - the reasons for it and possible measures to reduce it - is an

area that warrants further study.

468

1 am reminded of the statement of Lindoval in Moita Redonda: "If we had to fight [for the land], I would
be the only one left - no! even I would run."
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Table Vll-C - Attrition Rates (%)
100
90

80
70
60
50
40
30

20
10

0
NovaL.

=•=

Boa VIII

V. Canaa

M. Redonda

P. Esperan.

Biritinga

Veneza

In the seven settlements we studied, with rare exceptions, attrition was voluntary.
Reasons for leaving included family issues, life decisions (such as to remain in their old
neighborhood), health problems, and reactions to conflicts within a community.

In a

number of cases, settlers told us that many who had left were not suited to rural life.
And in communities, such as Biritinga, where there was no really viable source of usable
water for four years, attrition may be a result of undue hardship.
Notably absent as reasons for leaving were schools or health facilities (as opposed
to health problems).

In our experience, both of these are factors that can lead rural

families to abandon their land and move into towns. However, we found that - in all of
the communities - settlers were reasonably satisfied with the educational options offered
to their children, which usually included on-site primary education and reasonable
bussing for middle school and high school. While less satisfied with health facilities,
interviewees often expressed the opinion that the Brazilian health system is difficult
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everywhere, and did not necessarily see their own situation as substantially worse than it
would be elsewhere. We note here that the ability of the MBLR program to purchase
land relatively close to established towns facilitates access to health and education in
comparison with land reform projects in frontier or other areas far from population
centers.
With the exception of Biritinga, by the time of our visit, the initial attrition
process seemed to have worked itself out in the communities. In Passos de Esperan<?a,
for instance, which suffered one of the highest attrition rates, most attrition occurred early
on, and only one family had left during the two years prior to our visit.
Do these high attrition rates reflect negatively on the viability of the Cedula da
Terra process, or on the sustainability of the communities? A certain amount of attrition
is inevitable. But high attrition rates may be costly to the people involved and to the
community. In Moita Redonda, for instance, we found that fruit tree maturation lagged
in many lots that were no longer held by their original owners - either because the
original owners had not planted or, if they planted, cared for their fruit trees, or because
there was a gap between the original owner leaving and the new owner taking over,
during which period the trees were neglected.
Transition of lots from original to new owners was treated differently in the
various communities.

In some cases, the Association was active in picking the new

owners and setting the rules for transition, in others it allowed the original and new
owners to negotiate fairly freely. Most transitions seemed to be fairly reasonable - with
new settlers paying for improvements actually on the land and assuming the previous
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owner's PRONAF debts. This latter could be problematic where the original owner did
not invest the PRONAF funds well.

In one instance - in Moita Redonda - we

encountered a new settler who paid what seemed to us a very high amount for his lot,
thus diverting funds that might otherwise have been invested in the land.
Moita Redonda generally seemed to have the most difficulties with the effects of
attrition.

There was significant tension between some older and newer owners,

augmented by cultural differences between the original Bahiano settlers and the newer
Sergipano settlers. New owners as a group were kept in limbo over a multi-year period
due to lack of official approval of their status. But the tensions and uncertainties here
may be as much a symptom of underlying problems in Moita Redonda as a cause of those
problems.
Despite the undoubted psychological, organizational, and - at least in the fruitbased communities - economic costs of attrition, we did not see evidence that attrition,
per se, seriously impacts the long-term sustainability of these communities. To a certain
extent, those settlers who saw it as a winnowing process were not without reason. The
attrition may be seen as part of the "self-selection" process through which those who are
less interested, less determined, or less qualified remove themselves from participation in
the settlement (see Borras Jr. 2003, 371). Aside from Moita Redonda, we found that
newcomers were absorbed into the community and often viewed as an improvement over
those who had left.
To a certain extent, attrition may reflect weaknesses in the community
organizations that originally gave rise to the associations. In other cases, factors beyond
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the control of those associations resulted in a certain number of settlers being added to
the community at the last moment - in Biritinga, for instance, not enough members of the
original group qualified and seventeen of the original 37 families were added by CDA; in
Moita Redonda, the local politician who helped birth the movement seems to have
inserted some of her urban constituents into the group.

We recommend that

organizational and selection processes be examined to determine whether steps can be
taken to reduce attrition.
Overall settler satisfaction was high in all communities except Nova Lusitania. A
very high percentage of those interviewed said that they were not considering leaving the
community, i.e., by selling or trading their land (Table VII.D) (see Germani and Carvalho
2001, 67).
TABLE VII-D - Settlers Willing To Trade Or Sell (# Interviewees)

Nova Lus Boa V III

V Canaa

Moita R

P Esper

Biratinga

Veneza

Nova Lusitania is the oldest of the settlements studied. The large number of
settlers willing to sell/trade their property raises a concern for settlements as they leave
the initial funded period and move into a post funding stage. Once SIC and PRONAF-A
moneys have been spent and state assistance is less available, it is likely that the
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difficulties of day-to-day life and the concerns about ongoing financial and agricultural
issues are going to take a certain toll on settler feelings.

There is a vulnerable period

here.
This point is perhaps reinforced by noting that one of the highest levels of morale
and satisfaction we encountered was at Veneza, the newest of the settlements we studied,
where the honeymoon period was not yet over.
Nevertheless, out conclusion from the interviews is that the willingness in Nova
Lusitania to sell/trade stems primarily from deep disappointment due to the land being
unfit for citrus trees. This is a unique circumstance (shared, perhaps to a more limited
extent, with Boa Vista III). The other fruit-raising communities visited - Moita Redonda,
Passos de Esperan^a, and Biritinga - are buoyed by reasonable expectation that the fruit
groves will be productive. While in these latter communities there may be a period,
between the end of funding and the full maturation of orchards, during which difficulties
arise, we do not see Nova Lusitania's situation as being predictive of that in the other
communities.
Another indicator of satisfaction is how the settlers view their lives in comparison
with their situation prior to moving into the settlement. Table VII-E sets out comparative
figures for interviewees.

Here also the numbers are highly positive. Even in Nova

Lusitania, a significant majority of interviewees felt that their life was better or much
better in the settlement than it had been previously.469

469

Germani and Carvalho (2001, 66), who are critical of the Cedula da Terra program, record a similar
finding in the Antonio Conselheiro settlement: "According to... the majority of settlers, the condition of
their life was better. This is because the opportunity to become small landholders gave them more
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TABLE VII-E - Life Compared With Prior To Settlement (# Interviewees)

NovaLus

V Canaa

Boa V III

Moita R

Biritinga

PEsper

Veneza

These figures, especially given the strength of their verbal and non-verbal
expression as observed in the interviews, together with settlers' comments about their
future, demonstrate a strong desire on the part of most settlers to stay in the land reform
settlements. We have here a significant indicator of commitment to the settlement areas,
a positive element in building a sustainable community.
Although we have defined sustainability as approximately covering one
generation, it is interesting to note settler attitudes toward their children's future. In
almost all of the communities there were parents who definitely did not want their
children to continue in agriculture. However, there were also parents who did want and
expect their children to remain on the land, and in some cases, they had taken practical
steps toward this happening - most notably by providing their children fields of their own
to plant and/or in providing adult children their own houses within the settlement area.
We interviewed too few young people to draw definite conclusions, but among those we
interviewed, a number expressed interest in staying in the countryside. Maria Djalma

autonomy, guaranteeing the sustenance of their families and creating hopes of becoming future
entrepreneurs." Although the use of this last term is unusual, and may stem from Germani and Carvalho's
underlying premise that MBLR is an instrument of neo-liberalism, it captures the sense of hope we also
witnessed in most of the settlements.
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estimates that in the settlements she accompanies (Vila Canaa, Veneza, and several
more), approximately 20% of the young people want to stay on the land - and it seems
that this would be a reasonable estimate generally.
In this light, we find it unfortunate that we only encountered two instances - both
in Passos de Esperan9a - of young people who were studying at the Escolas Agricolas
Familiares, the integrated cooperative agricultural schools discussed in Chapter III.
Formal education generally in Brazil tends to promote urban values and denigrate rural
ones - all too often youth are presented with a choice between education or agriculture,
not an opportunity to have education for agriculture. To the extent that schools such as
the Escolas Agricolas Familiares can be promoted, the long term viability of small scale
farming will improve.470
To what degree are land settlement associations authentic and effective?
In Brazil, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it became fashionable for government
to offer programs and other benefits through community associations.

It sometimes

occurred that a local politician or other leader would throw together a largely artificial
"community association" - made up of real people but not a participatory, community
group in any real sense of that term - in order to meet the technical qualifications of the
law and receive whatever benefits it provided. All three members of our research team
had witnessed such happenings, and we were expecting to find that at least some of the
community associations were inventions of this type.

470

In the south of Brazil, the MST has established a network of schools. Although these have been
criticized for being ideological, they undoubtedly offer a rural-oriented education.
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We were therefore pleasantly surprised to discover that, although varying in their
effectiveness and quality of leadership, all of the associations were valid organizations
with genuine participation and, in most cases, histories rooted in genuine community
movements. Even in Moita Redonda, where there was evidence that the association had
been formed under the auspices of local politicians and where local political interference
was most apparent, the association - although plagued by dissension - had developed to
the point that it was able to take decisions independently of its political mentors.471
The bases of associations in pre-settlement community movements also affected
group cohesiveness.

Where a significant number of settlers came from the same

community, or a number of closely knit communities, they tended to have a cohesiveness
that helped them resolve leadership and community issues. This was certainly a factor in
Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III, where all of the settlers came from CELANOR
member communities in the municipio of Rio Real. Similarly, in Passos de Esperan^a,
all of the settlers came from a neighboring 1970s sergipano land settlement area, in Vila
Canaa, almost all came from a neighborhood about forty miles away,
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and in Veneza,
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This is not to deny Navarro's (1998, 21) observation that the associations, in some cases, may initially
have a "merely instrumental orientation" - i.e., that they may have been formed solely or primarily for the
objective of obtaining land. However, all of the associations we studied had some roots - Nova Lusitania
and Boa Vista III in longstanding colonization community associations (and CELANOR members) in the
municipio of Rio Real, Vila Canaa in an earlier land reform area (and its neighborhood) in a neighboring
municipality, Passos de Esperanga in the old land reform colonization area around Gameleira, Biritinga in
the Campolandia land invasion area, and Veneza in the group displaced by creation of a Native American
reservation. Even Moita Redonda - which, more than any other group, owed its origin to the influence of a
local politician - arose out of a movement that had organized to seek land two years prior to the purchase;
the group leader and politician saw a mutual benefit to working together to secure land. But this was
undoubtedly the association with the most "merely instrumental orientation."
472

In Vila Canaa, although only about half the community identified with the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, this shared religion also seemed to be a factor in creating considerable cohesiveness. Veneza was
almost entirely Catholic, and most other communities were majority Catholic with a small number of
Evangelical Protestants. Nova Lusitania was the community in which the Catholic-Evangelical split was
most divisive.
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almost all came from an area that had been declared to be an Native American
reservation. 473
An issue which we were able to help the associations address was the question of
participation of non-titleholder spouses, mostly women. In Biritinga, the ability of nontitleholder spouses to be active members and hold leadership position provides a rich
source of talent that has been unavailable to the settlements that prohibit membership
and/or leadership roles to non-titleholder spouses.

The assistance we were able to

provide to the associations during our visits, analyzing with them the regulations in this
respect, will enable them to change this situation.
Beyond the communities we studied, although we were not able to research the
matter in depth, we were told that "false" community associations have been relatively
rare in Cedula da Terra programs in Bahia - a state generally noted for political
machines and maneuvering.

Berta Veloso told us that, in the more humid southern

portion of the state, there had been a number of "adventurers and opportunists" in the
land settlement areas, but that this type of person is not attracted to difficult areas such as
,
. . .
. 474
the semi-and region.
The Collective Areas. One of the most important functions of the Associations is
administration of the collective areas. This is also one of the most fascinating aspects of
our study.
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Other factors affecting cohesiveness included the presence of extended family - a factor we identified
in almost every community - and the shared sergipano cultural identity found in Passos de Esperanpa,
Nova Lusitania, and Boa Vista III. On the other hand, in Moita Redonda, where most of the older settlers
were bahianos and the newer ones of sergipano heritage, this was divisive.
474

Interview January 31, 2006.
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In theory, if well managed, produce from the collective area in each settlement
can pay off the value of the land, as well as other community expenses. In only one of
the settlement areas, Veneza, did we find that the system worked as planned (and even
there, with modifications). This may be partly due to Veneza being the newest of the
settlements - enthusiasm for communal activity may diminish with time - but it is also
due to the mature sisal crop on community land that brings in income, allowing the
community to pay settler work hours.

Other settlements find it very hard to work

communal areas on a voluntary basis - some dwellers work, others do not, and this builds
resentment.475 The collective areas therefore varied between fairly successful to virtually
abandoned.
A number of communities have, in practice (it is not permitted formally), resorted
to dividing the collective areas among families, each family caring for its own area as
though it were an additional family lot. However, even here there are a number of
permutations. In Biritinga, for instance, shortly before we arrived, the communal dwarf
cashew trees were turned over to individual families, each family receiving
approximately 135 trees to care for and harvest.

Income from the area goes to the

association for payment of the land and other expenses, each family being credited with
amounts brought in from its section. Communal pasture was also divided up, each family
receiving seven tarefas, but communal manioc was kept under the Association, with a
collective work day held every couple of months to clean the field, and we were told that
"nearly everybody participates."
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In Biritinga, for instance, we were told that collective work never reached 50% participation. Other
communities did not provide numbers, but the issue was present in all of them. Enforcing rules may be
problematic: in Passos de Esperanga, a settler suspended from the Association for failure to perform his
required work days took the matter to civil court. CDA lawyers were defending the Association, but the
judge seemed inclined to favor the suspended settler.
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In Nova Lusitania, a similar division of responsibility for communal fruit trees
had been put in place earlier, but did not prove successful; we were told that many of the
allotted communal plots had been essentially abandoned, although this may have been in
part due to discouragement caused by the compacted subsoil problem, which was causing
the trees to die.

Boa Vista III also discovered that dividing up responsibility for the

communal lands was not successful; following a year of experimenting with a system of
individual family administration, the community returned to collectivized work shortly
before our visit.
In Moita Redonda, where each family originally donated one hectare of its own
plot to increase the size of the collective land, the Association plowed the land and
provided wire for the planting of two thousand passion fruit plants. Thirty per cent of the
revenue goes to the Association, the rest is divided among settlers according to the work
they provide on the passion fruit - those who do not participate have no right to income.
The administration of these areas continues to be a challenge. Part of the problem
may be that the concept of collective work is not in tune with local culture.

Maria

Djalma, the technical advisor for Vila Canaa and Veneza, noted that collective work is
not part of the culture of farmers in the Brazilian Northeast; she mentioned that the MST
has been more successful in introducing this idea. Generally in the North and Northeast
of Brazil, experiences with cooperative commercialization of produce have been far more
successful than cooperative production. It may be that, although collective planting is not
in all cases viable, the associations can find their vocation in organizing settlers to
industrialize (as is currently the case with sisal in Veneza) and commercialize their crops,
and in the cooperative purchase of fertilizer and other inputs.
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What is the micro-economic viability of holdings (i.e., the extent to which
potential income exceeds costs, including payments for the land)?
Earlier in this paper we discussed at some length the situation of agriculture in
Brazil, especially the situation regarding small family farms. While recognizing that
there is much debate over this issue, we lean toward the position that small scale farming
can be economically viable - that it can produce a good standard of living for a family at least with respect to certain types of crops. Among these are labor intensive farming especially organic and other specialized methodologies - as well as other activities such
as apiculture and certain forms of fruit farming. We noted, however, that small scale
farming increasingly requires excellent technical assistance and education to thrive,
techniques that make best use of land on a sustainable basis.476
One of the greatest areas of concern is the viability of the settlements in terms of
agriculture. Setting aside for the moment the cases of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III,
where the subsoil problem affects the agricultural capacity of the land, what is the
evidence that the agricultural production of these communities is sufficient to provide a
sustainable income for the settlers?477

476

To the extent that land reform settlements (through either traditional or market-based approaches) are
pushed toward marginal land, such assistance becomes even more important. Only highly competent
organic and alternative techniques can renew marginal lands and avoid problems such as desertification. In
this light it is encouraging to read the following from the Coordinator of CPE/Car: "...some projects in the
semi-arid region initiated work oriented toward organic agriculture and living in harmony with the dry
land, with use of native fruits on a sustainable basis...." (Lemos Junior 2003, 2).
477

This analysis is undertaken with the caveat that it is questionable whether, in the context of modern
society, any agriculture can be successful without some type of government subsidy (Powers 2006).
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Two of the settlements - Vila Canaa and Veneza - seem to us to be highly viable
communities.

Although each has its vulnerabilities, both show signs of long-term

sustainability. One of these signs is that both communities have two major potential
sources of income - black beans and sheep in Vila Canaa, sisal and goats in Veneza.
Although Vila Canaa may be currently relying too heavily on the natural richness of its
long-fallow soil - not yet having implemented crop rotation and organic fertilization community cohesiveness is strong, and leadership is capable and adaptable - able to
guide the community as it confronts issues that will arise. In Veneza, the strong base that
the existing sisal crop provides to the association should continue to underpin the
community's ability to pay for land and move forward with substantial collective
projects.
Moita Redonda and Passos de Esperan9a also give indications of being selfsustaining once their fruit trees mature. Passos de Esperan9a has done a better job of
diversifying, with almost equal distribution of land among orange, cashew, and passion
fruit; in addition, many families have commercial plantings of manioc.

As we have

noted elsewhere, ecological - as well as economic - diversification is crucial for
resilience of both the ecosystem and the economy. Moita Redonda is more dependent on
oranges; this increases the danger of any monoculture by being one with a particularly
volatile market. It is to be hoped that the settlers will continue to back this up with
plantings of passion fruit as well as other, smaller cash crops.

Biritinga had the lowest level of agricultural production of the settlements visited.
This resulted, in part, from early difficulties mentioned above, most notably a shortage of
water. However, the impending maturity of the cashew trees - the essential economic
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component of the community - indicated that the settlement had a good chance of
obtaining sustainability.

As noted, monoculture is not, in our opinion, advisable for

farms, but cashew offers more potential stability, and more possibility of local
processing, than other fruit monocultures. The large number of organic farmers here (the
highest percentage of any community studied) bodes well for the land being sustained and even improved - over the next generation.

If the community can develop less

expensive sources of natural fertilizer, can implement cashew processing facilities,
continues to maintain sufficient food crops to meet essential needs, and continues to
pursue honey production and other minor income producing activities, Boa VistaBiritinga should be able to prosper for at least a generation.
Boa Vista III is something of a question. It is not yet clear to what extent the
subsoil problem will keep the settlers from their objective of being orange farmers.
However, the settlers in Boa Vista III seem open to other possibilities. If orange raising
does not turn out to be possible, they may turn to other crops that are appropriate to the
land, such as yams, pineapple, passion fruit (if proper drainage can be established),
grains, or truck gardening. As the state recognizes a certain degree of responsibility with
respect to the subsoil problem - and especially as this problem impacts several
communities - there are indications that the state will help to provide training and seed
money to facilitate such a transition.
Nova Lusitania is the least likely of the settlements to be able to support itself
through agricultural production.

Oil revenues are currently playing a large role in

maintaining the settlement; we have no basis for knowing how long those revenues will
last, nor how continuous the flow of income may be. A few of the farmers are actively
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seeking to improve their land through organic methods and to find crops that can grow
well despite the serious subsoil problem. However, were oil revenues to cease without a
serious solution to the agricultural question, while it is not likely that the settlement will
disappear, it could easily become - as are some others in the Coastal North region - an
area of endemic poverty. It is therefore vital that the soil analyses being carried out by
the state be taken seriously as the starting point for a program to transition the community
to appropriate agricultural activities. Properly fertilized, passion fruit and/or other vine or
bush fruits might constitute a possibility. If not, an option might be considered to offer
resettlement to those current settlers who do not wish to transition from fruit growing
activities, and bring in settlers interested in engaging in agriculture appropriate to the
land.
One of the issues faced in all of the communities is inevitable inequalities. We
interviewed families in almost all communities who were very poor and seemingly
unable to do little more than sustain themselves, much less make land or financing
payments. Jose Firmino dos Santos, former President of the Association at Biritinga,
phrased the issue: "Among the poor, there are always some who are more poor." Ari in
Vila Canaa estimated that ten percent of the settlers there would never improve their
situation. Erico, President of the Association in Veneza, said that the poor among the
community were one of his major concerns.478
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Our analysis did not permit an in depth study of the root causes of the poverty of some settlers. Among
the factors mentioned in interviews and/or observed, alcohol addiction would be a major cause. In most
cases, single women raising families were hard pressed; in at least one of these cases, the single mother was
living in the settlement due to family influence and clearly did not have a vocation for agriculture - it
seemed she was in the settlement merely as a means to obtain housing. Lack of education did not seem to
be an issue, per se - many illiterate farmers were successful - but lack of know-how (agricultural, financial,
or both) seemed to play a factor to some extent. There were also incidents of illness. One of the most
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The settlers' have a joint obligation to make land payments, and failure to make
land payment suspends all other financing. The plan is for association income to cover
those payments, but in communities where it has not done so, the group has covered
payments for those families who cannot (the understanding being that these families will
repay when and if able). However, it is unlikely that the community can or will cover
lapsed Pronaf-A or custeio loans - although, at least where a good number of settlers are
unable to pay, the associations generally work to obtain extensions. Adilson, the former
President of Vila Canaa and a natural leader, stated that the better-off settlers take care of
the poorest among them; to a certain extent this view is reflected in other communities Maria Djalma noted that "social inclusion" is an essential part of the program.479 But
there is the view expressed by Antonio Costa, also of Vila Canaa, that "in ten years those
who are lazy will leave, those who stay will be active;"480 this also reflects a feeling
expressed in many interviews that some among the settlers do not exert themselves or
carry their weight.481
It has been noted that there is a general trend, worldwide, for agricultural
households to depend in part on income from non-agricultural activities. Many of the
telling of these was a young couple in Moita Redonda which had been doing very well until the husband
suffered a motorcycle accident, approximately ten months prior to our visit. The couple was very hard
pressed and living off of donations from their extended family.
479

Interview, March 15, 2006.
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Antonio speaks from the relatively privileged position of a healthy, single 35-year-old man with no
dependents and a title holding of his own.
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The question has been asked as to whether there are cultural/social factors that incentivize the "lazy." It
has been argued (e.g., Alvarez 2009) that the bolsa escola/bolsa familia may have this affect, but we did
not witness it as such; in most cases, it seemed to provide the families with a safety net that enabled them to
stay on the land and work it (rather than the husband migrating in search of work, as often happens in the
Northeast). The oil revenues in Nova Lusitania did seem to have the effect of causing many of the families
to become acomodadas (roughly "complacent"), i.e., not working the land as hard as they might, although
this occurred in tandem with the severe disappointment of discovering that the land was unsuitable for the
orange trees they wanted to raise. But we saw no other factors that would incentivize laziness.
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households interviewed have some non-farm income, common sources including the
hiring out the men's labor (in many cases this is agricultural related labor), freelance jobs
(bricklayers, electricians, a barber), municipal jobs (teacher auxiliaries, school bus
drivers, health assistants), and small commercial activities (small stores, bars, selling
cosmetics, etc.). Those who receive a government pension - either for retirement or
disability - earn a minimum monthly wage, which places them in a position of relative
affluence and security. Many families mentioned the importance of income received
from the Federal Bolsa Familia/Bolsa Escola, and it is our opinion that subsidy has
enabled many of the families to remain on the land during difficult stages when resources
are scarce.
Closely related to this is the attempt, within the communities - on either a
community or private basis - to capture a greater share of agricultural income by
engaging in some type of agricultural processing. Veneza has equipment for extracting
fiber from sisal, adding to the value of the end product. Boa Vista III is the community
that has most seriously pursued, with limited success, small industrial activities to capture
a greater share of the value of their produce. A few of the other communities are thinking
along these lines, although most seemed to focus on establishing manioc processing
facilities ("casas de farinha"), an economically questionable investment.
Natural Reserves.

One of the tertiary research questions posed in this study was

"To what extent have environmental reserves been provided for on the land?" We found
that, in all cases, at least the legally required twenty percent of land had been set aside as
ecological areas.
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Attitudes toward the ecological reserves varied.

At one extreme, a few

interviewees stated that they would like to do away with the reserves to allow for
expansion of the communities - in one case, for opening land for grown children of
settlers.

But most settlers had a relatively benign view of the reserves - repeatedly

interviewees told us that the reserves were good for preserving wild animals or for
avoiding drought - some said that they "call" (chama) the rain. Generally use of the
reserves was limited to grazing a few animals, bee raising, and/or collecting dead wood
for cooking.
The one exception was Biritinga, where respect for ecological reserve was the
highest we encountered.

Three settlers there told us that, in addition to the legally

required reserves, they had each set aside a portion of their own land as a reserve. It is
probably not a coincidence that Biritinga is the settlement with the highest percentage of
organic farmers.
Intangibles. While it is valid to attempt to objectify the reasons for success, it is also
clear that there are certain intangibles that are difficult to capture. Berta Veloso, a highly
respected government official who has worked with the Cedula da Terra program since
the beginning, told us that for years she has been asking herself why some land
settlements succeed and some fail. There is no real explanation, she feels, except the
people. Her colleague, Antonio Fernando da Silva (Fernando) agreed. They noted that
Fernando has been accompanying a settlement which, by any objective standard, should
have failed - having poor land and other disadvantages - but that the people are so
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determined they are making it work 482 Rafael of CELANOR noted the importance of
capacity for resilience (capacidade de resilianga) - the ability of a group to recuperate
from negative or even disastrous events.

483

These observations verify our own experience with land reform settlements,
community organizations, and human organizations of various kinds. The morale of the
group often makes the difference as to whether a project succeeds. Certainly many of the
items discussed above - leadership, group cohesiveness, group organization and history can affect morale, as can settler attitudes, satisfaction levels, and dozens of other
factors 484 But it is important to recognize that morale can go beyond (at times transcend)
these factors. While difficult to quantify or submit to objective tests, it can often be
sensed by experienced observers.
Tertiary Questions
Our research proposal also set forth five tertiary questions that warrant very brief
discussion:
Does the Cedula da Terra program promote a concept of land as a
commodity, rather than as a non-renewal environmental resource with which
humans live in a stewardship relationship?
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Interview, January 31, 2006 with Berta Veloso dos Passos and Antonio Fernando da Silva
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Interview, March 27, 2006 at Rio Real. He noted that resilience can be aided by outside circumstances;
for instance, he attributes some of the resilience of the settlers at Boa Vista III to the fact that some of them
retained small lands with fruit trees in their former area of residence, and were able to draw on these
resources when hard times arose.
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Settler attitudes and satisfaction levels reflect morale as well as affecting it; there is a feedback loop
here.

444

The Cedula da Terra program was born during at a time when neo-liberal thought
- i.e., that the world's problems could be resolved through market forces - was sweeping
the political world and a certain portion of the international development community.
The name "market-based" land reform, together with some of the literature that
accompanied that movement, gave rise to a concern that this program was intended to
and/or would further push the concept of land being a commodity, bought and sold with a
capitalist attitude, rather than being an essential part of the eco-system, a resource to be
lived with in a relationship of stewardship and caring.
I have a great deal of sympathy with this concern. To my mind, much harm has
been done by viewing land as a commodity or simple production resource, to be used in
accordance with short-range economic objectives. In the United States, ownership of
land by large corporations has been seen as one factor contributing toward this negative
attitude, and some states have taken steps to limit such ownership. An ideal is often
presented such as that in portions of Switzerland, where the same family lives on the land
for generations and, knowing the land will constitute the family's source of livelihood for
the long-range future, cares for the land in a way that helps it to maintain, and even
improve, its fertility.
On the other hand, as discussed in Chapter III, Brazil has a long history of abuse
of land by large hereditary landowners, who have used it over the generations to draw off
income and who have repeatedly, until relatively recently, failed to reinvest in it. Even
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e.g., Domingos (2002, 3) "...implementation of 'market-assisted agrarian reform' can only be
understood as the extension of neo-liberal concepts introduced by [the World Bank]." Similarly, Germani
and Carvalho (2002, 89-93): MBLR is "a program of undisguised neo-liberal style."
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among small landholders, practices such as slash and burn agriculture have proved
detrimental to their land.
As originally envisioned by Deininger (1999) and others, the MBLR concept
proposed that the land holdings gained through the programs would be fairly easily
transferable. This was in contrast to traditional expropriation land reform programs in
Brazil, which usually prohibited resale of the land by the original recipients without
government permission.
Within the Cedula da Terra program, however, there are a number of factors that
affect transferability. First, the land is owned by the Association, not by the individual
titleholders - it is, in essence, a type of condominium - and any transfer of lots requires
(at least in theory) Association approval. Second, at least until the land is fully paid for
(20 years after the contract date), any such transfer of land has to be approved by CDA the State agency that serves as guardian to the program.
Settlers who do not actually live on the land can be - and have been dispossessed of their land by CDA. Although in Biritinga there were a few titleholders
who did not live on their land (and this issue had been taken up with CDA), we did not
find this in any other community.486 This rule severely limits anyone buying a lot and
holding it for speculative and investment purposes.
With the major attrition in most communities, there were many transfers of lots.
As noted above, in some cases this entailed purchase by the incoming party of the
improvements that had been made by the outgoing party and/or assumption of the
486

In Vila Canaa, one of the better homes seemed to be closed up and the owners were not present, but we
did not fully examine whether this was a temporary or permanent situation.
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outgoing party's debt, but it did not generally include payment for the land itself (the
reason being that, in most cases, few land payments had been made and that most of
those were made, at least in part, by the Association).

But these transfers generally

resulted in changing ownership from a party who did not want and/or could not maintain
the land to a party who very much did want to own and work it.
We found no evidence among the settlers of their viewing the land as a
commodity. On the contrary, most talked about staying on it long term, and many spoke
of it as a heritage that they hoped to pass on to their children. The growing interest
among many of the settlers in organic agriculture was also based, in large part, on the
conviction that organic agriculture is best for the long range viability of their land.
Is the Program's emphasis on land purchase contradictory to the idea that
the landless farmers have a right to land, which right must be asserted, and, if so,
does this constitute a significant problem?
Domingos (2002, 5) sums up this critique admirably: "By passing the
responsibility to democratize land to the market, political leaders intend to relieve the
State of its essential legal responsibilities as outlined in the Brazilian constitution: the
distribution of land for social interests." To what extent is this true or meaningful?
In Chapter III we discuss the Brazilian Constitution and the problems incurred in
trying to translate general constitutional statements into an enforceable expropriation law.
Suffice it to say here that effort has been continuously frustrated and that expropriation
has had very limited success in Brazil.
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Critiques such as that made by Domingos seem to me to overestimate the
importance of the term "market" when used in this context. Under the Cedula da Terra
program, the government subsidizes approximately 70% of the cost of obtaining land.
The government provides guidance, supervises negotiations, must approve the land price,
funds the entire infrastructure, and has veto power over who can be a beneficiary to the
program. It does not seem to me that the government has reneged on its responsibility to
help landless farmers obtain land, but simply has found another instrument for doing so.
Nor do I read the Constitution as requiring that the land be freely distributed - that
farmers have to pay a certain amount (on highly subsidized credit) seems to me to be both
fair and wise policy.

Does the program significantly impair other forms of land reform through
transfer of political focus and/or funds?
One argument in favor of MBLR is that it offers another tool for landless farmers
to obtain land, and that it is best seen as an arrow in a quiver of policies, rather than as the
single primary solution to the land reform issue (see, e.g., Deininger, et al. 2003, 14;
Lambais 2007, 25; El-Ghonemy 2007).

In this respect, the government retaining its

power to expropriate land - and in fact doing so - provides an added incentive for
landowners to consider a willing sale under an MBLR program.
I believe there is merit in this position. However, given limited resources for
agrarian reform, there is evidence that MBLR has drawn focus and funds away from
other land reform measures. Wolford (2007, 249-250) notes that, between 1997, when
the Cedula da Terra program started, and 2001, INCRA's budget for traditional land
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reform was cut from US$2.6 billion to about half that amount, and by 2003, it was cut an
additional 39%.

However, she fails to note that the INCRA 1997 budget was unusually

high - in 1995 it was US$1.3 billion and in 1994 only US$0.4 billion (Deininger 1998,
23).
In any case, this reduction can be only in part attributed to the growth of the
MBLR programs. The direct cost of the Cedula da Terra program was estimated at
US$150 million, $90 million of which was a loan from the World Bank; the Credito
Fundiario system, which built upon that program, was US$450 million, about half loaned
by the World bank (Borras Jr, 376; Childress and Munoz 2008, 2). These totals, spread
over a period of approximately eight years, do not fully account for the decrease in
INCRA spending.
Be that as it may, to what extent is this shift in focus important? Unlike some
other countries (see Borras Jr., 376), Brazil maintains an active expropriation program,
and it would thus seem that the goal of having various instruments to carry out agrarian
reform is being realized.

It is our tentative conclusion from the evidence reviewed that

MBLR, in the Brazilian context, is probably a faster and less expensive way to obtain
land for the landless poor than is expropriation. If this is the case, it makes sense to shift
resources from expropriation efforts to MBLR.
One step was taken in 2000 by the Government and the World Bank in an effort
to maintain a balance between expropriation and MBLR. In general, lands purchased
through the Cedula da Terra had been relatively small and medium sized farms rather
than large latifundios, although in theory any land could be acquired.
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In 2001, in

response to critiques from the proponents of expropriation, the program was expressly
limited to acquiring lands of up to fifteen modules.487 Brazilian law expressly prohibits
expropriation of land below this limit, thus the Cedula da Terra was prohibited from
purchasing land that could be acquired through expropriation.

(Oliveira, Olalde, and

Germani 2006, 3).

Does the program tend to reinforce the power of local elites who have been
historically opposed to land reform?
One of the concerns with the Cedula da Terra program - a concerned our
research team shared as we began this study - was that it decentralized agrarian reform to
the states and municipalities.

Traditionally Northeastern states and rural local

governments have often been dominated by groups that identify with large landowners,
with electoral corrals being run by local politicians under the system of coronelismo
discussed in Chapter III. It was our concern that the programs would come under the
control of elites who oppose land reform and would thus be made ineffective. Did this
occur?
Borras Jr. (2003) is a critic of MBLR. Many of his comments are based on early
evaluations carried out by Navarro (1998) and Buainain et al (1999).

Borras writes

(378):

487

This policy allowed CONTAG and other civil society groups to support MBLR (Lambois 2007, 25).
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To a large extent, the beneficiary (self)-selection process has been manipulated
by local government officials, interested church people and elite peasant
leaders. These local elites controlled the information about the project and
selected by themselves the beneficiaries (Navarro 1998, 19). In fact, Navarro
finds that, in some regions, 'the friars are who decided who could or could not
be part of the association to be formed', as he points to 'the manipulation of the
local peasants induced into forming associations, not knowing the conditions of
the process' (Navarro 1998, 15, 19).
This critique is, to say the least, an odd one, mixing local government officials
(who may or may not be tied to landholding interests) with the Church - which has for
the last thirty years been the primary advocate of land reform. Indeed, the Navarro quote
is taken entirely out of context - turning to the original document in Portuguese, we
discover that Navarro (14) was pointing out that the friars intervened to remove people
who already had considerable patrimony from the land reform associations, so that the
land could be available to poorer people who really needed it!
Part of Borras' objection seems to be connected with his statement (378) that "the
4

DO

beneficiaries are generally from the rural poor, but not the poorest of the poor."
However, in almost forty years of working with community organization and social
programs in Brazil, I have found that it is almost never the poorest-of-the-poor who lead
any grass-roots movement or social change. Our case studies did indeed confirm that the
communities were generally developed and led by people who were not among the
488

Perhaps it is these not-poorest-of-the-poor that Borras means when he speaks (378) of "elite peasant
leaders" and "rich peasants."
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poorest of the poor. These leaders, together with NGO organizers, technical advisors, and
the state agency - CDA (which last had final decision power over the inclusion/exclusion
of any beneficiary), definitely did influence the selection of candidates.

It is our

impression that this selection process was generally a reasonably fair one, and that
problems developed where - as in Moita Redonda - it was to some extent ignored.
To state that beneficiary selection is influenced by these persons and groups is a
far cry from our initial concerns that the process would be controlled by landowner
groups or others who are opposed to land reform.

In only one community, Moita

Redonda, did a local politician have an inordinate amount of influence in forming the
community - and even there, she seemed to be acting out of populist motivation and not
in the interest of local landowners.
Minor interference by local politicians in community life is a factor in several of
the communities, where certain persons in the community are rewarded with municipal
jobs (teacher auxiliary, school bus driver, etc.), usually in return for their political
support. But this is common throughout Brazil, and in no case did the interference seem
to stem from pressure from large landowners. We found no evidence in our case studies
that decentralization led to domination of the Cedula da Terra program by large
landowners or other groups opposed to land reform.

To what extent has the program been used to undercut the action of landless
movements such as the MST?
One of the chief charges against the market-based land reform movement was that
it had been adopted by the Cardoso government to undercut the power of movements
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such as the Movimento Sem Terra (MST).

This charge was clearly to some extent

justified - the MST and Cardoso were strongly opposed, and finding another mechanism
for carrying out land reform was advantageous to the president.489 But to what extent
was the program actively used to undercut the MST and similar movements?
Interview questions dealt with settler attitudes toward the MST. These attitudes
were largely negative, but no more so than the attitudes of most Brazilians at the time
who gained their information primarily from Globo television - the main source of
information for the majority of settlers.

While the MST had enjoyed considerable

popularity in the late 1990s,490 by 2006 it had lost much of that support - due largely to
such actions as invading and trashing President Cardoso's farmhouse in Minas Gerais
(images of the wrecked furniture and filthy rooms were on everyone's television screen)
and invading and destroying specimens in an Aracruz botanical laboratory.491
Settlers generally rejected this type of approach.

However, there were some

settlers who stated that the MST had been important in raising consciousness of the need
for land reform, others who stated that the movement did some good, and a few who were
frankly positive toward it.

We saw no indication that the program had inculcated

attitudes toward the MST one way or the other.
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Fernandes (2006, 13-16) provides a good summary of the conflict between the Cardoso administration
and the MST. He notes that, while the Cardoso administration initially thought that settling families on the
land would reduce pressure from the landless, the opposite occurred: "...geographers can document that for
each settlement created, the number of landless workers carrying out grassroots action multiplied..." (14).
"In the Cardoso government, agrarian reform was treated as a problem left unsolved in the past and
formulated as a compensatory policy in line with a conservative model of agricultural modernization....
The compensatory policy is a form of minimizing socio-economic problems without solving them." (6-7)
490

Wolford (2007, 243) states that, at the end of the 1990s, 85% of urban middle-class Brazilians had
favorable attitudes toward the MST.
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This latter action was actually carried out by a small splinter group not under the control of the MST,
but in the minds of most Brazilians, the MST was identified with it.
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Perhaps most telling were comments of those settlers who had actual experience
with the MST. Founded in the South of Brazil, the movement has never been as effective
in the North and Northeast, and comments reflected this, and were generally critical.
Closely related to the issue of the MST was the overall level of socio-political
consciousness among settlers. With a few exceptions, we found this to be similar to the
general level of rural Northeasterners who are not actively involved in social justice or
union movements. There seemed to be little awareness of or interest in class issues.
Although Lula was immensely popular and the great majority of settlers had voted for
him and said they would do so again, there were very few who identified with the
Workers' Party.492 Local political identification was based on personal relationships and
local practicality as it is in most of rural Brazil, with little concern with the ideology of a
candidate's party on the national level.
I personally believe that most of the settlers would benefit from the type of
training provided by the CPT, socially conscious NGOs, and land reform groups - and
could learn a good deal from the MST, especially in such areas as rural education. It
would be interesting to see these groups reach out more to the Cedula da Terra and
Credito Fundiario settlers who are, in some respects, natural allies in building a society
that is more supportive of small scale agriculture. By, to a certain extent, anathematizing
the MBLR programs - and hence, by implication, the beneficiaries of those programs the MST (if not the Church and other agencies) creates an unnecessary barrier between
potential allies.
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The exception was in Biritinga, where Jurandi Nilo is a committed PT member, originally from Sao
Paulo; he and his wife, Josi, are leaders in the settlement. Eleven interviewees (out of 33) in Biritinga were
affiliated with the PT, and two more said they usually voted with the PT.
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Other Key Factors
In Chapter I, we noted nine Key Factors to development projects generally.

We

briefly touch upon those here in connection with the Cedula da Terra program as it
developed in Bahia.
1) Authenticity of participation. As noted in Chapter IV, the Cedula da Terra program,
when implanted at the national level, had very little input from civil society.

In

Bahia, early involvement of CELANOR - a clearly legitimate association of existing
small landholder communities - was one factor that helped to allay this. CELANOR
essentially designed the first communities, developing the agro-vila concept that
became standard, and orienting the first steps in the program.

There were also

indications in various localities of interaction between state officials (CDA/CAR) and
rural workers unions, church groups, and other components of civil society. Thus the
authenticity of participation at the state and local level exceeded that nationally. The
authenticity of the settler associations in themselves has been discussed at length
above.
2) Ownership. Once again, viewed at the state level, we were impressed by the degree
to which state officials involved in this program and technical advisors (both those
from NGOs and those from private groups) took ownership of this program. They
were clearly involved and concerned. Officials at the state level, such as Dr. Penedo,
Berta Veloso, and Antionio Fernandes da Silva, knew these communities personally
and were concerned with their problems. For instance, meaningful efforts were being
made - within the limited resources available - to bring in experts to study the
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compacted soil problem in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III.493

In some of the

municipios, most notably Esplanada (the location of Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista
III), the municipal governments were also interested and involved. The ownership of
the settlers themselves has been discussed - to summarize it, settlers had a strong
feeling of owning the program and their settlements, despite issues as to the role of
the associations and collective areas.
3) Adequate statement and communication of goals. It seemed to us that, by the time of
our study, state officials, technical advisors, and the associations themselves had a
good sense of the program's goals. This had admittedly grown over time - in the
beginning, as Maria Djalma remarked, nobody really knew what they were doing or
how to go about doing it 494 It also seemed that feedback from the Cedula da Terra
program - and a certain continuity of personnel - helped to improve the Credito
Fundiario program that followed it. The Cedula da Terra program nationally had, by
2002, exceeded its goal of settling 15,000 families on the land; the Credito Fundiario
program aimed at settling 50,000 families in three years (Teofilo and Prado Garcia
2003, 30).
4) Adequate time frame. Having worked for major international funding agencies, I was
impressed by the extent to which the Cedula da Terra program seemed to be
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But the following should be noted: "The State is trying to resolve issues, such as the case of purchase of
inappropriate land, but - almost always - this remains an intention. In assuming its responsibility and
seeking ways of resolving the problems, there are costs that are never passed on to the responsible people
involved in the negotiation process - especially the [former] landowners and the professionals - but to
society at large and, principally, to those most harmed, the beneficiaries who believed in a Project
legitimized by the State." (Oliveira, Olalde, and Germani 2006,4).
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Early mistakes, especially regarding the quality of land acquired, caused the State of Bahia to increase
state oversight of the program; originally the state oversight had been planned to be minimal (Oliveira,
Olalde, and Germani, 3).
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relatively free from artificial time pressures.

Funded in 1997, it was allowed to

function over a five year period - a reasonable time frame for development - with
SIC funds being disbursed even later, at an organic pace that seemed to coincide with
the various communities' capacity to absorb them. Thus as late as 2006, several of
the settlement areas still had SIC funds that had not been fully spent.495 It is unusual
to find a large program which is as willing as this to recognize the slow pace of rural
development and the necessity to allow programs to unfold in accordance with
cultural and seasonal rhythms.
5) Awareness of local social, cultural, and political complexities. One of the advantages
of decentralization of the Cedula da Terra program is that it allowed the program to
be adapted and carried out by people who more fully understood the local milieu.
Both CDA and CAR officials seemed to be strongly aware of the realities and
complexities of life in the semi-arid and north coastal regions of Bahia. Technical
advisors were all local people with a history of working with communities in these
areas. Input from community leaders was taken seriously.
6) Internal workings of aid industry and government. The relative flexibility with time
has been noted above. This reflects generally a characteristic noted by Deininger
(1998, 24) in comparing the Cedula da Terra with similar programs, that "the process
[in Brazil] is considerably more flexible and agile."
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This contrasts with what Deininger (1998, 9 n.15) says of the process in Colombia: "This failure to
proceed more swiftly with implementation of the negotiated model of land reform was not due to resource
constraints but rather institutional rigidities and resistance. In fact, resources available for market assisted
land reform were accumulated until the end of the year and then disbursed in a rushed process that bore
little relationship to the regulations of the law, using the argument that it would be better to spend the
resources imperfectly than losing them."
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At the same time, certain internal procedures, especially on the part of the World
Bank, seemed to work in favor of the program.

Audit mechanisms were almost

undoubtedly a factor in avoiding overcompensation of landowners (as had previously
occurred under government expropriation programs).

Feedback mechanism

-

especially as the World Bank was in the process of developing greater sensitivity to
beneficiary concerns and social/environmental impact of programs - helped to bring
about improvements in the subsequent Credito Fundiario program.
7) Resources - human, technical, financial. Resources in development programs are
almost never truly "enough." However, in this program, initial financial resources
seemed to be adequate to program needs. SIC funds provided a valuable means of
providing for initial infrastructure, agricultural inputs, and small productive projects.
These funds were substantially supplemented with funds from the CAR PRODUZIR
program and other sources. More concern for ongoing working capital and project
funds arises as the communities move beyond SIC and initial PRONAF-A funding.
Human and technical resources are more limited. As pointed out, the quality of
technical assistance was quite good, but a concern arises as communities pass out of
the SIC/PRONAF-A stage as to how that technical assistance will be provided. Even
in the initial stages, we have noted a number of areas where additional training and
accompaniment could be provided - where a small investment in "capacitation"496
would result in a disproportionately large benefit to the communities - for instance, in
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"Capacitagao" - the Portuguese word goes beyond the sense of training, and implies that one is truly
helping people to become capable of doing something on their own.
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the area of helping communities (either singly or, more likely, in small groups) to
conceive of and develop small facilities to partially industrialize their produce.
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8) Ongoing monitoring. During the period up until "emancipation" - i.e., the moment
when all of the SAT and SIC funds have been spent and accounted for - CDA seemed
(in all cases except Moita Redonda) to be doing a good job of monitoring ongoing
progress.

Periodic visits were made to communities by CDA (including to Nova

Lusitania, which had been informed verbally that it was "emancipated"), during
which CDA personnel dealt with questions and issues raised by the communities.
Association accounts were subject to audits. Banco do Brasil (BB) and Banco do
Nordeste do Brasil (BNB), respectively, were responsible for SIC and PRONAF
loans, and the latter made fairly regular visits to the communities.
9) Provisions for maintenance. As noted above, maintenance both of the program itself
and the land settlements it created is a concern.

Deininger (1999, 25) expresses

concern that, in Brazil, the high level of subsidy of the program (c. 70%), together
with the probability that many of the loans made will not be folly repaid, could hinder
the continuation/growth of the program. In Bahia in 2006, we began to see signs that
CDA was overburdened, and concern that it might not be able to continue to
accompany the programs to the degree that it would like to.

Additional Questions
At the beginning of this Chapter, I mentioned that case studies often suggest
further research. I come away from these case studies with a strong desire to return to the
497

I am currently discussing with my fellow researchers, Daniel Carvalho and Brenda King-Powers,
establishing a small program to provide this type of support to land settlement areas in northern Bahia.
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field and further examine many issues, not only (or even primarily) as an academic
researcher, but as a community organizer long engaged in empowerment evaluation (see
Chapter II).

Within the wealth of potential research, I would raise especially the

following:
1) What lessons can be learned from Association formation, leadership, and
participation? What are some of the best practices that have been developed
(both in the MBLR programs and elsewhere) and how might they be made
available/useful to the settlers - and to new groups engaging in programs?
2) What are the true statistics and real causes of attrition in MBLR settlements?
Is attrition due to weak associations, poor selection, and/or inadequate
orientation of candidates? Is it (as seems to be the case from our studies) a
winnowing process in the initial years that resolves itself as the communities
become established?

What steps can be taken to reduce attrition and to

ameliorate its consequences (e.g., through the smooth, well-regulated transfer
to new titleholders)?
3) How have the collective areas been handled in other settlement areas? Have
structures or mechanisms been found that make them more feasible? Or has
the division of the collectives into individually administered lots tended to
become the norm? Where the collective areas are individually administered,
have they been completely "privatized" or do sales/income still run through
the association?
4) What small-scale industrialization or other income-producing projects are
viable for these and similar communities?
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Do these work best when

administered by families, communities, or groups of communities (e.g., via
cooperatives)?

Through past experience, I have ideas of some that might

work - small scale cashew nut processing, for instance - but I would like to
expand upon and update this information.
5) With respect to the younger generation, what steps (if any) do their schools
take in preparing them for possible rural life? How can access to genuine,
participatory agricultural education be increased? How can young adults be
absorbed into communities with limited numbers of lots and/or how can
adequate new settlement areas be established for them (and does the number
of young people interested in an agriculture life warrant such an effort)?
In addition to these questions, there are a number of questions that researchers
with different qualifications could examine. Among these are best agricultural practices
for appropriate crops in the region, alternative crops that might be grown to supplement
income (ginger, peppers, etc.), alternative technologies applicable to the region and the
settlers, water usage and conservation, maximizing the viability of the environmental
reserves, best methods for soil treatment of purchased lands.
Conclusion
Years ago there was a debate in Brazil centered around Paulo Freire's work with
adult literacy training. Teaching Northeast Brazilian rural workers to read, Freire came
to the conclusion that the process of literacy training itself could be more or less
liberating, and he developed methods by which the workers truly participated in their
own learning process, becoming more fully conscienticized (a word invented by Freire)
as to the socio-economic realities which caused the poverty they experienced and
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developing the attitude that they could work together to make changes. The military
regime sent Freire into exile and his approach was essentially banned (except for a few
holdouts such as the Church's MEB program).
Freire himself was never doctrinaire, but there developed toward the end of the
dictatorship and thereafter, a feeling that only a Freire-style approach was valid in literacy
training, that more traditional or less participatory approaches were co-opting the learners
into the dominant system. The trouble was that, beyond small pilot programs, it was
difficult to train and run programs in the Freire style. Most adult literacy teachers were
poorly paid public school teachers or volunteer parishioners, and they taught the way they
had learned: by putting letters on the board and having the students copy them down,
going through the phonetics... ba, be, bi, bo, bu.

Should such training be allowed?

Portions of the Church and other "good faith" sectors of society reached the conclusion
that, whereas Freire's methods were clearly preferable, when working with adults,498
learning to read was in itself a liberating and empowering experience, and that the literate
adult could go on to grow.
In much the same way, I believe that ownership of land is, in itself, liberating and
empowering for the adult rural worker.499 This is not to say that the newly landed farmer
cannot be enmeshed in an undesirable commercial structure, overburdened with debt,
take wrong paths, give up, fail. All of those things can happen to new farmers, however
498

Brazil's rote education system, when working with children, can be very negative. The difference in
attitudes between students/graduates of participatory rural schools, such as the cooperative Family
Agricultural Schools, and the standard public schools, is notable.
499

It is interesting in this light to note Gomes de Alencar's finding (2002, 26) that the greatest value settlers
in the Ceara Cedula da Terra program cited was liberdade (liberty, freedom). Lambais (2007, 19) notes
with respect to studies of the program that "The freedom of the peasants from the economic rent imposed
by landowners enables them to use land and labor to arise from poverty even if the economic efficiency
levels are not satisfactory yet."
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they obtain their land.

They are perhaps less likely to happen to farmers who have

participated in MST, CPT, or similar programs. Like Freire, these groups may, in some
respects, have better methods of consciousness raising, but they are not reaching
everyone.
On initial analysis, in the Brazilian context, market-based programs seem capable
of getting more farmers permanently settled on the land more quickly than either
expropriation or land occupation/invasion.

As structured under the Cedula da Terra,

with SIC support and subsequent access to PRONAF credit, the programs also seem able
to give the settlers a good start toward productivity and the possibility of better
income,500 although additional technical assistance, educational opportunities, and access
to working capital seem to be needed.
As Teofilo and Prado Garcia (2003, 23) state, "Land distribution is only the first
step in the process of increasing opportunity and improving the lives of the rural poor,"
but it is a vital first step.501

Once on the land, small farmers will be better able to

constitute a political force capable of fighting for their needs - including credit, technical
assistance, and debt relief.502
Critical oversight of the programs on the part of civil society must continue. The
important questions need to be continuously asked: are these programs meeting their
500 "-pjjg performance of MBLR is overall satisfactory - the income has increased significantly with the
peasants rising from poverty, which is one of the main arguments of the MBRL - poverty alleviation"
(Lambais 2007, 25).
501

"Property rights are just one constraint on agricultural productivity. The state must ensure through its
policies that the squatters have access to other markets, including credit, products, inputs and technology
markets." (Teofilo and Prado Garcia, 23)
502

This process had begun in the communities we studied. Settlers in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III
participated in an occupation of INCRA offices in order to get SIC funding released; they also were
negotiating with the state and municipality regarding the soil problem. Associations in several of the
settlements had or were in the process of negotiation extensions of loan repayments.
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own criteria? are the community organizations representing beneficiary and small farm
interests?

are local elites attempting to co-opt the process?

is the government

manipulating the World Bank and/or the programs for its own political goals vis-a-vis
MST? Monitoring and accompaniment can help rural communities critique neo-liberal
values that periodically are in vogue at the Bank.
Critics rightly point out that MBLR cannot carry out a truly redistributive land
reform "in the same way that the state can" (Borras Jr., 390).

But forty-six years of the

Estatuto da Terra have demonstrated that there is little likelihood that the Brazilian
government is going to carry out a major redistributive land reform through expropriation
- indeed, given constitutional, legislative, and judicial barriers, it would be almost
impossible for the President of Brazil to do so even if he wished to. To reject MBLR as a
tool on the basis that it will not bring about truly redistributive change is to make the
perfect the enemy of the good.
In my opinion, it is vital for groups such as CPT and MST to engage MBLR
programs and use them to the full extent possible for the benefit of Brazilian landless
workers. To do otherwise is to throw away a valuable tool for carrying out agrarian
reform in Brazil.
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Interviews
Almeida, Sergio Ricardo Matos, March 27, 2006; telephone interview March 10, 2006.
Technical advisor for Boa Vista - Biritinga, also assists at Passos de Esperanga.
Andrade de Abreu, Maria Djalma, March 15, 17, 20, and 21, 2006. Technical advisor for
Vila Canaa, Fazenda Veneza, and other MBLR settlements.
Arcanjo, Miguel, April 27, 2006. Founder of CELANOR and leader of Rio Real
communities that gave rise to first Cedula da Terra projects.
Brito Batista, Edna, March 27, 2006. Technical advisor for Passos de Espran9a.
CAR - interview with technial advisor Marcos, March 17, 2006 in Euclides da Cunha.
He supports work in Vila Canaa and Fazenda Veneza.
CDA - interview with agronomist, Dr. Penedo, April 26, 2006 in Salvador. He is familiar
with all the settlements we visited, and is particularly knowledgeable with respect
to the sub-soil issue in Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III.
CELANOR - interview with director Rafael, April 27, 2006. Interviews with technican
Eduardo Carlos - in field at Nova Lusitania April 5, and at office April 27, 2006.
Frei Chico, April 5, 2006. Franciscan friar actively supporting land reform movement in
the Esplanada area (Nova Lusitania and Boa Vista III).
Reys, Benone March 29, 2006. Church activist and former mayor of Inhambupe, aware
of the political situation of Moita Redonda.
Rocha Reis, Jose Eduardo, March 29, 30, and 31, 2006. Technical advisor for Moita
Redonda.
Silva, Antonio Fernando, January 31 and April 26, 2006. CDA agronomist who has
accompanied all of the settlements that we visited.
Sussuarana, Marcos, August 18, 2001. A sociologist who founded CPPTCunia - an
NGO working with rural populations in Rondonia. He proposed a master's thesis
based on his observations that land reform areas in Rondonia resulting from MST
occupations are better located, and therefore more potentially sustainable, than
those resulting from government oriented expropriations.
Veloso dos Passos, Berta, January 31 and April 26, 2006, plus prior phone contact. CDA
agronomist who worked with Cedula da Terra since its inception.

505

List of Interviewees from Settlements
The following list names, nicknames, and ages of interviewees. Numbering is tracked to
the interview form of each set of interviewees.
Case Study 1: Nova Lusitania (April 5-6, 2006)
1)
2)
3)
4)

Edivaldo Rodrigues (36)
Elenice Rodrigues dos Santos (30)
Antonio Nascimento dos Santos (55)
Ivanete Maria de Jesus (37)
Almir Rodrigues (17) - son
Renasey Santos Rodrigues (18) - son - (socio trabalhador)
5) Vagner A. de Jesus (21)
6) Cosme Aurelio Silva (70)
Filomena Honora de Jesus (61) - spouse
7) Antonia Ferreira dos Santos (55)
8) Jocimaria Alves dos Santos Paixao (33)
9) Maria Lucia da Paixao (48)
Jose Viana da Paixao (48) - spouse
10) Jose Martins da Cruz (43)
Rosenilda Araujo Oliveira da Cruz (34)
11) Petronilio Dias de Oliveira (59)
12) Wilson Bastos Guirmaraes (36)
13) Judite de Concei<?ao Lago Ferreira (54)
14) Eliezer Martins da Cruz (59)
Isabel Martins (57) - spouse
15) Anselmo Nunes Rodrigues (25) - (socio trabalhador)
Zelia Nogueira Luz (16) - spouse

Case Study 2: Boa Vista III (April 28-30, 2006)
1) Edmundo (Mico Preto) (59)
Ma Lourdes (44) - spouse
Branca (20) - daughter
2) Jose Renato de Aquinos (Ze de Roque) (59)
Delmina (56) - spouse
3) lane Pinto Menezes (34)
4) Waldemar Correia de Jesus (55)
Alice Prima Aguiar (55) - spouse
5) Antonio Souza (Antonio Gago) (39)
Luciana Jesus de Souza (31) - spouse
6) Jose Perreira de Anunciacao (Del) (44))
Ana Ma Souza Santos (Ana) (43) - spouse
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7) Renato Edison da Costa (49)
8) Jose Primo dos Santos Irmao (Adilson) (46)
Maria Lucia Cruz Santos (44) - spouse
9) Anatalia Santos Souza (Natalia) (44)
10) Roque Mendes de Jesus (Dede) (47)
Maria de Concei9&o Santos de Oliveira (Concei9ao) (44) - spouse
11) Manuel Ferreira da Costa (Ze Sande) (44)
Elneide Roza Rebeiro da Costa (Neide) (43) - spouse
12) Fausto Rodrigues da Souza (43)
13) Jose Pereira Filho (Galego) (42)
14) Nilton Cesar dos Santos (35)
15) Luiz Carlos da Silva (Presidente da Associacao) (30)
16) Adilson Souza de Almeida (Gamelas) (31)
Marzia Nascimento dos Santos (24) - spouse
17) Jose dos Santos Reis (Ze Reis) (47)
18) Joao Bosco de Souza (Bosco) (47)
Maria Souza Santos (Santinha) (34) - spouse
19) Jose Isidoro de Santana (Isidoro) (49)
Josefa Alves de Goise (Meninha) (46) - spouse
Carla (20) - daughter

Case Study 3: Vila Canaa (March 16 & 19, 2006)
1) Jose Hilton Araujo Santana (Galego) (47)
2) Jose Domingo Santos Reis (46)
Marilene Gois Reis (42) - spouse
Gedione Gois Reis (16) - son
3) Adilson de Silva Souza (42)
Veraluce Santana Souza (40) -spouse
Renato (16) - son
4) Antonio Andrade Silva (46)
5) Ernesto Riveiro da Silva (Milho Assado) (48)
6) Antonio Costa Santana (Tonio) (35)
7) Gerson Felix de Jesus (52)
8) Cecilio Lopes Dantas (55)
9) Carlos Joao dos Santos (32)
Aliene Macedo dos Santos (34) - spouse
10) Jose Rodrigues de Gois (Ze de Messias) (42)
11) Decio Jose dos Santos (56)
12) Antonio Andre de Oliveia (Toninho) (56)
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13) Jose Anesio da Silva (Zequinho) (68)
Josefa Anajoaquim da Silva (55) - spouse
14) Josevanda Pereira dos Santos (Jo) (37)
15) Sonia Aleixo da Silva Santos (38)
16) Marineide Macedo da Silva Jesus (39)
17) Adelia Souza Santos (35)
Joice Souza Santos (15) - daughter
18) Isacale Daniel da Costa (Sossego) (30s - unspecified)
Catya Macedo da Costa (33) - spouse
Jaqueline (15) - daughter
19) Jose Moraes de Souza (Ze Nelson) (56)
Ana Francisca de Nascimento Souza (48) - spouse
20) Jose Gois da Silva (Ze Bebenuto) (48)
Nilza Santos Reis da Silva (42) - spouse
21) Antonio Santos Reis (Boca Crente) (60)
Teresa Rodrigues Reis (Tete) (58) - spouse
22) Jose Nilson Araujo da Silva (Ze Nilson) (33)
Ivaneide Jesus Santana (26) - spouse
23) Maria Josefa de Jesus (Preta) (38)
24) Valdinho Jesus dos Santos (Caboquinho) (32)
25) Osvaldo Santos dos Reis (Dada) (49)
26) Ari Souza (Nenzao) (49)
Eilane (15) - daughter (interviewed at the home of her uncle, Adilson)
27) Manoel Costa Santana (Nego Velho) (47)

Case Study 4: Moita Redonda (March 28-31, 2006)
1) Maria Angelina de Concegao (Maria de Gilo) (51)
Augusto Alves de Souza (Dudu) (54) - spouse
2) Marcos Roberto Santis Silva (28)
Maria Jose Ferreira dos Santos (28) - spouse
3) Benival Pereira de Santos (52)
Maria Wilma Martins dos Reis (33) - spouse
4) Raimundo Jesus Rodrigues (39)
Gedilsa Ribeira Nascimento Rodrigues (31)- spouse
5) Jose'Walmir Martins Reis (Walmir) (36)
Irelice Souza de Franca (29) - spouse
6) Jose Batista de Souza (29)
Anuncieta de Espirito Santo Souza (28) - spouse
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7) Jose Ribeiro dos Santos (63)
Dominga Alves de Silva (52) - spouse
Edivania da Silva (26) - daughter
8) Pedro Xavier dos Dantos (59)
9) Hilda Silva dos Santos (Miudinha) (39)
Jose Vincente Irmao (Ze de Beti) (62) - spouse
10) Tarcila Pereira Andrade Oliveira (Daci) (44)
11) Jose Correia dos Santos Irmao (Coho) (46)
Josefa Correia dos Santos (45) - spouse
12) Edivaldo Rodrigues dos Santos (Dadinho) (49)
13) Cecilia Souza dos Santos (43)
14) Walter de Souza (26)
15) Irandi Serra Santos (38)
Jose da Conceiijao (39) - spouse
Evailton (18) - son
16) Lindoval de Concei^o (46)
17) Antonio Pereira Lima (Liazinho) (65)
18) Antonio Alves Santos (59)
19) Aldemir de Goes Santos (Pipio) (32)
20) Renivaldo Dias dos Santos (Reninho) (34)
21) Israel Xavier dos Santos (Real) (52)
22) Joseneide Rodrigues dos Santos (Neide) (42)
23) Maria Olga Santana Reis (Olga) (59}
24) Lucineia Lima de Souza Santana (Neia) (20)
Case Study 5: Passos da Esperanca (March 27-28, 2006)
1) Valdina de Oliveira (41)
2) Josefina Santos Cavalho (44)
3) Donice Reis (37)
Adeladio Cardoso Souza (Bolero) - 46) - spouse
4) Denicio Antonio dos Santos (Barrudo) (33)
Gilvaneide Concei^ao dos Santos (Neide) (31) 5) Josefa Almeida da Silva (51)
Jose Bispo de Jesus (59)
6) Joao Ferreira Firmo (46)
Angelita Pereira de Souza (41) - spouse
7) Americo Anatole dos Santos (Anatole) (55)
Martinha Reis de Jesus (54) - spouse
8) Jose Nascimento dos Santos (28)
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Marivalda Reis Silva (21) - spouse
9) Edilson Emilio Ferreira (32)
Joselita Conceigao Santos Ferreira (28) - spouse
Desiane (13) - daughter
10) Railda Dantas Oliveira (40)
Eduardo Alves da Silva (42) - spouse
11) Jierson Secundino dos Reis (30)
Eurides Maria de Jesus Santos (26) - spouse
12) Josenito Oliveira Santana (59)
Maria Ilza dos Santos Santana (Ilza) (57) - spouse
13) Jose Figueira Almeida (Uga) (46)
Josefa Luziana dos Santos (29) - spouse
14) Mauricio Batista de Santana (32)
15) Domingo Vieira dos Santos (Bob Sponja) (62)
16) Gabriel Lopes dos Santos (Bie) (48)
Miriam Silva Santos (Mira) (42) - spouse
Lauravania Lopes Santos (21) - daughter
17) Antonio Luiz Ramos (Tonho de Valdete) (31)
18) Jose Fernandes Moreira da Silva (Fernando) (37)
19) Jose Pereira de Jesus (Ze da Gracia) (51)

Case Study 6: Boa Vista (Biritinga) (April 18-20, 2006)
1) Josenilda de Gois Bento (Josi) (33)
Jurandi Ferreiro Nilo (55) - spouse
2) Jacira Assis de Jesus (43)
3) Juraci Ferreira Lima (Jura) (56)
Josefa Silveira de Jesus Lima (Zefina) (38)
4) Manoel de Silva Santos (Leso) (38)
Luciene de Almeida (27) - spouse
5) Janilda da Silva (Jane) (25)
6) Joao Rocha (65)
Maria Delunda Guimaraes Oliveira (Del) (40) - spouse
Jailson (16) - son
7) Maria Elena de Souza (Dede) (50)
8) Antonio Sales da Silva (46)
Maria das Gramas Silva e Silva (Gracinha) (44) - spouse
9) Jose Osmari Motta de Carvalho (Nininho) (41)
Aliene Moraes dos Santos (35) - spouse
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10) Julia Jesus Ramos (34)
Jose Carlos de Jesus (Cabeludo) (33) - spouse
11) Jose Rubens Mata de Carvalho (35)
Juviane Maria Silva Carvalho (19) - spouse
12) Lourival Ferreira Lima (Lolo) (58)
13) Jose Firmino dos Santos (Firmino) (63)
14) Evandro Martins de Lima (Arroz) (35)
Vanusa da Silva (Cigana) (29) - spouse
15) Eugenia Rodrigues de Souza (Jenice) (53)
16) Jose Marivaldo Lima Pinheiro (Marivaldo) (48)
17) Sebastiao Binas Santos (Bastiao) (46)
18) Isidora Maria de Jesus (Dorinha) (62)
19) Jair Barbino Pereira de Santana (29)
Vanusia Jesus dos Santos (Nusia) (21) - spouse
20) Paulo Carmo Lima (43)
Maria Jose Capistrano Lima (Zefinha) (37) - spouse
21) Miguel Ferreira Santiago (49)

Case Study 7: Fazenda Veneza (March 18 & 20, 2006)
1) Jose dos Santos (Del?o) (34)
2) Raimundo Ferreira Silva Moraes (35)
Ivone Ferreira dos Santos (47) - spouse
3) Edeon Ferreira de Melo (35)
4) Walter Dantes de Oliveira (59)
5) Claudio Dantes de Carvalho (38)
6) Francisco Ferreira Dias (37)
Rosenilde Jesus Silva (37) - spouse
7) Ines Ferreira da Souza (29)
8) Jose Carlos Correia de Souza (28)
9) Renan Gonialves Teixeira (61)
Francisca Vasco da Silva (Chica) (51) - spouse
10) Duvalina Rodriques de Souza (Duva) (51)
Douglas Souza (Boca) (18) - son
11) Jose Tancredo Melo (Ze de Chico) (60)
Marcio Souza Melo (32) - son
12) Adenor Bittencourt da Silva (60)
Raimunda Santos da Silva (39) - spouse
13) Telso Costa Santos (64)
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14) Rogerio Xavier (34)
Menicia Cardoso e Silva Xavier (30) - spouse
15) Erico Dantas de Souza (28)
Dominga Gama (28) - spouse
16) Raimundo Aleixo dos Santos (Raimundinho) (31)
Monalisa Cardoso e Silva (31)- spouse
17) Mancileide Souza Melo (24)
18) Ireneide Aleixo de Moraes (37)
Joao de Deus de Carvalho (Jojao) (70)
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APPENDIX A
WRITTEN CONSENT FORM
The following is the form as actually used in the field. This was adapted for the sake of clarity
with the input of local native speakers. The English translation follows.
The consent form was read by (or to, where reading skills were limited) and explained to all
interviewees in the settlement areas. All interviewees waived confidentiality.

Formulario de Consentimento
Estudo de Cedula da Terra
Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo uma avaliagao do programa Cedula da Terra. A pesquisa esta sendo realizada por
Arthur George Powers em preparagao da sua tese doutoral na Universidade de New Hampshire, E.U.A.
A participagao de entrevistados e voluntaria. O entrevistado pode, a qualquer momento, recusar de responder a
qualquer pergunta ou pode parar a entrevista. A entrevista deve durar mais ou menos uma hora.
As informagoes compartilhadas na entrevista sao confidenciais no sentido que o entrevistado (menos que ele/ela
concorde ao contrario) nao sera citado o nome, em qualquer maneira que deixara que ele/ela possa ser identificado
como a fonte da informagao. O risco que esta confidencialidade pode ser violado e muito pouco.
A finalidade desta pesquisa sera uma avaliagao que beneficiara trabalhadores rurais e outros que apoiam reforma
agraria, como tambem agendas de desenvolvimento, possibilitando um melhor entendimento dos pontos fortes e
fracos deste modelo de reforma agraria, e providenciar informagoes que possam melhorar a situagao de pessoas
participantes deste programa e de outros programas semalhantes.
O responsavel para a pesquisa e Arthur George Powers: (Oxx 21 9615 0330 ou arthur_g_powers@yahoo.com)
Se voce tiver perguntas sobre os seus direitos referente a esta pesquisa, entre em contato com Julie Simpson no
Secretariado de Pesquisas da Universidade de New Hampshire: julie.simpson@unh.edu
Anota qualquer renuncia de confidencialidade e suas condigoes:

Assinatura do entrevistado
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Appendix A: English Translation
Consent Form
Cedula da Terra Study
This study has as its objective an evaluation of the Cedula da Terra program. The study is being
carried out by Arthur George Powers in preparation for his doctoral dissertation at the University
of New Hampshire, U.S.A.
Participation by interviewees is voluntary. The interviewee may, at any time, refuse to respond
to any question or stop the interview. The interview lasts more or less one hour.
Information shared in the interview is confidential in the sense that the interviewee (unless s/he
agrees to the contrary) will not be cited by name, in any manner that will allow him/her to be
identified as the source of information. The risk that this confidentiality can be violated is very
small.
The purpose of this study is an evaluation that will benefit rural workers and others who support
agrarian reform, as well as development agencies, making possible the better understanding of
the strong and weak points of this model of agrarian reform, and to provide information that can
better the situation of people participating in this program and other similar programs.
The person responsible for this study is Arthur George Powers (Oxx 21 9615 0330 or
arthur_g_powers@yahoo. com)
If you have questions regarding your rights in reference to this study, enter in contact with Julie
Simpson at the Secretariat of Studies of the University of New Hampshire:
julie.simpson@unh.edu
Note down any waiver of confidentiality and the conditions [of the waiver]:

Signature of the interviewee
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APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW FORMS

PORTUGUESE AND ENGLISH

For each household interviewed, a family information form (cadastro) was filled in. For each
interviewee, an interview form was available (though in practice, for logistical reasons,
interviewers often noted the responses of family members on the same form, indicating which
family member the response came from). In some cases, family members were interviewed
jointly, in others separately. Family member interviews were then brought together with the
cadastro and randomly assigned a number for records purposes.
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PROJETO DE ESTUDO
"CEDULA DA TERRA"

FICHA DE CADASTRO FAMILIAR
No.

1

LOCALIZACAO
Comunidade:

Municipio:

2

IDENTIFICACAO

Nome:
Estado civil:

Apelido:
Nascimento (data):

Zona rural ou urbana:

Cidade e estado:

Continua estudando? ()sim ( ) nao

Grau de instrugao:
Companheira:

Estado civil:

Apelido:
Nascimento:

Zona rural ou urbana:

Cidade e estado:
Grau de instrugao:

Continua estudando? ()sim ( ) nao

Dependentes:

Nome

Idade

Estuda
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Qual Serie

Parentesco

3

CAP ACID APE PRODUTIVA

A terra tern quantas hectares (ou tarefas)?

Planta? Oque?

Percentagem?

Quais fruteiras tem (tipo e numero)?
Criatorios:

Cria? 0 que?

4

Quantos?

RENPA

Trabalha em que?

Renda anual:

Tem aposentados(as) em casa?

Quantos?

Tem assalariados em casa?

Quantos?

•
Os assalariados trabalham em que?
Tem alguem que ganha como diarista ou biscateiro?

Quantos?

•
Ele(s) trabalha(m) em que?
Tem renda que vem atraves de produ^ao artesanal?
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5

CONDICOES DE INFRA-ESTRUTURA

Tipo de constru^ao da casa

Abastecimento

Tratamento da agua

Tijolo/Alvenaria

Barreiro

Filtrada

Adobe

Pofo/Nascente

Fervida

Taipa revestida

Carro pipa publico

Coada

Taipa nao revestida

Carro pipa privado

Semente de lirio branco

Madeira

Cisternas

Clora^ao

Material aproveitado

Rede publica

Corta (usa sal, cimento)

Outros

Outros

Outros

Escoamento Sanitario

Destino do lixo

Saude

Ceu aberto

Ceu aberto

Atendimento medico

Rede publica

Coletado

Saneamento

Fossa

Queimado

Posto de saude

Fossa septica

Enterrado

Agua encanada

Vala

Outro

Tern reservatorio de agua? ()sim ()nao

Quantos?

Qual a distancia para busacar agua?

Quern vai buscar?

Onde pega a agua? ( ) barreiro

( ) a^ude

Qual a qualidade da agua? ( ) salobra

()+magnesio

Outros:

( ) boa qualidade

Existe lavandaria comunitaria?

Tipo?

()barrenta

()limo

outros:

Onde:

Origem da agua:

Quais as principals doen^as que afetam sua familia?
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()poluida-dejetos

Pesquisa referente a "reforma agraria a base do mercado"
Arthur George Powers, disserta^ao de Ph.D. - Universidade de New Hamphsire
Para moradores nos assentamentos
Data:
Nome do entrevistado:
Apelido:
Outras pessoas presentes:
Confidencialidade:
•
•
•

Completa (a informa^ao nao sera atribuida ao entrevistado)
Parcial (indique os itens confidenciais)
Desnecessaria

Aplique flcha de cadastro familiar
1) Quero saber de voce:
a) famiiia de origem/regiao:
b) que fez antes da reforma agraria:
2) Como foi que chegou a morar aqui?

3) Me conta como foi que voce adquiriu esta terra.

4) Quem teve a ideia de comprar esta terra?

5) Voce ou alguem de sua famiiia [quem?] participou na decisao de comprar esta terra?

6) Quem foram os lideres na compra da terra? [Eles residem no assentamento? Que e que voce pensa
deles?]

7) A quem pertencia a terra? Fale sobre ele:

8) Voce ou alguem da sua famiiia participou nas negocia9oes da compra da terra? [Em que maneira?
Voce acha que sua participagao foi importante?]
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9) Voces tiveram assistencia tecnica na compra da terra? De quem? Como foi?

10) Atualmente, voce participa nas atividades/funcionamento do assentamento? De que maneira? Que e
que voce acha de sua participa^ao atual?

11) Quando voce precisa de conselho (orientagoes), voce procura quem - referente aos assuntos de
a)
b)
c)
d)

Terra?
Lavoura?
Finances?
Famiiia?

12) Quem sao os lideres atuais do assentamento?

13) Sao grandes diferen9as de opinao entre moradores do assentamento? Sobre que? Como e que estas
diferen9as sao tratadas?

14) Fale sobre a associa9ao. [Como foi que come90u? Quem foi que comegou? A associa9ao representa
bem os interesses de sua famiiia? Das outras familias?]

15) Voce participou na organiza9ao da associa9ao? Como foi sua participacao?

16) Voce particpa atualmente na associa9ao? (Se nao, porque?) Como e sua particpa9ao?

17) Se voce pudesse conseguir credito sem a associa9ao, ainda continuiaria de se manter associado?

18) Em quais programas de credito sua famiiia tem participado?

19) Se voce pudesse conseguir outro lote de terra nesta regiao, igual ou melhor do que a sua, voce sairia
do assentamento?

20) Se voce pudesse vender sua terra, venderia?
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21) Como e que voce sente sobre a vida que voce e sua familia tem aqui no assentamento?

22) Quais sao as coisas que voce gosta aqui?

23) Quais sao as coisas que nao gosta?

24) Que precisa para que a sua vida (e de sua familia) seja melhor?

25) Como sao as escolas? (acesso, nivel, qualidade)

26) Como e o servi^o de saude? (acesso, disponibilidade de medicos, qualidade)

27) Quando voce mudou para o assentamento, sua vida:
a) Ficou melhor?
b) Ficou pior?
c) Ficou mais ou menos no mesmo nivel?
28) Daqui a dois anos, a vida no assentamento sera melhor ou pior? E em dez anos? Porque?

29) Quais sao suas esperansas para o seu fiituro e de sua familia? Em 10 anos? Em 20?

30) Fale sobre a sua terra e lavoura:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

A terra e fertil?
Como e o preparo do solo para a plantagao?
Voce usa adubo - que tipo?
Voce usa pesticides - que tipo?
Que tipos de pragas tem na lavora?
Voce pratica rotaijao das lavoras?
De quanto em quanto tempo?
Que tipo de assistencia tecnica voce recebe?
Voce vende uma parte da sua produsao? Qual percentagem?
Onde vende?
preco?

31) A renda da familia e suficiente para suas necessidades? Explique.
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Qual

32) Quais sao os pagamentos que voces tem que fazer para a terra? Voce se preocupa com eles?

33) Quais sao as coisas que mais preocupa?

34) Os assentados aqui sao unidos ou divididos? Porque?

35) Que e que une mais as pessoas no assentamento? Que e que mais os divide?

36) No seu ver, quem e que apoia (esta a favor do) o trabalhador rural?

37) No seu ver, quem e que esta contra (dificulta a vida do) o trabalhador rural?

38) Que e que voce pensa do Movimento Sem Terra (MST)?

39) Voce votou na ultima elei<?ao para presidente? (Em quem? - primeiro e segundo turno)

40) E na eleitpao deste ano, voce pensa de votar em quem?

41) Voce tem um partido politico de preferencia? (Qual?)

42) Voce votou nas elei9oes para prefeito?

43) Voce ajudou algum candidato?
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44) Voce participa nas seguintes organiza^oes:
Organiza9oes

Muito

Mais ou
menos

Pouco

Nao

Qual Fun9ao?

Associa9ao do assentamento
Cooperativa
Partido politico
Grupo de mulheres
Sindicato
Igreja ou grupo religioso
Grupo de esporte
Grupo de jovens
Associa9ao de paes e mestres
Outros

Observa9oes da equipe:
•

Condi9oes da casa e limpeza, presen9a de outras consft^oes no lote, disponibilidade de agua,
disponabilidade de comida

•

Animais, lavora, padroes de produao, infraestrutura produtiva

•

Intera9ao entre vizinhos, sinais de conflito, sinais de divergencia de renda/riqueza dentro do
assentamento
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Appendix B - English Translation
Information Form

Study Project
Cedula da Terra
Family Information Form
No.

1. Locality
Community:

Municipality:
2. Identification
Name:
Nickname:
Birth date:
City & State:
Schooling:

Marital state:

Rural or urban?
Still studying? ( ) yes ( ) no

Spouse:
Name:
Nickname:
Birth date:
City & State:
Schooling:
Name

Marital state:

Rural or urban? .
Still studying? ( ) yes ( ) no
Age

Studies
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What grade?

Relationship

3. Productive Capacity
How many hectares (or tarefas) does your land have?
What do you plant?

Percentage?

What fruit trees do you have (type & number)?
Livestock:
What do you raise?

How many

4. Income
What do you work at?
Are there pensioners in the family?
Are there salaried people in the family?
•

Annual income:
How many?
How many?

The salaried workers do what?

Does anyone earn as a day laborer or freelance worker? How many?
•

They work at what?

Is there any income from artisan work?
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5. Infrastructure Conditions
Type of house construction
brick

Water supply

Water treatment

_ reservoir

_ filter

_ adobe

well/spring

_ boiled

_ taipa with plaster

public water truck

_ passed through a cloth

_ unplastered taipa

private water truck _ white lily seed

wood
_ found materials

rain cachements

_ chloration

public water

_ cut with salt, cement

others

other

others

Human waste

Garbage

Health

_ Open sky

_ open sky

_ medical attendant

_ public sewage

_ collected

_ sanitation

_ privy

-_ burned

_ septic hole

_ buried

ditch

health post
_ piped water

Other

Do you have a water reservatory? ()yes ()no How big? Type?
What is the distance to go for water?
Where do you get water? () dam

Who fetches it?
() reservoir

Other:

What is the quality of water? () salty ()magnesium ()clay ()lime ()polluted
() good quality
Is there a community laundry area?

()other
Where:

What are the principal sicknesses that affect your family?
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Source of water:

Appendix B
Questionnaire

Study of "market-based land reform"
Arthur George Powers, Ph.D. dissertation - University of New Hampshire
For dwellers in settlement areas
Date:
Name of interviewee:
Nickname:
Other persons present:
Confidentiality:
-

Complete (the information will not be attributed to the interviewee)
Partial (indicate the confidential items)
Unnecessary

Fill in the Family Information Form
1) I would like to know from you:
a) Family and region of origin:
b) What you did prior to agrarian reform:
2) How did you come to live here?
3) Tell me how it was that you acquired this land.
4) Who had the idea of buying this land?
5) Did you or anyone in your family (who?) participate in the decision to buy this land?
6) Who were the leaders in the land purchase? (Do they still reside in the settlement? What do
you think of them?)
7) To whom did the land belong? Talk about him:
8) Did you or anyone in your family participate in the negotiations to buy the land? {In what
way?) Do you think that your participation was important?)
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9) Did you have technical assistance in purchasing the land? From whom? How was it?
10) Presently, do you participate in settlement activities/functioning? In what way? What do
you think about your present participation?
11) When you need advice (orientation), whom to you seek out in terms of the following matters:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Land?
Crops?
Finances?
Family matters?

12) Who are the present leaders of the settlement?
13) Are there big differences of opinion among the settlement dwellers? About what? Who are
these differences dealt with?
14) Talk about the association. (How did it begin? Who started it?
represent well the interests of your family? Of other families?)

Does the association

15) Did you participate in the organization of the association? How was your participation?
16) Do you presently participate in the association? (If not, why not?) How is your participation?
17) If you could obtain credit without the association, would you continue to be a member?
18) In which credit programs does your family participate?
19) If you could obtain another lot [of land] in this region, equal or better than yours, would you
leave the settlement?
20) If you could sell your lot, would you do so?
21) How do you feel about the life you and your family have here in the settlement?
22) What are the things you like here?
23) What are the things you don't like?
24) What is needed for your life (and that of your family) to be better?
25) How are the schools? (access, level, quality)
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26) How is the health service? (access, availability of doctors, quality)
27) When you moved to the settlement, your life:
a) Got better?
b) Got worse?
c) Stayed more or less at the same level?
28) In two years, will life in the settlement be better or worse? In ten years? Why?
29) What are your hopes for your future and that of your family? In 10 years? In 20?
30) Talk about your land and crops:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

Is the land fertile?
How do you prepare the soil for planting?
Do you use fertilizer - what type?
Do you use pesticides - what type?
What type of pests do you have in the crops?
Do you practice crop rotation? How often?
What type of technical assistance do you receive?
Do you sell a part of what you grow? What percent? Where do you sell it? At what
price?

31) Is your family income sufficient for your needs? Explain.
32) What are the payments you need to make for the land? Do you worry about them?
33) What are the things that most worry you?
34) Are the settlers here united or divided? Why?
35) What is it that most unites people in the settlement? What most divides them?
36) In your opinion, who supports (is in favor of) the rural worker?
37) In your opinion, who is against (makes life difficult for) the rural worker?
38) What do you think of the Movimento Sem Terra (MST)?
39) Did you vote in the last election for president? (For whom - first & second balloting)
40) And in the election this year, you are thinking of voting for whom?
41) Do you have a political party that you prefer? (Which?)
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42) Did you vote in the elections for the municipal prefect?
43) Did you help any candidate?
44) Do you participate in the following organizations?
Oranizations
Settlement Association
Cooperative
Political party
Women's group
Union
Church or religious group
Sporting group
Youth group
Parent-teachers assoc.
Others

A lot

More or less

A little

No

What role?

Team observations:
Condition and cleanliness of home, presence of other buildings on lot, availability of
water, availability of food
Animals, crops, production patterns, productive infrastructure
Interaction with neighbors, signs of conflict, signs of gaps of income/wealth within the
settlement

530

APPENDIX C

IRB LETTER

531

U n [ V E R S f T Y

of

N e w

H a m p s h i r e

May 24, 2005
Arthur Powers
Natural Resources
James Hall
Durham, NH 03824
IRB # :
3279
Study:
Market-Based Land Reform in Brazil
Approval Date: 05/23/2005
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB)
has reviewed and approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Title
45, Code of Federal Regulations-(CFR), Part 46, Subsection 101(b). Approval is granted
to conduct your study as described in your protocol.
Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as
outlined in the attached document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies
Involving Human Subjects.
(This
document
is also available at
http://www.unh.edu/osr/compliance/IRB.html.) Please read this document carefully
before commencing your work involving human subjects.
Upon completion of your study, please complete the enclosed pink Exempt Study Final
Report form and return it to this office along with a report of your findings.
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to
contact me at 603-862-2003 or Julie.simpson@unh.edu. Please refer to the IRB #
above in ail correspondence related to this study. The IRB wishes you success with your
research.

cc:

File
Mimi Larsen Becker

Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research, Service
Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564

